Are you an honest scientist? Truthfulness in science should be an iron law, not a vague aspiration
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; Volume 73: 633-635
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Summary
Anyone who has been a scientist for more than a couple of decades will realize that there has been a progressive and pervasive decline in the honesty of scientific communications. Yet real science simply must be an arena where truth is the rule; or else the activity simply stops being science and becomes something else: Zombie science. Although all humans ought to be truthful at all times; science is the one area of social functioning in which truth is the primary value, and truthfulness the core evaluation. Truth-telling and truth-seeking should not, therefore, be regarded as unattainable aspirations for scientists, but as iron laws, continually and universally operative. Yet such is the endemic state of corruption that an insistence on truthfulness in science seems perverse, aggressive, dangerous, or simply utopian. Not so: truthfulness in science is not utopian and was indeed taken for granted (albeit subject to normal human imperfections) just a few decades ago. Furthermore, as Jacob Bronowski argued, humans cannot be honest only in important matters while being expedient in minor matters: truth is all of a piece. There are always so many incentives to lie that truthfulness is either a habit or else it declines. This means that in order to be truthful in the face of opposition, scientists need to find a philosophical basis which will sustain a life of habitual truth and support them through the pressure to be expedient (or agreeable) rather than honest. The best hope of saving science from a progressive descent into Zombiedom seems to be a moral Great Awakening: an ethical revolution focused on re-establishing the primary purpose of science: which is the pursuit of truth. Such an Awakening would necessarily begin with individual commitment, but to have any impact it would need to progress rapidly to institutional forms. The most realistic prospect is that some sub-specialties of science might self-identify as being engaged primarily in the pursuit of truth, might form invisible colleges, and (supported by strong ethical systems to which their participants subscribe) impose on their members a stricter and more honest standard of behaviour. From such seeds of truth, real science might again re-grow. However, at present, I can detect no sign of any such thing as a principled adherence to perfect truthfulness among our complacent, arrogant and ever-more-powerful scientific leadership – and that is the group of which a Great Awakening would need to take-hold even if the movement were originated elsewhere.
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The decline of honesty in science
Anyone who has been a scientist for more than 20 years will realize that there has been a progressive decline in the honesty of communications between scientists, between scientists and their institutions, and between scientists and their institutions and the outside world.
Yet real science must be an arena where truth is the rule; or else the activity simply stops being science and becomes something else: Zombie science. Zombie science is a science that is dead, but is artificially kept moving by a continual infusion of funding. From a distance Zombie science looks like the real thing, the surface features of a science are in place – white coats, laboratories, computer programming, Ph.D’s, papers, conferences, prizes, etc. But the Zombie is not interested in the pursuit of truth – its actions are externally-controlled and directed at non-scientific goals, and inside the Zombie everything is rotten.
The most egregious domain of untruthfulness is probably where scientists comment or write about their own work. Indeed, so pervasive are the petty misrepresentations and cautious lies, that it is likely that many scientists are now dishonest even with themselves, in the privacy of their own thoughts. Such things can happen to initially honest people either by force of habit, or because they know no better; and because lies breed lies in order to explain the discrepancies between predictions and observations.
Lying to oneself may be one cause of the remarkable incoherence of so much modern scientific thinking. It is much easier to be coherent, and to recognize incoherence, when discourse is uncontaminated by deliberate misrepresentations. There is less to cover-up. Most scientists can think-straight only by being completely honest. If scientists are not honest even with themselves, then their work will be a mess.
Scientists are usually too careful and clever to risk telling outright lies, but instead they push the envelope of exaggeration, selectivity and distortion as far as possible. And tolerance for this kind of untruthfulness has greatly increased over recent years. So it is now routine for scientists deliberately to ‘hype’ the significance of their status and performance, and ‘spin’ the importance of their research.
Furthermore, it is entirely normal and unremarkable for scientists to spend their entire professional life doing work they know in their hearts to be trivial or bogus – preferring that which promotes their career over that which has the best chance of advancing science. Indeed, such misapplication of effort is positively encouraged in many places, including some of what were the very best places, because careerism is a more reliable route to high productivity than real science – and because senior scientists in the best places are expert at hyping mundane research to create a misleading impression of revolutionary importance.
What is going on? How have matters reached this state? Everyone should be honest at all times and about everything, but especially scientists. Everyone should seriously aim for truthfulness – yet scientists, of all people, must not just aim but actually be truthful: otherwise the very raison d’etre of science is subverted.
So although truthfulness is a basic, universal moral rule; science is the one area of social functioning in which truth is the primary value, and truthfulness the core evaluation. Truth-telling and truth-seeking should not, therefore, be regarded as unattainable ideals within science, but as iron laws, continually and universally operative.
Causes of dishonesty in science
Although some scientists are selfishly dishonest simply in order to promote their own careers, for most people quasi-altruistic arguments for lying (dishonesty in a good cause of helping others, or to be an agreeable colleague) are likely to be a more powerful inducement to routine untruthfulness than is the gaining of personal advantage.
For example, scientists are pressured to be less-than-wholly-truthful for the benefit of their colleagues or institutions, or for official/political reasons. Often, scientists are unable to opt-out of administrative or managerial exercises which almost insist-upon dishonest responses – and for which colleagues expect dishonesty in order to promote the interests of the group. Project leaders may feel responsible for raising money to support their junior team members; and feel obliged to do whatever type of research is most generously funded, and to say or write whatever is necessary to obtain that funding.
So, in a bureaucratic context where cautious dishonesty is rewarded, strict truthfulness is taboo and will cause trouble for colleagues, for teams, for institutions – there may be a serious risk that funding is removed, status damaged, or worse. When everyone else is exaggerating their achievement then any precisely accurate person will, de facto, be judged as even worse than their already modest claims. In this kind of situation, individual truthfulness may be interpreted as an irresponsible indulgence.
Clearly then, even in the absence of the sort of direct coercion which prevails in many un-free societies, scientists may be subjected to such pressure that they are more-or-less forced to be dishonest; and this situation can (in decent people) lead to feelings of regret, or to shame and remorse. Unfortunately, regret and shame may not lead to remorse but instead to rationalization, to the elaborate construction of excuses, and eventually a denial of dishonesty.
Yet, whatever are the motivations and reasons for dishonesty, it has been by such means that modern scientists have become inculcated into habitual falsity; until we have become used-to dishonesty, don’t notice dishonesty, eventually come to expect dishonesty.
Roots of dishonesty in science
My belief is that science has rotted from the head down – and the blame mostly lies with senior scientists in combination with the massive expansion and influence of peer review until it has become the core process of scientific evaluation.
Overall, senior scientists have set a bad example of untruthfulness and self-seeking in their own behaviour, and they have also tended to administer science in such a way as to reward hype and careful-dishonesty, and punish modesty and strict truth-telling. And although some senior scientists have laudably refused to compromise their honesty, they have done this largely by quietly ‘opting out’, and not much by using their power and influence to create and advertise alternative processes and systems in which honest scientists might work.
The corruption of science has been (mostly unintentionally) amplified by the replacement of ‘peer usage’ with peer review as the major mechanism of scientific evaluation. Peer review (of ever greater complexity) has been applied everywhere: to job appointments and promotions, to scientific publications and conferences, to ethical review and funding, to prizes and awards. And peer review processes are set-up and dominated by senior scientists.
Peer usage was the traditional process of scientific evaluation during the Golden Age of science (extending up to about the mid-1960s). Peer usage means that the validity of science is judged retrospectively by whether or not it has been used by peers, i.e. whether ideas or facts turned-out to be useful in further science done by researchers in the same field. For example, a piece of research might be evaluated by its validity in predicting future observations or as a basis for making effective interventions. Peer usage is distinctive to science, probably almost definitive of science.
Peer review, by contrast, means that science is judged by the opinion of other scientists in the same field. Peer review is not distinctive to science, but is found in all academic subjects and in many formal bureaucracies. When peer usage was replaced by peer review, then all the major scientific evaluation processes – their measurement metrics, their rewards and their sanctions - were brought under the direct control of senior scientists whose opinions thereby became the ultimate arbiter of validity. By making its validity a mere matter of professional opinion, the crucial link between science and the natural world was broken, and the door opened to unrestrained error as well as to corruption.
The over-expansion and domination of peer review in science is therefore a sign of scientific decline and decadence, not (as so commonly asserted) a sign of increased rigour. Peer review as the ultimate arbiter represents the conversion of science to generic bureaucracy; a replacement of testing by opinion; a replacement of objectivity by subjectivity. And the increased role for subjectivity in science has created space into which dishonesty has expanded.
In a nutshell, the inducements to dishonesty have come from outside of science – from politics, government administration and the media (for example) all of whom are continually attempting to distort science to the needs of their own agendas and covert real science to Zombie science. But whatever the origin of the pressures to corrupt science, it is sadly obvious that scientific leaders have mostly themselves been corrupted by these pressures rather than courageously resisting them. And these same leaders have degraded hypothesis-testing real science into an elaborate expression of professional opinion (‘peer review’) that is formally indistinguishable from bureaucratic power-games.
Is there a future for honesty?
Such is our state of pervasive corruption that an insistence on truthfulness in science seems perverse, aggressive, dangerous, or simply utopian. Not so. Truthfulness in science is not utopian. Indeed it was mundane reality, taken for granted (albeit subject to normal human imperfections) just a few decades ago. Old-style science had many faults, but deliberate and systematic misrepresentation was not one of them.
To become systematically truthful in a modern scientific environment would be to inflict damage on one’s own career; on one’s chances of getting jobs, promotions, publications, grants and so on. And in a world of dishonesty, of hype, spin and inflated estimations – the occasional truthful individual will be judged by the prevailing corrupt standards. To be truthful would also be to risk becoming exceedingly unpopular with colleagues and employers – since a strictly honest scientist would be perceived as endangering the status and security of those around them.
Nonetheless, science must be honest, and the only answer to dishonesty is honesty; and this is up to individuals. The necessary first step is for scientists who are concerned about truth to acknowledge the prevailing state of corruption, and then to make a personal resolution to be truthful in all things at all times: to become both truth-tellers and truth-seekers.
Honest individuals are clearly necessary for an honest system of science – they are the basis of all that is good in science. However, honest individuals do not necessarily create an honest system. Individual honesty is not sufficient but needs to be supported by new social structures. Scientific truth cannot, over the long stretch, be a product of solitary activity. A solitary truth-seeker who is unsupported either by tradition or community will degenerate into mere eccentricity, eventually to be intimidated and crushed by the organized power of untruthfulness.
Furthermore, as Jacob Bronowski argued, humans cannot be honest only in important matters while being expedient in minor matters: truth is all of a piece. There are so many incentives to be untruthful that truthfulness is either a habit, or else truthfulness declines. This means that in order to retain their principles in the face of opposition, scientists need to find a philosophical basis which will sustain a life of habitual truth and support them through the pressure to be expedient (or agreeable) rather than honest.
A Great Awakening to truth in science
The best hope of saving science from a progressive descent into complete Zombiedom seems to be a moral Great Awakening: an ethical revolution focused on re-establishing the primary purpose of science: the pursuit of truth.
In using the phrase, I am thinking of something akin to the periodic evangelical Great Awakenings which have swept the USA throughout its history, and have (arguably) served periodically to roll-back the advance of societal corruption, and generate improved ethical behaviour.
Such an Awakening would necessarily begin with individual commitment, but to have any impact it would need to progress rapidly to institutional forms. In effect there would need to be a ‘Church’ of truth; or, rather, many such Churches – especially in the different scientific fields or invisible colleges of active scholars and researchers.
I use the word ‘Church’ because nothing less morally-potent than a Church would suffice to overcome the many immediate incentives for seeking status, power, wealth and security. Nothing less powerfully-motivating could, I feel, nurture and sustain the requisite individual commitment. If truth-pursuing groups were not actually religiously-based (and, given the high proportion of atheists in science, this is probable), then such groups would need to be sustained by secular ethical systems of at least equal strength to religion, equally devoted to transcendental ideals, equally capable of eliciting courage, self-sacrifice and adherence to principle.
The most realistic prospect is that some sub-specialties of science might self-identify as being engaged primarily in the pursuit of truth and (supported by strong ethical systems to which their participants subscribe) impose on their members a stricter and more honest standard of behaviour. Since science must be truthful in order to thrive qua science, any such truthful sub-specialities would be expected to thrive over the long term (this is assuming they can attract scientists of sufficient calibre backed-up with sufficient resources). From such seeds of truth, real science might again re-grow.
Could it happen? – could there really be a Great Awakening to truth in science in which scientists in specific disciplines or en masse would simply start being truthful about all things great and small, and would swiftly organize to support each other in this principle? I am hopeful that some kind of moral renewal might potentially occur in science, but I am not optimistic. I am hopeful – or else I would not be writing this. But I am not optimistic, because there appears to be little awareness of the endemic state of corruption – presumably because the relentless but incremental expansion of dishonesty has been so gradual that it failed to cause sufficient alarm; and at each step in the decline scientists quickly habituated to the new situation.
At present, I can detect no sign of anything like a principled adherence to perfect truthfulness among our complacent, arrogant and ever-more-powerful scientific leadership – and that is the group among which a Great Awakening would need to take-hold; even if, as seems likely, the movement originated elsewhere.
Further reading: The above polemical essay builds upon the argument of several of my previous publications including: ‘Peer usage versus peer review’ (BMJ 2007; 335:451); Zombie science’ (Medical Hypotheses 2008; 71:327–329); ‘The vital role of transcendental truth in science’ (Medical Hypotheses 2009; 72:373–376); and ‘Are you an honest academic?’ (Oxford Magazine 2009; 287:8–10).
Tuesday, 13 October 2009
Monday, 21 September 2009
Clever Sillies - Why the high IQ lack common sense
Clever sillies: Why high IQ people tend to be deficient in common sense
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses - in the press - doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.08.016
Available online 4 September 2009.
Summary
In previous editorials I have written about the absent-minded and socially-inept ‘nutty professor’ stereotype in science, and the phenomenon of ‘psychological neoteny’ whereby intelligent modern people (including scientists) decline to grow-up and instead remain in a state of perpetual novelty-seeking adolescence. These can be seen as specific examples of the general phenomenon of ‘clever sillies’ whereby intelligent people with high levels of technical ability are seen (by the majority of the rest of the population) as having foolish ideas and behaviours outside the realm of their professional expertise. In short, it has often been observed that high IQ types are lacking in ‘common sense’ – and especially when it comes to dealing with other human beings. General intelligence is not just a cognitive ability; it is also a cognitive disposition. So, the greater cognitive abilities of higher IQ tend also to be accompanied by a distinctive high IQ personality type including the trait of ‘Openness to experience’, ‘enlightened’ or progressive left-wing political values, and atheism. Drawing on the ideas of Kanazawa, my suggested explanation for this association between intelligence and personality is that an increasing relative level of IQ brings with it a tendency differentially to over-use general intelligence in problem-solving, and to over-ride those instinctive and spontaneous forms of evolved behaviour which could be termed common sense. Preferential use of abstract analysis is often useful when dealing with the many evolutionary novelties to be found in modernizing societies; but is not usually useful for dealing with social and psychological problems for which humans have evolved ‘domain-specific’ adaptive behaviours. And since evolved common sense usually produces the right answers in the social domain; this implies that, when it comes to solving social problems, the most intelligent people are more likely than those of average intelligence to have novel but silly ideas, and therefore to believe and behave maladaptively. I further suggest that this random silliness of the most intelligent people may be amplified to generate systematic wrongness when intellectuals are in addition ‘advertising’ their own high intelligence in the evolutionarily novel context of a modern IQ meritocracy. The cognitively-stratified context of communicating almost-exclusively with others of similar intelligence, generates opinions and behaviours among the highest IQ people which are not just lacking in common sense but perversely wrong. Hence the phenomenon of ‘political correctness’ (PC); whereby false and foolish ideas have come to dominate, and moralistically be enforced upon, the ruling elites of whole nations.
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IQ and evolved problem-solving
On the whole, and all else being equal, in modern societies the higher a person’s general intelligence (as measured by the intelligence quotient or IQ), the better will be life for that person; since higher intelligence leads (among other benefits) to higher social status and salary, longer life expectancy and better health [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5]. However, at the same time, it has been recognized for more than a century that increasing IQ is biologically-maladaptive because there is an inverse relationship between IQ and fertility [6], [7] and [8]. Under modern conditions, therefore, high intelligence is fitness-reducing.
In the course of exploring this modern divergence between social-adaptation and biological-adaptation, Satoshi Kanazawa has made the insightful observation that a high level of general intelligence is mainly useful in dealing with life problems which are an evolutionary novelty. By contrast, performance in solving problems which were a normal part of human life in the ancestral hunter–gatherer era may not be helped (or may indeed be hindered) by higher IQ [9] and [10].
(This statement requires a qualification. When a person has suffered some form of brain damage, or a pathology affecting brain function, then this might well produce generalized impairment of cognition: reducing both general intelligence and other forms of evolved cognitive functioning, depending on the site and extent of the brain pathology. Since a population with low IQ would include some whose IQ had been lowered by brain pathology, the average level of social intelligence or common sense would probably also be lower in this population. This confounding effect of brain pathology would be expected to create a weak and non-causal statistical correlation between IQ and social intelligence/common sense, a correlation that would mainly be apparent at low levels of IQ.)
As examples of how IQ may help with evolutionary novelties, it has been abundantly-demonstrated that increasing measures of IQ are strongly and positively correlated with a wide range of abilities which require abstract reasoning and rapid learning of new knowledge and skills; such as educational outcomes, and abilities at most complex modern jobs [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and [11]. Science and mathematics are classic examples of problem-solving activities that arose only recently in human evolutionary history and in which differential ability is very strongly predicted by relative general intelligence [12].
However, there are also many human tasks which our human ancestors did encounter repeatedly and over manifold generations, and natural selection has often produced ‘instinctive’, spontaneous ways of dealing with these. Since humans are social primates, one major such category is social problems, which have to do with understanding, predicting and manipulating the behaviours of other human beings [13], [14], [15] and [16]. Being able to behave adaptively in dealing with these basic human situations is what I will term having ‘common sense’.
Kanazawa’s idea is that there is therefore a contrast between recurring, mainly social problems which affected fitness for our ancestors and for which all normal humans have evolved behavioural responses; and problems which are an evolutionary novelty but which have a major impact on individual functioning in the context of modern societies [9] and [10]. When a problem is an evolutionary novelty, individual differences in general intelligence make a big difference to each individual’s abilities to analyze the problem, and learn to how solve it. So, the idea is that having a high IQ would predict a better ability in understanding and dealing with new problems; but higher IQ would not increase the level of a person’s common sense ability to deal with social situations.
IQ not just an ability, but also a disposition
Although general intelligence is usually conceptualized as differences in cognitive ability, IQ is not just about ability but also has personality implications [17].
For example, in some populations there is a positive correlation between IQ and the personality trait of Openness to experience (‘Openness’) [18] and [19]; a positive correlation with ‘enlightened’ or progressive values of a broadly socialist and libertarian type [20]; and a negative correlation with religiousness [21].
So, the greater cognitive ability of higher IQ is also accompanied by a somewhat distinctive high IQ personality type. My suggested explanation for this association is that an increasing level of IQ brings with it an increased tendency to use general intelligence in problem-solving; i.e. to over-ride those instinctive and spontaneous forms of evolved behaviour which could be termed common sense.
The over-use of abstract reasoning may be most obvious in the social domain, where normal humans are richly equipped with evolved psychological mechanisms both for here-and-now interactions (e.g. rapidly reading emotions from facial expression, gesture and posture, and speech intonation) and for ‘strategic’ modelling of social interactions to understand predict and manipulate the behaviour of others [16]. Social strategies deploy inferred knowledge about the dispositions, motivations and intentions of others. When the most intelligent people over-ride the social intelligence systems and apply generic, abstract and systematic reasoning of the kind which is enhanced among higher IQ people, they are ignoring an ‘expert system’ in favour of a non-expert system.
In suggesting that the most intelligent people tend to use IQ to over-ride common sense I am unsure of the extent to which this is due to a deficit in the social reasoning ability, perhaps due to a trade-off between cognitive abilities – as suggested by Baron-Cohen’s conceptualization of Asperger’s syndrome, including the male- versus female-type of systematizing/empathizing brain [22]. Or alternatively it could be more of an habitual tendency to over-use abstract analysis, that might (in principle) be overcome by effort or with training. Observing the apparent universality of ‘Silly Clevers’ in modernizing societies, I suspect that a higher IQ bias towards over-utilizing abstract reasoning would probably turn-out to be innate and relatively stable.
Indeed, I suggest that higher levels of the personality trait of Openness in higher IQ people may the flip-side of this over-use of abstraction. I regard Openness as the result of deploying abstract analysis for social problems to yield unstable and unpredictable results, when innate social intelligence would tend to yield predictable and stable results. This might plausibly underlie the tendency of the most intelligent people in modernizing societies to hold ‘left-wing’ political views [10] and [20].
I would argue that neophilia (or novelty-seeking) is a driving attribute of the personality trait of Openness; and a disposition common in adolescents and immature adults who display what I have termed ‘psychological neoteny’ [23] and [24]. When problems are analyzed using common sense ‘instincts’ the evaluative process would be expected to lead to the same answers in all normal humans, and these answers are likely to be stable over time. But when higher IQ people ignore or over-ride common sense, they generate a variety of uncommon ideas. Since these ideas are only feebly-, or wholly un-, supported by emotions; they are held more weakly than common sense ideas, and so are more likely to change over time.
For instance, a group of less intelligent people using instinctive social intelligence to analyze a social situation will presumably reach the same traditional conclusion as everyone else and this conclusion will not change with time; while a more intelligent group might by contrast use abstract analysis and generate a wider range of novel and less-compelling solutions. This behaviour appears as if motivated by novelty-seeking.
Applying abstract analysis to social situations might be seen as ‘creative’, and indeed Openness has been put forward as the major personality trait which supports creativity [19] and [25]. This is reasonable in the sense that an intellectual high in Openness would be likely to disregard common sense, and to generate multiple, unpredictable and unfamiliar answers to evolutionarily-familiar problems which would only yield a single ‘obvious’ solution to those who deployed evolved modes of intelligence. However, I would instead argue that a high IQ person applying abstract systemizing intelligence to activities which are more usually done by instinctive intelligence is not a truly ‘creative’ process.
Instead, following Eysenck, I would regard true psychological creativity as primarily an associative activity which Eysenck includes as part of the trait Psychoticism; cognitively akin to the ‘primary process’ thinking of sleep, delirium and psychotic illness [26] and [27]. A major difference between these two concepts of creativity is that while ‘Openness creativity’ is abstract, coolly-impartial and as if driven by novelty-seeking (neophilia); ‘Psychoticism creativity’ is validated by emotions: such that the high-Psychoticism creative person is guided by their emotional responses to their own creative production.
Clever sillies in the IQ meritocracy
It therefore seems plausible that the folklore or stereotypical idea of the eccentric, unworldly, absent-minded or obtuse scientist – who is brilliant at their job while being fatuous and incompetent in terms of their everyday life [28], might be the result of this psychological tendency to over-use abstract intelligence and use it in inappropriate situations.
However, there is a further aspect of this phenomenon. Modern societies are characterized by large population, extensive division of labour, and a ‘meritocratic’ form of social organization in which social roles (jobs, occupations) tend to be filled on the basis of educational credentials and job performance rather than on an hereditary basis (as was the case in most societies of the past). This means that in modern societies there is an unprecedented degree of cognitive stratification [29]. Cognitive stratification is the layering of social organization by IQ; such that residence, schooling and occupations are characterized by narrow bands of intelligence. Large modern countries are therefore ruled by concentrations of highly intelligent people in the major social systems such as politics, civil administration, law, science and technology, the mass media and education. Communication in these elites is almost-exclusively among the highly intelligent.
In such an evolutionarily-unprecedented, artificial ‘hothouse’ environment, it is plausible that any IQ-related behaviours are amplified: partly because there is little counter-pressure from the less intelligent people with less neophiliac personalities, and perhaps mainly because there is a great deal of IQ-advertisement. Indeed, it looks very much as if the elites of modern societies are characterized by considerable IQ-signalling [19]. Sometimes this is direct advertisement (e.g. when boasting about intellectual attainments or attendance at highly-selective colleges) and more often the signalling is subtly-indirect when people display the attitudes, beliefs, fashions, manners and hobbies associated with high intelligence. This advertising is probably based on sexual selection [30], if IQ has been a measure of general fitness during human evolutionary history, and was associated with a wide range of adaptive traits [31].
My hunch is that it is this kind of IQ-advertisement which has led to the most intelligent people in modern societies having ideas about social phenomena that are not just randomly incorrect (due to inappropriately misapplying abstract analysis) but are systematically wrong. I am talking of the phenomenon known as political correctness (PC) in which foolish and false ideas have become moralistically-enforced among the ruling intellectual elite. And these ideas have invaded academic, political and social discourse. Because while the stereotypical nutty professor in the hard sciences is a brilliant scientist but silly about everything else; the stereotypical nutty professor social scientist or humanities professor is not just silly about ‘everything else’, but also silly in their professional work.
Getting answers to problems relating to hard science is extremely intellectually-difficult and (because the subject is an evolutionary novelty) necessarily requires abstract reasoning [12] and [26]. Therefore the hard scientist is invariably vastly more competent at their science than the average member of the public, and he has no need to be novelty-seeking in order to advertise his intelligence.
But getting answers to problems in science involving human social behaviour is something which is already done very well by evolved human psychological mechanisms [13], [14], [15] and [16]. In this situation it is difficult to improve on common sense, and – even without being taught – normal people already have a pretty good understanding of human motivations, incentives and deterrents, and the basic cause and effect processes of society. Because psychological and social intelligence expertise is so widespread and adaptive; in order to advertise his intelligence the social scientist must produce something systematically-different from common sense, something novel and (necessarily) counter-intuitive. And because it goes against evolved psychology, in this instance something different is likely to be something wrong. So, the social scientist professional deploying abstract reasoning on social problems is often less likely to generate a correct answer than the average member of the public who is using the common sense of evolved, spontaneous social intelligence.
In the human and social sciences there is therefore a professional incentive to be perversely wrong – to be silly, in other words. And this is indeed what we see. The more that the subject matter of an academic field requires, or depends on, common sense; the sillier it will be.
The results of cognitive stratification and IQ-advertising are therefore bad enough to have destroyed the value of whole domains of the arts and academia, and in the domain of public policy the results have been simply disastrous. Over the past four decades the dishonest fantasy-world discourse of non-biological political correctness has evolved to dominate the intellectual arena of whole nations – perhaps the whole developed world – such that wrong and ridiculous ideas have become not just mainstream, but compulsory.
Because clever silliness is not just one of several competing ideas in the elite arena – it is both intellectually- and moralistically-enforced with such zeal as utterly to exclude alternatives [32]. The first level of defence is that denying a PC assertion is taken as proof of dumbness or derangement; such that flat-denial without refutation is regarded as sufficient response. But the toughest enforcement is moral: anyone smart and sane who disbelieves the silly clever falsehoods and asserts something different is not just denounced as dumb but actually pilloried as evil [33].
I infer that the motivation behind the moralizing venom of political correctness is the fact that spontaneous human instincts are universal and more powerfully-felt than the absurd abstractions of PC; plus the fact that common sense is basically correct while PC is perversely wrong. Hence, at all costs a fair debate must be prevented if the PC consensus is to be protected. Common sense requires to be stigmatized in order that it is neutralized.
Ultimately these manoeuvres serve to defend the power, status and distinctiveness of the intellectual elite [34]. They are socially-adaptive over the short-term, even as they are biologically-maladaptive over the longer-term.
Conclusion
Because evolved ‘common sense’ usually produces the right answers in the social domain, yet the most intelligent people have personalities which over-use abstract analysis in the social domain [9] and [10], this implies that the most intelligent people are predisposed to have silly ideas and to behave maladaptively when it comes to solving social problems.
Ever since the development of cognitive stratification in modernizing societies [29], the clever sillies have been almost monopolistically ‘in charge’. They really are both clever and silly – but the cleverness is abstract while the silliness is focused on the psychological and social domains. Consequently, the fatal flaw of modern ruling elites lies in their lack of common sense – especially the misinterpretations of human psychology and socio-political affairs. My guess is that this lack of common sense is intrinsic and incorrigible – and perhaps biologically-linked with the evolution of high intelligence and the rise of modernity [35].
Stanovich has also described the over-riding of the ‘Darwinian brain’ of autonomous systems by the analytic system, and has identified the phenomenon as underlying modern non-adaptive ethical reasoning [36]. Stanovich has also noted that IQ accounts for much (but not all) of the inter-individual differences in using analytic evaluations; however, Stanovich regards the increased use of abstraction to replace traditional ‘common sense’ very positively, not as ‘silly’ but as a vital aspect of what he interprets as the higher status of modern social morality.
Yet, whatever else, to be a clever silly is a somewhat tragic state; because it entails being cognitively-trapped by compulsive abstraction; unable to engage directly and spontaneously with what most humans have traditionally regarded as psycho-social reality; disbarred from the common experience of humankind and instead cut-adrift on the surface of a glittering but shallow ocean of novelties: none of which can ever truly convince or satisfy. It is to be alienated from the world; and to find no stable meaning of life that is solidly underpinned by emotional conviction [37]. Little wonder, perhaps, that clever sillies usually choose sub-replacement reproduction [6].
To term the Western ruling elite ‘clever sillies’ is of course a broad generalization, but is not merely name-calling. Because, as well as political correctness being systematically dishonest [33] and [34]; in relation to absolute and differential fertility, modern elite behaviour is objectively maladaptive in a strictly biological sense. It remains to be seen whether the genetic self-annihilation of the IQ elite will lead-on towards self-annihilation of the societies over which they rule.
Note: I should in all honesty point-out that I recognize this phenomenon from the inside. In other words, I myself am a prime example of a ‘clever silly’; having spent much of adolescence and early adult life passively absorbing high-IQ-elite-approved, ingenious-but-daft ideas that later needed, painfully, to be dismantled. I have eventually been forced to acknowledge that when it comes to the psycho-social domain, the commonsense verdict of the majority of ordinary people throughout history is much more likely to be accurate than the latest fashionably-brilliant insight of the ruling elite. So, this article has been written on the assumption, eminently-challengeable, that although I have nearly-always been wrong in the past – I now am right….
References
[1] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Am Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[2] N.J. Mackintosh, IQ and human intelligence, Oxford University Press (1998).
[3] A.R. Jensen, The g factor the science of mental ability, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1988).
[4] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2001).
[5] G.D. Batty, I.J. Deary and L.S. Gottfredson, Pre-morbid (early life) IQ and later mortality risk: systematic review, Ann Epidemiol 17 (2007), pp. 278–288.
[6] R. Lynn, Dysgenics, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1996).
[7] R. Lynn and M. Van Court, New evidence for dysgenic fertility for intelligence in the United States, Intelligence 32 (2004), pp. 193–201.
[8] D. Nettle and T.V. Pollet, Natural selection on male wealth in humans, Am Nat 172 (2008), pp. 658–666.
[9] S. Kanazawa, General Intelligence as a domain-specific adaptation, Psychol Rev 111 (2004), pp. 512–523.
[10] S. Kanazawa, IQ and the values of nations, J Biosoc Sci 41 (2009), pp. 537–556.
[11] L.S. Gottfredson, Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse societies. In: C.L. Frisby and C.R. Reynolds, Editors, Comprehensive handbook of multicultural school psychology, Wiley, New York (2005), pp. 517–554.
[12] D. Lubinski and C.P. Benbow, Study of mathematically precocious youth after 35 years: uncovering antecedents for the development of math-science expertise, Perspect Psychol Sci 1 (2006), pp. 316–345.
[13] N.K. Humphrey, The social function of intellect. In: P.P.G. Bateson and R.A. Hinde, Editors, Growing points in ethology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1976).
[14] In: R.W. Byrne and A. Whiten, Editors, Machiavellian intelligence social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1988).
[15] L. Brothers, The social brain: a project for integrating primate behavior and neurophysiology in a new domain, Concept Neurosci 1 (1990), pp. 27–51.
[16] B.G. Charlton, Theory of mind delusions and bizarre delusions in an evolutionary perspective: psychiatry and the social brain. In: Martin Brune, Hedda Ribbert and Wulf Schiefenhovel, Editors, The social brain – evolution and pathology, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester (2003), pp. 315–338.
[17] Charlton BG. Why it is ‘better’ to be reliable but dumb than smart but slapdash: are intelligence (IQ) and conscientiousness best regarded as gifts or virtues? Med Hypotheses; in press, doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.06.048.
[18] D. Nettle, Personality: what makes you the way you are, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2007).
[19] G. Miller, Spent: sex, evolution and consumer behaviour, Viking, New York (2009).
[20] I.J. Deary, G.D. Batty and C.R. Gale, Bright children become enlightened adults, Psychol Sci 19 (2008), pp. 1–6.
[21] R. Lynn, J. Harvey and H. Nyborg, Average intelligence predicts atheism rates across 137 nations, Intelligence 37 (2009), pp. 11–15.
[22] S. Baron-Cohen, The essential difference: men, women and the extreme male brain, Penguin/Basic Books, London (2003).
[23] B.G. Charlton, The rise of the boy-genius: psychological neoteny, science and modern life, Med Hypotheses 67 (2006), pp. 679–681.
[24] B.G. Charlton, Psychological neoteny and higher education: associations with delayed parenthood, Med Hypotheses 69 (2007), pp. 237–240.
[25] Penke L. Creativity: theories, prediction, and etiology. Diploma thesis. Department of Psychology, University of Bielefeld, Germany; 2003 [accessed 3.08.09].
[26] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[27] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[28] B.G. Charlton, From nutty professor to buddy love: personality types in modern science, Med Hypotheses 8 (2007), pp. 243–244.
[29] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life, New York, Forbes (1994).
[30] G. Miller, The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature, Heinemann, London (2000).
[31] A. Pierce, G.F. Miller, R. Arden and L. Gottfredson, Why is intelligence correlated with semen quality? Biochemical pathways common to sperm and neurons, and the evolutionary genetics of general fitness, Commun Integr Biol 2 (2009), pp. 1–3.
[32] B.G. Charlton, Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 625–628.
[33] B.G. Charlton, First a hero of science and now a martyr to science: the James Watson Affair – political correctness crushes free scientific communication, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1077–1080.
[34] B.G. Charlton, Replacing education with psychometrics: how learning about IQ almost-completely changed my mind about education, Med Hypotheses 73 (2009), pp. 273–277.
[35] G. Clark, A Farewell to Alms: a brief economic history of the world, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA (2007).
[36] K.E. Stanovitch, The robot’s rebellion: finding meaning in the age of Darwin, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2004).
[37] B.G. Charlton, Alienation, recovered animism and altered states of consciousness, Med Hypotheses 68 (2007), pp. 727–731.
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses - in the press - doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.08.016
Available online 4 September 2009.
Summary
In previous editorials I have written about the absent-minded and socially-inept ‘nutty professor’ stereotype in science, and the phenomenon of ‘psychological neoteny’ whereby intelligent modern people (including scientists) decline to grow-up and instead remain in a state of perpetual novelty-seeking adolescence. These can be seen as specific examples of the general phenomenon of ‘clever sillies’ whereby intelligent people with high levels of technical ability are seen (by the majority of the rest of the population) as having foolish ideas and behaviours outside the realm of their professional expertise. In short, it has often been observed that high IQ types are lacking in ‘common sense’ – and especially when it comes to dealing with other human beings. General intelligence is not just a cognitive ability; it is also a cognitive disposition. So, the greater cognitive abilities of higher IQ tend also to be accompanied by a distinctive high IQ personality type including the trait of ‘Openness to experience’, ‘enlightened’ or progressive left-wing political values, and atheism. Drawing on the ideas of Kanazawa, my suggested explanation for this association between intelligence and personality is that an increasing relative level of IQ brings with it a tendency differentially to over-use general intelligence in problem-solving, and to over-ride those instinctive and spontaneous forms of evolved behaviour which could be termed common sense. Preferential use of abstract analysis is often useful when dealing with the many evolutionary novelties to be found in modernizing societies; but is not usually useful for dealing with social and psychological problems for which humans have evolved ‘domain-specific’ adaptive behaviours. And since evolved common sense usually produces the right answers in the social domain; this implies that, when it comes to solving social problems, the most intelligent people are more likely than those of average intelligence to have novel but silly ideas, and therefore to believe and behave maladaptively. I further suggest that this random silliness of the most intelligent people may be amplified to generate systematic wrongness when intellectuals are in addition ‘advertising’ their own high intelligence in the evolutionarily novel context of a modern IQ meritocracy. The cognitively-stratified context of communicating almost-exclusively with others of similar intelligence, generates opinions and behaviours among the highest IQ people which are not just lacking in common sense but perversely wrong. Hence the phenomenon of ‘political correctness’ (PC); whereby false and foolish ideas have come to dominate, and moralistically be enforced upon, the ruling elites of whole nations.
***
IQ and evolved problem-solving
On the whole, and all else being equal, in modern societies the higher a person’s general intelligence (as measured by the intelligence quotient or IQ), the better will be life for that person; since higher intelligence leads (among other benefits) to higher social status and salary, longer life expectancy and better health [1], [2], [3], [4] and [5]. However, at the same time, it has been recognized for more than a century that increasing IQ is biologically-maladaptive because there is an inverse relationship between IQ and fertility [6], [7] and [8]. Under modern conditions, therefore, high intelligence is fitness-reducing.
In the course of exploring this modern divergence between social-adaptation and biological-adaptation, Satoshi Kanazawa has made the insightful observation that a high level of general intelligence is mainly useful in dealing with life problems which are an evolutionary novelty. By contrast, performance in solving problems which were a normal part of human life in the ancestral hunter–gatherer era may not be helped (or may indeed be hindered) by higher IQ [9] and [10].
(This statement requires a qualification. When a person has suffered some form of brain damage, or a pathology affecting brain function, then this might well produce generalized impairment of cognition: reducing both general intelligence and other forms of evolved cognitive functioning, depending on the site and extent of the brain pathology. Since a population with low IQ would include some whose IQ had been lowered by brain pathology, the average level of social intelligence or common sense would probably also be lower in this population. This confounding effect of brain pathology would be expected to create a weak and non-causal statistical correlation between IQ and social intelligence/common sense, a correlation that would mainly be apparent at low levels of IQ.)
As examples of how IQ may help with evolutionary novelties, it has been abundantly-demonstrated that increasing measures of IQ are strongly and positively correlated with a wide range of abilities which require abstract reasoning and rapid learning of new knowledge and skills; such as educational outcomes, and abilities at most complex modern jobs [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and [11]. Science and mathematics are classic examples of problem-solving activities that arose only recently in human evolutionary history and in which differential ability is very strongly predicted by relative general intelligence [12].
However, there are also many human tasks which our human ancestors did encounter repeatedly and over manifold generations, and natural selection has often produced ‘instinctive’, spontaneous ways of dealing with these. Since humans are social primates, one major such category is social problems, which have to do with understanding, predicting and manipulating the behaviours of other human beings [13], [14], [15] and [16]. Being able to behave adaptively in dealing with these basic human situations is what I will term having ‘common sense’.
Kanazawa’s idea is that there is therefore a contrast between recurring, mainly social problems which affected fitness for our ancestors and for which all normal humans have evolved behavioural responses; and problems which are an evolutionary novelty but which have a major impact on individual functioning in the context of modern societies [9] and [10]. When a problem is an evolutionary novelty, individual differences in general intelligence make a big difference to each individual’s abilities to analyze the problem, and learn to how solve it. So, the idea is that having a high IQ would predict a better ability in understanding and dealing with new problems; but higher IQ would not increase the level of a person’s common sense ability to deal with social situations.
IQ not just an ability, but also a disposition
Although general intelligence is usually conceptualized as differences in cognitive ability, IQ is not just about ability but also has personality implications [17].
For example, in some populations there is a positive correlation between IQ and the personality trait of Openness to experience (‘Openness’) [18] and [19]; a positive correlation with ‘enlightened’ or progressive values of a broadly socialist and libertarian type [20]; and a negative correlation with religiousness [21].
So, the greater cognitive ability of higher IQ is also accompanied by a somewhat distinctive high IQ personality type. My suggested explanation for this association is that an increasing level of IQ brings with it an increased tendency to use general intelligence in problem-solving; i.e. to over-ride those instinctive and spontaneous forms of evolved behaviour which could be termed common sense.
The over-use of abstract reasoning may be most obvious in the social domain, where normal humans are richly equipped with evolved psychological mechanisms both for here-and-now interactions (e.g. rapidly reading emotions from facial expression, gesture and posture, and speech intonation) and for ‘strategic’ modelling of social interactions to understand predict and manipulate the behaviour of others [16]. Social strategies deploy inferred knowledge about the dispositions, motivations and intentions of others. When the most intelligent people over-ride the social intelligence systems and apply generic, abstract and systematic reasoning of the kind which is enhanced among higher IQ people, they are ignoring an ‘expert system’ in favour of a non-expert system.
In suggesting that the most intelligent people tend to use IQ to over-ride common sense I am unsure of the extent to which this is due to a deficit in the social reasoning ability, perhaps due to a trade-off between cognitive abilities – as suggested by Baron-Cohen’s conceptualization of Asperger’s syndrome, including the male- versus female-type of systematizing/empathizing brain [22]. Or alternatively it could be more of an habitual tendency to over-use abstract analysis, that might (in principle) be overcome by effort or with training. Observing the apparent universality of ‘Silly Clevers’ in modernizing societies, I suspect that a higher IQ bias towards over-utilizing abstract reasoning would probably turn-out to be innate and relatively stable.
Indeed, I suggest that higher levels of the personality trait of Openness in higher IQ people may the flip-side of this over-use of abstraction. I regard Openness as the result of deploying abstract analysis for social problems to yield unstable and unpredictable results, when innate social intelligence would tend to yield predictable and stable results. This might plausibly underlie the tendency of the most intelligent people in modernizing societies to hold ‘left-wing’ political views [10] and [20].
I would argue that neophilia (or novelty-seeking) is a driving attribute of the personality trait of Openness; and a disposition common in adolescents and immature adults who display what I have termed ‘psychological neoteny’ [23] and [24]. When problems are analyzed using common sense ‘instincts’ the evaluative process would be expected to lead to the same answers in all normal humans, and these answers are likely to be stable over time. But when higher IQ people ignore or over-ride common sense, they generate a variety of uncommon ideas. Since these ideas are only feebly-, or wholly un-, supported by emotions; they are held more weakly than common sense ideas, and so are more likely to change over time.
For instance, a group of less intelligent people using instinctive social intelligence to analyze a social situation will presumably reach the same traditional conclusion as everyone else and this conclusion will not change with time; while a more intelligent group might by contrast use abstract analysis and generate a wider range of novel and less-compelling solutions. This behaviour appears as if motivated by novelty-seeking.
Applying abstract analysis to social situations might be seen as ‘creative’, and indeed Openness has been put forward as the major personality trait which supports creativity [19] and [25]. This is reasonable in the sense that an intellectual high in Openness would be likely to disregard common sense, and to generate multiple, unpredictable and unfamiliar answers to evolutionarily-familiar problems which would only yield a single ‘obvious’ solution to those who deployed evolved modes of intelligence. However, I would instead argue that a high IQ person applying abstract systemizing intelligence to activities which are more usually done by instinctive intelligence is not a truly ‘creative’ process.
Instead, following Eysenck, I would regard true psychological creativity as primarily an associative activity which Eysenck includes as part of the trait Psychoticism; cognitively akin to the ‘primary process’ thinking of sleep, delirium and psychotic illness [26] and [27]. A major difference between these two concepts of creativity is that while ‘Openness creativity’ is abstract, coolly-impartial and as if driven by novelty-seeking (neophilia); ‘Psychoticism creativity’ is validated by emotions: such that the high-Psychoticism creative person is guided by their emotional responses to their own creative production.
Clever sillies in the IQ meritocracy
It therefore seems plausible that the folklore or stereotypical idea of the eccentric, unworldly, absent-minded or obtuse scientist – who is brilliant at their job while being fatuous and incompetent in terms of their everyday life [28], might be the result of this psychological tendency to over-use abstract intelligence and use it in inappropriate situations.
However, there is a further aspect of this phenomenon. Modern societies are characterized by large population, extensive division of labour, and a ‘meritocratic’ form of social organization in which social roles (jobs, occupations) tend to be filled on the basis of educational credentials and job performance rather than on an hereditary basis (as was the case in most societies of the past). This means that in modern societies there is an unprecedented degree of cognitive stratification [29]. Cognitive stratification is the layering of social organization by IQ; such that residence, schooling and occupations are characterized by narrow bands of intelligence. Large modern countries are therefore ruled by concentrations of highly intelligent people in the major social systems such as politics, civil administration, law, science and technology, the mass media and education. Communication in these elites is almost-exclusively among the highly intelligent.
In such an evolutionarily-unprecedented, artificial ‘hothouse’ environment, it is plausible that any IQ-related behaviours are amplified: partly because there is little counter-pressure from the less intelligent people with less neophiliac personalities, and perhaps mainly because there is a great deal of IQ-advertisement. Indeed, it looks very much as if the elites of modern societies are characterized by considerable IQ-signalling [19]. Sometimes this is direct advertisement (e.g. when boasting about intellectual attainments or attendance at highly-selective colleges) and more often the signalling is subtly-indirect when people display the attitudes, beliefs, fashions, manners and hobbies associated with high intelligence. This advertising is probably based on sexual selection [30], if IQ has been a measure of general fitness during human evolutionary history, and was associated with a wide range of adaptive traits [31].
My hunch is that it is this kind of IQ-advertisement which has led to the most intelligent people in modern societies having ideas about social phenomena that are not just randomly incorrect (due to inappropriately misapplying abstract analysis) but are systematically wrong. I am talking of the phenomenon known as political correctness (PC) in which foolish and false ideas have become moralistically-enforced among the ruling intellectual elite. And these ideas have invaded academic, political and social discourse. Because while the stereotypical nutty professor in the hard sciences is a brilliant scientist but silly about everything else; the stereotypical nutty professor social scientist or humanities professor is not just silly about ‘everything else’, but also silly in their professional work.
Getting answers to problems relating to hard science is extremely intellectually-difficult and (because the subject is an evolutionary novelty) necessarily requires abstract reasoning [12] and [26]. Therefore the hard scientist is invariably vastly more competent at their science than the average member of the public, and he has no need to be novelty-seeking in order to advertise his intelligence.
But getting answers to problems in science involving human social behaviour is something which is already done very well by evolved human psychological mechanisms [13], [14], [15] and [16]. In this situation it is difficult to improve on common sense, and – even without being taught – normal people already have a pretty good understanding of human motivations, incentives and deterrents, and the basic cause and effect processes of society. Because psychological and social intelligence expertise is so widespread and adaptive; in order to advertise his intelligence the social scientist must produce something systematically-different from common sense, something novel and (necessarily) counter-intuitive. And because it goes against evolved psychology, in this instance something different is likely to be something wrong. So, the social scientist professional deploying abstract reasoning on social problems is often less likely to generate a correct answer than the average member of the public who is using the common sense of evolved, spontaneous social intelligence.
In the human and social sciences there is therefore a professional incentive to be perversely wrong – to be silly, in other words. And this is indeed what we see. The more that the subject matter of an academic field requires, or depends on, common sense; the sillier it will be.
The results of cognitive stratification and IQ-advertising are therefore bad enough to have destroyed the value of whole domains of the arts and academia, and in the domain of public policy the results have been simply disastrous. Over the past four decades the dishonest fantasy-world discourse of non-biological political correctness has evolved to dominate the intellectual arena of whole nations – perhaps the whole developed world – such that wrong and ridiculous ideas have become not just mainstream, but compulsory.
Because clever silliness is not just one of several competing ideas in the elite arena – it is both intellectually- and moralistically-enforced with such zeal as utterly to exclude alternatives [32]. The first level of defence is that denying a PC assertion is taken as proof of dumbness or derangement; such that flat-denial without refutation is regarded as sufficient response. But the toughest enforcement is moral: anyone smart and sane who disbelieves the silly clever falsehoods and asserts something different is not just denounced as dumb but actually pilloried as evil [33].
I infer that the motivation behind the moralizing venom of political correctness is the fact that spontaneous human instincts are universal and more powerfully-felt than the absurd abstractions of PC; plus the fact that common sense is basically correct while PC is perversely wrong. Hence, at all costs a fair debate must be prevented if the PC consensus is to be protected. Common sense requires to be stigmatized in order that it is neutralized.
Ultimately these manoeuvres serve to defend the power, status and distinctiveness of the intellectual elite [34]. They are socially-adaptive over the short-term, even as they are biologically-maladaptive over the longer-term.
Conclusion
Because evolved ‘common sense’ usually produces the right answers in the social domain, yet the most intelligent people have personalities which over-use abstract analysis in the social domain [9] and [10], this implies that the most intelligent people are predisposed to have silly ideas and to behave maladaptively when it comes to solving social problems.
Ever since the development of cognitive stratification in modernizing societies [29], the clever sillies have been almost monopolistically ‘in charge’. They really are both clever and silly – but the cleverness is abstract while the silliness is focused on the psychological and social domains. Consequently, the fatal flaw of modern ruling elites lies in their lack of common sense – especially the misinterpretations of human psychology and socio-political affairs. My guess is that this lack of common sense is intrinsic and incorrigible – and perhaps biologically-linked with the evolution of high intelligence and the rise of modernity [35].
Stanovich has also described the over-riding of the ‘Darwinian brain’ of autonomous systems by the analytic system, and has identified the phenomenon as underlying modern non-adaptive ethical reasoning [36]. Stanovich has also noted that IQ accounts for much (but not all) of the inter-individual differences in using analytic evaluations; however, Stanovich regards the increased use of abstraction to replace traditional ‘common sense’ very positively, not as ‘silly’ but as a vital aspect of what he interprets as the higher status of modern social morality.
Yet, whatever else, to be a clever silly is a somewhat tragic state; because it entails being cognitively-trapped by compulsive abstraction; unable to engage directly and spontaneously with what most humans have traditionally regarded as psycho-social reality; disbarred from the common experience of humankind and instead cut-adrift on the surface of a glittering but shallow ocean of novelties: none of which can ever truly convince or satisfy. It is to be alienated from the world; and to find no stable meaning of life that is solidly underpinned by emotional conviction [37]. Little wonder, perhaps, that clever sillies usually choose sub-replacement reproduction [6].
To term the Western ruling elite ‘clever sillies’ is of course a broad generalization, but is not merely name-calling. Because, as well as political correctness being systematically dishonest [33] and [34]; in relation to absolute and differential fertility, modern elite behaviour is objectively maladaptive in a strictly biological sense. It remains to be seen whether the genetic self-annihilation of the IQ elite will lead-on towards self-annihilation of the societies over which they rule.
Note: I should in all honesty point-out that I recognize this phenomenon from the inside. In other words, I myself am a prime example of a ‘clever silly’; having spent much of adolescence and early adult life passively absorbing high-IQ-elite-approved, ingenious-but-daft ideas that later needed, painfully, to be dismantled. I have eventually been forced to acknowledge that when it comes to the psycho-social domain, the commonsense verdict of the majority of ordinary people throughout history is much more likely to be accurate than the latest fashionably-brilliant insight of the ruling elite. So, this article has been written on the assumption, eminently-challengeable, that although I have nearly-always been wrong in the past – I now am right….
References
[1] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Am Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[2] N.J. Mackintosh, IQ and human intelligence, Oxford University Press (1998).
[3] A.R. Jensen, The g factor the science of mental ability, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1988).
[4] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2001).
[5] G.D. Batty, I.J. Deary and L.S. Gottfredson, Pre-morbid (early life) IQ and later mortality risk: systematic review, Ann Epidemiol 17 (2007), pp. 278–288.
[6] R. Lynn, Dysgenics, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1996).
[7] R. Lynn and M. Van Court, New evidence for dysgenic fertility for intelligence in the United States, Intelligence 32 (2004), pp. 193–201.
[8] D. Nettle and T.V. Pollet, Natural selection on male wealth in humans, Am Nat 172 (2008), pp. 658–666.
[9] S. Kanazawa, General Intelligence as a domain-specific adaptation, Psychol Rev 111 (2004), pp. 512–523.
[10] S. Kanazawa, IQ and the values of nations, J Biosoc Sci 41 (2009), pp. 537–556.
[11] L.S. Gottfredson, Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse societies. In: C.L. Frisby and C.R. Reynolds, Editors, Comprehensive handbook of multicultural school psychology, Wiley, New York (2005), pp. 517–554.
[12] D. Lubinski and C.P. Benbow, Study of mathematically precocious youth after 35 years: uncovering antecedents for the development of math-science expertise, Perspect Psychol Sci 1 (2006), pp. 316–345.
[13] N.K. Humphrey, The social function of intellect. In: P.P.G. Bateson and R.A. Hinde, Editors, Growing points in ethology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1976).
[14] In: R.W. Byrne and A. Whiten, Editors, Machiavellian intelligence social expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1988).
[15] L. Brothers, The social brain: a project for integrating primate behavior and neurophysiology in a new domain, Concept Neurosci 1 (1990), pp. 27–51.
[16] B.G. Charlton, Theory of mind delusions and bizarre delusions in an evolutionary perspective: psychiatry and the social brain. In: Martin Brune, Hedda Ribbert and Wulf Schiefenhovel, Editors, The social brain – evolution and pathology, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester (2003), pp. 315–338.
[17] Charlton BG. Why it is ‘better’ to be reliable but dumb than smart but slapdash: are intelligence (IQ) and conscientiousness best regarded as gifts or virtues? Med Hypotheses; in press, doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.06.048.
[18] D. Nettle, Personality: what makes you the way you are, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2007).
[19] G. Miller, Spent: sex, evolution and consumer behaviour, Viking, New York (2009).
[20] I.J. Deary, G.D. Batty and C.R. Gale, Bright children become enlightened adults, Psychol Sci 19 (2008), pp. 1–6.
[21] R. Lynn, J. Harvey and H. Nyborg, Average intelligence predicts atheism rates across 137 nations, Intelligence 37 (2009), pp. 11–15.
[22] S. Baron-Cohen, The essential difference: men, women and the extreme male brain, Penguin/Basic Books, London (2003).
[23] B.G. Charlton, The rise of the boy-genius: psychological neoteny, science and modern life, Med Hypotheses 67 (2006), pp. 679–681.
[24] B.G. Charlton, Psychological neoteny and higher education: associations with delayed parenthood, Med Hypotheses 69 (2007), pp. 237–240.
[25] Penke L. Creativity: theories, prediction, and etiology. Diploma thesis. Department of Psychology, University of Bielefeld, Germany
[26] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[27] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[28] B.G. Charlton, From nutty professor to buddy love: personality types in modern science, Med Hypotheses 8 (2007), pp. 243–244.
[29] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life, New York, Forbes (1994).
[30] G. Miller, The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature, Heinemann, London (2000).
[31] A. Pierce, G.F. Miller, R. Arden and L. Gottfredson, Why is intelligence correlated with semen quality? Biochemical pathways common to sperm and neurons, and the evolutionary genetics of general fitness, Commun Integr Biol 2 (2009), pp. 1–3.
[32] B.G. Charlton, Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 625–628.
[33] B.G. Charlton, First a hero of science and now a martyr to science: the James Watson Affair – political correctness crushes free scientific communication, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1077–1080.
[34] B.G. Charlton, Replacing education with psychometrics: how learning about IQ almost-completely changed my mind about education, Med Hypotheses 73 (2009), pp. 273–277.
[35] G. Clark, A Farewell to Alms: a brief economic history of the world, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA (2007).
[36] K.E. Stanovitch, The robot’s rebellion: finding meaning in the age of Darwin, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2004).
[37] B.G. Charlton, Alienation, recovered animism and altered states of consciousness, Med Hypotheses 68 (2007), pp. 727–731.
Monday, 31 August 2009
Reliable but dumb, or smart but slapdash?
Bruce G Charlton
Why it is ‘better’ to be reliable but dumb than smart but slapdash: Are intelligence (IQ) and Conscientiousness best regarded as gifts or virtues?
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; Volume 73: 465-467
Editorial
Summary
The psychological attributes of intelligence and personality are usually seen as being quite distinct in nature: higher intelligence being regarded a ‘gift’ (bestowed mostly by heredity); while personality or ‘character’ is morally evaluated by others, on the assumption that it is mostly a consequence of choice? So a teacher is more likely to praise a child for their highly Conscientious personality (high ‘C’) – an ability to take the long view, work hard with self-discipline and persevere in the face of difficulty – than for possessing high IQ. Even in science, where high intelligence is greatly valued, it is seen as being more virtuous to be a reliable and steady worker. Yet it is probable that both IQ and personality traits (such as high-C) are about-equally inherited ‘gifts’ (heritability of both likely to be in excess of 0.5). Rankings of both IQ and C are generally stable throughout life (although absolute levels of both will typically increase throughout the lifespan, with IQ peaking in late-teens and C probably peaking in middle age). Furthermore, high IQ is not just an ability to be used only as required; higher IQ also carries various behavioural predispositions – as reflected in the positive correlation with the personality trait of Openness to Experience; and characteristically ‘left-wing’ or ‘enlightened’ socio-political values among high IQ individuals. However, IQ is ‘effortless’ while high-C emerges mainly in tough situations where exceptional effort is required. So we probably tend to regard personality in moral terms because this fits with a social system that provides incentives for virtuous behaviour (including Conscientiousness). In conclusion, high IQ should probably more often be regarded in morally evaluative terms because it is associated with behavioural predispositions; while C should probably be interpreted with more emphasis on its being a gift or natural ability. In particular, people with high levels of C are very lucky in modern societies, since they are usually well-rewarded for this aptitude. This includes science, where it seems that C has been selected-for more rigorously than IQ. Indeed, those ‘gifted’ with high Conscientiousness are in some ways even luckier than the very intelligent – because there are more jobs for reliable and hard-working people (even if they are relatively ‘dumb’) than for smart people with undependable personalities.
***
Moral evaluations of intelligence and personality
The psychological attributes of intelligence and personality are usually seen as being quite distinct in nature: higher intelligence being regarded as a morally-neutral aptitude which is a lucky ‘gift’; while personality or ‘character’ is morally evaluated by others, on the assumption that it is mostly a consequence of choices. So a teacher is much more likely repeatedly to praise a child for exceptional self-discipline and hard work than for being of high intelligence. In other words, virtue is seen as an aspect of character/personality rather than intelligence.
General intelligence (aka. ‘g factor’ intelligence, or ‘intelligence quotient’ or IQ) [1], [2], [3] and [4] and the ‘Big Five’ personality trait of Conscientiousness [5], [6] and [7] are the two main measurable psychological factors, higher levels of which are predictive of better educational and job performance [8] and [9]. IQ is the aptitude that enables a person to think abstractly and logically, to solve a wide range of novel problems, and to learn rapidly.
The personality trait of Conscientiousness (‘C’) incorporates features such as perseverance, self-discipline, meticulousness, and long-termism. In a nutshell, Conscientiousness is the capacity to work hard at a task over the long-term despite finding the task uninteresting and despite receiving no immediate reward.
The usual conceptualization sees IQ as a gift and C as a virtue; i.e. intelligence as an ability available to be used when necessary and personality traits such as Conscientiousness as a moral disposition to make better or worse behavioural choices. The mainstream idea would be that people are not responsible for the level of their intelligence but are responsible for their behaviour. So apparently it makes sense to praise Conscientiousness as virtuous but not similarly to praise IQ.
However, I will argue that – while there are indeed practical reasons to praise good behaviour – in reality IQ has morally-relevant elements, while high-C (and other valued personality traits) should also be regarded as a gift. So, both intelligence and personality can be regarded either as gifts or as virtues, according to context.
Intelligence is regarded as a gift
Most people regard intelligence as a ‘gift’ – and highly intelligent children have sometimes been termed gifted. This interpretation is accurate, in the sense that the main known determinant of general intelligence is heredity: people inherit intelligence from their parents [1], [2], [3] and [4]. While bad experiences (such as starvation and disease in the womb or during infancy) can pull intelligence downwards, it is at present difficult or impossible significantly to raise a person’s real, underlying, long-term predictive general intelligence by any kind of environmental intervention[10]. (It may, however, be possible to raise IQ scores by practicing IQ tests and other focused interventions; but this does not cash-out into significant and prolonged general benefits in terms of education and employment).
IQ is calculated by testing groups of people at different ages, and (usually) putting their scores into rank order and organizing rankings onto a normal distribution curve with a mean average IQ of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Using this type of calculation, intelligence scores/rankings are relatively stable throughout life – so that a child of 8 with high IQ will usually grow to become an adult with similarly high IQ, and vice versa [1], [2], [3] and [4].
Because intelligence is a gift which is substantially hereditary and stable throughout life, on the whole it is regarded as a result of ‘luck’ and something for which people should be grateful; and not, therefore, as a virtue deserving of moral approbation or praise. Indeed, people with high intelligence may be given less help than they need, and may be held to a higher standard of behaviour, precisely because they are regarded as lucky.
Higher intelligence is socially valued more highly than lower intelligence, probably because people with a higher IQ are on average more useful economically [11] (having higher economic productivity, on average); nonetheless the most intelligent people are not usually regarded as intrinsically virtuous nor especially morally praiseworthy. And although it is true that people of low intelligence may attract hurtful and insulting descriptors such as dumb, dull, slow or stupid; nonetheless, a person with these attributes is not regarded as intrinsically wicked.
Personality traits are morally evaluated
There is a contrast between IQ and personality in respect of moral evaluations. While IQ is seen as a gift there is a spontaneous tendency to regard personality as a morally distinguishing feature – as a visible marker of a person’s underlying moral nature. It is quite normal to praise the most diligent people for their high capacity for hard work, and at the same time to regard them as merely fortunate if they are also of high intelligence.
Yet it is probable that both IQ and personality traits (such as the ability to work hard) are almost-equally hereditary ‘gifts’. The heritability of IQ is generally quoted as between 0.5 and 0.8 (probably at the higher end) [1], [2], [3] and [4] and the heritability of personality is quoted as being around 0.5 [5], [6] and [7]. However, the estimate of personality heritability is certainly an underestimate due to the sub-optimal conceptualization of personality traits, and especially to the lesser precision of current personality measurement methods compared with IQ tests [4]. To the extent that these things can be observed in everyday experience, both IQ and personality are probably about-equally inherited; and the high IQ and extra-hard-working person should about-equally thank their genes rather than congratulate themselves.
Furthermore, rankings of personality, like IQ, are generally stable throughout life; so that a highly Conscientious child will probably grow into a highly Conscientious adult and vice versa (whatever their familial, educational and socially experiences may be). However, it is also important to recognize that average personality traits change through the lifespan – e.g. Conscientiousness levels increase through early adult life, while Extraversion declines [12]. The high-C personality type which enables people to work hard, be self-disciplined and pursue long-term goals is therefore, in this sense, no more ‘virtuous’ than the high IQ ability quickly to do complex verbal, mathematic and symbolic puzzles.
But Conscientiousness is often regarded as highly moral behaviour, and an exceptionally-reliable individual will probably be regarded as virtuous even when they are of low IQ. However, in contrast, a person who is low in C is likely to be feckless, distractible, slapdash, and focused on short-term rewards – even when they are very intelligent. These behaviours are regarded as moral deficiencies; and the coexistence of high IQ in some ways makes it worse, because it is often felt that clever people ‘should know better’. Of course, low-C traits are negatively evaluated probably for the obvious reason that they are not very useful socially – indeed a person of very low Conscientiousness is likely to be a poor student and troublesome employee under most circumstances.
Aside, it should be noted that low-C may also be associated with some positively-evaluated attributes; especially creativity (insofar as highly creative people tend to have very high IQ and moderately high ‘Psychoticism’ which trait includes moderately-low Conscientiousness [13]). I have previously suggested that selecting for very high-C will therefore – as an unintended side effect – tend to reduce the average level of creativity; and that this may have happened in science over the past several decades [14].
Furthermore, it has been argued that in the hunter gatherer societies of our ancestors it would probably have been advantageous for most people to have lower levels of C than seem to be optimal nowadays; in the sense that it was more important for hunter gatherers to react spontaneously and quickly to immediate stimuli; and less important for them to plan far ahead, or to be able to persevere in the unrewarding and often repetitive tasks that characterize much of formal education or agricultural and industrial employment [7].
But in modern societies, it is certainly an advantage (on average) to have higher levels of C.
Moral evaluation of personality
The evidence therefore suggests that it is likely that although the two psychological attributes of IQ and C are not highly-correlated (see Ref. [13] for review); the ability to work hard and with self-discipline and the ability of general intelligence are about-equally inherited, about-equally stable throughout life, and about-equally difficult to change either by self-determination or by the social interventions of other people. It seems that we as individuals are pretty much ‘stuck with’ the intelligence and the personalities with which we were born; and it is strange that exceptional IQ should be regarded as a gift while exceptional C is regarded as being the praiseworthy result of resolution and effort.
It might be argued that personality traits are associated with moral behaviours in a way that IQ is not. Certainly personality traits do have moral aspects. Three of the Big Five – Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Neuroticism – have one extreme which would generally be immoral [6] and [7]. For example, it would generally be regarded as ‘bad behaviour’ to be low in Agreeableness since this would include selfishness, uncooperativeness, emotional coldness, unfriendliness, unhelpfulness. Likewise it may be regarded as socially-undesirable to be high in Neuroticism since this would include proneness to mood swings, irritability and anger.
But the reason that humans apparently spontaneously regard personality in moral terms is presumably because humans respond to incentives. Society would probably wish to encourage pro-social behaviour by praising it, on the basis that even though personality rankings cannot be much changed by whole-population interventions, at the individual level behaviour can be shaped by incentives – by rewards and punishments.
Furthermore, high-C behaviour takes more effort than low-C behaviour. Although the ability to work hard on topics that are uninteresting is mostly hereditary, and therefore a gift, hard work is still hard work, and it is still easier not to work hard! Slapdash, distractible behaviour is undemanding, takes less effort. So, unless there is system of incentives which encourages hard work, then the default position is to work less hard, or not to work at all.
However, when the same incentives are applied to the whole of a group of people varying in C; it is unreasonable and may be cruel to expect that the Conscientiousness gap between high and low individuals to disappear. Although all students might work harder, at least while the incentives were being applied, the gap between high-C and low-C students would remain, and the size of this gap might increase. Certainly, this is what has been found with IQ, when attempting to close various IQ-testing ‘gaps’. And, insofar as C is like IQ (heritable and stable), the possible size of improvement due to interventions is likely to be modest or negligible [2]. The accumulated experience of trying to improve general intelligence (in developed nations) is that it is difficult or impossible to produce sustained long-term improvements in intelligence, especially when the improvements are tested by independent outcomes such performance in employment. Improvements are often superficial results of specific training which only enhance specific types of test performance or evaluations done while under the influence of structured motivational systems [10].
Conclusion
Personality clearly has a moral dimension, but something similar could also be said of intelligence in the indirect sense that higher intelligence is associated with reduced levels of a range of social pathologies including crime and family breakdown [15].
Furthermore intelligence is associated with several aspects of personality and behaviour. There is a positive association between IQ and the Big Five trait of Openness to Experience – which means that more-intelligent people are more likely to seek novelty, enjoy artistic experiences, and be imaginative [7]. Furthermore, intelligence is associated positively with atheism and also with what have been termed ‘enlightened’ values such as left-wing or ‘liberal’ and anti-traditional/anti-conservative views [16]. So that IQ is associated with several morally-evaluated socio-political views which could be judged as virtuous, adaptive, mistaken or even damaging – according to one’s socio-political and religious perspective.
I do not, however, wish to press the similarity of personality and intelligence too hard since these attributes may have a somewhat distinct evolutionary rationale, and selectional basis [17]. My main point is that, although we regard intelligence and personality as different kinds of psychological attributes, in fact they are similar in several important ways.
Nonetheless, in sum, it seems that our traditional interpretations of intelligence and personality require modification. IQ is not just an ability which can be used as required; instead higher IQ is also a predisposition which on average includes a bias towards some types of behaviours and away from others. And high conscientiousness – such as the ability to take the long view, work hard and persevere in the face of difficulty – should probably be interpreted with more emphasis on its being a gift in much the same sense as high intelligence – despite the fact that IQ is ‘effortless’ while high-C emerges mainly in tough situations where exceptional diligence is required.
People with high levels of IQ are mostly very lucky, as is widely recognized; but people with high-C are very lucky too, because they are usually well-rewarded for this aptitude in modern society; and indeed rewarded in science too, where it seems that self-discipline is now selected-for more rigorously than IQ [14].
Indeed, in some ways those ‘gifted’ with high-C are even luckier than very intelligent people, because there are always going to be more jobs for reliable and hard-working people (even if they are relatively ‘dumb’) than jobs which are suitable for smart people who are undependable, short-termist and slapdash.
References
[1] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Am Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[2] A.R. Jensen, The g factor: the science of mental ability, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1988).
[3] N.J. Mackintosh, IQ and human intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998).
[4] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
[5] J.R. Harris, The nurture assumption: why children turn out the way they do, Bloomsbury, London (1998).
[6] G. Matthews, I.J. Deary and M.C. Whiteman, Personality traits, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2003).
[7] D. Nettle, Personality: what makes you the way you are, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2007).
[8] M.R. Barrick and M.K. Mount, The big five personality dimensions and job performance: a meta analysis, Pers Psychol 44 (1991), pp. 1–26.
[9] A.L. Duckworth and M.E.P. Seligman, Self-discipline outdoes IQ in predicting academic performance of adolescents, Psychol Sci 12 (2005), pp. 939–944.
[10] H.H. Spitz, The raising of intelligence: a selected history of attempts to raise retarded intelligence, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, USA (1986).
[11] L.S. Gottfredson, Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse societies. In: C.L. Frisby and C.R. Reynolds, Editors, Comprehensive handbook of multicultural school psychology, Wiley, New York (2005), pp. 517–554.
[12] P.T. Costa and R.R. McCrae, Stability and change in personality from adolescence through adulthood. In: C.F. Halverson Jr, G.A. Kohnstamm and R.P. Martin, Editors, The developing structure of temperament and personality from infancy to adulthood, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, USA (1994), pp. 139–150.
[13] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[14] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[15] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life, Forbes, New York (1994).
[16] I.J. Deary, C.D. Batty and C.R. Gale, Bright children become enlightened adults, Psychol Sci 19 (2008), pp. 1–6.
[17] L. Penke, J.J. Denissen and G.F. Miller, The evolutionary genetics of personality, Eur J Personality 21 (2007), pp. 549–587.
Why it is ‘better’ to be reliable but dumb than smart but slapdash: Are intelligence (IQ) and Conscientiousness best regarded as gifts or virtues?
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; Volume 73: 465-467
Editorial
Summary
The psychological attributes of intelligence and personality are usually seen as being quite distinct in nature: higher intelligence being regarded a ‘gift’ (bestowed mostly by heredity); while personality or ‘character’ is morally evaluated by others, on the assumption that it is mostly a consequence of choice? So a teacher is more likely to praise a child for their highly Conscientious personality (high ‘C’) – an ability to take the long view, work hard with self-discipline and persevere in the face of difficulty – than for possessing high IQ. Even in science, where high intelligence is greatly valued, it is seen as being more virtuous to be a reliable and steady worker. Yet it is probable that both IQ and personality traits (such as high-C) are about-equally inherited ‘gifts’ (heritability of both likely to be in excess of 0.5). Rankings of both IQ and C are generally stable throughout life (although absolute levels of both will typically increase throughout the lifespan, with IQ peaking in late-teens and C probably peaking in middle age). Furthermore, high IQ is not just an ability to be used only as required; higher IQ also carries various behavioural predispositions – as reflected in the positive correlation with the personality trait of Openness to Experience; and characteristically ‘left-wing’ or ‘enlightened’ socio-political values among high IQ individuals. However, IQ is ‘effortless’ while high-C emerges mainly in tough situations where exceptional effort is required. So we probably tend to regard personality in moral terms because this fits with a social system that provides incentives for virtuous behaviour (including Conscientiousness). In conclusion, high IQ should probably more often be regarded in morally evaluative terms because it is associated with behavioural predispositions; while C should probably be interpreted with more emphasis on its being a gift or natural ability. In particular, people with high levels of C are very lucky in modern societies, since they are usually well-rewarded for this aptitude. This includes science, where it seems that C has been selected-for more rigorously than IQ. Indeed, those ‘gifted’ with high Conscientiousness are in some ways even luckier than the very intelligent – because there are more jobs for reliable and hard-working people (even if they are relatively ‘dumb’) than for smart people with undependable personalities.
***
Moral evaluations of intelligence and personality
The psychological attributes of intelligence and personality are usually seen as being quite distinct in nature: higher intelligence being regarded as a morally-neutral aptitude which is a lucky ‘gift’; while personality or ‘character’ is morally evaluated by others, on the assumption that it is mostly a consequence of choices. So a teacher is much more likely repeatedly to praise a child for exceptional self-discipline and hard work than for being of high intelligence. In other words, virtue is seen as an aspect of character/personality rather than intelligence.
General intelligence (aka. ‘g factor’ intelligence, or ‘intelligence quotient’ or IQ) [1], [2], [3] and [4] and the ‘Big Five’ personality trait of Conscientiousness [5], [6] and [7] are the two main measurable psychological factors, higher levels of which are predictive of better educational and job performance [8] and [9]. IQ is the aptitude that enables a person to think abstractly and logically, to solve a wide range of novel problems, and to learn rapidly.
The personality trait of Conscientiousness (‘C’) incorporates features such as perseverance, self-discipline, meticulousness, and long-termism. In a nutshell, Conscientiousness is the capacity to work hard at a task over the long-term despite finding the task uninteresting and despite receiving no immediate reward.
The usual conceptualization sees IQ as a gift and C as a virtue; i.e. intelligence as an ability available to be used when necessary and personality traits such as Conscientiousness as a moral disposition to make better or worse behavioural choices. The mainstream idea would be that people are not responsible for the level of their intelligence but are responsible for their behaviour. So apparently it makes sense to praise Conscientiousness as virtuous but not similarly to praise IQ.
However, I will argue that – while there are indeed practical reasons to praise good behaviour – in reality IQ has morally-relevant elements, while high-C (and other valued personality traits) should also be regarded as a gift. So, both intelligence and personality can be regarded either as gifts or as virtues, according to context.
Intelligence is regarded as a gift
Most people regard intelligence as a ‘gift’ – and highly intelligent children have sometimes been termed gifted. This interpretation is accurate, in the sense that the main known determinant of general intelligence is heredity: people inherit intelligence from their parents [1], [2], [3] and [4]. While bad experiences (such as starvation and disease in the womb or during infancy) can pull intelligence downwards, it is at present difficult or impossible significantly to raise a person’s real, underlying, long-term predictive general intelligence by any kind of environmental intervention[10]. (It may, however, be possible to raise IQ scores by practicing IQ tests and other focused interventions; but this does not cash-out into significant and prolonged general benefits in terms of education and employment).
IQ is calculated by testing groups of people at different ages, and (usually) putting their scores into rank order and organizing rankings onto a normal distribution curve with a mean average IQ of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. Using this type of calculation, intelligence scores/rankings are relatively stable throughout life – so that a child of 8 with high IQ will usually grow to become an adult with similarly high IQ, and vice versa [1], [2], [3] and [4].
Because intelligence is a gift which is substantially hereditary and stable throughout life, on the whole it is regarded as a result of ‘luck’ and something for which people should be grateful; and not, therefore, as a virtue deserving of moral approbation or praise. Indeed, people with high intelligence may be given less help than they need, and may be held to a higher standard of behaviour, precisely because they are regarded as lucky.
Higher intelligence is socially valued more highly than lower intelligence, probably because people with a higher IQ are on average more useful economically [11] (having higher economic productivity, on average); nonetheless the most intelligent people are not usually regarded as intrinsically virtuous nor especially morally praiseworthy. And although it is true that people of low intelligence may attract hurtful and insulting descriptors such as dumb, dull, slow or stupid; nonetheless, a person with these attributes is not regarded as intrinsically wicked.
Personality traits are morally evaluated
There is a contrast between IQ and personality in respect of moral evaluations. While IQ is seen as a gift there is a spontaneous tendency to regard personality as a morally distinguishing feature – as a visible marker of a person’s underlying moral nature. It is quite normal to praise the most diligent people for their high capacity for hard work, and at the same time to regard them as merely fortunate if they are also of high intelligence.
Yet it is probable that both IQ and personality traits (such as the ability to work hard) are almost-equally hereditary ‘gifts’. The heritability of IQ is generally quoted as between 0.5 and 0.8 (probably at the higher end) [1], [2], [3] and [4] and the heritability of personality is quoted as being around 0.5 [5], [6] and [7]. However, the estimate of personality heritability is certainly an underestimate due to the sub-optimal conceptualization of personality traits, and especially to the lesser precision of current personality measurement methods compared with IQ tests [4]. To the extent that these things can be observed in everyday experience, both IQ and personality are probably about-equally inherited; and the high IQ and extra-hard-working person should about-equally thank their genes rather than congratulate themselves.
Furthermore, rankings of personality, like IQ, are generally stable throughout life; so that a highly Conscientious child will probably grow into a highly Conscientious adult and vice versa (whatever their familial, educational and socially experiences may be). However, it is also important to recognize that average personality traits change through the lifespan – e.g. Conscientiousness levels increase through early adult life, while Extraversion declines [12]. The high-C personality type which enables people to work hard, be self-disciplined and pursue long-term goals is therefore, in this sense, no more ‘virtuous’ than the high IQ ability quickly to do complex verbal, mathematic and symbolic puzzles.
But Conscientiousness is often regarded as highly moral behaviour, and an exceptionally-reliable individual will probably be regarded as virtuous even when they are of low IQ. However, in contrast, a person who is low in C is likely to be feckless, distractible, slapdash, and focused on short-term rewards – even when they are very intelligent. These behaviours are regarded as moral deficiencies; and the coexistence of high IQ in some ways makes it worse, because it is often felt that clever people ‘should know better’. Of course, low-C traits are negatively evaluated probably for the obvious reason that they are not very useful socially – indeed a person of very low Conscientiousness is likely to be a poor student and troublesome employee under most circumstances.
Aside, it should be noted that low-C may also be associated with some positively-evaluated attributes; especially creativity (insofar as highly creative people tend to have very high IQ and moderately high ‘Psychoticism’ which trait includes moderately-low Conscientiousness [13]). I have previously suggested that selecting for very high-C will therefore – as an unintended side effect – tend to reduce the average level of creativity; and that this may have happened in science over the past several decades [14].
Furthermore, it has been argued that in the hunter gatherer societies of our ancestors it would probably have been advantageous for most people to have lower levels of C than seem to be optimal nowadays; in the sense that it was more important for hunter gatherers to react spontaneously and quickly to immediate stimuli; and less important for them to plan far ahead, or to be able to persevere in the unrewarding and often repetitive tasks that characterize much of formal education or agricultural and industrial employment [7].
But in modern societies, it is certainly an advantage (on average) to have higher levels of C.
Moral evaluation of personality
The evidence therefore suggests that it is likely that although the two psychological attributes of IQ and C are not highly-correlated (see Ref. [13] for review); the ability to work hard and with self-discipline and the ability of general intelligence are about-equally inherited, about-equally stable throughout life, and about-equally difficult to change either by self-determination or by the social interventions of other people. It seems that we as individuals are pretty much ‘stuck with’ the intelligence and the personalities with which we were born; and it is strange that exceptional IQ should be regarded as a gift while exceptional C is regarded as being the praiseworthy result of resolution and effort.
It might be argued that personality traits are associated with moral behaviours in a way that IQ is not. Certainly personality traits do have moral aspects. Three of the Big Five – Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Neuroticism – have one extreme which would generally be immoral [6] and [7]. For example, it would generally be regarded as ‘bad behaviour’ to be low in Agreeableness since this would include selfishness, uncooperativeness, emotional coldness, unfriendliness, unhelpfulness. Likewise it may be regarded as socially-undesirable to be high in Neuroticism since this would include proneness to mood swings, irritability and anger.
But the reason that humans apparently spontaneously regard personality in moral terms is presumably because humans respond to incentives. Society would probably wish to encourage pro-social behaviour by praising it, on the basis that even though personality rankings cannot be much changed by whole-population interventions, at the individual level behaviour can be shaped by incentives – by rewards and punishments.
Furthermore, high-C behaviour takes more effort than low-C behaviour. Although the ability to work hard on topics that are uninteresting is mostly hereditary, and therefore a gift, hard work is still hard work, and it is still easier not to work hard! Slapdash, distractible behaviour is undemanding, takes less effort. So, unless there is system of incentives which encourages hard work, then the default position is to work less hard, or not to work at all.
However, when the same incentives are applied to the whole of a group of people varying in C; it is unreasonable and may be cruel to expect that the Conscientiousness gap between high and low individuals to disappear. Although all students might work harder, at least while the incentives were being applied, the gap between high-C and low-C students would remain, and the size of this gap might increase. Certainly, this is what has been found with IQ, when attempting to close various IQ-testing ‘gaps’. And, insofar as C is like IQ (heritable and stable), the possible size of improvement due to interventions is likely to be modest or negligible [2]. The accumulated experience of trying to improve general intelligence (in developed nations) is that it is difficult or impossible to produce sustained long-term improvements in intelligence, especially when the improvements are tested by independent outcomes such performance in employment. Improvements are often superficial results of specific training which only enhance specific types of test performance or evaluations done while under the influence of structured motivational systems [10].
Conclusion
Personality clearly has a moral dimension, but something similar could also be said of intelligence in the indirect sense that higher intelligence is associated with reduced levels of a range of social pathologies including crime and family breakdown [15].
Furthermore intelligence is associated with several aspects of personality and behaviour. There is a positive association between IQ and the Big Five trait of Openness to Experience – which means that more-intelligent people are more likely to seek novelty, enjoy artistic experiences, and be imaginative [7]. Furthermore, intelligence is associated positively with atheism and also with what have been termed ‘enlightened’ values such as left-wing or ‘liberal’ and anti-traditional/anti-conservative views [16]. So that IQ is associated with several morally-evaluated socio-political views which could be judged as virtuous, adaptive, mistaken or even damaging – according to one’s socio-political and religious perspective.
I do not, however, wish to press the similarity of personality and intelligence too hard since these attributes may have a somewhat distinct evolutionary rationale, and selectional basis [17]. My main point is that, although we regard intelligence and personality as different kinds of psychological attributes, in fact they are similar in several important ways.
Nonetheless, in sum, it seems that our traditional interpretations of intelligence and personality require modification. IQ is not just an ability which can be used as required; instead higher IQ is also a predisposition which on average includes a bias towards some types of behaviours and away from others. And high conscientiousness – such as the ability to take the long view, work hard and persevere in the face of difficulty – should probably be interpreted with more emphasis on its being a gift in much the same sense as high intelligence – despite the fact that IQ is ‘effortless’ while high-C emerges mainly in tough situations where exceptional diligence is required.
People with high levels of IQ are mostly very lucky, as is widely recognized; but people with high-C are very lucky too, because they are usually well-rewarded for this aptitude in modern society; and indeed rewarded in science too, where it seems that self-discipline is now selected-for more rigorously than IQ [14].
Indeed, in some ways those ‘gifted’ with high-C are even luckier than very intelligent people, because there are always going to be more jobs for reliable and hard-working people (even if they are relatively ‘dumb’) than jobs which are suitable for smart people who are undependable, short-termist and slapdash.
References
[1] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Am Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[2] A.R. Jensen, The g factor: the science of mental ability, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1988).
[3] N.J. Mackintosh, IQ and human intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998).
[4] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
[5] J.R. Harris, The nurture assumption: why children turn out the way they do, Bloomsbury, London (1998).
[6] G. Matthews, I.J. Deary and M.C. Whiteman, Personality traits, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2003).
[7] D. Nettle, Personality: what makes you the way you are, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2007).
[8] M.R. Barrick and M.K. Mount, The big five personality dimensions and job performance: a meta analysis, Pers Psychol 44 (1991), pp. 1–26.
[9] A.L. Duckworth and M.E.P. Seligman, Self-discipline outdoes IQ in predicting academic performance of adolescents, Psychol Sci 12 (2005), pp. 939–944.
[10] H.H. Spitz, The raising of intelligence: a selected history of attempts to raise retarded intelligence, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, USA (1986).
[11] L.S. Gottfredson, Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse societies. In: C.L. Frisby and C.R. Reynolds, Editors, Comprehensive handbook of multicultural school psychology, Wiley, New York (2005), pp. 517–554.
[12] P.T. Costa and R.R. McCrae, Stability and change in personality from adolescence through adulthood. In: C.F. Halverson Jr, G.A. Kohnstamm and R.P. Martin, Editors, The developing structure of temperament and personality from infancy to adulthood, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, USA (1994), pp. 139–150.
[13] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[14] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[15] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life, Forbes, New York (1994).
[16] I.J. Deary, C.D. Batty and C.R. Gale, Bright children become enlightened adults, Psychol Sci 19 (2008), pp. 1–6.
[17] L. Penke, J.J. Denissen and G.F. Miller, The evolutionary genetics of personality, Eur J Personality 21 (2007), pp. 549–587.
Saturday, 11 July 2009
Replacing education with psychometrics
Bruce G Charlton
Replacing education with psychometrics: How learning about IQ almost-completely changed my mind about education.
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; 73: 273-277
***
Summary
I myself am a prime example of the way in which ignorance of IQ leads to a distorted understanding of education (and many other matters). I have been writing on the subject of education – especially higher education, science and medical education – for about 20 years, but now believe that many of my earlier ideas were wrong for the simple reason that I did not know about IQ. Since discovering the basic facts about IQ, several of my convictions have undergone a U-turn. Just how radically my ideas were changed has been brought home by two recent books: Real Education by Charles Murray and Spent by Geoffrey Miller. Since IQ and personality are substantially hereditary and rankings (although not absolute levels) are highly stable throughout a persons adult life, this implies that differential educational attainment within a society is mostly determined by heredity and therefore not by differences in educational experience. This implies that education is about selection more than enhancement, and educational qualifications mainly serve to ‘signal’ or quantify a person’s hereditary attributes. So education mostly functions as an extremely slow, inefficient and imprecise form of psychometric testing. It would therefore be easy to construct a modern educational system that was both more efficient and more effective than the current one. I now advocate a substantial reduction in the average amount of formal education and the proportion of the population attending higher education institutions. At the age of about sixteen each person could leave school with a set of knowledge-based examination results demonstrating their level of competence in a core knowledge curriculum; and with usefully precise and valid psychometric measurements of their general intelligence and personality (especially their age ranked degree of Conscientiousness). However, such change would result in a massive down-sizing of the educational system and this is a key underlying reason why IQ has become a taboo subject. Miller suggests that academics at the most expensive, elite, intelligence-screening universities tend to be sceptical of psychometric testing; precisely because they do not want to be undercut by cheaper, faster, more-reliable IQ and personality evaluations.
***
Introduction
It was only in early 2007 that I began properly to engage, for the first time in my professional career, with the literature on IQ. Surprisingly, this engagement had been stimulated by a book of economic history. And learning the basic facts about IQ rapidly changed my views on many things, none more so than education.
Just how radically my ideas about education were changed by learning about IQ has been brought home by two recent books: Real Education By Charles Murray [1] and Spent by Geoffrey Miller [2]. In line with analyses of Murray and Miller, I would now repudiate many of my previous opinions on the subject, and advocate a substantial reduction in the average amount of formal education and the proportion of the population attending higher education. In general, I now believe that many years of formal education can and should be substantially (but not entirely!) replaced with ‘psychometric’ measures of intelligence and personality as a basis for evaluating career potential.
In this article I use my own experience as a case study of the potentially-disruptive influence of psychometric knowledge, and discuss further the reasons why basic IQ facts have been so effectively concealed, confused and denied by mainstream elite intellectual opinion in the UK and USA.
The importance of IQ
I have been writing on the subject of education for about 20 years (especially on higher education, science and medical education), but I now believe that much of what I wrote was wrong for the simple reason that I did not know about IQ. Personality traits are important in a similar way to IQ, however personality measurement is currently less reliable and valid than IQ testing, and less-well quantified.
In the early 2000s I argued that modern formal education should be directed primarily at inculcating the ability to think abstractly and systematically [3] and that therefore the structure and not the specific content of education was critical (although ‘science’ – broadly defined – was likely to be the best basis for this type of education [4]). I suggested that higher education should be regarded as a non-vocational process, in which most degrees are modular, and modules were optional and multi-disciplinary, so that each student would assemble their own degree program in a minimally-constrained, ‘pick and mix’ fashion [5]. I also contended that since abstract systemizing cognition was so essential to modernizing societies, a major aim of social reform should be to include as many people as possible in formal education for as long as possible [6].
All of these views I would now regard as mistaken – and the reason is mostly my new understanding of IQ [7], [8], [9] and [10]. Miller concisely explains the basic facts about IQ:
“General intelligence (a.k.a. IQ, general cognitive ability, the g factor) is a way of quantifying intelligence’s variability among people. It is the best-established, most predictive, most heritable mental trait ever discovered in psychology. Whether measured with formal IQ tests or assessed through informal conversations and observations, intelligence predicts objective performance and learning ability across all important life-domains that show reliable individual differences” [2].
The crux of my new understanding is that IQ, and to a lesser but important extent personality traits, are highly predictive of educational attainment. This is a very old finding, and scientifically uncontroversial – but the implications have still not been acknowledged.
Since IQ is very substantially inherited with a true heritability of about 80% [7], [8], [9] and [10] and personality too has about a 50% heritability [11] and [12]; and since both IQ and personality rankings are highly stable throughout a persons adult life [13] (it is, for example, very difficult for educational interventions to have any significant and lasting effect on underlying IQ [1]) – then this implies that differential educational attainment within societies is mostly determined by heredity and therefore not by differences in educational experience.
(The other big factor which influences attainment is of course the large element of chance – which affects individuals unpredictably. However, chance is not completely random, in the sense that many outcomes such as accidental injuries and a range of illnesses are also correlated with IQ and personality [14]).
When full account has been taken of IQ and personality (and the measured effects of IQ and personality have been increased to take account of the inevitable imprecision of IQ measurements and the even greater difficulties of determining personality), and when the presumed effects of chance have also been subtracted – then there is not much variation of outcomes left-over within which educational differences could have an effect. Of course there will be some systemic effect of educational differences, but the effect is likely to be very much smaller than generally assumed, and even the direction of the education effect may be hard to detect when other more powerful factors are operative [1].
I found the fact that differences in educational attainment within a society are mostly due to heredity to be a stunning conclusion, which effectively demolished most of what I believed about education. My understanding of what education was doing was radically reshaped, and my beliefs about the justifiable duration and proper focus of the system of formal education were transformed. I began to realize that the educational system in modern societies was operating under false pretences. It seems that current educational systems are barely ‘fit for purpose’ and (lacking a proper understanding of IQ) are in many instances progressively getting worse rather than better.
In sum, education is more about selection than enhancement, and educational qualifications mostly serve to ‘signal’ or quantify a person’s hereditary attributes [15] – especially IQ and personality. Differential educational experience does not seem to have much of a systemic effect on people’s ability to think or work.
To put it another way – education mostly functions as an extremely slow, inefficient and imprecise form of psychometric testing. And because this fact is poorly understood, those aspects of modern education which are not psychometric are consequently neglected and misdirected.
Policy implications of psychometrics
If psychometric measures of IQ and personality were available, then it would be easy to construct a modern educational system that was both more efficient and more effective than the current one. However, such change would result in a massive down-sizing of the educational system – with substantial and permanent loss of jobs and status for educational professionals of all types including teachers, professors, administrators and managers.
According to Geoffrey Miller’s analysis [2], this impact on educational professionals is likely to be a key underlying reason why IQ has become a taboo subject, and why the basic facts of IQ have been so effectively obfuscated. Miller notes that it is the ultra-elite, most-selective and heavily research-oriented universities which are the focus of IQ resistance. At the same time more functionally-orientated institutions, such as the United States military, have for many decades quietly been using IQ as a tool to assist with selection and training allocations [16].
“Is it an accident that researchers at the most expensive, elite, IQ-screening universities tend to be most sceptical of IQ tests? I think not. Universities offer a costly, slow, unreliable intelligence-indicating product that competes directly with cheap, fast, more-reliable IQ tests. (…) Harvard and Yale sell nicely printed sheets of paper called degrees that cost about $160,000 (…). To obtain the degree, one must demonstrate a decent level of Conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness in one’s coursework, but above all, one must have the intelligence to get admitted, based on SAT scores and high school grades. Thus the Harvard degree is basically an IQ guarantee”.
“Elite universities do not want to be undercut by competitors. They do not want their expensive IQ-warranties to suffer competition from cheap, fast IQ tests which would commodify the intelligence-display market and drive down costs. Therefore, elite universities have a hypocritical, love-hate relationship with intelligence tests”.
The vulnerability of the elite institutions to IQ knowledge is because most of the assumed advantages of an expensive elite education can be ascribed to their historic ability to select the top stratum of IQ (and also the most desirable personality types): given the stability and predictive power of these traits the elite students are therefore pre-determined to be (on average) highly successful.
Consequently the most elite institutions and their graduates have in the past few decades, both via academic publications and in the mass media, thoroughly obscured the basic and validated facts about IQ. We now have a situation where the high predictive powers of IQ and personality and the stable and hereditary nature of these traits are routinely concealed, confused or (in extremis) explicitly denied by some of the most prestigious and best-educated members of modern society [17].
Four mistaken beliefs resulting from my lack of IQ knowledge
I will summarize under four heading my main pre-IQ errors regarding education.
Mistaken belief number 1: Modern formal education should be directed primarily at inculcating the ability to think abstractly and systematically [3].
Revision: Modern formal education should be directed primarily at inculcating specific knowledge content.
Abstract systematic thinking is exceptionally important in modern societies. And I used to believe that that abstract systematic thinking was mostly a product of formal education – indeed I regarded this as the main function of formal education [3]. But I now recognize that abstract systematic thinking is pretty close to a definition of IQ; and that strongly IQ related (or heavily ‘g-loaded’) educational outcomes – such as differentials in reading comprehension and mathematical ability – are very difficult/impossible to improve in a real and sustained fashion by educational interventions [1].
In other words, a person’s level of ability to think abstractly and systematically is mostly a biological given – and not a consequence of formal education. The implication is that formal education should not be focusing on trying to do what it cannot do – i.e. enhance IQ. Instead, formal education should focus on educational goals where is can make a difference: i.e. the teaching of specific knowledge [1].
Mistaken belief number 2: Structure not content of formal education is crucial [5].
Revision: Content not structure of education is crucial.
I used to think that it did not matter what subject was studied in formal education, so long as the method of education was one which nurtured abstract systematic thinking [3]. I believed that how we learned was more important than what we learned, because I believed that abstract systematic thinking was a result of formal education – and this cognitive ability was more important than any particular body of information which had been memorized.
This line of reasoning meant that I favoured ‘pick and mix’, wide choice and multi-disciplinary curricula as a method of improving motivation by allowing students to study what most interested them, and giving students practice in learning new material and applying systematic thinking in many knowledge domains [5].
The reason that I believed all this has been summarized by Geoffrey Miller:
“The highly selective credential with little relevant content [such as an elite college degree in any subject] often trumps the less-selective credential with very relevant content. Nor are such preferences irrational. General intelligence is such a powerful predictor of job performance that a content-free IQ guarantee can be much more valuable to an employer or graduate school than a set of rote-learned content with no IQ guarantee” [2].
Since IQ is such a powerful influence on educational (and other) outcomes [18], the value of specific educational content is therefore only apparent when IQ has been controlled-for. Since IQ is routinely ignored or denied, the value of educational content is not apparent in outcomes which are sensitive to differences in general intelligence.
Murray argues that variations in the structure and methods of education are not able significantly to influence those educational outcomes which are ‘g-loaded’ such as reading comprehension or mathematic reasoning [1]. Numerous attempts to raise real long-term intelligence (rather than merely raising specific test scores) have failed [19]. However, the subject matter being studied will (obviously!) make a big difference to what gets learned. Once we set aside the delusional goal of enhancing IQ by educational reform, then the subject matter – or curriculum – becomes a more important focus than educational structure and methods.
Charles Murray therefore endorses the approach to ‘Cultural Literacy’ or a core knowledge curriculum pioneered by Ed Hirsch (www.coreknowledge.org). This educational philosophy focuses on constructing a comprehensive curriculum of the factual material that people should know, or ‘need to know’. Over the past couple of decades some detailed and well-validated programmes of study have been developed for the USA, and these can be purchased by educational institutions and also home-schooling parents.
It is claimed that such a core knowledge curriculum should enable the student to become a citizen participating at the highest possible social level, and that a shared education in core knowledge should hold society together with a stronger ‘cultural glue’. If such benefits are real, then school, especially between the ages of about 6 and 14, is the best place to follow such a program; since, although the core curriculum involves more than mere memorization, nonetheless memorization is an important element – and young children can memorize information much more easily and lastingly than adults [1].
Understanding IQ has therefore provoked me into a U-turn on the matter of curricula. I now believe that what we learn in formal education is more important than how we learn, because what we learn can have a lasting effect on what we know; while how we learn does not, after all, teach us how to think.
Mistaken belief number 3: A major aim of social reform should be to include as many people as possible in formal education for as long as possible. Ever-more people should get ever-more education for the foreseeable future [6].
Revision: The system of formal education is hugely over-expanded and should be substantially reduced (to considerably less than half its current size). The average person should receive fewer years of formal education, fewer people should attend higher education institutions and do fewer bachelor’s degrees, and those in higher education should – on average – complete the process in fewer years.
The proportion of school leavers entering higher education in the UK has at least trebled over the past three decades, from around 15% to more than 45%. The rationale behind this vast expansion was based on the observation of higher all-round performance among college graduates – better performance in jobs, and also a wide range of other good outcomes including improved health and happiness [6].
However, it turns out that almost all of this differential in behaviours can be explained in terms of selection for (mostly hereditary) intelligence, rather than these improvements being something added to individuals by their educational experience. The main extra information provided by the successful completion of prolonged educational programs (i.e. extra in addition to signalling IQ) is that educational certification provides a broadly-reliable signal of a highly-Conscientious personality.
Miller has neatly described this trait: “Conscientiousness is the Big Five personality trait that includes such characteristics as integrity, reliability, predictability, consistency, and punctuality. It predicts respect for social norms and responsibilities, and the likelihood of fulfilling promises and contracts. A century ago, people would have called it character, principle, honor, or moral fiber. (…) Conscientiousness is lower on average in juveniles, and it matures slowly with age” [2].
Other attributes of a highly-Conscientious personality are self-discipline, perseverance and long-termism [20].
But a person’s degree of Conscientiousness is not a product of their educational experience; rather it is a mostly-inherited psychological attribute which develops throughout life, the relative (or differential) possession of which is stable throughout life [13]. In other words, Conscientiousness is (mostly) an innate ability in a similar sense to intelligence – and similarly difficult to influence by educational means.
It turns out that modern formal education is mainly signalling [15], or providing indirect evidence about, a person’s IQ and personality abilities which they have mostly inherited [1] and [2]. This means that imposing an ever-increasing number of years of formal education for an ever-increasing proportion of the population is ever-increasingly inefficient – and is wasting years of people’s lives, wasting vast amounts of money on the education provision, and imposing huge economic and social ‘opportunity costs’ by forcing people to remain in formal education when their time would often be better spent doing something else (for example something economically-productive or something more personally-fulfilling).
Mistaken belief number 4: Higher education should be regarded as a general, non-vocational process, in which most degrees are modular and multi-disciplinary; and where specialization or vocational preparation should be a relatively brief and ‘last-minute’ training at the end of a long process of education [3], [5] and [6].
Revision: The period of general education should not extend much beyond about 16 (the approximate age of IQ maturity), and this general education should be focused on the basic skills of literacy and numeracy together with a core knowledge curriculum.
At the age of about 16 each person could potentially leave school with a set of knowledge-based examination results demonstrating their level of competence in a core knowledge curriculum; and with usefully precise and valid psychometric measurements of their general intelligence and personality (especially their age ranked degree of Conscientiousness). The combination of psychometric measures of IQ and Conscientiousness would serve the same kind of function as educational evaluations do at present, providing a basis for employment selection or valid predictions to guide the allocation of access to further levels of formal education.
Beyond this I believe that most education should be ‘functional’ or vocational, in the sense of being a relatively-focused training in the knowledge and skills required to do something specific. This functional post-sixteen formal higher education could vary in duration from weeks or months (for semi-skilled jobs) to several years (for access to the starting level of the most highly skilled and knowledge-intensive professions such as architecture, engineering, medicine or law).
But when IQ and personality measurements are available, then the majority of ‘white collar’ jobs – jobs such as management, administration, or school teaching (up to the age of about 16) – would no longer require a college degree. Instead specific knowledge-based training would be provided ‘on the job’, presumably by the traditional mixture of a formally-structured curriculum for imparting the core knowledge and systematic elements with apprenticeship and individual instruction in order to impart specialized skills.
Murray also suggests that much specialist educational certification for careers could in principle be better done by rigorous public examinations such as those for accountancy, than by the medium of minimum-duration college degrees [1].
Measuring personality
The main unsolved problem for this psychometric approach is the evaluation of personality. Most of the current evidence for the predictive and explanatory power of personality comes from self-rating questionnaires, and clearly these would not be suitable for educational and job evaluations since it is facile to learn the responses which would lead to a high rating for Conscientiousness.
Rather than being simply asserted in a questionnaire, a Conscientious, persevering, self-disciplined personality requires to be demonstrated in actual practice. The modern educational system has, inadvertently, evolved in the direction of requiring higher levels of Conscientiousness [20]. The main factor in this evolution has been the progressive lengthening of the educational process (in the UK the modal average age for leaving formal education has increased from 16 to about 21 in the space of 30 years), but educational evaluations have also become less IQ-orientated (less g-loaded) and more dependent upon the ability of students frequently and punctually to complete neat and regular course work assignments [20] and [21].
However, the modern educational system is not explicitly aware that it is measuring Conscientiousness – the changes have been an accidental by-product of other trends, and there was not a deliberate attempt to enhance Conscientiousness-selectivity as a matter of policy. Because the educational system is blind to the consequences of its own actions, there are counter-pressures to make course work easier and more-interesting and to offer more choices – when in fact it would be a more efficient and accurate measure of Conscientiousness to have students complete compulsory, dull and irrelevant tasks which required a great deal of toil and effort!
However, it may be socially-preferable to have students prove their Conscientiousness in the realm of economic employment rather than by setting them pointless and grinding work in a formal educational context. There are plenty of dull and demanding but necessary jobs, the successful and sufficiently-prolonged accomplishment of which could serve as a valid and accurate reliable signal of Conscientiousness. So it would be more useful for people to prove their level of Conscientiousness in the arena of paid work, than by having this measurement task done by formal educational institutions.
An alternative suggestion for evaluating Conscientiousness comes from Geoffrey Miller, who advocates using broad surveys of opinion from families, peers, employers or any reliable and informed person who is in prolonged social contact with the subject [2].
Conclusions
I have previously written about the extraordinary way in which knowledge of IQ in particular, and psychometrics in general, is ‘hidden in plain sight’ in modern culture [17]. The basic facts about IQ are accessible, abundant and convincing for those who take the trouble to look; but modern mainstream intellectual culture has for around half a decade ‘immunized’ most educated people against looking-at or learning about IQ by multiple forms of misinformation and denigration [22] and [23].
The recent books of Murray and Miller marshal more strongly than before the evidence that one major reason for its taboo status is that IQ knowledge has extremely damaging implications for the vast and expanding system of formal education which employs many intellectuals directly, and which provides almost all other intellectuals with the credentials upon which their status and employability depend. Miller’s phrase is worth repeating: “they do not want their expensive IQ-warranties to suffer competition from cheap, fast IQ tests which would commodify the intelligence-display market and drive down costs” [2].
Murray argues that a properly-demanding 4 year, general and core knowledge-based, ‘liberal arts’ degree would be valuable as a pre-specialization education for the high IQ intellectual elite [1]. Perhaps because I am a product of the (now disappeared) traditional English system of early educational specialization, I am unconvinced about the systematic benefits of general education at a college level. I suspect that the most efficient pattern of higher education would be to specialize at age 16 (or earlier for the highest IQ individuals) on completion of the standard core knowledge program; and that liberal arts should mainly be seen as an avocation (done for reasons of personal fulfilment) rather than a vocation (done as a job).
In other words, a liberal arts education beyond core knowledge could, and perhaps should, be optional and provided by the market, rather than being included in the educational ‘system’. For example, in the UK such an education is universally available without any residential requirement at a reasonable price and high quality via the Open University (www3.open.ac.uk/about).
But in a system where objective IQ and personality evaluations were available as signals of aptitude, it could be left to ‘the market’ to decide whether the possession of a rigorous 4 year general liberal arts degree opened more doors; or attracted any extra premium of status, salary or conditions compared with a specialized, early vocational degree such as medicine, law, architecture, engineering, or one of the sciences. (There would presumably also be some specialist arts and humanities degrees, mainly vocationally-orientated towards training high-level school and college teachers – as was the traditional English practice until about 40 years ago [3].)
In summary, modern societies are currently vastly over-provided with formal education, and this education has the wrong emphasis. In particular, the job of sorting people by their general aptitude could be done more accurately, cheaply and quickly by using psychometrics to measure IQ and Conscientiousness. This would free-up time and energy for early training in key skills such as reading, writing and mathematics; and to focus on a core knowledge curriculum.
However, for reasons related to self-interest, the intellectual class do not want people to know the basic facts about IQ; and since the intellectual class provide the information upon which the rest of society depends for their understanding – consequently most people do not know the basic facts about IQ. And lacking knowledge of IQ, people are not able to understand the education system and what it actually does.
I can point to myself as a prime example of the way in which ignorance of IQ leads to a distorted understanding of education. Before I knew about the basic facts of IQ, I had articulated what seemed to be a rational and coherent set of beliefs about education. But since discovering the facts about IQ several of my convictions have undergone what amounts to a U-turn.
Acknowledgements
“A Farewell to Alms: a brief economic history of the world” by Gregory Clark (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2007) was the book of economic history which first stimulated my (belated) engagement with the scientific literature of intelligence and personality. The web pages of Steve Sailer have since provided both an invaluable introduction and also a higher education in the subject (e.g. www.isteve.com/Articles_IQ.htm).
References
[1] C. Murray, Real education: four simple truths for bringing America’s schools back to reality, Crown Forum, New York (2008).
[2] G. Miller, Spent: sex, evolution and consumer behaviour, Viking, New York (2009).
[3] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Auditing as a tool of public policy – the misuse of quality assurance techniques in the UK university expansion, Eur Polit Sci 2 (2002), pp. 24–35.
[4] B.G. Charlton, Science as a general education: conceptual science should constitute the compulsory core of multi-disciplinary undergraduate degrees, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 451–453.
[5] Charlton BG, Andras P. The educational function and implications for teaching of multi-disciplinary modular (MDM) undergraduate degrees. OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 12; 2003. http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk
[6] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Universities and social progress in modernizing societies: how educational expansion has replaced socialism as an instrument of political reform, CQ (Crit Quart) 47 (2005), pp. 30–39.
[7] N.J. Mackintosh, IQ and human intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998).
[8] A.R. Jensen, The g factor: the science of mental ability, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1988).
[9] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Am Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[10] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
[11] J.R. Harris, The nurture assumption: why children turn out the way they do, Bloomsbury, London (1998).
[12] D. Nettle, Personality: what makes you the way you are, Oxford University Press (2007).
[13] P.T. Costa and R.R. McCrae, Stability and change in personality from adolescence through adulthood. In: C.F. Halverson Jr., G.A. Kohnstamm and R.P. Martin, Editors, The developing structure of temperament and personality from infancy to adulthood, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, USA (1994), pp. 139–150.
[14] G.D. Batty, I.J. Deary and L.S. Gottfredson, Pre-morbid (early life) IQ and later mortality risk: systematic review, Ann Epidemiol 17 (2007), pp. 278–288.
[15] Caplan B. Mixed signals: Why Becker, Cowen, and Kling should reconsider the signaling model of education.. Accessed 06.04.09.
[16] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life, Forbes, New York (1994).
[17] B.G. Charlton, Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 625–628.
[18] L.S. Gottfredson, Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse societies. In: C.L. Frisby and C.R. Reynolds, Editors, Comprehensive handbook of multicultural school psychology, Wiley, New York (2005), pp. 517–554.
[19] Spitz HH. The raising of intelligence: a selected history of attempts to raise retarded intelligence. Hillsdale, NJ, USA: Erlbaum; 1986.
[20] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[21] Charlton BG. Sex ratios in the most-selective elite undergraduate US colleges and universities are consistent with the hypothesis that modern educational systems increasingly select for conscientious personality compared with intelligence. Med Hypotheses; in press, doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.03.016.
[22] A. Wooldridge, Measuring the mind: education and psychology in England, c.1860–c.1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1994).
[23] L.S. Gottfredson, Logical fallacies used to dismiss the evidence on intelligence testing. In: R. Phelps, Editor, Correcting fallacies about educational and psychological testing, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC (2009), pp. 11–65.
Replacing education with psychometrics: How learning about IQ almost-completely changed my mind about education.
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; 73: 273-277
***
Summary
I myself am a prime example of the way in which ignorance of IQ leads to a distorted understanding of education (and many other matters). I have been writing on the subject of education – especially higher education, science and medical education – for about 20 years, but now believe that many of my earlier ideas were wrong for the simple reason that I did not know about IQ. Since discovering the basic facts about IQ, several of my convictions have undergone a U-turn. Just how radically my ideas were changed has been brought home by two recent books: Real Education by Charles Murray and Spent by Geoffrey Miller. Since IQ and personality are substantially hereditary and rankings (although not absolute levels) are highly stable throughout a persons adult life, this implies that differential educational attainment within a society is mostly determined by heredity and therefore not by differences in educational experience. This implies that education is about selection more than enhancement, and educational qualifications mainly serve to ‘signal’ or quantify a person’s hereditary attributes. So education mostly functions as an extremely slow, inefficient and imprecise form of psychometric testing. It would therefore be easy to construct a modern educational system that was both more efficient and more effective than the current one. I now advocate a substantial reduction in the average amount of formal education and the proportion of the population attending higher education institutions. At the age of about sixteen each person could leave school with a set of knowledge-based examination results demonstrating their level of competence in a core knowledge curriculum; and with usefully precise and valid psychometric measurements of their general intelligence and personality (especially their age ranked degree of Conscientiousness). However, such change would result in a massive down-sizing of the educational system and this is a key underlying reason why IQ has become a taboo subject. Miller suggests that academics at the most expensive, elite, intelligence-screening universities tend to be sceptical of psychometric testing; precisely because they do not want to be undercut by cheaper, faster, more-reliable IQ and personality evaluations.
***
Introduction
It was only in early 2007 that I began properly to engage, for the first time in my professional career, with the literature on IQ. Surprisingly, this engagement had been stimulated by a book of economic history. And learning the basic facts about IQ rapidly changed my views on many things, none more so than education.
Just how radically my ideas about education were changed by learning about IQ has been brought home by two recent books: Real Education By Charles Murray [1] and Spent by Geoffrey Miller [2]. In line with analyses of Murray and Miller, I would now repudiate many of my previous opinions on the subject, and advocate a substantial reduction in the average amount of formal education and the proportion of the population attending higher education. In general, I now believe that many years of formal education can and should be substantially (but not entirely!) replaced with ‘psychometric’ measures of intelligence and personality as a basis for evaluating career potential.
In this article I use my own experience as a case study of the potentially-disruptive influence of psychometric knowledge, and discuss further the reasons why basic IQ facts have been so effectively concealed, confused and denied by mainstream elite intellectual opinion in the UK and USA.
The importance of IQ
I have been writing on the subject of education for about 20 years (especially on higher education, science and medical education), but I now believe that much of what I wrote was wrong for the simple reason that I did not know about IQ. Personality traits are important in a similar way to IQ, however personality measurement is currently less reliable and valid than IQ testing, and less-well quantified.
In the early 2000s I argued that modern formal education should be directed primarily at inculcating the ability to think abstractly and systematically [3] and that therefore the structure and not the specific content of education was critical (although ‘science’ – broadly defined – was likely to be the best basis for this type of education [4]). I suggested that higher education should be regarded as a non-vocational process, in which most degrees are modular, and modules were optional and multi-disciplinary, so that each student would assemble their own degree program in a minimally-constrained, ‘pick and mix’ fashion [5]. I also contended that since abstract systemizing cognition was so essential to modernizing societies, a major aim of social reform should be to include as many people as possible in formal education for as long as possible [6].
All of these views I would now regard as mistaken – and the reason is mostly my new understanding of IQ [7], [8], [9] and [10]. Miller concisely explains the basic facts about IQ:
“General intelligence (a.k.a. IQ, general cognitive ability, the g factor) is a way of quantifying intelligence’s variability among people. It is the best-established, most predictive, most heritable mental trait ever discovered in psychology. Whether measured with formal IQ tests or assessed through informal conversations and observations, intelligence predicts objective performance and learning ability across all important life-domains that show reliable individual differences” [2].
The crux of my new understanding is that IQ, and to a lesser but important extent personality traits, are highly predictive of educational attainment. This is a very old finding, and scientifically uncontroversial – but the implications have still not been acknowledged.
Since IQ is very substantially inherited with a true heritability of about 80% [7], [8], [9] and [10] and personality too has about a 50% heritability [11] and [12]; and since both IQ and personality rankings are highly stable throughout a persons adult life [13] (it is, for example, very difficult for educational interventions to have any significant and lasting effect on underlying IQ [1]) – then this implies that differential educational attainment within societies is mostly determined by heredity and therefore not by differences in educational experience.
(The other big factor which influences attainment is of course the large element of chance – which affects individuals unpredictably. However, chance is not completely random, in the sense that many outcomes such as accidental injuries and a range of illnesses are also correlated with IQ and personality [14]).
When full account has been taken of IQ and personality (and the measured effects of IQ and personality have been increased to take account of the inevitable imprecision of IQ measurements and the even greater difficulties of determining personality), and when the presumed effects of chance have also been subtracted – then there is not much variation of outcomes left-over within which educational differences could have an effect. Of course there will be some systemic effect of educational differences, but the effect is likely to be very much smaller than generally assumed, and even the direction of the education effect may be hard to detect when other more powerful factors are operative [1].
I found the fact that differences in educational attainment within a society are mostly due to heredity to be a stunning conclusion, which effectively demolished most of what I believed about education. My understanding of what education was doing was radically reshaped, and my beliefs about the justifiable duration and proper focus of the system of formal education were transformed. I began to realize that the educational system in modern societies was operating under false pretences. It seems that current educational systems are barely ‘fit for purpose’ and (lacking a proper understanding of IQ) are in many instances progressively getting worse rather than better.
In sum, education is more about selection than enhancement, and educational qualifications mostly serve to ‘signal’ or quantify a person’s hereditary attributes [15] – especially IQ and personality. Differential educational experience does not seem to have much of a systemic effect on people’s ability to think or work.
To put it another way – education mostly functions as an extremely slow, inefficient and imprecise form of psychometric testing. And because this fact is poorly understood, those aspects of modern education which are not psychometric are consequently neglected and misdirected.
Policy implications of psychometrics
If psychometric measures of IQ and personality were available, then it would be easy to construct a modern educational system that was both more efficient and more effective than the current one. However, such change would result in a massive down-sizing of the educational system – with substantial and permanent loss of jobs and status for educational professionals of all types including teachers, professors, administrators and managers.
According to Geoffrey Miller’s analysis [2], this impact on educational professionals is likely to be a key underlying reason why IQ has become a taboo subject, and why the basic facts of IQ have been so effectively obfuscated. Miller notes that it is the ultra-elite, most-selective and heavily research-oriented universities which are the focus of IQ resistance. At the same time more functionally-orientated institutions, such as the United States military, have for many decades quietly been using IQ as a tool to assist with selection and training allocations [16].
“Is it an accident that researchers at the most expensive, elite, IQ-screening universities tend to be most sceptical of IQ tests? I think not. Universities offer a costly, slow, unreliable intelligence-indicating product that competes directly with cheap, fast, more-reliable IQ tests. (…) Harvard and Yale sell nicely printed sheets of paper called degrees that cost about $160,000 (…). To obtain the degree, one must demonstrate a decent level of Conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness in one’s coursework, but above all, one must have the intelligence to get admitted, based on SAT scores and high school grades. Thus the Harvard degree is basically an IQ guarantee”.
“Elite universities do not want to be undercut by competitors. They do not want their expensive IQ-warranties to suffer competition from cheap, fast IQ tests which would commodify the intelligence-display market and drive down costs. Therefore, elite universities have a hypocritical, love-hate relationship with intelligence tests”.
The vulnerability of the elite institutions to IQ knowledge is because most of the assumed advantages of an expensive elite education can be ascribed to their historic ability to select the top stratum of IQ (and also the most desirable personality types): given the stability and predictive power of these traits the elite students are therefore pre-determined to be (on average) highly successful.
Consequently the most elite institutions and their graduates have in the past few decades, both via academic publications and in the mass media, thoroughly obscured the basic and validated facts about IQ. We now have a situation where the high predictive powers of IQ and personality and the stable and hereditary nature of these traits are routinely concealed, confused or (in extremis) explicitly denied by some of the most prestigious and best-educated members of modern society [17].
Four mistaken beliefs resulting from my lack of IQ knowledge
I will summarize under four heading my main pre-IQ errors regarding education.
Mistaken belief number 1: Modern formal education should be directed primarily at inculcating the ability to think abstractly and systematically [3].
Revision: Modern formal education should be directed primarily at inculcating specific knowledge content.
Abstract systematic thinking is exceptionally important in modern societies. And I used to believe that that abstract systematic thinking was mostly a product of formal education – indeed I regarded this as the main function of formal education [3]. But I now recognize that abstract systematic thinking is pretty close to a definition of IQ; and that strongly IQ related (or heavily ‘g-loaded’) educational outcomes – such as differentials in reading comprehension and mathematical ability – are very difficult/impossible to improve in a real and sustained fashion by educational interventions [1].
In other words, a person’s level of ability to think abstractly and systematically is mostly a biological given – and not a consequence of formal education. The implication is that formal education should not be focusing on trying to do what it cannot do – i.e. enhance IQ. Instead, formal education should focus on educational goals where is can make a difference: i.e. the teaching of specific knowledge [1].
Mistaken belief number 2: Structure not content of formal education is crucial [5].
Revision: Content not structure of education is crucial.
I used to think that it did not matter what subject was studied in formal education, so long as the method of education was one which nurtured abstract systematic thinking [3]. I believed that how we learned was more important than what we learned, because I believed that abstract systematic thinking was a result of formal education – and this cognitive ability was more important than any particular body of information which had been memorized.
This line of reasoning meant that I favoured ‘pick and mix’, wide choice and multi-disciplinary curricula as a method of improving motivation by allowing students to study what most interested them, and giving students practice in learning new material and applying systematic thinking in many knowledge domains [5].
The reason that I believed all this has been summarized by Geoffrey Miller:
“The highly selective credential with little relevant content [such as an elite college degree in any subject] often trumps the less-selective credential with very relevant content. Nor are such preferences irrational. General intelligence is such a powerful predictor of job performance that a content-free IQ guarantee can be much more valuable to an employer or graduate school than a set of rote-learned content with no IQ guarantee” [2].
Since IQ is such a powerful influence on educational (and other) outcomes [18], the value of specific educational content is therefore only apparent when IQ has been controlled-for. Since IQ is routinely ignored or denied, the value of educational content is not apparent in outcomes which are sensitive to differences in general intelligence.
Murray argues that variations in the structure and methods of education are not able significantly to influence those educational outcomes which are ‘g-loaded’ such as reading comprehension or mathematic reasoning [1]. Numerous attempts to raise real long-term intelligence (rather than merely raising specific test scores) have failed [19]. However, the subject matter being studied will (obviously!) make a big difference to what gets learned. Once we set aside the delusional goal of enhancing IQ by educational reform, then the subject matter – or curriculum – becomes a more important focus than educational structure and methods.
Charles Murray therefore endorses the approach to ‘Cultural Literacy’ or a core knowledge curriculum pioneered by Ed Hirsch (www.coreknowledge.org). This educational philosophy focuses on constructing a comprehensive curriculum of the factual material that people should know, or ‘need to know’. Over the past couple of decades some detailed and well-validated programmes of study have been developed for the USA, and these can be purchased by educational institutions and also home-schooling parents.
It is claimed that such a core knowledge curriculum should enable the student to become a citizen participating at the highest possible social level, and that a shared education in core knowledge should hold society together with a stronger ‘cultural glue’. If such benefits are real, then school, especially between the ages of about 6 and 14, is the best place to follow such a program; since, although the core curriculum involves more than mere memorization, nonetheless memorization is an important element – and young children can memorize information much more easily and lastingly than adults [1].
Understanding IQ has therefore provoked me into a U-turn on the matter of curricula. I now believe that what we learn in formal education is more important than how we learn, because what we learn can have a lasting effect on what we know; while how we learn does not, after all, teach us how to think.
Mistaken belief number 3: A major aim of social reform should be to include as many people as possible in formal education for as long as possible. Ever-more people should get ever-more education for the foreseeable future [6].
Revision: The system of formal education is hugely over-expanded and should be substantially reduced (to considerably less than half its current size). The average person should receive fewer years of formal education, fewer people should attend higher education institutions and do fewer bachelor’s degrees, and those in higher education should – on average – complete the process in fewer years.
The proportion of school leavers entering higher education in the UK has at least trebled over the past three decades, from around 15% to more than 45%. The rationale behind this vast expansion was based on the observation of higher all-round performance among college graduates – better performance in jobs, and also a wide range of other good outcomes including improved health and happiness [6].
However, it turns out that almost all of this differential in behaviours can be explained in terms of selection for (mostly hereditary) intelligence, rather than these improvements being something added to individuals by their educational experience. The main extra information provided by the successful completion of prolonged educational programs (i.e. extra in addition to signalling IQ) is that educational certification provides a broadly-reliable signal of a highly-Conscientious personality.
Miller has neatly described this trait: “Conscientiousness is the Big Five personality trait that includes such characteristics as integrity, reliability, predictability, consistency, and punctuality. It predicts respect for social norms and responsibilities, and the likelihood of fulfilling promises and contracts. A century ago, people would have called it character, principle, honor, or moral fiber. (…) Conscientiousness is lower on average in juveniles, and it matures slowly with age” [2].
Other attributes of a highly-Conscientious personality are self-discipline, perseverance and long-termism [20].
But a person’s degree of Conscientiousness is not a product of their educational experience; rather it is a mostly-inherited psychological attribute which develops throughout life, the relative (or differential) possession of which is stable throughout life [13]. In other words, Conscientiousness is (mostly) an innate ability in a similar sense to intelligence – and similarly difficult to influence by educational means.
It turns out that modern formal education is mainly signalling [15], or providing indirect evidence about, a person’s IQ and personality abilities which they have mostly inherited [1] and [2]. This means that imposing an ever-increasing number of years of formal education for an ever-increasing proportion of the population is ever-increasingly inefficient – and is wasting years of people’s lives, wasting vast amounts of money on the education provision, and imposing huge economic and social ‘opportunity costs’ by forcing people to remain in formal education when their time would often be better spent doing something else (for example something economically-productive or something more personally-fulfilling).
Mistaken belief number 4: Higher education should be regarded as a general, non-vocational process, in which most degrees are modular and multi-disciplinary; and where specialization or vocational preparation should be a relatively brief and ‘last-minute’ training at the end of a long process of education [3], [5] and [6].
Revision: The period of general education should not extend much beyond about 16 (the approximate age of IQ maturity), and this general education should be focused on the basic skills of literacy and numeracy together with a core knowledge curriculum.
At the age of about 16 each person could potentially leave school with a set of knowledge-based examination results demonstrating their level of competence in a core knowledge curriculum; and with usefully precise and valid psychometric measurements of their general intelligence and personality (especially their age ranked degree of Conscientiousness). The combination of psychometric measures of IQ and Conscientiousness would serve the same kind of function as educational evaluations do at present, providing a basis for employment selection or valid predictions to guide the allocation of access to further levels of formal education.
Beyond this I believe that most education should be ‘functional’ or vocational, in the sense of being a relatively-focused training in the knowledge and skills required to do something specific. This functional post-sixteen formal higher education could vary in duration from weeks or months (for semi-skilled jobs) to several years (for access to the starting level of the most highly skilled and knowledge-intensive professions such as architecture, engineering, medicine or law).
But when IQ and personality measurements are available, then the majority of ‘white collar’ jobs – jobs such as management, administration, or school teaching (up to the age of about 16) – would no longer require a college degree. Instead specific knowledge-based training would be provided ‘on the job’, presumably by the traditional mixture of a formally-structured curriculum for imparting the core knowledge and systematic elements with apprenticeship and individual instruction in order to impart specialized skills.
Murray also suggests that much specialist educational certification for careers could in principle be better done by rigorous public examinations such as those for accountancy, than by the medium of minimum-duration college degrees [1].
Measuring personality
The main unsolved problem for this psychometric approach is the evaluation of personality. Most of the current evidence for the predictive and explanatory power of personality comes from self-rating questionnaires, and clearly these would not be suitable for educational and job evaluations since it is facile to learn the responses which would lead to a high rating for Conscientiousness.
Rather than being simply asserted in a questionnaire, a Conscientious, persevering, self-disciplined personality requires to be demonstrated in actual practice. The modern educational system has, inadvertently, evolved in the direction of requiring higher levels of Conscientiousness [20]. The main factor in this evolution has been the progressive lengthening of the educational process (in the UK the modal average age for leaving formal education has increased from 16 to about 21 in the space of 30 years), but educational evaluations have also become less IQ-orientated (less g-loaded) and more dependent upon the ability of students frequently and punctually to complete neat and regular course work assignments [20] and [21].
However, the modern educational system is not explicitly aware that it is measuring Conscientiousness – the changes have been an accidental by-product of other trends, and there was not a deliberate attempt to enhance Conscientiousness-selectivity as a matter of policy. Because the educational system is blind to the consequences of its own actions, there are counter-pressures to make course work easier and more-interesting and to offer more choices – when in fact it would be a more efficient and accurate measure of Conscientiousness to have students complete compulsory, dull and irrelevant tasks which required a great deal of toil and effort!
However, it may be socially-preferable to have students prove their Conscientiousness in the realm of economic employment rather than by setting them pointless and grinding work in a formal educational context. There are plenty of dull and demanding but necessary jobs, the successful and sufficiently-prolonged accomplishment of which could serve as a valid and accurate reliable signal of Conscientiousness. So it would be more useful for people to prove their level of Conscientiousness in the arena of paid work, than by having this measurement task done by formal educational institutions.
An alternative suggestion for evaluating Conscientiousness comes from Geoffrey Miller, who advocates using broad surveys of opinion from families, peers, employers or any reliable and informed person who is in prolonged social contact with the subject [2].
Conclusions
I have previously written about the extraordinary way in which knowledge of IQ in particular, and psychometrics in general, is ‘hidden in plain sight’ in modern culture [17]. The basic facts about IQ are accessible, abundant and convincing for those who take the trouble to look; but modern mainstream intellectual culture has for around half a decade ‘immunized’ most educated people against looking-at or learning about IQ by multiple forms of misinformation and denigration [22] and [23].
The recent books of Murray and Miller marshal more strongly than before the evidence that one major reason for its taboo status is that IQ knowledge has extremely damaging implications for the vast and expanding system of formal education which employs many intellectuals directly, and which provides almost all other intellectuals with the credentials upon which their status and employability depend. Miller’s phrase is worth repeating: “they do not want their expensive IQ-warranties to suffer competition from cheap, fast IQ tests which would commodify the intelligence-display market and drive down costs” [2].
Murray argues that a properly-demanding 4 year, general and core knowledge-based, ‘liberal arts’ degree would be valuable as a pre-specialization education for the high IQ intellectual elite [1]. Perhaps because I am a product of the (now disappeared) traditional English system of early educational specialization, I am unconvinced about the systematic benefits of general education at a college level. I suspect that the most efficient pattern of higher education would be to specialize at age 16 (or earlier for the highest IQ individuals) on completion of the standard core knowledge program; and that liberal arts should mainly be seen as an avocation (done for reasons of personal fulfilment) rather than a vocation (done as a job).
In other words, a liberal arts education beyond core knowledge could, and perhaps should, be optional and provided by the market, rather than being included in the educational ‘system’. For example, in the UK such an education is universally available without any residential requirement at a reasonable price and high quality via the Open University (www3.open.ac.uk/about).
But in a system where objective IQ and personality evaluations were available as signals of aptitude, it could be left to ‘the market’ to decide whether the possession of a rigorous 4 year general liberal arts degree opened more doors; or attracted any extra premium of status, salary or conditions compared with a specialized, early vocational degree such as medicine, law, architecture, engineering, or one of the sciences. (There would presumably also be some specialist arts and humanities degrees, mainly vocationally-orientated towards training high-level school and college teachers – as was the traditional English practice until about 40 years ago [3].)
In summary, modern societies are currently vastly over-provided with formal education, and this education has the wrong emphasis. In particular, the job of sorting people by their general aptitude could be done more accurately, cheaply and quickly by using psychometrics to measure IQ and Conscientiousness. This would free-up time and energy for early training in key skills such as reading, writing and mathematics; and to focus on a core knowledge curriculum.
However, for reasons related to self-interest, the intellectual class do not want people to know the basic facts about IQ; and since the intellectual class provide the information upon which the rest of society depends for their understanding – consequently most people do not know the basic facts about IQ. And lacking knowledge of IQ, people are not able to understand the education system and what it actually does.
I can point to myself as a prime example of the way in which ignorance of IQ leads to a distorted understanding of education. Before I knew about the basic facts of IQ, I had articulated what seemed to be a rational and coherent set of beliefs about education. But since discovering the facts about IQ several of my convictions have undergone what amounts to a U-turn.
Acknowledgements
“A Farewell to Alms: a brief economic history of the world” by Gregory Clark (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2007) was the book of economic history which first stimulated my (belated) engagement with the scientific literature of intelligence and personality. The web pages of Steve Sailer have since provided both an invaluable introduction and also a higher education in the subject (e.g. www.isteve.com/Articles_IQ.htm).
References
[1] C. Murray, Real education: four simple truths for bringing America’s schools back to reality, Crown Forum, New York (2008).
[2] G. Miller, Spent: sex, evolution and consumer behaviour, Viking, New York (2009).
[3] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Auditing as a tool of public policy – the misuse of quality assurance techniques in the UK university expansion, Eur Polit Sci 2 (2002), pp. 24–35.
[4] B.G. Charlton, Science as a general education: conceptual science should constitute the compulsory core of multi-disciplinary undergraduate degrees, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 451–453.
[5] Charlton BG, Andras P. The educational function and implications for teaching of multi-disciplinary modular (MDM) undergraduate degrees. OxCHEPS Occasional Paper No. 12; 2003. http://oxcheps.new.ox.ac.uk
[6] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Universities and social progress in modernizing societies: how educational expansion has replaced socialism as an instrument of political reform, CQ (Crit Quart) 47 (2005), pp. 30–39.
[7] N.J. Mackintosh, IQ and human intelligence, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1998).
[8] A.R. Jensen, The g factor: the science of mental ability, Praeger, Westport, CT, USA (1988).
[9] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Am Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[10] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
[11] J.R. Harris, The nurture assumption: why children turn out the way they do, Bloomsbury, London (1998).
[12] D. Nettle, Personality: what makes you the way you are, Oxford University Press (2007).
[13] P.T. Costa and R.R. McCrae, Stability and change in personality from adolescence through adulthood. In: C.F. Halverson Jr., G.A. Kohnstamm and R.P. Martin, Editors, The developing structure of temperament and personality from infancy to adulthood, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, USA (1994), pp. 139–150.
[14] G.D. Batty, I.J. Deary and L.S. Gottfredson, Pre-morbid (early life) IQ and later mortality risk: systematic review, Ann Epidemiol 17 (2007), pp. 278–288.
[15] Caplan B. Mixed signals: Why Becker, Cowen, and Kling should reconsider the signaling model of education.
[16] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve: intelligence and class structure in American life, Forbes, New York (1994).
[17] B.G. Charlton, Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 625–628.
[18] L.S. Gottfredson, Implications of cognitive differences for schooling within diverse societies. In: C.L. Frisby and C.R. Reynolds, Editors, Comprehensive handbook of multicultural school psychology, Wiley, New York (2005), pp. 517–554.
[19] Spitz HH. The raising of intelligence: a selected history of attempts to raise retarded intelligence. Hillsdale, NJ, USA: Erlbaum; 1986.
[20] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[21] Charlton BG. Sex ratios in the most-selective elite undergraduate US colleges and universities are consistent with the hypothesis that modern educational systems increasingly select for conscientious personality compared with intelligence. Med Hypotheses; in press, doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2009.03.016.
[22] A. Wooldridge, Measuring the mind: education and psychology in England, c.1860–c.1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1994).
[23] L.S. Gottfredson, Logical fallacies used to dismiss the evidence on intelligence testing. In: R. Phelps, Editor, Correcting fallacies about educational and psychological testing, American Psychological Association, Washington, DC (2009), pp. 11–65.
Wednesday, 27 May 2009
Do elite US colleges choose personality over IQ?
Sex ratios in the most-selective elite US undergraduate colleges and universities are consistent with the hypothesis that modern educational systems increasingly select for conscientious personality compared with intelligence
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; 73: 127-129
Bruce G. Charlton, , Editor-in-Chief, Medical Hypotheses
Professor of Theoretical Medicine University of Buckingham, UK
Summary
The main predictors of examination results and educational achievement in modern societies are intelligence (IQ – or general factor ‘g’ intelligence) and the personality trait termed ‘Conscientiousness’ (C). I have previously argued that increased use of continuous assessment (e.g. course work rather than timed and supervised examinations) and increased duration of the educational process implies that modern educational systems have become increasingly selective for the personality trait of Conscientiousness and consequently less selective for IQ. I have tested this prediction (in a preliminary fashion) by looking at the sex ratios in the most selective elite US universities. My two main assumptions are: (1) that a greater proportion of individuals with very high intelligence are men than women, and (2) that women are more conscientious than men. To estimate the proportion of men and women expected at highly-selective schools, I performed demonstration calculations based on three plausible estimates of male and female IQ averages and standard deviations. The expected percentage of men at elite undergraduate colleges (selecting students with IQ above 130 – i.e. in the top 2% of the population) were 66%, 61% and 74%. When these estimates were compared with the sex ratios at 33 elite colleges and universities, only two technical institutes had more than 60% men. Elite US colleges and universities therefore seem to be selecting primarily on the basis of something other than IQ – probably conscientiousness. There is a ‘missing population’ of very high IQ men who are not being admitted to the most selective and prestigious undergraduate schools, probably because their high school educational qualifications and evaluations are too low. This analysis is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that modern educational systems tend to select more strongly for Conscientiousness than for IQ. The implication is that modern undergraduates at the most-selective US schools are not primarily an intelligence elite, as commonly assumed, but instead an elite for Conscientious personality.
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IQ and C predict educational attainment
Evidence from a range of studies suggests that the main determinants of examination results and educational achievement in modern societies are intelligence (IQ – or general factor ‘g’ intelligence) and the personality trait variously described as ‘Conscientiousness’, self-discipline, perseverance or something similar (see Ref. [1] for review). IQ is (roughly speaking) that cognitive ability which enables people to think abstractly and learn quickly; Conscientiousness (broadly synonymous with perseverance or self-discipline) is the personality trait that enables people to work hard for long periods at dull tasks, to think before acting and to take a long term view.
I have previously argued that a combination of the increased use of continuous assessment (e.g. course work rather than timed and supervised examinations) and the increased duration of the educational process implies that modern educational systems have become increasingly selective for Conscientiousness (C) [1]. My argument is that, because C is not closely correlated with intelligence, then demand for increasing levels of C will inevitably lead to reduced selectivity for intelligence. Ever-higher levels of C will usually only be attainable by progressively relaxing standards for IQ.
If this reasoning is correct, it would be predicted that the most highly-educated and most educationally-selected people would be characterized more by their extremely-high Conscientiousness than by their extremely-high intelligence. More precisely, there would be a trend for educational selectivity to increase average ranking for C more than the average ranking for IQ.
Sex ratios at the most-selective US colleges and universities
I have tested this prediction (in a preliminary fashion) by looking at the sex ratios in the most selective elite US universities. My two main assumptions are: (1) that a greater proportion of individuals with very high intelligence are men than women, and (2) that women are more Conscientious than men.
Most IQ studies find a greater proportion of men than women among very high IQ adults. For example, the US national 2008 SAT results show a higher proportion of men than women scoring in the highest band for the most g-loaded sections (Critical Reading and Mathematics) [2]. This male domination of the highest scorers in IQ testing is consistent with IQ surveys going back over many decades [3] and studies of creative and intellectual genius [4] and [5]. I will therefore assume a higher proportion of men than women at levels of very high IQ. In contrast, current evidence suggests that Conscientiousness, especially the academically-relevant sub-trait of self-discipline, is higher in women than men [1] and [6].
On this basis alone, without any calculations, and if we assume equal proportions of men and women in the US population, no important differences in sex applications to college and a sex-blind policy of selectivity; it would be expected that there was a greater proportion of men than women at highly-selective elite colleges, and that the more selective the colleges the greater would be the expected proportion of men. By contrast, if there was an equal or greater-proportion of women at elite colleges then this would be consistent with C being more rigorously selected-for than IQ.
Predicted proportion of men at elite schools – on the basis of IQ
To make this exercise more precise, it is helpful to estimate the proportion of men and women which would be expected at highly-selective schools.
I have focused on predictions related to IQ because much more is known about IQ than C, and C cannot yet be quantified as precisely as IQ. An IQ of 130 is used as a plausible threshold for selectivity at elite universities: this is approximately two standard deviations above the average IQ and includes the top 2% of the population.
However, the magnitude of the expected sex differential is relevant, since if the expected sex differential was small it could easily be swamped by statistical noise, or by other relevant variables. The magnitude of the predicted sex differential depends on the assumptions of male and female IQ average differences and distributions.
There are three mainstream explanations of why there are more men than women among the population of very high IQ people.
1. Men have a higher average IQ than women, but the same variance. For instance, Lynn suggests that men have an average IQ about 4–5 points higher than women with the sexes having the same standard deviation (conventionally 15 IQ points) [7].
2. Men and women have a near-identical average IQ, but men have a greater variance in IQ than women (higher standard deviation). For instance Hedges and Nowell present Project Talent data that suggest men and women have the same IQ, but men have a standard deviation around 10% greater than women [8].
3. Men have both a higher average IQ and larger standard deviation of IQ than women. For instance, Hans Eysenck accepted Lynn’s estimate of about 4 IQ points difference in average IQ and also assumed that women had a standard deviation of 14 compared with the male standard deviation of 15 [4].
We can use these ball-park estimates as the basis for calculating approximate expected sex ratios at elite US undergraduate schools.
Therefore on the basis of IQ considered alone (Table 1), it would be expected to find a considerably greater proportion of men than women at elite undergraduate colleges. The prediction is that the most selective institutions would admit at least 60% men (and probably a higher proportion).
Table 1.
Demonstration calculations of the effect of plausible male versus female IQ averages and standard deviations on the proportion of men and women at elite colleges with threshold IQ of 130 for a US population with average mean IQ 100 (SD 15). Key: SD = standard deviation; M = men; W = women; av. = average.
Assumption Mean IQ (SD) Percentage IQ > 130 Predicted % men at elite college
M higher av. IQ than W: M 102 (15) 3.1% c. 66% W 98 (15) 1.6%
M > SD than W: M 100 (15.75) 2.8% c. 61% W 100 (14.25) 1.8%
Men higher av. IQ: M 102 (15) 3.1% c. 74% & >SD than W W 98 (14) 1.1%
So, any sex ratio less than this would imply that other qualities than IQ are actually determining selection; or alternatively that one or more of the assumptions are incorrect – for example there might be sexually differential patterns of application or selection.
Using the About.com: College Admissions web pages (http://collegeapps.about.com/ – up to March 2009) I generated a list of sex ratios (the percentage of men) at three categories of elite US colleges and universities: (1) Ivy League plus several comparably-selective private research universities; (2) The top 10 public universities; (3) The top 10 liberal arts colleges.
From Table 2 it is clear that almost all these 33 elite US undergraduate schools select approximately equal proportions of men and women with only two technical universities (Caltech and Georgia Tech) having a male sex ratio greater than 60%. If the assumptions hold, then the implication is that elite colleges seem to be selecting mainly on the basis of something other than IQ – probably Conscientiousness.
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Table 2.
Sex ratios at undergraduate level – percentage of men. Colleges with more than 60% men are marked with an asterisk.
Ivy League and similar private research universities
Brown 48%
Columbia 51%
Cornell 51%
Dartmouth 50%
Harvard 47%
Pennsylvania 49%
Princeton 53%
Yale 51%
Stanford 52%
Duke 51%
Chicago 50%
MIT 56%
*Caltech 71%
Top 10 public universities
Berkeley 46%
*Georgia Tech 71%
UCLA 45%
UCSD 48%
U Michigan 50%
UNC Chapel Hill 41%
Urbana Champaign 53%
U Virginia 45%
William and Mary 46%
Top 10 liberal arts colleges: (NB: Wellesley is essentially a women’s college)
Amherst 50%
Carleton 47%
Claremont–McKenna 54%
Grinnell 46%
Haverford 46%
Middlebury 48%
Pomona 51%
Reed 45%
Swarthmore 48%
Wellesley 2%
Williams 49%
It seems that there is a ‘missing population’ of very high IQ men who are not getting admitted to the most selective and prestigious undergraduate schools. The likely reason is that their high school educational qualifications and evaluations are too low, since these men probably lack the very high levels of C required to negotiate modern educational systems and achieve the very highest level of success (in the top 2% of attainment). These men with very high IQ but only moderate C are presumably attending a wide spectrum of less-selective and lower-ranked undergraduate schools, or (less plausibly) dropping-out of the educational system altogether.
A further factor may be that colleges are also selecting on the basis of high sociability, which can be measured as the personality trait of Agreeableness [1]. Agreeableness is higher in women. High Agreeableness would not be expected to lead to better educational performance, but instead would be likely to enhance an applicant’s resume with a record of participation in societies, charities and sports together with general friendliness and club-ability – these factors may well be counted in favour of a student and would also tend differentially to favour the admission of women.
My hypothesis [1] that Conscientiousness (and perhaps Agreeableness) count for more than IQ at the level of elite college admissions receives some support from this data set, and could be tested further by longitudinal studies which measured IQ and personality during childhood (rankings of IQ and personality tend to be stable throughout life), and followed-up students through the school and college examination and selection process to observe the interaction between these variables.
The implication is that modern undergraduates at the most selective US universities are not so much an elite for intelligence, as is commonly assumed, but more of an elite in terms of traits such as perseverance and self-discipline.
Acknowledgement
My thanks to Richard Lynn for his help and advice in preparing this editorial.
References
[1] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[2] College Board SAT, 2008 College Bound Seniors.; [accessed 19.03.09].
[3] B.G. Charlton, Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 625–628.
[4] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[5] C. Murray, Human accomplishment. The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences 800 BC to 1950, HarperCollins, New York (2003).
[6] A.L. Duckworth and M.E.P. Seligman, Self-discipline gives girls the edge, J Educ Psychol 98 (2006), pp. 198–208.
[7] R. Lynn and P. Irwing, Sex differences on the progressive matrices: a meta analysis, Intelligence 32 (2004), pp. 481–498.
[8] L.V. Hedges and A. Nowell, Sex differences in mental test scores, variability, and numbers of high-scoring individuals, Science 269 (1995), pp. 41–45.
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; 73: 127-129
Bruce G. Charlton, , Editor-in-Chief, Medical Hypotheses
Professor of Theoretical Medicine University of Buckingham, UK
Summary
The main predictors of examination results and educational achievement in modern societies are intelligence (IQ – or general factor ‘g’ intelligence) and the personality trait termed ‘Conscientiousness’ (C). I have previously argued that increased use of continuous assessment (e.g. course work rather than timed and supervised examinations) and increased duration of the educational process implies that modern educational systems have become increasingly selective for the personality trait of Conscientiousness and consequently less selective for IQ. I have tested this prediction (in a preliminary fashion) by looking at the sex ratios in the most selective elite US universities. My two main assumptions are: (1) that a greater proportion of individuals with very high intelligence are men than women, and (2) that women are more conscientious than men. To estimate the proportion of men and women expected at highly-selective schools, I performed demonstration calculations based on three plausible estimates of male and female IQ averages and standard deviations. The expected percentage of men at elite undergraduate colleges (selecting students with IQ above 130 – i.e. in the top 2% of the population) were 66%, 61% and 74%. When these estimates were compared with the sex ratios at 33 elite colleges and universities, only two technical institutes had more than 60% men. Elite US colleges and universities therefore seem to be selecting primarily on the basis of something other than IQ – probably conscientiousness. There is a ‘missing population’ of very high IQ men who are not being admitted to the most selective and prestigious undergraduate schools, probably because their high school educational qualifications and evaluations are too low. This analysis is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that modern educational systems tend to select more strongly for Conscientiousness than for IQ. The implication is that modern undergraduates at the most-selective US schools are not primarily an intelligence elite, as commonly assumed, but instead an elite for Conscientious personality.
***
IQ and C predict educational attainment
Evidence from a range of studies suggests that the main determinants of examination results and educational achievement in modern societies are intelligence (IQ – or general factor ‘g’ intelligence) and the personality trait variously described as ‘Conscientiousness’, self-discipline, perseverance or something similar (see Ref. [1] for review). IQ is (roughly speaking) that cognitive ability which enables people to think abstractly and learn quickly; Conscientiousness (broadly synonymous with perseverance or self-discipline) is the personality trait that enables people to work hard for long periods at dull tasks, to think before acting and to take a long term view.
I have previously argued that a combination of the increased use of continuous assessment (e.g. course work rather than timed and supervised examinations) and the increased duration of the educational process implies that modern educational systems have become increasingly selective for Conscientiousness (C) [1]. My argument is that, because C is not closely correlated with intelligence, then demand for increasing levels of C will inevitably lead to reduced selectivity for intelligence. Ever-higher levels of C will usually only be attainable by progressively relaxing standards for IQ.
If this reasoning is correct, it would be predicted that the most highly-educated and most educationally-selected people would be characterized more by their extremely-high Conscientiousness than by their extremely-high intelligence. More precisely, there would be a trend for educational selectivity to increase average ranking for C more than the average ranking for IQ.
Sex ratios at the most-selective US colleges and universities
I have tested this prediction (in a preliminary fashion) by looking at the sex ratios in the most selective elite US universities. My two main assumptions are: (1) that a greater proportion of individuals with very high intelligence are men than women, and (2) that women are more Conscientious than men.
Most IQ studies find a greater proportion of men than women among very high IQ adults. For example, the US national 2008 SAT results show a higher proportion of men than women scoring in the highest band for the most g-loaded sections (Critical Reading and Mathematics) [2]. This male domination of the highest scorers in IQ testing is consistent with IQ surveys going back over many decades [3] and studies of creative and intellectual genius [4] and [5]. I will therefore assume a higher proportion of men than women at levels of very high IQ. In contrast, current evidence suggests that Conscientiousness, especially the academically-relevant sub-trait of self-discipline, is higher in women than men [1] and [6].
On this basis alone, without any calculations, and if we assume equal proportions of men and women in the US population, no important differences in sex applications to college and a sex-blind policy of selectivity; it would be expected that there was a greater proportion of men than women at highly-selective elite colleges, and that the more selective the colleges the greater would be the expected proportion of men. By contrast, if there was an equal or greater-proportion of women at elite colleges then this would be consistent with C being more rigorously selected-for than IQ.
Predicted proportion of men at elite schools – on the basis of IQ
To make this exercise more precise, it is helpful to estimate the proportion of men and women which would be expected at highly-selective schools.
I have focused on predictions related to IQ because much more is known about IQ than C, and C cannot yet be quantified as precisely as IQ. An IQ of 130 is used as a plausible threshold for selectivity at elite universities: this is approximately two standard deviations above the average IQ and includes the top 2% of the population.
However, the magnitude of the expected sex differential is relevant, since if the expected sex differential was small it could easily be swamped by statistical noise, or by other relevant variables. The magnitude of the predicted sex differential depends on the assumptions of male and female IQ average differences and distributions.
There are three mainstream explanations of why there are more men than women among the population of very high IQ people.
1. Men have a higher average IQ than women, but the same variance. For instance, Lynn suggests that men have an average IQ about 4–5 points higher than women with the sexes having the same standard deviation (conventionally 15 IQ points) [7].
2. Men and women have a near-identical average IQ, but men have a greater variance in IQ than women (higher standard deviation). For instance Hedges and Nowell present Project Talent data that suggest men and women have the same IQ, but men have a standard deviation around 10% greater than women [8].
3. Men have both a higher average IQ and larger standard deviation of IQ than women. For instance, Hans Eysenck accepted Lynn’s estimate of about 4 IQ points difference in average IQ and also assumed that women had a standard deviation of 14 compared with the male standard deviation of 15 [4].
We can use these ball-park estimates as the basis for calculating approximate expected sex ratios at elite US undergraduate schools.
Therefore on the basis of IQ considered alone (Table 1), it would be expected to find a considerably greater proportion of men than women at elite undergraduate colleges. The prediction is that the most selective institutions would admit at least 60% men (and probably a higher proportion).
Table 1.
Demonstration calculations of the effect of plausible male versus female IQ averages and standard deviations on the proportion of men and women at elite colleges with threshold IQ of 130 for a US population with average mean IQ 100 (SD 15). Key: SD = standard deviation; M = men; W = women; av. = average.
Assumption Mean IQ (SD) Percentage IQ > 130 Predicted % men at elite college
M higher av. IQ than W: M 102 (15) 3.1% c. 66% W 98 (15) 1.6%
M > SD than W: M 100 (15.75) 2.8% c. 61% W 100 (14.25) 1.8%
Men higher av. IQ: M 102 (15) 3.1% c. 74% & >SD than W W 98 (14) 1.1%
So, any sex ratio less than this would imply that other qualities than IQ are actually determining selection; or alternatively that one or more of the assumptions are incorrect – for example there might be sexually differential patterns of application or selection.
Using the About.com: College Admissions web pages (http://collegeapps.about.com/ – up to March 2009) I generated a list of sex ratios (the percentage of men) at three categories of elite US colleges and universities: (1) Ivy League plus several comparably-selective private research universities; (2) The top 10 public universities; (3) The top 10 liberal arts colleges.
From Table 2 it is clear that almost all these 33 elite US undergraduate schools select approximately equal proportions of men and women with only two technical universities (Caltech and Georgia Tech) having a male sex ratio greater than 60%. If the assumptions hold, then the implication is that elite colleges seem to be selecting mainly on the basis of something other than IQ – probably Conscientiousness.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.
Sex ratios at undergraduate level – percentage of men. Colleges with more than 60% men are marked with an asterisk.
Ivy League and similar private research universities
Brown 48%
Columbia 51%
Cornell 51%
Dartmouth 50%
Harvard 47%
Pennsylvania 49%
Princeton 53%
Yale 51%
Stanford 52%
Duke 51%
Chicago 50%
MIT 56%
*Caltech 71%
Top 10 public universities
Berkeley 46%
*Georgia Tech 71%
UCLA 45%
UCSD 48%
U Michigan 50%
UNC Chapel Hill 41%
Urbana Champaign 53%
U Virginia 45%
William and Mary 46%
Top 10 liberal arts colleges: (NB: Wellesley is essentially a women’s college)
Amherst 50%
Carleton 47%
Claremont–McKenna 54%
Grinnell 46%
Haverford 46%
Middlebury 48%
Pomona 51%
Reed 45%
Swarthmore 48%
Wellesley 2%
Williams 49%
It seems that there is a ‘missing population’ of very high IQ men who are not getting admitted to the most selective and prestigious undergraduate schools. The likely reason is that their high school educational qualifications and evaluations are too low, since these men probably lack the very high levels of C required to negotiate modern educational systems and achieve the very highest level of success (in the top 2% of attainment). These men with very high IQ but only moderate C are presumably attending a wide spectrum of less-selective and lower-ranked undergraduate schools, or (less plausibly) dropping-out of the educational system altogether.
A further factor may be that colleges are also selecting on the basis of high sociability, which can be measured as the personality trait of Agreeableness [1]. Agreeableness is higher in women. High Agreeableness would not be expected to lead to better educational performance, but instead would be likely to enhance an applicant’s resume with a record of participation in societies, charities and sports together with general friendliness and club-ability – these factors may well be counted in favour of a student and would also tend differentially to favour the admission of women.
My hypothesis [1] that Conscientiousness (and perhaps Agreeableness) count for more than IQ at the level of elite college admissions receives some support from this data set, and could be tested further by longitudinal studies which measured IQ and personality during childhood (rankings of IQ and personality tend to be stable throughout life), and followed-up students through the school and college examination and selection process to observe the interaction between these variables.
The implication is that modern undergraduates at the most selective US universities are not so much an elite for intelligence, as is commonly assumed, but more of an elite in terms of traits such as perseverance and self-discipline.
Acknowledgement
My thanks to Richard Lynn for his help and advice in preparing this editorial.
References
[1] B.G. Charlton, Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 237–243.
[2] College Board SAT, 2008 College Bound Seniors.
[3] B.G. Charlton, Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 625–628.
[4] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[5] C. Murray, Human accomplishment. The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences 800 BC to 1950, HarperCollins, New York (2003).
[6] A.L. Duckworth and M.E.P. Seligman, Self-discipline gives girls the edge, J Educ Psychol 98 (2006), pp. 198–208.
[7] R. Lynn and P. Irwing, Sex differences on the progressive matrices: a meta analysis, Intelligence 32 (2004), pp. 481–498.
[8] L.V. Hedges and A. Nowell, Sex differences in mental test scores, variability, and numbers of high-scoring individuals, Science 269 (1995), pp. 41–45.
Friday, 24 April 2009
Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning (SEAP) memory theory
The Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning (SEAP) theory of memory: Long term memories grow in complexity during sleep and undergo selection while awake. Clinical, psychopharmacological and creative implications
Medical Hypotheses; 73: 1-4
Bruce G. Charlton and Peter Andras
bruce.charlton@buckingham.ac.uk
***
Summary
Long term memory (LTM) systems need to be adaptive such that they enhance an organism’s reproductive fitness and self-reproducing in order to maintain their complexity of communications over time in the face of entropic loss of information. Traditional ‘representation–consolidation’ accounts conceptualize memory adaptiveness as due to memories being ‘representations’ of the environment, and the longevity of memories as due to ‘consolidation’ processes. The assumption is that memory representations are formed while an animal is awake and interacting with the environment, and these memories are consolidated mainly while the animal is asleep. So the traditional view of memory is ‘instructionist’ and assumes that information is transferred from the environment into the brain. By contrast, we see memories as arising endogenously within the brain’s LTM system mainly during sleep, to create complex but probably maladaptive memories which are then simplified (‘pruned’) and selected during the awake period. When awake the LTM system is brought into a more intense interaction with past and present experience. Ours is therefore a ‘selectionist’ account of memory, and could be termed the Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning (or SEAP) theory. The SEAP theory explains the longevity of memories in the face of entropy by the tendency for memories to grow in complexity during sleep; and explains the adaptiveness of memory by selection for consistency with perceptions and previous memories during the awake state. Sleep is therefore that behavioural state during which most of the internal processing of the system of LTM occurs; and the reason sleep remains poorly understood is that its primary activity is the expansion of long term memories. By re-conceptualizing the relationship between memory, sleep and the environment; SEAP provides a radically new framework for memory research, with implications for the measurement of memory and the design of empirical investigations in clinical, psychopharmacological and creative domains. For example, it would be predicted that states of insufficient alertness such as delirium would produce errors of commission (memory distortion and false memories, as with psychotic delusions), while sleep deprivation would produce errors of memory omission (memory loss). Ultimately, the main argument in favour of SEAP is that long term memory must be a complex adaptive system, and complex systems arise, are selected and sustained according to the principles of systems theory; and therefore LTM cannot be functioning in the way assumed by ‘representation–consolidation’ theories.
***
The nature of long term memory: instructionist or selectionist?
What follows is an ‘in principle’ argument about the basic nature of human long term memory. Although the details of real human memory may differ; if the premises concerning the nature of complex systems are correct, then memory ‘must’ work in something like the way we describe [1].
Human long term memory is typically described as a brain system for the storage of information about what has happened to an organism, so that the organism will be able to use this information in the future in order better to survive and reproduce (i.e., to increase its ‘fitness’). The kind of thing which is ‘stored’ in the long term memory system includes external stimuli (perceived via the five senses) and internal body states (perceived via the autonomic nervous system and messenger molecules such as hormones) [2]. Long term memories (LTMs) are typically conceptualized in terms of changes to brain circuitry [3], for example changes in the pattern of synaptic sensitivities [4].
The vast capacity of human long term memory implies that memory must be an extremely complex system, and all complex systems share basic formal properties [1], [5] and [6].
The usual description has memories as ‘representations’ of environmental entities being formed while an animal is awake and alert; after which these memories are edited, sorted, combined, selected or pruned (i.e., ‘consolidated’) while the animal is asleep. This could be termed an awake elaboration–sleep simplification theory of memory, or an awake representation–sleep consolidation theory.
In contrast, we propose almost the opposite idea: that memories are elaborated mostly during sleep (when the brain is more-or-less cut-off from interaction with its environment) and these memories are then selected or ‘pruned’ by interaction with other brain communications when awake. Our theory could be termed the Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning (or SEAP) theory of memory.
The traditional ‘representation–consolidation’ view of memory is ‘instructionist’ because the environment is seen as instructing the brain during awake periods. In other words, the complexity of memory is ‘exogenous’ because it originates in the environment; and complexity is transferred from the environment into the brain such that brain complexity ‘represents’, or in-effect mirrors, environmental complexity; then subsequently this complex information in the brain is summarized and thereby simplified mainly during sleep (i.e., the ‘consolidation’ phase).
By contrast, we see the complexity of memories as having an endogenous origin: i.e., originating within the brain. We suggest that complexity of memories is generated within the brain during sleep, to create elaborate memories which are then simplified (‘pruned’) mainly during the awake period of alertness, when the brain is brought into a more intense interaction with both its internal and external environment.
So the SEAP theory sees complexity as arising in the brain (mostly during sleep), and the editing of this complexity as a secondary consequence of the brain interacting with the environment when the animal is awake and behaving. Instead of the complexity of memories deriving from the environment, the complexity of memories is reduced by interaction with the environment – such that (for instance) in response to experience some memories are lost, others are abbreviated, while other connected memories are separated.
The SEAP theory is therefore akin to ‘selectionist’ accounts of neurobiology such as those provided by Edelman [7] and Gazzaniga [8]. SEAP is a selectionist theory of memory in which random variation and combination generates non-adaptive complexity; and in which complexity is reduced and adaptiveness emerges by a competitive selection mechanism of differential growth and extinction of complex systems. The complex systems which survive selection and grow are those which are more adaptive in that particular selection environment.
Like Edelman and Gazzaniga we regard memories as a consequence of the generation of diversity and selection among variants. But we also believe that only systems of communications [5] undergo selection, and therefore it is not necessarily or usually the brain’s physical units (such as neurons) which are selected [1] and [6].
SEAP is therefore based on the axiom derived from Luhmann’s theory of complex systems [5] that systems of communications are primary, and the communicating components of these systems (such as neurons) are secondary [6]. So that long term memories should properly be conceptualized as abstract systems of communications between neurons; and not the particular pattern of anatomical entities such as neurons or synapses.
Growth of memory systems
Memory systems need to be self-reproducing in order to maintain their complexity of communications over time in the face of the universal tendency for entropic loss of organised complexity: i.e., loss of information. In other words, the intrinsic tendency is for memories to be lost [4], and memory systems need a mechanism whereby complexity can be generated and information can be maintained despite this entropic tendency.
According to the SEAP theory, self-reproduction of memories generates surplus memory communications and a tendency for expansion in complexity of the memory system. So that self-reproduction of the memory system randomly generates memory complexity, and growth of new memories and combinations of memories will in turn create competition between the newly-generated memories.
This competition between new memories leads to differential survival and extinction of memories and is the basis of the process of selection among memories in a manner precisely analogous to natural selection in biology, or the selection processes of the immune system. All types of selection share basic formal properties [6] and [9]. Natural selection and immune system selection both lead to adaptation to the environment, but by the generation of random complexity being subjected to pruning of ‘maladaptive’ (or, more exactly, less-adaptive) variants via interaction with the environment.
Hence memory systems must tend to grow to ensure their own survival, and growth in this systemic sense entails growth in complexity. So the conclusion is that memory systems must have a tendency to grow in complexity; and superimposed on this tendency to growth are selection mechanisms that enforce adaptiveness.
Selection of endogenously-generated memories occurs by interaction with other memories within the long term memory system, and also from the memory system’s interaction with other brain systems. Interaction between memories and their environment probably happens at the level of neurons – which are the units generating and receiving communications in the memory system. Presumably, individual long term memory (LTM) neurons will typically participate in ‘coding’ (communicating) more than one memory; and some LTM neurons will also participate in other neural systems.
Selection of memory systems
Selection is a consequence of these interactions at the neuron level between more than one memory sharing a particular neuron, and between memories and other brain functions in which that neuron participates. For example, a cortical neuron may participate in several memories relating to an individual person, and also in the awake processing relating to visual perception [4]. Some of these networks of communication will be compatible, and memories then may be combined and thus grow to generate more complex memories by including more neurons into the communications network, or by triggering more frequent communications from neurons already in the network.
This may be conceptualized as memories being selected by their compatibility with ongoing personal experience. ‘False’ memories are therefore those contradicted by perceptions, while ‘true’ memories are those compatible with perceptions.
And memories will also conflict and interfere, such that one memory system may suppress neuronal participation in another memory system; and such memories cannot be combined and cannot grow in complexity. Such memory systems are more likely to become extinct, and these memories be lost.
The rationale by which memories either grow and increase in complexity, or interfere and reduce in complexity, are the structural and functional properties of the long term memory system – which are currently poorly understood. Presumably the sketchy current knowledge of how and why memory associations form, or how and why some memories rapidly disappear, are preliminary evidence concerning the structural and functional properties of the long term memory system.
Memories are therefore subject to continual selection and reshaping by the organism’s ongoing waking experience, and each night memories will be elaborated and combined, so that the interaction between nocturnal memory growth and diurnal pruning means that memories will tend to evolve over time. Most memories will become extinct, but those which are not ‘contradicted’ by awake experience will continue to increase in complexity (mainly during sleep) until such a point that they do eventually lead to contradiction after which the erroneous memories will be pruned-back.
Cyclical nocturnal growth of complexity and diurnal competitive pruning by the perceptual system is therefore the process by which long term memories on the one hand overcome the continuous tendency to loss of information by random entropic processes, and on the other hand maintain their adaptive relevance such that the long term memories (on average, and in the environment where they evolved) will tend to be fitness-increasing.
The function of sleep in memory
While sleep is advantageous to reproductive fitness in most (although not all [4] and [10]) animals, nonetheless understanding the ‘function of sleep’ has proved elusive [11]. While sleep very probably has to do with the editing and maintenance of long term memory [4], the specifics of this have proved hard to pin-down (e.g. [12] and [13]).
The reason sleep remains poorly understood, we suggest, is that sleep does not really have ‘a function’ in terms of the organism as a whole. Rather, according to SEAP theory, sleep is the behavioural state during which most of the internal processing of the system of long term memory (LTM) occurs. The primary ‘function’ of sleep is therefore maintenance and increase of LTM complexity. Or, the function of sleep is the expansion of long term memories.
This implies that serving as an adaptive ‘memory’ system for the organism is merely a secondary function of memory; and that sleep does not exist to improve the ‘accuracy’ (or adaptive relevance) of memories but instead to generate the complexity of memories.
The main requirement for LTM is among complex animals living in complex and changing environments – i.e., situations in which organisms have a repertoire of potential behaviours, where each day generates different challenges, and when therefore animals stand potentially to benefit from memories of their previous experiences [4]. In such animals (including humans) LTM often has a vast information capacity, and therefore necessarily memory is vastly complex.
The complexity of a system can be defined in terms of its having a much greater density of internal communication than its interactions with the non-system environment: in principle, the quantitative differential between internal communications and external interactions is a measure of system complexity [5] and [6]. Such internal complexity appears to an external observer as memory activity ‘autonomous’ from the rest of the organism, and with little or no communication between the LTM and its environment.
In other words, the memory system (like any complex system) needs to be relatively cut-off from environmental interactions (especially the computationally-heavy load of visual stimulation). The long term memory system likewise needs to be all – but disengaged from initiating ‘action’ – therefore not engaged in purposive movement, with the organism either temporarily inert or merely performing repetitive and stereotyped motor behaviour. This set of conditions is closely approximated by the state of sleep [3] and [4].
Sleep may therefore be considered as the cycle during which memory systems are most engaged in their primary activity of internal processing. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that sleep is important for memory functions [14] – but the perspective of abstract communication systems goes considerably further than this.
From the perspective of the long term memory (LTM) system, sleep processing is its main activity; sleep allows its maintenance, self-reproduction and increase in complexity, and the ‘memory function’ of the LTM system is a subordinate activity which has evolved to enable the LTM system to emerge, survive and thrive in the context of the rest of the brain.
In a metaphorical sense, the ‘memory function’ is merely rent paid by the LTM system to the organism.
Clinical and behavioural implications of the SEAP theory
Sleep
Sleep disturbances – reduced amount or quality of sleep – are an extremely common aspect of clinical practice. Lack of alertness is another common clinical problem. According to the SEAP theory, both sleep disturbance and impaired alertness would both be expected to impair memory – but in different ways.
Insufficient or too-often-interrupted sleep would presumably result in a reduction of complexity of communication in LTM: that is, a reduction in informational capacity of LTM. In summary, after sleep deprivation memories would be accurate and correct, but there would be a loss of content. The consequences of reduced complexity might include a reduction in potential total memory capacity of LTM, simplification of memories (less informational content, less combination of individual memories to form scenarios), and a greater probability of loss and extinction of memories. All of these predicted effects would be in principle measurable by properly designed memory tests.
Because the SEAP theory predicts that the accuracy of memories is mainly a consequence of selection processes during the awake and alert period; so that a major consequence of reduced alertness would be reduced accuracy of memories. So long as sleep was un-impaired; lack of alertness would be expected to produce inaccurate or false memories but not to cause memory losses. There would be plenty of memories, and memories would not be lost to entropy, but memory information would be inaccurate, unreliable, maladaptive. This inaccuracy would happen because memories had not undergone effective selection by interaction with perceptual systems and other pre-existing memories which had themselves undergone selection. So memories might be incompatible with direct experience and also with previous knowledge.
This situation of distorted and incoherent memories resembles the bizarre delusions which occur in psychotic states; and many psychotic states are associated with impaired alertness or ‘delirium’ [15]. Of course, sleep deprivation can itself be a cause of reduced alertness by causing increased sleepiness/impaired consciousness [16].
So specific states of insufficient alertness would be expected to produce errors of commission (memory distortion, false memories, memory inaccuracy), while sleep deprivation would produce errors of memory omission (memory loss). These predictions are testable, given the development of specific psychological measurement instruments to distinguish these types of memory error.
However, the specific consequences of sleep deprivation may be hard to predict without knowledge of the principles (or contingencies) of internal organization of the LTM. Furthermore, there may be various combinations of sleep loss and lack of alertness. One confusing factor is that sleep loss can itself produce drowsiness/delirium/lack of alertness (see below). These factors might explain the difficulties that sleep and memory researchers have experienced in precisely defining the function of sleep. For instance, the effects of ‘pure’ sleep deficiency on memory would be expected to be seen in terms of impairing the complexity of memories – but not necessarily on reducing the accuracy of memories.
Psychopharmacology
The SEAP theory implies that there is likely to be a trade-off and a phasic effect in the memory effects of some psychotropic drugs.
There are many sedative drugs (e.g., benzodiazepines, sedative antihistamines) that improve sleep; and also several psychostimulant drugs (e.g., dexamphetamine, methylphenidate) that improve alertness. However, these mainstream drugs lack specificity of action, because sedatives tend to have hangover effects of drowsiness after wakening, while stimulant drugs tend to have ‘hangover’ effects of insomnia and other types of sleep disturbance [17].
Therefore, the expected memory effect of sedatives might (assuming that sleep really is improved) be first to improve the recall of memories; but the secondary effect would be to impair the accuracy of memories (due to hangover and reduced alertness). The effect of psycho-stimulants might be the opposite: firstly to improve the accuracy of memories, then (when sleep disturbance became a problem) secondarily to impair sleep and increase the problem of memory losses.
Perhaps no single drug would therefore be expected to improve memory, and the most likely possibility for pharmacological enhancement of memory would be alternate and sequential circadian dosages of short-acting stimulants and short-acting sedatives.
Another possibility for memory enhancement might be methods for direct and specific brain stimulation – if it became possible technologically to initiate at will both restorative sleep and an awake and alert state of consciousness, and to impose these states alternately and sequentially.
Creative trance
It can be seen that the elaborative phase of long term memory bears considerable resemblance with the process of creativity as we usually understand it [18]. This suggests that most creative activity is likely to occur during sleep – indeed the characteristic ‘wide associative field’ of creative thinking has long been recognized as similar to the mental processes of dreaming. However, some creative people seem able to engage in associative thinking while relatively awake and alert – especially in a ‘trance’ state of altered consciousness of a kind traditionally associated with religious, spiritual, artistic and scientific breakthroughs and ‘eureka’ moments [19].
Since the process of elaborative memory is prone to maladaptive errors of commission, the SEAP theory emphasises that the creative trance is also likely to suffer from the same errors of commission as occur during other states of impaired alertness – and the products of a creative trance state therefore typically require pruning or ‘editing’ by the alert mind (or by other people) in order to eliminate this type of error.
Indeed, this two stage procedure of generation of raw material in a trance state of ‘impaired consciousness’ followed by the period of revision of critique in a state of alertness and clear consciousness is frequently seen in accounts of creativity. For example, the English poet and novelist Robert Graves described his writing procedure in precisely these terms: as firstly a self-induced trance state which generated the primary ‘raw material’, then a stage of making multiple revisions and re-shapings to the raw material when in a ‘normal’ state of alertness and concentration [20]. And the same stages are also observed in some examples of scientific creativity – the ‘breakthrough’ coming in a visionary state of actual sleep, sleepiness or some other altered state of consciousness – followed by a period of checking and validating [19].
This model may also explain the role of alcohol in creativity, since a high proportion of creative geniuses (especially in the arts) also ‘abuse’ alcohol [18] and [22]. A very intelligent and knowledgeable person may find their creativity limited, and use the sedative (alertness-reducing) properties of alcohol to enable the associations which form the basic raw material of their creativity (so long as the dose of alcohol is not so great as to lead to inertia). The alcohol-fuelled raw material is then selected, pruned and revised when sober.
Furthermore, creative geniuses may exhibit a phasic pattern of asocial versus social behaviour: a phase of solitude when they are cut-off from interaction with others so that their ideas (memories) may increase in complexity; followed by social engagement when these ideas are selected by interaction with the peer group.
Autodidacts, who lack interaction with a peer group; are often very creative and original but their ideas often also tend to be wrong or ‘crazy’ because they have lacked the selection process of peer interaction. They have too much solitary introspective brooding, and not enough interaction. However, professionals working in institutions tend to generate ideas that are sensible and correct but which tend to be dull and unoriginal – merely incremental extrapolations from existing knowledge. They exhibit too much peer interaction, and not enough solitary brooding.
The SEAP theory may therefore explain why most creative people are introverted [18], but that intermittent periods of peer interaction are also usually necessary.
Conclusion
The Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning theory of memory is not merely a reversal of the mainstream instructionist theory of memory since the putative memory processes are quite distinct. In particular, SEAP regards the complexity of memories as being endogenously-derived rather than ‘representing’ environmental complexity; and SEAP replaces the concept of ‘consolidation’ during sleep with interactional pruning while awake. Ultimately, the main argument in favour of SEAP (or something similar) is that long term memory must be a complex adaptive system, and that complex systems arise and are sustained along the lines we have described, and not in the way assumed by ‘representation–consolidation’ theories of memory.
Therefore, by re-conceptualizing the relationship between memory, sleep and the environment; SEAP provides a radically new framework for memory research, with implications for the measurement of memory and the design of empirical investigations in clinical, psychopharmacological and creative domains.
References
[1] Charlton BG, Andras P. Complex biological memory conceptualized as an abstract communication system–human long term memories grow in complexity during sleep and undergo selection while awake. In: Perlovsky LI, Kozma R, editors. Understanding complex systems (series): neurodynamics of cognition and consciousness, www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/publications/books/papers/315.pdf; 2007 [accessed 12 March 2009].
[2] A.R. Damasio, Descartes error: emotion, reason and the human brain, Putnam, New York (1994).
[3] J.A. Hobson, The dream drugstore, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (2002).
[4] J.L. Kavanau, Memory, sleep and dynamic stabilization of neural circuitry: evolutionary perspectives, Neurosci Biobehav Rev 20 (1996), pp. 289–311.
[5] N. Luhmann, Social systems, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA (1996).
[6] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
[7] G.M. Edelman, Neural Darwinism: the theory of neuronal group selection, Basic Books, New York (1987).
[8] M. Gazzaniga, Nature’s mind: biological roots of thinking, emotions, sexuality and intelligence, Penguin, London (1994).
[9] D.L. Hull, Science and selection, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2001).
[10] J.L. Kavanau, Is sleep’s ’supreme mystery’ unraveling? An evolutionary analysis of sleep encounters no mystery; nor does life’s earliest sleep, recently discovered in jellyfish, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 3–9.
[11] J.M. Siegel, Why we sleep, Sci Am (November) (2003), pp. 92–97. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (18)
[12] P. Maquet, The role of sleep in learning and memory, Science 294 (2001), pp. 1048–1052.
[13] J.M. Siegel, The REM sleep–memory consolidation hypothesis, Science 294 (2001), pp. 1058–1063.
[14] M.P. Walker and R. Stickgold, Sleep, memory, and plasticity, Ann Rev Psychol 57 (2006), pp. 139–166.
[15] B.G. Charlton, Theory of mind delusions and bizarre delusions in an evolutionary perspective: psychiatry and the social brain. In: M. Brune, H. Ribbert and W. Schiefenhovel, Editors, The social brain – evolution and pathology, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester (2003), pp. 315–338.
[16] B.G. Charlton and J.L. Kavanau, Delirium and psychotic symptoms – an integrative model, Med Hypotheses 58 (2002), pp. 24–27.
[17] D. Healy, Psychiatric drugs explained (4th ed.), Churchill Livingstone, Oxford (2004).
[18] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[19] B.G. Charlton, Alienation, recovered animism and altered states of consciousness, Med Hypotheses 68 (2007), pp. 727–731.
[20] M. Seymour-Smith, Robert Graves: his life and work, Paladin, London (1982) p. 99–100 [1987 edition].
[22] B.G. Charlton, Scientific discovery, peak experiences and the Col-oh-nell Flastratus! phenomenon, Med Hypotheses 69 (2007), pp. 475–477.
Medical Hypotheses; 73: 1-4
Bruce G. Charlton and Peter Andras
bruce.charlton@buckingham.ac.uk
***
Summary
Long term memory (LTM) systems need to be adaptive such that they enhance an organism’s reproductive fitness and self-reproducing in order to maintain their complexity of communications over time in the face of entropic loss of information. Traditional ‘representation–consolidation’ accounts conceptualize memory adaptiveness as due to memories being ‘representations’ of the environment, and the longevity of memories as due to ‘consolidation’ processes. The assumption is that memory representations are formed while an animal is awake and interacting with the environment, and these memories are consolidated mainly while the animal is asleep. So the traditional view of memory is ‘instructionist’ and assumes that information is transferred from the environment into the brain. By contrast, we see memories as arising endogenously within the brain’s LTM system mainly during sleep, to create complex but probably maladaptive memories which are then simplified (‘pruned’) and selected during the awake period. When awake the LTM system is brought into a more intense interaction with past and present experience. Ours is therefore a ‘selectionist’ account of memory, and could be termed the Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning (or SEAP) theory. The SEAP theory explains the longevity of memories in the face of entropy by the tendency for memories to grow in complexity during sleep; and explains the adaptiveness of memory by selection for consistency with perceptions and previous memories during the awake state. Sleep is therefore that behavioural state during which most of the internal processing of the system of LTM occurs; and the reason sleep remains poorly understood is that its primary activity is the expansion of long term memories. By re-conceptualizing the relationship between memory, sleep and the environment; SEAP provides a radically new framework for memory research, with implications for the measurement of memory and the design of empirical investigations in clinical, psychopharmacological and creative domains. For example, it would be predicted that states of insufficient alertness such as delirium would produce errors of commission (memory distortion and false memories, as with psychotic delusions), while sleep deprivation would produce errors of memory omission (memory loss). Ultimately, the main argument in favour of SEAP is that long term memory must be a complex adaptive system, and complex systems arise, are selected and sustained according to the principles of systems theory; and therefore LTM cannot be functioning in the way assumed by ‘representation–consolidation’ theories.
***
The nature of long term memory: instructionist or selectionist?
What follows is an ‘in principle’ argument about the basic nature of human long term memory. Although the details of real human memory may differ; if the premises concerning the nature of complex systems are correct, then memory ‘must’ work in something like the way we describe [1].
Human long term memory is typically described as a brain system for the storage of information about what has happened to an organism, so that the organism will be able to use this information in the future in order better to survive and reproduce (i.e., to increase its ‘fitness’). The kind of thing which is ‘stored’ in the long term memory system includes external stimuli (perceived via the five senses) and internal body states (perceived via the autonomic nervous system and messenger molecules such as hormones) [2]. Long term memories (LTMs) are typically conceptualized in terms of changes to brain circuitry [3], for example changes in the pattern of synaptic sensitivities [4].
The vast capacity of human long term memory implies that memory must be an extremely complex system, and all complex systems share basic formal properties [1], [5] and [6].
The usual description has memories as ‘representations’ of environmental entities being formed while an animal is awake and alert; after which these memories are edited, sorted, combined, selected or pruned (i.e., ‘consolidated’) while the animal is asleep. This could be termed an awake elaboration–sleep simplification theory of memory, or an awake representation–sleep consolidation theory.
In contrast, we propose almost the opposite idea: that memories are elaborated mostly during sleep (when the brain is more-or-less cut-off from interaction with its environment) and these memories are then selected or ‘pruned’ by interaction with other brain communications when awake. Our theory could be termed the Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning (or SEAP) theory of memory.
The traditional ‘representation–consolidation’ view of memory is ‘instructionist’ because the environment is seen as instructing the brain during awake periods. In other words, the complexity of memory is ‘exogenous’ because it originates in the environment; and complexity is transferred from the environment into the brain such that brain complexity ‘represents’, or in-effect mirrors, environmental complexity; then subsequently this complex information in the brain is summarized and thereby simplified mainly during sleep (i.e., the ‘consolidation’ phase).
By contrast, we see the complexity of memories as having an endogenous origin: i.e., originating within the brain. We suggest that complexity of memories is generated within the brain during sleep, to create elaborate memories which are then simplified (‘pruned’) mainly during the awake period of alertness, when the brain is brought into a more intense interaction with both its internal and external environment.
So the SEAP theory sees complexity as arising in the brain (mostly during sleep), and the editing of this complexity as a secondary consequence of the brain interacting with the environment when the animal is awake and behaving. Instead of the complexity of memories deriving from the environment, the complexity of memories is reduced by interaction with the environment – such that (for instance) in response to experience some memories are lost, others are abbreviated, while other connected memories are separated.
The SEAP theory is therefore akin to ‘selectionist’ accounts of neurobiology such as those provided by Edelman [7] and Gazzaniga [8]. SEAP is a selectionist theory of memory in which random variation and combination generates non-adaptive complexity; and in which complexity is reduced and adaptiveness emerges by a competitive selection mechanism of differential growth and extinction of complex systems. The complex systems which survive selection and grow are those which are more adaptive in that particular selection environment.
Like Edelman and Gazzaniga we regard memories as a consequence of the generation of diversity and selection among variants. But we also believe that only systems of communications [5] undergo selection, and therefore it is not necessarily or usually the brain’s physical units (such as neurons) which are selected [1] and [6].
SEAP is therefore based on the axiom derived from Luhmann’s theory of complex systems [5] that systems of communications are primary, and the communicating components of these systems (such as neurons) are secondary [6]. So that long term memories should properly be conceptualized as abstract systems of communications between neurons; and not the particular pattern of anatomical entities such as neurons or synapses.
Growth of memory systems
Memory systems need to be self-reproducing in order to maintain their complexity of communications over time in the face of the universal tendency for entropic loss of organised complexity: i.e., loss of information. In other words, the intrinsic tendency is for memories to be lost [4], and memory systems need a mechanism whereby complexity can be generated and information can be maintained despite this entropic tendency.
According to the SEAP theory, self-reproduction of memories generates surplus memory communications and a tendency for expansion in complexity of the memory system. So that self-reproduction of the memory system randomly generates memory complexity, and growth of new memories and combinations of memories will in turn create competition between the newly-generated memories.
This competition between new memories leads to differential survival and extinction of memories and is the basis of the process of selection among memories in a manner precisely analogous to natural selection in biology, or the selection processes of the immune system. All types of selection share basic formal properties [6] and [9]. Natural selection and immune system selection both lead to adaptation to the environment, but by the generation of random complexity being subjected to pruning of ‘maladaptive’ (or, more exactly, less-adaptive) variants via interaction with the environment.
Hence memory systems must tend to grow to ensure their own survival, and growth in this systemic sense entails growth in complexity. So the conclusion is that memory systems must have a tendency to grow in complexity; and superimposed on this tendency to growth are selection mechanisms that enforce adaptiveness.
Selection of endogenously-generated memories occurs by interaction with other memories within the long term memory system, and also from the memory system’s interaction with other brain systems. Interaction between memories and their environment probably happens at the level of neurons – which are the units generating and receiving communications in the memory system. Presumably, individual long term memory (LTM) neurons will typically participate in ‘coding’ (communicating) more than one memory; and some LTM neurons will also participate in other neural systems.
Selection of memory systems
Selection is a consequence of these interactions at the neuron level between more than one memory sharing a particular neuron, and between memories and other brain functions in which that neuron participates. For example, a cortical neuron may participate in several memories relating to an individual person, and also in the awake processing relating to visual perception [4]. Some of these networks of communication will be compatible, and memories then may be combined and thus grow to generate more complex memories by including more neurons into the communications network, or by triggering more frequent communications from neurons already in the network.
This may be conceptualized as memories being selected by their compatibility with ongoing personal experience. ‘False’ memories are therefore those contradicted by perceptions, while ‘true’ memories are those compatible with perceptions.
And memories will also conflict and interfere, such that one memory system may suppress neuronal participation in another memory system; and such memories cannot be combined and cannot grow in complexity. Such memory systems are more likely to become extinct, and these memories be lost.
The rationale by which memories either grow and increase in complexity, or interfere and reduce in complexity, are the structural and functional properties of the long term memory system – which are currently poorly understood. Presumably the sketchy current knowledge of how and why memory associations form, or how and why some memories rapidly disappear, are preliminary evidence concerning the structural and functional properties of the long term memory system.
Memories are therefore subject to continual selection and reshaping by the organism’s ongoing waking experience, and each night memories will be elaborated and combined, so that the interaction between nocturnal memory growth and diurnal pruning means that memories will tend to evolve over time. Most memories will become extinct, but those which are not ‘contradicted’ by awake experience will continue to increase in complexity (mainly during sleep) until such a point that they do eventually lead to contradiction after which the erroneous memories will be pruned-back.
Cyclical nocturnal growth of complexity and diurnal competitive pruning by the perceptual system is therefore the process by which long term memories on the one hand overcome the continuous tendency to loss of information by random entropic processes, and on the other hand maintain their adaptive relevance such that the long term memories (on average, and in the environment where they evolved) will tend to be fitness-increasing.
The function of sleep in memory
While sleep is advantageous to reproductive fitness in most (although not all [4] and [10]) animals, nonetheless understanding the ‘function of sleep’ has proved elusive [11]. While sleep very probably has to do with the editing and maintenance of long term memory [4], the specifics of this have proved hard to pin-down (e.g. [12] and [13]).
The reason sleep remains poorly understood, we suggest, is that sleep does not really have ‘a function’ in terms of the organism as a whole. Rather, according to SEAP theory, sleep is the behavioural state during which most of the internal processing of the system of long term memory (LTM) occurs. The primary ‘function’ of sleep is therefore maintenance and increase of LTM complexity. Or, the function of sleep is the expansion of long term memories.
This implies that serving as an adaptive ‘memory’ system for the organism is merely a secondary function of memory; and that sleep does not exist to improve the ‘accuracy’ (or adaptive relevance) of memories but instead to generate the complexity of memories.
The main requirement for LTM is among complex animals living in complex and changing environments – i.e., situations in which organisms have a repertoire of potential behaviours, where each day generates different challenges, and when therefore animals stand potentially to benefit from memories of their previous experiences [4]. In such animals (including humans) LTM often has a vast information capacity, and therefore necessarily memory is vastly complex.
The complexity of a system can be defined in terms of its having a much greater density of internal communication than its interactions with the non-system environment: in principle, the quantitative differential between internal communications and external interactions is a measure of system complexity [5] and [6]. Such internal complexity appears to an external observer as memory activity ‘autonomous’ from the rest of the organism, and with little or no communication between the LTM and its environment.
In other words, the memory system (like any complex system) needs to be relatively cut-off from environmental interactions (especially the computationally-heavy load of visual stimulation). The long term memory system likewise needs to be all – but disengaged from initiating ‘action’ – therefore not engaged in purposive movement, with the organism either temporarily inert or merely performing repetitive and stereotyped motor behaviour. This set of conditions is closely approximated by the state of sleep [3] and [4].
Sleep may therefore be considered as the cycle during which memory systems are most engaged in their primary activity of internal processing. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that sleep is important for memory functions [14] – but the perspective of abstract communication systems goes considerably further than this.
From the perspective of the long term memory (LTM) system, sleep processing is its main activity; sleep allows its maintenance, self-reproduction and increase in complexity, and the ‘memory function’ of the LTM system is a subordinate activity which has evolved to enable the LTM system to emerge, survive and thrive in the context of the rest of the brain.
In a metaphorical sense, the ‘memory function’ is merely rent paid by the LTM system to the organism.
Clinical and behavioural implications of the SEAP theory
Sleep
Sleep disturbances – reduced amount or quality of sleep – are an extremely common aspect of clinical practice. Lack of alertness is another common clinical problem. According to the SEAP theory, both sleep disturbance and impaired alertness would both be expected to impair memory – but in different ways.
Insufficient or too-often-interrupted sleep would presumably result in a reduction of complexity of communication in LTM: that is, a reduction in informational capacity of LTM. In summary, after sleep deprivation memories would be accurate and correct, but there would be a loss of content. The consequences of reduced complexity might include a reduction in potential total memory capacity of LTM, simplification of memories (less informational content, less combination of individual memories to form scenarios), and a greater probability of loss and extinction of memories. All of these predicted effects would be in principle measurable by properly designed memory tests.
Because the SEAP theory predicts that the accuracy of memories is mainly a consequence of selection processes during the awake and alert period; so that a major consequence of reduced alertness would be reduced accuracy of memories. So long as sleep was un-impaired; lack of alertness would be expected to produce inaccurate or false memories but not to cause memory losses. There would be plenty of memories, and memories would not be lost to entropy, but memory information would be inaccurate, unreliable, maladaptive. This inaccuracy would happen because memories had not undergone effective selection by interaction with perceptual systems and other pre-existing memories which had themselves undergone selection. So memories might be incompatible with direct experience and also with previous knowledge.
This situation of distorted and incoherent memories resembles the bizarre delusions which occur in psychotic states; and many psychotic states are associated with impaired alertness or ‘delirium’ [15]. Of course, sleep deprivation can itself be a cause of reduced alertness by causing increased sleepiness/impaired consciousness [16].
So specific states of insufficient alertness would be expected to produce errors of commission (memory distortion, false memories, memory inaccuracy), while sleep deprivation would produce errors of memory omission (memory loss). These predictions are testable, given the development of specific psychological measurement instruments to distinguish these types of memory error.
However, the specific consequences of sleep deprivation may be hard to predict without knowledge of the principles (or contingencies) of internal organization of the LTM. Furthermore, there may be various combinations of sleep loss and lack of alertness. One confusing factor is that sleep loss can itself produce drowsiness/delirium/lack of alertness (see below). These factors might explain the difficulties that sleep and memory researchers have experienced in precisely defining the function of sleep. For instance, the effects of ‘pure’ sleep deficiency on memory would be expected to be seen in terms of impairing the complexity of memories – but not necessarily on reducing the accuracy of memories.
Psychopharmacology
The SEAP theory implies that there is likely to be a trade-off and a phasic effect in the memory effects of some psychotropic drugs.
There are many sedative drugs (e.g., benzodiazepines, sedative antihistamines) that improve sleep; and also several psychostimulant drugs (e.g., dexamphetamine, methylphenidate) that improve alertness. However, these mainstream drugs lack specificity of action, because sedatives tend to have hangover effects of drowsiness after wakening, while stimulant drugs tend to have ‘hangover’ effects of insomnia and other types of sleep disturbance [17].
Therefore, the expected memory effect of sedatives might (assuming that sleep really is improved) be first to improve the recall of memories; but the secondary effect would be to impair the accuracy of memories (due to hangover and reduced alertness). The effect of psycho-stimulants might be the opposite: firstly to improve the accuracy of memories, then (when sleep disturbance became a problem) secondarily to impair sleep and increase the problem of memory losses.
Perhaps no single drug would therefore be expected to improve memory, and the most likely possibility for pharmacological enhancement of memory would be alternate and sequential circadian dosages of short-acting stimulants and short-acting sedatives.
Another possibility for memory enhancement might be methods for direct and specific brain stimulation – if it became possible technologically to initiate at will both restorative sleep and an awake and alert state of consciousness, and to impose these states alternately and sequentially.
Creative trance
It can be seen that the elaborative phase of long term memory bears considerable resemblance with the process of creativity as we usually understand it [18]. This suggests that most creative activity is likely to occur during sleep – indeed the characteristic ‘wide associative field’ of creative thinking has long been recognized as similar to the mental processes of dreaming. However, some creative people seem able to engage in associative thinking while relatively awake and alert – especially in a ‘trance’ state of altered consciousness of a kind traditionally associated with religious, spiritual, artistic and scientific breakthroughs and ‘eureka’ moments [19].
Since the process of elaborative memory is prone to maladaptive errors of commission, the SEAP theory emphasises that the creative trance is also likely to suffer from the same errors of commission as occur during other states of impaired alertness – and the products of a creative trance state therefore typically require pruning or ‘editing’ by the alert mind (or by other people) in order to eliminate this type of error.
Indeed, this two stage procedure of generation of raw material in a trance state of ‘impaired consciousness’ followed by the period of revision of critique in a state of alertness and clear consciousness is frequently seen in accounts of creativity. For example, the English poet and novelist Robert Graves described his writing procedure in precisely these terms: as firstly a self-induced trance state which generated the primary ‘raw material’, then a stage of making multiple revisions and re-shapings to the raw material when in a ‘normal’ state of alertness and concentration [20]. And the same stages are also observed in some examples of scientific creativity – the ‘breakthrough’ coming in a visionary state of actual sleep, sleepiness or some other altered state of consciousness – followed by a period of checking and validating [19].
This model may also explain the role of alcohol in creativity, since a high proportion of creative geniuses (especially in the arts) also ‘abuse’ alcohol [18] and [22]. A very intelligent and knowledgeable person may find their creativity limited, and use the sedative (alertness-reducing) properties of alcohol to enable the associations which form the basic raw material of their creativity (so long as the dose of alcohol is not so great as to lead to inertia). The alcohol-fuelled raw material is then selected, pruned and revised when sober.
Furthermore, creative geniuses may exhibit a phasic pattern of asocial versus social behaviour: a phase of solitude when they are cut-off from interaction with others so that their ideas (memories) may increase in complexity; followed by social engagement when these ideas are selected by interaction with the peer group.
Autodidacts, who lack interaction with a peer group; are often very creative and original but their ideas often also tend to be wrong or ‘crazy’ because they have lacked the selection process of peer interaction. They have too much solitary introspective brooding, and not enough interaction. However, professionals working in institutions tend to generate ideas that are sensible and correct but which tend to be dull and unoriginal – merely incremental extrapolations from existing knowledge. They exhibit too much peer interaction, and not enough solitary brooding.
The SEAP theory may therefore explain why most creative people are introverted [18], but that intermittent periods of peer interaction are also usually necessary.
Conclusion
The Sleep Elaboration–Awake Pruning theory of memory is not merely a reversal of the mainstream instructionist theory of memory since the putative memory processes are quite distinct. In particular, SEAP regards the complexity of memories as being endogenously-derived rather than ‘representing’ environmental complexity; and SEAP replaces the concept of ‘consolidation’ during sleep with interactional pruning while awake. Ultimately, the main argument in favour of SEAP (or something similar) is that long term memory must be a complex adaptive system, and that complex systems arise and are sustained along the lines we have described, and not in the way assumed by ‘representation–consolidation’ theories of memory.
Therefore, by re-conceptualizing the relationship between memory, sleep and the environment; SEAP provides a radically new framework for memory research, with implications for the measurement of memory and the design of empirical investigations in clinical, psychopharmacological and creative domains.
References
[1] Charlton BG, Andras P. Complex biological memory conceptualized as an abstract communication system–human long term memories grow in complexity during sleep and undergo selection while awake. In: Perlovsky LI, Kozma R, editors. Understanding complex systems (series): neurodynamics of cognition and consciousness, www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/publications/books/papers/315.pdf; 2007 [accessed 12 March 2009].
[2] A.R. Damasio, Descartes error: emotion, reason and the human brain, Putnam, New York (1994).
[3] J.A. Hobson, The dream drugstore, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (2002).
[4] J.L. Kavanau, Memory, sleep and dynamic stabilization of neural circuitry: evolutionary perspectives, Neurosci Biobehav Rev 20 (1996), pp. 289–311.
[5] N. Luhmann, Social systems, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA (1996).
[6] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
[7] G.M. Edelman, Neural Darwinism: the theory of neuronal group selection, Basic Books, New York (1987).
[8] M. Gazzaniga, Nature’s mind: biological roots of thinking, emotions, sexuality and intelligence, Penguin, London (1994).
[9] D.L. Hull, Science and selection, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2001).
[10] J.L. Kavanau, Is sleep’s ’supreme mystery’ unraveling? An evolutionary analysis of sleep encounters no mystery; nor does life’s earliest sleep, recently discovered in jellyfish, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 3–9.
[11] J.M. Siegel, Why we sleep, Sci Am (November) (2003), pp. 92–97. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (18)
[12] P. Maquet, The role of sleep in learning and memory, Science 294 (2001), pp. 1048–1052.
[13] J.M. Siegel, The REM sleep–memory consolidation hypothesis, Science 294 (2001), pp. 1058–1063.
[14] M.P. Walker and R. Stickgold, Sleep, memory, and plasticity, Ann Rev Psychol 57 (2006), pp. 139–166.
[15] B.G. Charlton, Theory of mind delusions and bizarre delusions in an evolutionary perspective: psychiatry and the social brain. In: M. Brune, H. Ribbert and W. Schiefenhovel, Editors, The social brain – evolution and pathology, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester (2003), pp. 315–338.
[16] B.G. Charlton and J.L. Kavanau, Delirium and psychotic symptoms – an integrative model, Med Hypotheses 58 (2002), pp. 24–27.
[17] D. Healy, Psychiatric drugs explained (4th ed.), Churchill Livingstone, Oxford (2004).
[18] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[19] B.G. Charlton, Alienation, recovered animism and altered states of consciousness, Med Hypotheses 68 (2007), pp. 727–731.
[20] M. Seymour-Smith, Robert Graves: his life and work, Paladin, London (1982) p. 99–100 [1987 edition].
[22] B.G. Charlton, Scientific discovery, peak experiences and the Col-oh-nell Flastratus! phenomenon, Med Hypotheses 69 (2007), pp. 475–477.
Thursday, 2 April 2009
Robert 'Humphrey' Havard - Medical 'Inkling'
Charlton, BG. Reflections on a scientific paper of 1926 by the medical ‘Inkling’ Robert Emlyn ‘Humphrey’ Havard (1901–1985). Medical Hypotheses. 2009; Volume 72: Pages 619-620
Summary
Robert Emlyn Havard (1901–1985; general practitioner and sometimes medical scientist) was the only non-literary member of the Inklings – a1930s and 1940s Oxford University club which included Lewis and Tolkien. Despite spending most of his time in family medicine, Havard was a productive medical scientist. While still a student at Cambridge University, Havard co-authored an influential study published in the Journal of Physiology of 1926 entitled ‘The influence of exercise on the inorganic phosphates in the blood and urine’. The style and structure of this paper provides a charming window into the elite medical science of the 1920s.
Article Outline
Havard: The medical Inkling
The Inklings was a group of friends and colleagues who gathered around Lewis in Oxford University during the 1930s and 1940s [1]. The group would meet weekly after dinner in the evening at Lewis’s rooms in Magdalen College to read works-in-progress, and more informally to converse in the Eagle and Child (‘Bird and Baby’) pub in St Giles.
Lewis is now world famous as author of the Narnia fairy stories, and was probably the greatest lay Christian writer of the 20th century. The other world famous Inkling was Tolkien, author of The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings. Charles Williams the novelist, poet and theologian was a later member. Other well-known Inklings included the philosopher Owen Barfield, Nevill Coghill – who became known as a Shakespearian director and published the best known modern English version of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, the ‘angry young man’ novelist and literary scholar John Wain, and the biographer Lord David Cecil. Lewis’s brother Warren (‘Warnie’) was usually in attendance: he was a popular historian of the France of Louis XIV. Tolkien’s youngest son Christopher later joined, and is now the only surviving Inkling – Christopher Tolkien is the most important scholar of his father’s work.
In a recent book on the Inklings, The company they kept [2], Diana Pavlac Glyer notes that almost all of the regular members of the group were active authors – producing academic books, essays, novels, stories, plays and poems. The Inklings essentially functioned as a writers’ group that provided mutual encouragement, criticism and editorial assistance. Superficially at least, the odd-man-out was Robert Emlyn Havard (1901–1985), who was a general practitioner and sometimes medical scientist and the family physician for both Lewis and Tolkien.
Havard appears in fictional form as the somnolent but shrewd character ‘Dolbear’ in Tolkien’s posthumously published story The Notion Club papers [3]; and Lewis’s Prince Caspian is dedicated to Havard’s daughter [4]. He had various nicknames bestowed on him by the group including ‘Humphrey’, ‘the Red Admiral’ (due to a beard grown while in the navy) and UQ – which stood for the ‘Useless Quack’. Indeed, in his sneering and pervasively unreliable biography of Lewis, Havard is depicted by AN Wilson as something of a buffoon [5].
This was far from the case, as can be seen from Havard’s early career as a medical scientist. The most complete account of Havard’s life so-far is by Walter Hooper in his Lewis: a companion and guide [6]. Havard began by taking a first class degree in chemistry at Keble College, Oxford then studying medicine at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge and Guy’s Hospital in London to graduate with the Oxford medical degree of BM BCh in 1927. He took an Oxford DM (Doctor of Medicine) in 1934 while working at Leeds University in the Biochemistry Department, and in the same year returned to Oxford as a research fellow in The Queen’s College, and around this time became a general practitioner.
Despite spending most of his time in general medical practice, Havard was a productive medical scientist with his name on more than two dozen papers published in first rank journals such as Nature, the Lancet, Biochemical Journal and the Journal of Physiology. He had three spells of research and publication – the first mainly to do with human biochemistry during the mid 1920s while he was still a medical student; a second studying more clinical aspects of biochemistry from the early 1930s as a medical graduate doing a doctorate in Leeds and Oxford, and the third from the early 1940s when working on anti-malarial drugs while an above-conscription-age volunteer for military service during world war two [2].
Exercise, phosphates and fun
During his days as a medical undergraduate in Cambridge, Havard co-authored (with George Adam Reay) an influential study published in the Journal of Physiology of 1926 entitled ’The influence of exercise on the inorganic phosphates in the blood and urine’. It was this amiable paper, with its depictions of a time when doing science was akin to an undergraduate ‘jape’, that provoked the following reflections.
This paper was certainly not earth-shattering, nonetheless seems to have been one of the most cited of that year’s volume of J. Physiol. There are currently 13 references to be found on the Google Scholar database (http://scholar.google.co.uk) (quite a lot for such an old paper) with the most recent reference in 1971.
The style and structure provides a charming window onto the very different science of the early 1920s; with its un-translated ‘varsity’ slang, ‘clubby’ style of referencing which lists only authors surnames without initials (in 1926 the membership of the Physiological Society was less than 400 [7]) and delightful vignettes concerning the conduct of experiments.
One striking feature is that the experimental methodology reported in the paper is described as having changed significantly throughout the period of the experiment, and results are given both for before and after these trial-and-error modifications. A modern scientific paper would surely omit the earlier failed attempts. Indeed, the style of this article is less like a modern paper than a slice of laboratory life. The impression is that these scientific pioneers wanted to share not just their results, but the nuts and bolts of how results were generated.
Havard and Reay describe how ‘the exercise took the form of the subject running up and down the laboratory stairs, 40 ft in height, until he was exhausted’ during and after which many one cubic centimetre blood samples were taken from the subject’s finger in order to measure the phosphate etc. – which seems likely to have been a painful procedure. However, one of the main subjects listed was ‘R.E.H.’ himself, so he could not be accused of inflicting on others something he avoided himself.
Indeed, all the experimental subjects are listed by their initials, and presumably therefore identifiable by those ‘in the know’ (so, none of our present-day worries about ‘confidentiality’ are in evidence). In one of the tables we are told that that subjects include G.B. described as ‘A rowing man’, W.E.T. a ‘Rugby “Blue”’ (a ‘Blue’ was awarded to Oxford undergraduates for competing at the highest level of university sport), H.K.B.O. a ‘Running “Blue”’, E.H.F a ‘Sprinter’; and again Havard himself who is, by contrast to these athletes, only ‘Partly trained’.
Collecting urine samples was a problem – we are informed that H.K.B.O. (despite – or maybe because? – of being a Running Blue) was unable to produce a urine sample for 7 min after his exercise. In another experiment R.H.B (‘Running’) was ‘as exhausted and distressed as any of the untrained subjects’ – which must have been rather humiliating for him. But then R.H.B seems not to have been a Blue.
Three women were included as subjects. Miss (I assume it was a Miss) M.M. did exercise which was rather disdainfully dismissed as ‘not very vigorous’; Miss B.E.H. managed ‘more vigorous’ exercise; while the Amazonian Miss C.E.L. was able to perform ‘very vigorous’ exercise – unfortunately however after these exertions she was depicted as ‘very exhausted’. Havard noted, with obvious regret, that the women produced ‘anomalous results’ which were ‘difficult to account for’.
In conclusion the authors reported that phosphate goes up a little then markedly down on exercise, and that trained men show less of these exercise-induced changes in their blood inorganic phosphate.
A snapshot from a lost era
My interest in this paper was stimulated because it presents in microcosm a snapshot of science from an all-but lost era of the ‘invisible college’ of collaborating and competing researchers who knew each other well-enough to dispense with formalities, and whose world was essentially private despite publication in widely circulated journals [8]. To the hard-nosed professional modern scientist, such early 20th century papers look eccentric and idiosyncratic. The paper is indeed ‘amateur’, but mostly in a desirable sense of describing science as an avocation done for intrinsic reasons and the esteem of peers, rather than a vocation rewarded by a secure income and managerial power.
But much more important and striking is the total absence of exaggeration, hype, or spin: the paper’s openness, candour – in a word honesty. This marks the biggest and most dismaying contrast between publications of the science of 80 years ago and of modern science. There has indeed been a loss of innocence, collegiality and fun; but a loss of unvarnished truthfulness is the most serious change against current practice [9].
I have said that Havard was not himself a writer, but on the evidence of this early article, Havard was an unusually vivid scientific author from his mid-twenties. Indeed he wrote essays and journalistic reviews dating back to his student days and continuing through into the 1950s. Furthermore, Havard contributed posthumous memoirs of both Lewis [10] and Tolkien [11].
All of which helps explain why, despite not being a literary man, ‘Humphrey’s’ presence at the Inklings meetings was so highly valued.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Robert Havard’s eldest son John, who kindly gave me a list of some of his father’s publications, and provided fascinating background information by means of e-mail and telephone conversations. John Havard’s brother Mark (i.e. RE Havard’s second son) also corresponded, and reminded me that the doctor in CS Lewis’s 1943 novel Perelandra was named ‘Humphrey’.
References
[1] H. Carpenter, The inklings, George Allen and Unwin, London (1981).
[2] D.P. Glyer, The company they keep: CS Lewis and JRR Tolkien and writers in community, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio (2007).
[3] J.R.R. Tolkien, The Notion Club papers, Morgoth’s ring: history of middle earth volume IX, HarperCollins, London (1992).
[4] C.S. Lewis, Prince Caspian, Geoffrey Bles, London (1951).
[5] A.N. Wilson, CS Lewis: A biography, Collins, London (1990).
[6] R.E. Havard and G.A. Reay, The influence of exercise on the inorganic phosphates of the blood and urine, J Physiol 61 (1926), pp. 35–48.
[7] W.F. Bynum, A short history of the physiological society 1926–1976, J Physiol 263 (1976), pp. 23–72. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (0)
[8] T. Kealey, Sex, science and profits: how people evolved to make money, William Heinemann, London (2008).
[9] B.G. Charlton, The vital role of transcendental truth in science, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 373–376.
[10] R.E. Havard, Philia: Jack at ease. In: T. James and C.S. Como, Editors, Lewis at the breakfast table and other reminiscences, Harvest/HBJ Book, New York (1979), pp. 215–228.
[11] R.E. Havard and J.R.R. Professor, Tolkien: a personal memoir, Mythlore 17 (1990), pp. 61–62.
Summary
Robert Emlyn Havard (1901–1985; general practitioner and sometimes medical scientist) was the only non-literary member of the Inklings – a1930s and 1940s Oxford University club which included Lewis and Tolkien. Despite spending most of his time in family medicine, Havard was a productive medical scientist. While still a student at Cambridge University, Havard co-authored an influential study published in the Journal of Physiology of 1926 entitled ‘The influence of exercise on the inorganic phosphates in the blood and urine’. The style and structure of this paper provides a charming window into the elite medical science of the 1920s.
Article Outline
Havard: The medical Inkling
The Inklings was a group of friends and colleagues who gathered around Lewis in Oxford University during the 1930s and 1940s [1]. The group would meet weekly after dinner in the evening at Lewis’s rooms in Magdalen College to read works-in-progress, and more informally to converse in the Eagle and Child (‘Bird and Baby’) pub in St Giles.
Lewis is now world famous as author of the Narnia fairy stories, and was probably the greatest lay Christian writer of the 20th century. The other world famous Inkling was Tolkien, author of The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings. Charles Williams the novelist, poet and theologian was a later member. Other well-known Inklings included the philosopher Owen Barfield, Nevill Coghill – who became known as a Shakespearian director and published the best known modern English version of Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, the ‘angry young man’ novelist and literary scholar John Wain, and the biographer Lord David Cecil. Lewis’s brother Warren (‘Warnie’) was usually in attendance: he was a popular historian of the France of Louis XIV. Tolkien’s youngest son Christopher later joined, and is now the only surviving Inkling – Christopher Tolkien is the most important scholar of his father’s work.
In a recent book on the Inklings, The company they kept [2], Diana Pavlac Glyer notes that almost all of the regular members of the group were active authors – producing academic books, essays, novels, stories, plays and poems. The Inklings essentially functioned as a writers’ group that provided mutual encouragement, criticism and editorial assistance. Superficially at least, the odd-man-out was Robert Emlyn Havard (1901–1985), who was a general practitioner and sometimes medical scientist and the family physician for both Lewis and Tolkien.
Havard appears in fictional form as the somnolent but shrewd character ‘Dolbear’ in Tolkien’s posthumously published story The Notion Club papers [3]; and Lewis’s Prince Caspian is dedicated to Havard’s daughter [4]. He had various nicknames bestowed on him by the group including ‘Humphrey’, ‘the Red Admiral’ (due to a beard grown while in the navy) and UQ – which stood for the ‘Useless Quack’. Indeed, in his sneering and pervasively unreliable biography of Lewis, Havard is depicted by AN Wilson as something of a buffoon [5].
This was far from the case, as can be seen from Havard’s early career as a medical scientist. The most complete account of Havard’s life so-far is by Walter Hooper in his Lewis: a companion and guide [6]. Havard began by taking a first class degree in chemistry at Keble College, Oxford then studying medicine at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge and Guy’s Hospital in London to graduate with the Oxford medical degree of BM BCh in 1927. He took an Oxford DM (Doctor of Medicine) in 1934 while working at Leeds University in the Biochemistry Department, and in the same year returned to Oxford as a research fellow in The Queen’s College, and around this time became a general practitioner.
Despite spending most of his time in general medical practice, Havard was a productive medical scientist with his name on more than two dozen papers published in first rank journals such as Nature, the Lancet, Biochemical Journal and the Journal of Physiology. He had three spells of research and publication – the first mainly to do with human biochemistry during the mid 1920s while he was still a medical student; a second studying more clinical aspects of biochemistry from the early 1930s as a medical graduate doing a doctorate in Leeds and Oxford, and the third from the early 1940s when working on anti-malarial drugs while an above-conscription-age volunteer for military service during world war two [2].
Exercise, phosphates and fun
During his days as a medical undergraduate in Cambridge, Havard co-authored (with George Adam Reay) an influential study published in the Journal of Physiology of 1926 entitled ’The influence of exercise on the inorganic phosphates in the blood and urine’. It was this amiable paper, with its depictions of a time when doing science was akin to an undergraduate ‘jape’, that provoked the following reflections.
This paper was certainly not earth-shattering, nonetheless seems to have been one of the most cited of that year’s volume of J. Physiol. There are currently 13 references to be found on the Google Scholar database (http://scholar.google.co.uk) (quite a lot for such an old paper) with the most recent reference in 1971.
The style and structure provides a charming window onto the very different science of the early 1920s; with its un-translated ‘varsity’ slang, ‘clubby’ style of referencing which lists only authors surnames without initials (in 1926 the membership of the Physiological Society was less than 400 [7]) and delightful vignettes concerning the conduct of experiments.
One striking feature is that the experimental methodology reported in the paper is described as having changed significantly throughout the period of the experiment, and results are given both for before and after these trial-and-error modifications. A modern scientific paper would surely omit the earlier failed attempts. Indeed, the style of this article is less like a modern paper than a slice of laboratory life. The impression is that these scientific pioneers wanted to share not just their results, but the nuts and bolts of how results were generated.
Havard and Reay describe how ‘the exercise took the form of the subject running up and down the laboratory stairs, 40 ft in height, until he was exhausted’ during and after which many one cubic centimetre blood samples were taken from the subject’s finger in order to measure the phosphate etc. – which seems likely to have been a painful procedure. However, one of the main subjects listed was ‘R.E.H.’ himself, so he could not be accused of inflicting on others something he avoided himself.
Indeed, all the experimental subjects are listed by their initials, and presumably therefore identifiable by those ‘in the know’ (so, none of our present-day worries about ‘confidentiality’ are in evidence). In one of the tables we are told that that subjects include G.B. described as ‘A rowing man’, W.E.T. a ‘Rugby “Blue”’ (a ‘Blue’ was awarded to Oxford undergraduates for competing at the highest level of university sport), H.K.B.O. a ‘Running “Blue”’, E.H.F a ‘Sprinter’; and again Havard himself who is, by contrast to these athletes, only ‘Partly trained’.
Collecting urine samples was a problem – we are informed that H.K.B.O. (despite – or maybe because? – of being a Running Blue) was unable to produce a urine sample for 7 min after his exercise. In another experiment R.H.B (‘Running’) was ‘as exhausted and distressed as any of the untrained subjects’ – which must have been rather humiliating for him. But then R.H.B seems not to have been a Blue.
Three women were included as subjects. Miss (I assume it was a Miss) M.M. did exercise which was rather disdainfully dismissed as ‘not very vigorous’; Miss B.E.H. managed ‘more vigorous’ exercise; while the Amazonian Miss C.E.L. was able to perform ‘very vigorous’ exercise – unfortunately however after these exertions she was depicted as ‘very exhausted’. Havard noted, with obvious regret, that the women produced ‘anomalous results’ which were ‘difficult to account for’.
In conclusion the authors reported that phosphate goes up a little then markedly down on exercise, and that trained men show less of these exercise-induced changes in their blood inorganic phosphate.
A snapshot from a lost era
My interest in this paper was stimulated because it presents in microcosm a snapshot of science from an all-but lost era of the ‘invisible college’ of collaborating and competing researchers who knew each other well-enough to dispense with formalities, and whose world was essentially private despite publication in widely circulated journals [8]. To the hard-nosed professional modern scientist, such early 20th century papers look eccentric and idiosyncratic. The paper is indeed ‘amateur’, but mostly in a desirable sense of describing science as an avocation done for intrinsic reasons and the esteem of peers, rather than a vocation rewarded by a secure income and managerial power.
But much more important and striking is the total absence of exaggeration, hype, or spin: the paper’s openness, candour – in a word honesty. This marks the biggest and most dismaying contrast between publications of the science of 80 years ago and of modern science. There has indeed been a loss of innocence, collegiality and fun; but a loss of unvarnished truthfulness is the most serious change against current practice [9].
I have said that Havard was not himself a writer, but on the evidence of this early article, Havard was an unusually vivid scientific author from his mid-twenties. Indeed he wrote essays and journalistic reviews dating back to his student days and continuing through into the 1950s. Furthermore, Havard contributed posthumous memoirs of both Lewis [10] and Tolkien [11].
All of which helps explain why, despite not being a literary man, ‘Humphrey’s’ presence at the Inklings meetings was so highly valued.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Robert Havard’s eldest son John, who kindly gave me a list of some of his father’s publications, and provided fascinating background information by means of e-mail and telephone conversations. John Havard’s brother Mark (i.e. RE Havard’s second son) also corresponded, and reminded me that the doctor in CS Lewis’s 1943 novel Perelandra was named ‘Humphrey’.
References
[1] H. Carpenter, The inklings, George Allen and Unwin, London (1981).
[2] D.P. Glyer, The company they keep: CS Lewis and JRR Tolkien and writers in community, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio (2007).
[3] J.R.R. Tolkien, The Notion Club papers, Morgoth’s ring: history of middle earth volume IX, HarperCollins, London (1992).
[4] C.S. Lewis, Prince Caspian, Geoffrey Bles, London (1951).
[5] A.N. Wilson, CS Lewis: A biography, Collins, London (1990).
[6] R.E. Havard and G.A. Reay, The influence of exercise on the inorganic phosphates of the blood and urine, J Physiol 61 (1926), pp. 35–48.
[7] W.F. Bynum, A short history of the physiological society 1926–1976, J Physiol 263 (1976), pp. 23–72. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (0)
[8] T. Kealey, Sex, science and profits: how people evolved to make money, William Heinemann, London (2008).
[9] B.G. Charlton, The vital role of transcendental truth in science, Med Hypotheses 72 (2009), pp. 373–376.
[10] R.E. Havard, Philia: Jack at ease. In: T. James and C.S. Como, Editors, Lewis at the breakfast table and other reminiscences, Harvest/HBJ Book, New York (1979), pp. 215–228.
[11] R.E. Havard and J.R.R. Professor, Tolkien: a personal memoir, Mythlore 17 (1990), pp. 61–62.
Friday, 13 March 2009
Electroshock and Pirsig
Electroshock in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance – Fictional, not factual
David Healy and Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses; 2009: 72: 485-6.
(Healy) North Wales Department of Psychological Medicine, Cardiff University, Bangor, Wales LL57 2PW, United Kingdom Tel.: +44 1248 384452; fax: +44 1248 371397
***
Summary
Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT/electroshock) features in a number of books and movies, but always unfavourably. ECT plays a major role in Robert Pirsig’s philosophical novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (‘ZAMM’). This has sold more than five million copies; making Pirsig perhaps the most widely read philosopher alive. ZAMM is apparently autobiographical, and describes the author suffering a psychotic breakdown which was treated by ECT. ECT led to a ‘cure’ but supposedly by deleting all memories of the author’s earlier self, producing a lost personality called Phaedrus. The presentation of ECT in ZAMM is chilling: ‘Destroyed by order of the court, enforced by the transmission of high-voltage alternating current through the lobes of his brain. Approximately 800 mills of amperage at durations of 0.5–1.5 s had been applied on twenty-eight consecutive occasions, in a process known technologically as ‘Annihilation ECS’. A whole personality had been liquidated without a trace in a technologically faultless act ....’. Yet newly published biographical information on Pirsig from Mark Richardson (Zen and now: on the trail of Robert Pirsig and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: Knopf; 2008) has documented that the role of ECT in ZAMM is a ‘literary device’, added at a late stage in drafting the book. In reality the ECT had erased some short-term memory, but Pirsig’s long-term memory had quickly returned. Richardson obtained this information from Robert Pirsig’s (then) wife, from his sister, and also from his friend John Sutherland (who appears as a character in ZAMM). It seems that one of the most famous depictions of ECT, one that had appeared factual, was actually fictional.
***
Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT/electroshock) features in a number of books and movies. Never favourably.
Van Atta [1], Abbott [2], and Freeman [3] while starting with mental illness portray a treatment that seems based largely on imagined imagery. Gotkin and Gotkin [4], Thomas [5], Frame [6] and Helfgott [7] have an autobiographical core with a possibly fictional overlay, but portray ECT in more realistic terms. In general, all these books view ECT as a punishment. Where recovery happens after ECT, it is put down to a loving relationship or other factors that enables the person to survive this treatment among other things.
The best known portrayal of ECT appears in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest [8]. In book and movie, an older unmodified ECT is portrayed relatively realistically but ECT is used punitively as a device to move the plot along rather than as a treatment. Kesey’s own views of ECT may have been somewhat at odds with the use to which treatment is put in the book, in that he appears to have rigged up a device at his home in an effort to induce a convulsion, probably to explore whether it might have a consciousness expanding effect [9]. The use of ECT in Cuckoo’s Nest is well-known, but Kesey’s own experiments with ECT are almost unknown.
Another book in which ECT features is Robert Pirsig’s philosophical novel [10] B. Charlton, A Philosophical Novel: Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert M. Pirsig, Durham Univ J 84 (1992), pp. 111–117.[10] Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (‘ZAMM’; [11]). This has sold more than five million copies; making Pirsig perhaps the most widely read philosopher alive [12].
The book is apparently autobiographical, and describes the author suffering a psychotic breakdown which was treated by ECT. ECT led to a ‘cure’ but supposedly by deleting all memories of the author’s earlier self, producing a lost personality called Phaedrus.
The presentation of ECT in ZAMM is chilling. ‘[The personality of Phaedrus was d]estroyed by order of the court, enforced by the transmission of high-voltage alternating current through the lobes of his brain. Approximately 800 mills of amperage at durations of 0.5–1.5 s had been applied on twenty-eight consecutive occasions, in a process known technologically as ‘Annihilation ECS’. A whole personality had been liquidated without a trace in a technologically faultless act ...’ [11]; pp. 84.
Yet newly published biographical information on Pirsig from Mark Richardson [13] has documented that the role of ECT in ZAMM, as in Cuckoo’s nest, is a ‘literary device’, added at a late stage in drafting the book: ‘in truth the shock treatments had erased some short-term memory, but his long-term memory had quickly returned. Robert Pirsig the author could recall everything about Phaedrus just fine: it was Robert Pirsig the narrator who was still delusional’. ([13]; pp. 188–189). Richardson obtained this information from Robert Pirsig’s (then) wife, from his sister, and also from his friend John Sutherland (who appears as a character in ZAMM) [14].
It would appear therefore that yet another of the most famous depictions of ECT, one that had appeared factual, was fictional. While ZAMM is prefaced with the disclaimer that ‘much has been changed for rhetorical purposes’ [11]; pp. iii, Pirzig has never given any indication that the side effects ascribed to ECT were fictional.
References
[1] W. Van Atta, Shock treatment, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, NY (1961).
[2] J.H. Abbott, In the belly of the beast: letters from prison, Random House, NY (1981).
[3] H. Freeman, Judge, jury and executioner, Talking Leaves Publishing Co., Urbana IL (1986).
[4] J. Gotkin and P. Gotkin, Too much anger, too many tears. A personal triumph over psychiatry, Quadrangle Books, NY (1975).
[5] M. Thomas, Home from 7-North: a psychological journey, Libra Publishers, NY (1984).
[6] J. Frame, An angel at my table, Flamingo, Hammersmith London (1987).
[7] G. Helfgott, Love you to bits and pieces, Penguin Books, Australia (1996).
[8] K. Kesey, One flew over the Cuckoo’s nest, Viking Press, NY (1962).
[9] E. Shorter and D. Healy, Electroshock: a history of electroconvulsive treatment in mental illness, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, USA (2007).
[10] B. Charlton, A Philosophical Novel: Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert M. Pirsig, Durham Univ J 84 (1992), pp. 111–117.
[11] M. Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Corgi, London (1976) [Originally published 1974].
[12] Tim Adams. The interview: Robert Pirsig, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2006/nov/19/fiction; 2008 [Accessed 8 12 2008].
[13] Richardson Mark, Zen and now: on the trail of Robert Pirsig and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Knopf, New York (2008).
[14] Mark Richardson – Personal communication with BG Charlton by e-mail. 8th Dec 2008.
David Healy and Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses; 2009: 72: 485-6.
(Healy) North Wales Department of Psychological Medicine, Cardiff University, Bangor, Wales LL57 2PW, United Kingdom Tel.: +44 1248 384452; fax: +44 1248 371397
***
Summary
Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT/electroshock) features in a number of books and movies, but always unfavourably. ECT plays a major role in Robert Pirsig’s philosophical novel Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (‘ZAMM’). This has sold more than five million copies; making Pirsig perhaps the most widely read philosopher alive. ZAMM is apparently autobiographical, and describes the author suffering a psychotic breakdown which was treated by ECT. ECT led to a ‘cure’ but supposedly by deleting all memories of the author’s earlier self, producing a lost personality called Phaedrus. The presentation of ECT in ZAMM is chilling: ‘Destroyed by order of the court, enforced by the transmission of high-voltage alternating current through the lobes of his brain. Approximately 800 mills of amperage at durations of 0.5–1.5 s had been applied on twenty-eight consecutive occasions, in a process known technologically as ‘Annihilation ECS’. A whole personality had been liquidated without a trace in a technologically faultless act ....’. Yet newly published biographical information on Pirsig from Mark Richardson (Zen and now: on the trail of Robert Pirsig and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. New York: Knopf; 2008) has documented that the role of ECT in ZAMM is a ‘literary device’, added at a late stage in drafting the book. In reality the ECT had erased some short-term memory, but Pirsig’s long-term memory had quickly returned. Richardson obtained this information from Robert Pirsig’s (then) wife, from his sister, and also from his friend John Sutherland (who appears as a character in ZAMM). It seems that one of the most famous depictions of ECT, one that had appeared factual, was actually fictional.
***
Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT/electroshock) features in a number of books and movies. Never favourably.
Van Atta [1], Abbott [2], and Freeman [3] while starting with mental illness portray a treatment that seems based largely on imagined imagery. Gotkin and Gotkin [4], Thomas [5], Frame [6] and Helfgott [7] have an autobiographical core with a possibly fictional overlay, but portray ECT in more realistic terms. In general, all these books view ECT as a punishment. Where recovery happens after ECT, it is put down to a loving relationship or other factors that enables the person to survive this treatment among other things.
The best known portrayal of ECT appears in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest [8]. In book and movie, an older unmodified ECT is portrayed relatively realistically but ECT is used punitively as a device to move the plot along rather than as a treatment. Kesey’s own views of ECT may have been somewhat at odds with the use to which treatment is put in the book, in that he appears to have rigged up a device at his home in an effort to induce a convulsion, probably to explore whether it might have a consciousness expanding effect [9]. The use of ECT in Cuckoo’s Nest is well-known, but Kesey’s own experiments with ECT are almost unknown.
Another book in which ECT features is Robert Pirsig’s philosophical novel [10] B. Charlton, A Philosophical Novel: Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert M. Pirsig, Durham Univ J 84 (1992), pp. 111–117.[10] Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (‘ZAMM’; [11]). This has sold more than five million copies; making Pirsig perhaps the most widely read philosopher alive [12].
The book is apparently autobiographical, and describes the author suffering a psychotic breakdown which was treated by ECT. ECT led to a ‘cure’ but supposedly by deleting all memories of the author’s earlier self, producing a lost personality called Phaedrus.
The presentation of ECT in ZAMM is chilling. ‘[The personality of Phaedrus was d]estroyed by order of the court, enforced by the transmission of high-voltage alternating current through the lobes of his brain. Approximately 800 mills of amperage at durations of 0.5–1.5 s had been applied on twenty-eight consecutive occasions, in a process known technologically as ‘Annihilation ECS’. A whole personality had been liquidated without a trace in a technologically faultless act ...’ [11]; pp. 84.
Yet newly published biographical information on Pirsig from Mark Richardson [13] has documented that the role of ECT in ZAMM, as in Cuckoo’s nest, is a ‘literary device’, added at a late stage in drafting the book: ‘in truth the shock treatments had erased some short-term memory, but his long-term memory had quickly returned. Robert Pirsig the author could recall everything about Phaedrus just fine: it was Robert Pirsig the narrator who was still delusional’. ([13]; pp. 188–189). Richardson obtained this information from Robert Pirsig’s (then) wife, from his sister, and also from his friend John Sutherland (who appears as a character in ZAMM) [14].
It would appear therefore that yet another of the most famous depictions of ECT, one that had appeared factual, was fictional. While ZAMM is prefaced with the disclaimer that ‘much has been changed for rhetorical purposes’ [11]; pp. iii, Pirzig has never given any indication that the side effects ascribed to ECT were fictional.
References
[1] W. Van Atta, Shock treatment, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, NY (1961).
[2] J.H. Abbott, In the belly of the beast: letters from prison, Random House, NY (1981).
[3] H. Freeman, Judge, jury and executioner, Talking Leaves Publishing Co., Urbana IL (1986).
[4] J. Gotkin and P. Gotkin, Too much anger, too many tears. A personal triumph over psychiatry, Quadrangle Books, NY (1975).
[5] M. Thomas, Home from 7-North: a psychological journey, Libra Publishers, NY (1984).
[6] J. Frame, An angel at my table, Flamingo, Hammersmith London (1987).
[7] G. Helfgott, Love you to bits and pieces, Penguin Books, Australia (1996).
[8] K. Kesey, One flew over the Cuckoo’s nest, Viking Press, NY (1962).
[9] E. Shorter and D. Healy, Electroshock: a history of electroconvulsive treatment in mental illness, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, USA (2007).
[10] B. Charlton, A Philosophical Novel: Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance by Robert M. Pirsig, Durham Univ J 84 (1992), pp. 111–117.
[11] M. Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Corgi, London (1976) [Originally published 1974].
[12] Tim Adams. The interview: Robert Pirsig, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2006/nov/19/fiction; 2008 [Accessed 8 12 2008].
[13] Richardson Mark, Zen and now: on the trail of Robert Pirsig and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Knopf, New York (2008).
[14] Mark Richardson – Personal communication with BG Charlton by e-mail. 8th Dec 2008.
Wednesday, 25 February 2009
Transcendental truth in science
The vital role of transcendental truth in science
Bruce G. Charlton; University of Buckingham, UK
Medical Hypotheses. Volume 72, Issue 4, April 2009, Pages 373-376
***
Summary
I have come to believe that science depends for its long-term success on an explicit and pervasive pursuit of the ideal of transcendental truth. ‘Transcendental’ implies that a value is ideal and ultimate – it is aimed-at but can only imperfectly be known, achieved or measured. So, transcendental truth is located outside of science; beyond scientific methods, processes and peer consensus. Although the ultimate scientific authority of a transcendental value of truth was a view held almost universally by the greatest scientists throughout recorded history, modern science has all-but banished references to truth from professional scientific discourse – these being regarded as wishful, mystical and embarrassing at best, and hypocritical or manipulative at worst. With truth excluded, the highest remaining evaluation mechanism is ‘professional consensus’ or peer review – beyond which there is no higher court of appeal. Yet in Human accomplishment, Murray argues that cultures which foster great achievement need transcendental values (truth, beauty and virtue) to be a live presence in the culture; such that great artists and thinkers compete to come closer to the ideal. So a scientific system including truth as a live presence apparently performs better than a system which excludes truth. Transcendental truth therefore seems to be real in the pragmatic sense that it makes a difference. To restore the primacy of truth to science a necessary step would be to ensure that only truth-seekers were recruited to the key scientific positions, and to exclude from leadership those who are untruthful or exhibit insufficient devotion to the pursuit of truth. In sum, to remain anchored in its proper role, science should through ‘truth talk’ frequently be referencing normal professional practice to transcendental truth values. Ultimately, science should be conducted at every level, from top to bottom, on the basis of what Bronowski termed the ’habit of truth’. Such a situation currently seems remote and fanciful. But within living memory, routine truthfulness and truth-seeking were simply facts of scientific life – taken for granted among real scientists.
***
Introduction
I have come to believe that science depends for its long-term success on an explicit and pervasive pursuit of the ideal of transcendental truth.
‘Transcendental’ implies that a value is ideal and ultimate – it is aimed-at but can be known, achieved or measured only imperfectly. So, transcendental truth is located outside of science; beyond scientific methods, processes and peer consensus.
Transcendental truth is not, therefore, evaluated by science; but is instead the proper aim of science. Especially truth is the proper aim of scientists as individuals. In other words, science should be a social system dominated by scientists who are dedicated truth-seekers: who practice ’the habit of truth’ and whose practice of science includes ‘truth talk’ that references current actuality to ideal aspirations.
(Henceforth in this essay, the word ‘truth’ should always be understood to refer to ‘transcendental truth’.)
An experiment in excluding truth from scientific discourse
Although the ultimate scientific authority of a transcendental value of truth was a view almost universally held by the greatest scientists throughout recorded history, and was a frequent topic of discourse among scientists and in the literature until the mid-20th century; modern science has pretty much dispensed with the idea of truth. References to truth in an ultimate sense have by now been all-but banished from professional scientific literature and discourse; being regarded by a younger generation of hard-nosed and technically-orientated researchers as wishful, mystical and embarrassing at best – and hypocritical or manipulative at worst. Instead, all disputes are constrained to operate within an evaluation system of proximate methodology and peer approved standard practice.
Such exclusion of references to truth from scientific discourse could be regarded as an experiment which has been gathering support for about 50 years – although the overlapping of scientific generations meant that senior scientists continued to discuss truth in a transcendental fashion at least into the 1980s, and a handful still continue. The experiment in exclusion of truth talk was driven (presumably) by the desire for greater efficiency – on the belief that transcendental values are nonsense, and serve no function except to waste time and energy, to confuse and mislead. The assumption was that science could more-efficiently be done using just internal evaluations.
This profound shift within science is described most tellingly in Real Science by the late John Ziman [1] – a British physicist of great distinction as well as a philosopher and sociologist of science. He termed the transformation a change from ‘academic science’ to ‘post-academic science’. Post-academic discourse is framed such that questions of truth have lost their meaning.
When truth was excluded, what replaced it? The answer is that without truth ‘professional consensus’ is left as the highest remaining evaluation mechanism. Peer review is now the ultimate validation procedure beyond which there is no higher court of appeal. Yet in science up to the last quarter of the twentieth century, peer review had a modest and inessential role [2] and [3]. Furthermore, peer review is not distinctive to science; but is a characteristic of all academic disciplines. In so far as peer review is the highest court of appeal in science, then science has been replaced with generic administrative procedure. In sum, peer review is neither necessary nor sufficient as a definition of science; and domination by peer review marks the disappearance of ’real science’ and the inclusion of its activities within the system of large, complex trans-national bureaucracies.
The lack of any anchor of practice to transcendental truth has rendered many areas of modern science a kind of ‘glass bead game’ [4], disciplines that are free-spinning cogs with little or no explanatory, predictive or manipulative connection with the natural world. By its ultimate reliance on professional evaluations (various different versions of peer review applied to research funding, publication, prizes, promotions, etc. [5]) some branches of modern science have become structurally indistinguishable from academic literary criticism: arcane, rigorous, sometimes brilliant – but ultimately a fashion-driven pastime of ringing variations for the sake of career advancement.
This experiment in trying to do science without reference to transcendental truth has – I believe – failed, as evidenced by several linked phenomena including the decline of scientific genius [6] and [7], impaired efficiency in science (i.e. escalating input of resources with declining or static substantive scientific production) [8], and a pathological dependence upon social consensus as the ultimate arbiter of reality [5] and [9].
Charles Murray’s Human accomplishment
In his magisterial book Human accomplishment [6], Murray suggests that the highest level of genius is attained more frequently in societies which explicitly and pervasively incorporate concepts of the transcendental values of ‘the good’ ‘the true’ and ‘the beautiful’; or virtue, truth and beauty:
“…A culture that fosters great accomplishment needs a coherent sense of the transcendental goods. Coherent sense means that the goods are a live presence in the culture, and that great artists and thinkers compete to come closer to the ideal that captivates them.”
Murray used bibliometric methods to evaluate the importance of individuals in the sciences, arts, music, philosophy and literature from the earliest recorded times up to 1950. In essence, he created a representative sample of standard authoritative historical texts of different types, and used a variety of methods for measuring the relative attention devoted to different individuals or the numbers of their achievements. When these measures were totalled and ranked, Murray discovered (or confirmed) the relative importance of specific individuals.
So that, for example, Beethoven and Mozart were given most attention in texts of the Western Classical Music Tradition; in Literature it was Shakespeare; in Western Philosophy – Aristotle; in Western Art – Michelangelo. To turn to the sciences: in Chemistry number one was Lavoisier; in Physics – jointly Newton and Einstein, in Mathematics – Euler; in Biology the top 10 are Darwin, followed by Aristotle, Lamarck, Cuvier, Morgan, Linnaeus, Harvey, Schwann, Hales and Swammerdam; in Medicine the top ten are Pasteur, Hippocrates, Koch, Galen, Paracelsus, Paul Erlich, Laennec, McCollum, Fleming and Pare.
Murray also performed quantitative analyses across historical periods and between countries and tested several putative explanatory variables (mainly using multiple regression statistical methods) to try and understand why the highest levels of individual human accomplishment are often clustered spatio-temporally – e.g. Classical Greece and Renaissance Italy.
Murray’s suggestion when applied to science is that a system of science which fosters a significant rate of great accomplishment by individuals (i.e. genius at an above-random or more-than-sporadic incidence of occurrence) needs to incorporate the concept of transcendental truth as a ‘live presence’ in its functional discourse [6].
Transcendental truth therefore seems to be real in the pragmatic sense that it makes a difference. The difference is systemic: one scientific system out-performing another [10] according to scientific criteria. A scientific system including truth as a ‘live presence’ seems to perform measurably better than a system which excludes truth – at least it performs better in terms of generating geniuses attaining the highest level of accomplishment.
But transcendental truth cannot be proven to exist in any direct way since it is neither detectable nor measurable – it is an ideal. Truth cannot be extracted, isolated, cloned or photographed. Truth is not a ‘fact’ within a discipline. Any real world measure of truth is approximate, incomplete and subject to distortion. So proximate ‘performance’ measures such as positions, prizes and awards, publications, citations, or amount of research funding are not the same as truth, and need to be distinguished from truth. Therefore – although real – truth is not scientifically demonstrable.
It is, in a sense, obvious that science must aim at something outside science; because if science was guided only by values from within science, then science would simply revert to an axiomatic or circular activity in which science validated science – so that false or useless science would be indistinguishable from true or useful science so long as it did not contradict its own internal rules.
Ultimately the value of science is measured in terms of its performance as judged from outside science, using non-scientific criteria. Science as a whole is evaluated on a criterion of truth, since what the rest of human life wants from science is reliable knowledge [11].
The habit of truth or a habit of hype?
Truth-seeking science is a product of the domination of the social system of science by intrinsically truthful scientists – and such a system will also evolve social mechanisms for the enforcement of truthfulness. One example of a practice of science that embodies truth-seeking is that which Bronowski termed the habit of truth [12].
Bronowski argues that for science to be truthful as a whole it is not sufficient to aim at truth as an ultimate outcome, scientists must also be habitually truthful in the ‘minute particulars’ of their scientific lives. The end does not justify the means, instead the means are indivisible from the end: scientific work is ‘of a piece, in the large and in detail; so that if we silence one scruple about our means, we infect ourselves and our ends together’ [12].
I believe that Bronowski’s understanding of truth is a profound insight. However, it can readily be observed that at all levels of modern science, but especially among the scientific leadership, quite the opposite to a habit of truth applies: scientists practice a ‘habit of hype’.
Routine modern scientific discourse, especially at the highest levels, is often as dishonest as it can get-away-with [13]. It is not merely that people are failing to aim-at truthfulness, which would be bad enough; scientists are too often aiming at the maximum amount of self-serving falsehood that is compatible with a fear of being denounced by those powerful enough to harm them. And when such denunciation is unlikely – i.e. when self-serving falsehood is compatible with the needs of established power – then the level of dishonesty among modern scientific leaders can be very great indeed.
The habit of hype is inculcated by the fact that scientific self-promotion has become a daily, even hourly, requirement for optimizing career-survival and success [1]. That social reality is itself a consequence of the experiment in excluding truth from science, since hype is unlikely to be confronted with truth talk. And for a successful modern scientist, there is a pervasive need for competitive self-justification to promote demands, activities and achievements – expressed in papers, grant and fellowship proposals, requests for space and personnel, actions to attract and retain staff and leaders, engagement in media activities… the list is endless, the task continuous, and the consequence is that scientists receive a thorough training in marketing their research to any and all powerful stakeholders, until the activity becomes habitual.
Some scientists have so deeply ingrained a habit of hype that they never switch-it-off – even in private and off the record. Others have developed a dualistic cynicism whereby their public face is denied and mocked by their private opinions [14]. So that world famous scientists may privately and off the record acknowledge the triviality or falsity of work for which they are honoured and rewarded; work which they will advertise and hype to the skies when they appear in the public domain.
Dishonesty among powerful scientists is not necessarily selfish – often enough hype is done for the benefit of the research team, members of whom are dependent on the ability of their leader to ‘spin’ the team’s research in a highly competitive marketplace of science. And anyway, in the environment of modern science, a one-off individual scientist who behaved with scrupulous honesty would nevertheless usually be assumed to be engaged in hype like everyone else; and would see the magnitude of their achievement discounted on this assumption.
But whatever the motivations, whether good or bad, selfish or altruistic, the pervasive abandonment of the scientific imperative for truth-telling has debased the currency of communication and eroded the integrity of modern science in the same way that monetary hyper-inflation damages the economy [13].
Is truth true, or just a convenient fiction?
It seems that transcendental truth is needed in science for many reasons.
One reason relates to the motivation for individual scientists to aim as high as their abilities allow. Only when science is truth-seeking can its practice mobilize the most profound dedication from its practitioners – a level of motivation far greater than that elicited by peer-approval-seeking science, or science done from a sense of duty [6]. Another reason for valuing truth is the need for science as a social system to tolerate (and if possible actively support) individuals who seek truth – even when this generates greater risk and a short term reduction in performance. Likewise to tolerate also the fact that the most brilliant and creative scientists will often have unworldly, erratic or abrasive personalities [15]. In other words, only the living presence of truth may provide a higher context for decision-making in which considerations of social expediency can potentially be transcended.
A third factor is that without transcendental truth the professional practice of science will drift away from its proper end and become something else. I believe that this has already happened – especially in medical science, which is the dominant world science – and the results are perceived by observers outside of science [8]. Yet the situation of ineffective, inefficient and misguided science is tolerated due to the apparent lack of viable alternatives. It is in order to generate alternatives that a greater understanding of the role of truth in science is needed.
But despite these advantages, the ‘big question’ for any modern scientist is whether transcendental truth really is ‘true’ or is merely a convenient fiction.
By ‘convenient fiction’ I mean the idea that even if it could convincingly be argued that scientists work better when they believe in transcendental truth; such ’truth’ is actually no more than a delusion, albeit a useful delusion. The convenient fiction argument is that in reality there is no such thing as truth but it is a good thing for science and for society when scientists act as if truth is real.
Early scientists generally assumed that the truth was a property of the universe created by a God, communicated in outline to humans by divine revelation, understood by God-given reason, and applied to the study of Nature by God-given human ingenuity. They believed in both God and truth. Later scientists were atheists about God and realists about truth. For example Albert Einstein had an abstract, pantheistic view of the universe and a belief in the fortunate (but not God-given) rational and intuitive ability of humans to understand the nature of reality. Another generation or two onwards, and most of the best scientists were atheists about God and also did not believe in the reality of truth. They disbelieved in both God and truth, nonetheless the best scientists behaved as if they did regard truth as real. For example Richard Feynman was not religious and did not believe in transcendental truth but anyway lived and worked by a strict ethic of truthfulness and truth-seeking. Modern scientists have abandoned all this as so much useless baggage. They are atheists about God, relativists about truth, and careerists in their behaviour: they neither believe, nor behave as if they believe in transcendental truth.
How a scientist behaves is clearly more important than his or her belief system. But – viewed through the ’retrospectoscope’ – I am not convinced of the coherence or long-term sustainability of Feynman’s views – nor even Einstein’s. The problem is that while the overall performance of science can serve as an empirical justification for the necessity of truth-seeking, if the truthfulness of science is a product of individual truthfulness of a multitude of scientists in the minute particulars of their everyday practice, then a goal of enhancing the overall performance of science seems too remote and weak an incentive to enforce a personal ethic of truth-seeking. A more proximate and powerful reason for truthfulness may be required if the endemic corruptions of parasitic selfish expediency are to be avoided.
So, in retrospect, Einstein and Feynman’s attitudes both look like steps along the path which has led to the modern exclusion of truth from science. I suspect that for science to function over the long term might entail a basis of faith in ‘scientific revelation’ – specifically the revelations of transcendental truth transmitted by the great scientists of the past, upon whom modern scientists rely for a basic understanding of the reality of truth. For those who are both dedicated and fortunate, this basic understanding of the nature of truth may be validated and supplemented by the experience of personal revelations of truth.
In a nutshell, it seems that there are several ways to live by transcendental truth – ranging from formal theology to the assumption that an apprehension of truth and the validity of rationality were hit upon by chance, but amplified by natural selection mechanisms because they led to better results than the available alternatives. Some belief systems relating to truth may be more stable and coherent than others, but for scientists the crucial matter is that each should work according to an ethic of transcendental truth.
Recruiting only truth-seekers and truth tellers, encouraging truth-talk
Even when they regard it as desirable that science be truth-guided, modern scientists may find it puzzling to understand how truth could be operationalized in scientific practice; despite the fact that truth actually was operationalized in science until a couple of generations ago.
Essentially, what is needed is that the social system of science should be staffed by devoted truth-seekers and that transcendental truth should be (to adapt Murray’s quote) a live presence in the culture of science such that scientific leaders compete to come closer to the ideal of truth that captivates them. Once such a system is established, then science should grow by recruitment of similar personnel – by a kind of ‘apostolic succession’ in which genuine truth-seekers recognize others sharing their own motivations. So science depends on a restoration of the truth-seeking apostolic succession of scientists.
(This mechanism of apostolic succession is most clearly seen in a field such as classical music, where the abilities and motivations of composers, conductors and solo performers are so refined and subtle that they can only be recognized and measured by the best of the previous generation by direct personal apprehension. So there are lineages of elite composers, conductors and performers – of pupils and teachers – stretching-back over many generations. But for music the ruling transcendental value would be beauty, not truth [16].)
One consequence of a restoration of the apostolic succession of truth-seeking scientists would be a return of ‘truth-talk’ in mainstream scientific discourse. Such an outcome would probably irritate philosophers of science (who might well see scientists’ truth discussions as unacceptably lacking in rigour or question-begging) and also the large proportion of scientists who are actually technicians in terms of having a purely professional and instrumental perspective. It would also, no doubt, lead to a great deal of hot air and hypocrisy. Nonetheless, it is a necessary development.
Following this might come a restoration of the ‘habit of truth’ [12] at all levels within all legitimate branches of science. In other words a reinforcement of the primacy of truth evaluations that tend to hold science to its core function; and a focusing upon truth evaluations rather than – as so often at present [5] – a focus upon discriminating validity solely on the basis of secondary matters of standard technique, or peer evaluation, or non-scientific evaluations whether political, moral, financial, marketing or whatever.
The first necessary step is then to ensure that truth-seekers are recruited to the key scientific positions, and to exclude from leadership those who – no matter how valuable are their other qualities – have a record of untruthfulness either in minutiae or in big things; or exhibit lack of devotion to the ideal of truth. A further step would then be to enforce truthfulness within the system, with scientific sanctions against those who infringe this imperative. And individual scientists also need recurrently to reference their thoughts and activities to truth, if they are to mobilize their best efforts and strongest motivations for truth-seeking, and to direct their purpose toward transcendental goals.
In sum, to remain anchored in its proper role, science must frequently through ‘truth talk’ be referencing current professional opinion, standard practice and long-term strategy to the values of transcendental truth – a matter of modelling and comparing science as it is with science as ideally it should be. Ultimately, science should be conducted at every level, from top to bottom, on the basis of an habitual ethic of truth. Such a situation currently seems a remote and fanciful prospect. But within living memory, routine truthfulness and truth-seeking were simply facts of scientific life - taken for granted among real scientists.
References
[1] J. Ziman, Real science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2000).
[2] D.F. Horrobin, The philosophical basis of peer review and the suppression of innovation, JAMA 263 (1990), pp. 1438–1441.
[3] B.G. Charlton, Conflicts of interest in medical science: peer usage, peer review and ‘CoI consultancy’, Med Hypotheses 63 (2004), pp. 181–186.
[4] H. Hesse, The glass bead game, Penguin, London (1975) (Originally published 1943).
[5] B.G. Charlton, Figureheads, ghost-writers and pseudonymous quant bloggers: the recent evolution of authorship in science publishing, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 475–480.
[6] C. Murray, Human accomplishment: the pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences, 800 BC to 1950, HarperCollins, New York (2003).
[7] B.G. Charlton, The last genius? – reflections on the death of Francis Crick, Med Hypotheses 63 (2004), pp. 923–924.
[8] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Medical research funding may have over-expanded and be due for collapse, QJM 98 (2005), pp. 53–55.
[9] B.G. Charlton, Peer usage versus peer review, BMJ 335 (2007), p. 451. Full Text via CrossRef
[10] B. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
[11] J. Ziman, Reliable knowledge: an exploration of the grounds for belief in science, Cambridge University Press, New York (1978).
[12] J. Bronowski, Science and human values, Penguin, London (1964).
[13] B. Charlton and P. Andras, Hype and spin in the NHS, Brit J Gen Practice 52 (2002), pp. 520–521.
[14] P. Sloterdijk, Critique of cynical reason, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1988).
[15] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[16] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, The future of ‘pure’ medical science. The need for a new specialist professional research system, Med Hypotheses 65 (2005), pp. 419–425.
Bruce G. Charlton; University of Buckingham, UK
Medical Hypotheses. Volume 72, Issue 4, April 2009, Pages 373-376
***
Summary
I have come to believe that science depends for its long-term success on an explicit and pervasive pursuit of the ideal of transcendental truth. ‘Transcendental’ implies that a value is ideal and ultimate – it is aimed-at but can only imperfectly be known, achieved or measured. So, transcendental truth is located outside of science; beyond scientific methods, processes and peer consensus. Although the ultimate scientific authority of a transcendental value of truth was a view held almost universally by the greatest scientists throughout recorded history, modern science has all-but banished references to truth from professional scientific discourse – these being regarded as wishful, mystical and embarrassing at best, and hypocritical or manipulative at worst. With truth excluded, the highest remaining evaluation mechanism is ‘professional consensus’ or peer review – beyond which there is no higher court of appeal. Yet in Human accomplishment, Murray argues that cultures which foster great achievement need transcendental values (truth, beauty and virtue) to be a live presence in the culture; such that great artists and thinkers compete to come closer to the ideal. So a scientific system including truth as a live presence apparently performs better than a system which excludes truth. Transcendental truth therefore seems to be real in the pragmatic sense that it makes a difference. To restore the primacy of truth to science a necessary step would be to ensure that only truth-seekers were recruited to the key scientific positions, and to exclude from leadership those who are untruthful or exhibit insufficient devotion to the pursuit of truth. In sum, to remain anchored in its proper role, science should through ‘truth talk’ frequently be referencing normal professional practice to transcendental truth values. Ultimately, science should be conducted at every level, from top to bottom, on the basis of what Bronowski termed the ’habit of truth’. Such a situation currently seems remote and fanciful. But within living memory, routine truthfulness and truth-seeking were simply facts of scientific life – taken for granted among real scientists.
***
Introduction
I have come to believe that science depends for its long-term success on an explicit and pervasive pursuit of the ideal of transcendental truth.
‘Transcendental’ implies that a value is ideal and ultimate – it is aimed-at but can be known, achieved or measured only imperfectly. So, transcendental truth is located outside of science; beyond scientific methods, processes and peer consensus.
Transcendental truth is not, therefore, evaluated by science; but is instead the proper aim of science. Especially truth is the proper aim of scientists as individuals. In other words, science should be a social system dominated by scientists who are dedicated truth-seekers: who practice ’the habit of truth’ and whose practice of science includes ‘truth talk’ that references current actuality to ideal aspirations.
(Henceforth in this essay, the word ‘truth’ should always be understood to refer to ‘transcendental truth’.)
An experiment in excluding truth from scientific discourse
Although the ultimate scientific authority of a transcendental value of truth was a view almost universally held by the greatest scientists throughout recorded history, and was a frequent topic of discourse among scientists and in the literature until the mid-20th century; modern science has pretty much dispensed with the idea of truth. References to truth in an ultimate sense have by now been all-but banished from professional scientific literature and discourse; being regarded by a younger generation of hard-nosed and technically-orientated researchers as wishful, mystical and embarrassing at best – and hypocritical or manipulative at worst. Instead, all disputes are constrained to operate within an evaluation system of proximate methodology and peer approved standard practice.
Such exclusion of references to truth from scientific discourse could be regarded as an experiment which has been gathering support for about 50 years – although the overlapping of scientific generations meant that senior scientists continued to discuss truth in a transcendental fashion at least into the 1980s, and a handful still continue. The experiment in exclusion of truth talk was driven (presumably) by the desire for greater efficiency – on the belief that transcendental values are nonsense, and serve no function except to waste time and energy, to confuse and mislead. The assumption was that science could more-efficiently be done using just internal evaluations.
This profound shift within science is described most tellingly in Real Science by the late John Ziman [1] – a British physicist of great distinction as well as a philosopher and sociologist of science. He termed the transformation a change from ‘academic science’ to ‘post-academic science’. Post-academic discourse is framed such that questions of truth have lost their meaning.
When truth was excluded, what replaced it? The answer is that without truth ‘professional consensus’ is left as the highest remaining evaluation mechanism. Peer review is now the ultimate validation procedure beyond which there is no higher court of appeal. Yet in science up to the last quarter of the twentieth century, peer review had a modest and inessential role [2] and [3]. Furthermore, peer review is not distinctive to science; but is a characteristic of all academic disciplines. In so far as peer review is the highest court of appeal in science, then science has been replaced with generic administrative procedure. In sum, peer review is neither necessary nor sufficient as a definition of science; and domination by peer review marks the disappearance of ’real science’ and the inclusion of its activities within the system of large, complex trans-national bureaucracies.
The lack of any anchor of practice to transcendental truth has rendered many areas of modern science a kind of ‘glass bead game’ [4], disciplines that are free-spinning cogs with little or no explanatory, predictive or manipulative connection with the natural world. By its ultimate reliance on professional evaluations (various different versions of peer review applied to research funding, publication, prizes, promotions, etc. [5]) some branches of modern science have become structurally indistinguishable from academic literary criticism: arcane, rigorous, sometimes brilliant – but ultimately a fashion-driven pastime of ringing variations for the sake of career advancement.
This experiment in trying to do science without reference to transcendental truth has – I believe – failed, as evidenced by several linked phenomena including the decline of scientific genius [6] and [7], impaired efficiency in science (i.e. escalating input of resources with declining or static substantive scientific production) [8], and a pathological dependence upon social consensus as the ultimate arbiter of reality [5] and [9].
Charles Murray’s Human accomplishment
In his magisterial book Human accomplishment [6], Murray suggests that the highest level of genius is attained more frequently in societies which explicitly and pervasively incorporate concepts of the transcendental values of ‘the good’ ‘the true’ and ‘the beautiful’; or virtue, truth and beauty:
“…A culture that fosters great accomplishment needs a coherent sense of the transcendental goods. Coherent sense means that the goods are a live presence in the culture, and that great artists and thinkers compete to come closer to the ideal that captivates them.”
Murray used bibliometric methods to evaluate the importance of individuals in the sciences, arts, music, philosophy and literature from the earliest recorded times up to 1950. In essence, he created a representative sample of standard authoritative historical texts of different types, and used a variety of methods for measuring the relative attention devoted to different individuals or the numbers of their achievements. When these measures were totalled and ranked, Murray discovered (or confirmed) the relative importance of specific individuals.
So that, for example, Beethoven and Mozart were given most attention in texts of the Western Classical Music Tradition; in Literature it was Shakespeare; in Western Philosophy – Aristotle; in Western Art – Michelangelo. To turn to the sciences: in Chemistry number one was Lavoisier; in Physics – jointly Newton and Einstein, in Mathematics – Euler; in Biology the top 10 are Darwin, followed by Aristotle, Lamarck, Cuvier, Morgan, Linnaeus, Harvey, Schwann, Hales and Swammerdam; in Medicine the top ten are Pasteur, Hippocrates, Koch, Galen, Paracelsus, Paul Erlich, Laennec, McCollum, Fleming and Pare.
Murray also performed quantitative analyses across historical periods and between countries and tested several putative explanatory variables (mainly using multiple regression statistical methods) to try and understand why the highest levels of individual human accomplishment are often clustered spatio-temporally – e.g. Classical Greece and Renaissance Italy.
Murray’s suggestion when applied to science is that a system of science which fosters a significant rate of great accomplishment by individuals (i.e. genius at an above-random or more-than-sporadic incidence of occurrence) needs to incorporate the concept of transcendental truth as a ‘live presence’ in its functional discourse [6].
Transcendental truth therefore seems to be real in the pragmatic sense that it makes a difference. The difference is systemic: one scientific system out-performing another [10] according to scientific criteria. A scientific system including truth as a ‘live presence’ seems to perform measurably better than a system which excludes truth – at least it performs better in terms of generating geniuses attaining the highest level of accomplishment.
But transcendental truth cannot be proven to exist in any direct way since it is neither detectable nor measurable – it is an ideal. Truth cannot be extracted, isolated, cloned or photographed. Truth is not a ‘fact’ within a discipline. Any real world measure of truth is approximate, incomplete and subject to distortion. So proximate ‘performance’ measures such as positions, prizes and awards, publications, citations, or amount of research funding are not the same as truth, and need to be distinguished from truth. Therefore – although real – truth is not scientifically demonstrable.
It is, in a sense, obvious that science must aim at something outside science; because if science was guided only by values from within science, then science would simply revert to an axiomatic or circular activity in which science validated science – so that false or useless science would be indistinguishable from true or useful science so long as it did not contradict its own internal rules.
Ultimately the value of science is measured in terms of its performance as judged from outside science, using non-scientific criteria. Science as a whole is evaluated on a criterion of truth, since what the rest of human life wants from science is reliable knowledge [11].
The habit of truth or a habit of hype?
Truth-seeking science is a product of the domination of the social system of science by intrinsically truthful scientists – and such a system will also evolve social mechanisms for the enforcement of truthfulness. One example of a practice of science that embodies truth-seeking is that which Bronowski termed the habit of truth [12].
Bronowski argues that for science to be truthful as a whole it is not sufficient to aim at truth as an ultimate outcome, scientists must also be habitually truthful in the ‘minute particulars’ of their scientific lives. The end does not justify the means, instead the means are indivisible from the end: scientific work is ‘of a piece, in the large and in detail; so that if we silence one scruple about our means, we infect ourselves and our ends together’ [12].
I believe that Bronowski’s understanding of truth is a profound insight. However, it can readily be observed that at all levels of modern science, but especially among the scientific leadership, quite the opposite to a habit of truth applies: scientists practice a ‘habit of hype’.
Routine modern scientific discourse, especially at the highest levels, is often as dishonest as it can get-away-with [13]. It is not merely that people are failing to aim-at truthfulness, which would be bad enough; scientists are too often aiming at the maximum amount of self-serving falsehood that is compatible with a fear of being denounced by those powerful enough to harm them. And when such denunciation is unlikely – i.e. when self-serving falsehood is compatible with the needs of established power – then the level of dishonesty among modern scientific leaders can be very great indeed.
The habit of hype is inculcated by the fact that scientific self-promotion has become a daily, even hourly, requirement for optimizing career-survival and success [1]. That social reality is itself a consequence of the experiment in excluding truth from science, since hype is unlikely to be confronted with truth talk. And for a successful modern scientist, there is a pervasive need for competitive self-justification to promote demands, activities and achievements – expressed in papers, grant and fellowship proposals, requests for space and personnel, actions to attract and retain staff and leaders, engagement in media activities… the list is endless, the task continuous, and the consequence is that scientists receive a thorough training in marketing their research to any and all powerful stakeholders, until the activity becomes habitual.
Some scientists have so deeply ingrained a habit of hype that they never switch-it-off – even in private and off the record. Others have developed a dualistic cynicism whereby their public face is denied and mocked by their private opinions [14]. So that world famous scientists may privately and off the record acknowledge the triviality or falsity of work for which they are honoured and rewarded; work which they will advertise and hype to the skies when they appear in the public domain.
Dishonesty among powerful scientists is not necessarily selfish – often enough hype is done for the benefit of the research team, members of whom are dependent on the ability of their leader to ‘spin’ the team’s research in a highly competitive marketplace of science. And anyway, in the environment of modern science, a one-off individual scientist who behaved with scrupulous honesty would nevertheless usually be assumed to be engaged in hype like everyone else; and would see the magnitude of their achievement discounted on this assumption.
But whatever the motivations, whether good or bad, selfish or altruistic, the pervasive abandonment of the scientific imperative for truth-telling has debased the currency of communication and eroded the integrity of modern science in the same way that monetary hyper-inflation damages the economy [13].
Is truth true, or just a convenient fiction?
It seems that transcendental truth is needed in science for many reasons.
One reason relates to the motivation for individual scientists to aim as high as their abilities allow. Only when science is truth-seeking can its practice mobilize the most profound dedication from its practitioners – a level of motivation far greater than that elicited by peer-approval-seeking science, or science done from a sense of duty [6]. Another reason for valuing truth is the need for science as a social system to tolerate (and if possible actively support) individuals who seek truth – even when this generates greater risk and a short term reduction in performance. Likewise to tolerate also the fact that the most brilliant and creative scientists will often have unworldly, erratic or abrasive personalities [15]. In other words, only the living presence of truth may provide a higher context for decision-making in which considerations of social expediency can potentially be transcended.
A third factor is that without transcendental truth the professional practice of science will drift away from its proper end and become something else. I believe that this has already happened – especially in medical science, which is the dominant world science – and the results are perceived by observers outside of science [8]. Yet the situation of ineffective, inefficient and misguided science is tolerated due to the apparent lack of viable alternatives. It is in order to generate alternatives that a greater understanding of the role of truth in science is needed.
But despite these advantages, the ‘big question’ for any modern scientist is whether transcendental truth really is ‘true’ or is merely a convenient fiction.
By ‘convenient fiction’ I mean the idea that even if it could convincingly be argued that scientists work better when they believe in transcendental truth; such ’truth’ is actually no more than a delusion, albeit a useful delusion. The convenient fiction argument is that in reality there is no such thing as truth but it is a good thing for science and for society when scientists act as if truth is real.
Early scientists generally assumed that the truth was a property of the universe created by a God, communicated in outline to humans by divine revelation, understood by God-given reason, and applied to the study of Nature by God-given human ingenuity. They believed in both God and truth. Later scientists were atheists about God and realists about truth. For example Albert Einstein had an abstract, pantheistic view of the universe and a belief in the fortunate (but not God-given) rational and intuitive ability of humans to understand the nature of reality. Another generation or two onwards, and most of the best scientists were atheists about God and also did not believe in the reality of truth. They disbelieved in both God and truth, nonetheless the best scientists behaved as if they did regard truth as real. For example Richard Feynman was not religious and did not believe in transcendental truth but anyway lived and worked by a strict ethic of truthfulness and truth-seeking. Modern scientists have abandoned all this as so much useless baggage. They are atheists about God, relativists about truth, and careerists in their behaviour: they neither believe, nor behave as if they believe in transcendental truth.
How a scientist behaves is clearly more important than his or her belief system. But – viewed through the ’retrospectoscope’ – I am not convinced of the coherence or long-term sustainability of Feynman’s views – nor even Einstein’s. The problem is that while the overall performance of science can serve as an empirical justification for the necessity of truth-seeking, if the truthfulness of science is a product of individual truthfulness of a multitude of scientists in the minute particulars of their everyday practice, then a goal of enhancing the overall performance of science seems too remote and weak an incentive to enforce a personal ethic of truth-seeking. A more proximate and powerful reason for truthfulness may be required if the endemic corruptions of parasitic selfish expediency are to be avoided.
So, in retrospect, Einstein and Feynman’s attitudes both look like steps along the path which has led to the modern exclusion of truth from science. I suspect that for science to function over the long term might entail a basis of faith in ‘scientific revelation’ – specifically the revelations of transcendental truth transmitted by the great scientists of the past, upon whom modern scientists rely for a basic understanding of the reality of truth. For those who are both dedicated and fortunate, this basic understanding of the nature of truth may be validated and supplemented by the experience of personal revelations of truth.
In a nutshell, it seems that there are several ways to live by transcendental truth – ranging from formal theology to the assumption that an apprehension of truth and the validity of rationality were hit upon by chance, but amplified by natural selection mechanisms because they led to better results than the available alternatives. Some belief systems relating to truth may be more stable and coherent than others, but for scientists the crucial matter is that each should work according to an ethic of transcendental truth.
Recruiting only truth-seekers and truth tellers, encouraging truth-talk
Even when they regard it as desirable that science be truth-guided, modern scientists may find it puzzling to understand how truth could be operationalized in scientific practice; despite the fact that truth actually was operationalized in science until a couple of generations ago.
Essentially, what is needed is that the social system of science should be staffed by devoted truth-seekers and that transcendental truth should be (to adapt Murray’s quote) a live presence in the culture of science such that scientific leaders compete to come closer to the ideal of truth that captivates them. Once such a system is established, then science should grow by recruitment of similar personnel – by a kind of ‘apostolic succession’ in which genuine truth-seekers recognize others sharing their own motivations. So science depends on a restoration of the truth-seeking apostolic succession of scientists.
(This mechanism of apostolic succession is most clearly seen in a field such as classical music, where the abilities and motivations of composers, conductors and solo performers are so refined and subtle that they can only be recognized and measured by the best of the previous generation by direct personal apprehension. So there are lineages of elite composers, conductors and performers – of pupils and teachers – stretching-back over many generations. But for music the ruling transcendental value would be beauty, not truth [16].)
One consequence of a restoration of the apostolic succession of truth-seeking scientists would be a return of ‘truth-talk’ in mainstream scientific discourse. Such an outcome would probably irritate philosophers of science (who might well see scientists’ truth discussions as unacceptably lacking in rigour or question-begging) and also the large proportion of scientists who are actually technicians in terms of having a purely professional and instrumental perspective. It would also, no doubt, lead to a great deal of hot air and hypocrisy. Nonetheless, it is a necessary development.
Following this might come a restoration of the ‘habit of truth’ [12] at all levels within all legitimate branches of science. In other words a reinforcement of the primacy of truth evaluations that tend to hold science to its core function; and a focusing upon truth evaluations rather than – as so often at present [5] – a focus upon discriminating validity solely on the basis of secondary matters of standard technique, or peer evaluation, or non-scientific evaluations whether political, moral, financial, marketing or whatever.
The first necessary step is then to ensure that truth-seekers are recruited to the key scientific positions, and to exclude from leadership those who – no matter how valuable are their other qualities – have a record of untruthfulness either in minutiae or in big things; or exhibit lack of devotion to the ideal of truth. A further step would then be to enforce truthfulness within the system, with scientific sanctions against those who infringe this imperative. And individual scientists also need recurrently to reference their thoughts and activities to truth, if they are to mobilize their best efforts and strongest motivations for truth-seeking, and to direct their purpose toward transcendental goals.
In sum, to remain anchored in its proper role, science must frequently through ‘truth talk’ be referencing current professional opinion, standard practice and long-term strategy to the values of transcendental truth – a matter of modelling and comparing science as it is with science as ideally it should be. Ultimately, science should be conducted at every level, from top to bottom, on the basis of an habitual ethic of truth. Such a situation currently seems a remote and fanciful prospect. But within living memory, routine truthfulness and truth-seeking were simply facts of scientific life - taken for granted among real scientists.
References
[1] J. Ziman, Real science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2000).
[2] D.F. Horrobin, The philosophical basis of peer review and the suppression of innovation, JAMA 263 (1990), pp. 1438–1441.
[3] B.G. Charlton, Conflicts of interest in medical science: peer usage, peer review and ‘CoI consultancy’, Med Hypotheses 63 (2004), pp. 181–186.
[4] H. Hesse, The glass bead game, Penguin, London (1975) (Originally published 1943).
[5] B.G. Charlton, Figureheads, ghost-writers and pseudonymous quant bloggers: the recent evolution of authorship in science publishing, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 475–480.
[6] C. Murray, Human accomplishment: the pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences, 800 BC to 1950, HarperCollins, New York (2003).
[7] B.G. Charlton, The last genius? – reflections on the death of Francis Crick, Med Hypotheses 63 (2004), pp. 923–924.
[8] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Medical research funding may have over-expanded and be due for collapse, QJM 98 (2005), pp. 53–55.
[9] B.G. Charlton, Peer usage versus peer review, BMJ 335 (2007), p. 451. Full Text via CrossRef
[10] B. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
[11] J. Ziman, Reliable knowledge: an exploration of the grounds for belief in science, Cambridge University Press, New York (1978).
[12] J. Bronowski, Science and human values, Penguin, London (1964).
[13] B. Charlton and P. Andras, Hype and spin in the NHS, Brit J Gen Practice 52 (2002), pp. 520–521.
[14] P. Sloterdijk, Critique of cynical reason, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1988).
[15] H.J. Eysenck, Genius: the natural history of creativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (1995).
[16] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, The future of ‘pure’ medical science. The need for a new specialist professional research system, Med Hypotheses 65 (2005), pp. 419–425.
Saturday, 7 February 2009
Why are modern scientists so dull?
Why are modern scientists so dull? How science selects for perseverance and sociability at the expense of intelligence and creativity
Medical Hypotheses. Volume 72, Issue 3, Pages 237-243
Bruce G. Charlton
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Summary
Question: why are so many leading modern scientists so dull and lacking in scientific ambition? Answer: because the science selection process ruthlessly weeds-out interesting and imaginative people. At each level in education, training and career progression there is a tendency to exclude smart and creative people by preferring Conscientious and Agreeable people. The progressive lengthening of scientific training and the reduced independence of career scientists have tended to deter vocational ‘revolutionary’ scientists in favour of industrious and socially adept individuals better suited to incremental ‘normal’ science. High general intelligence (IQ) is required for revolutionary science. But educational attainment depends on a combination of intelligence and the personality trait of Conscientiousness; and these attributes do not correlate closely. Therefore elite scientific institutions seeking potential revolutionary scientists need to use IQ tests as well as examination results to pick-out high IQ ‘under-achievers’. As well as high IQ, revolutionary science requires high creativity. Creativity is probably associated with moderately high levels of Eysenck’s personality trait of ‘Psychoticism’. Psychoticism combines qualities such as selfishness, independence from group norms, impulsivity and sensation-seeking; with a style of cognition that involves fluent, associative and rapid production of many ideas. But modern science selects for high Conscientiousness and high Agreeableness; therefore it enforces low Psychoticism and low creativity. Yet my counter-proposal to select elite revolutionary scientists on the basis of high IQ and moderately high Psychoticism may sound like a recipe for disaster, since resembles a formula for choosing gifted charlatans and confidence tricksters. A further vital ingredient is therefore necessary: devotion to the transcendental value of Truth. Elite revolutionary science should therefore be a place that welcomes brilliant, impulsive, inspired, antisocial oddballs – so long as they are also dedicated truth-seekers.
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Introduction
Why are so many leading modern scientists intellectually dull and lacking in scientific ambition? The short answer is: because the science selection process ruthlessly weeds-out interesting and imaginative people [1].
At each level in education, training and career progression there is a tendency to exclude smart and creative people by preferring conscientious and sociable people. As science becomes ever-more dominated by ‘peer review’ mechanisms, pro-social behaviour in scientists has been accorded primacy over the brilliant and inspired – but abrasive and rebellious – type of truth-seekers who used to be common among the best scientists.
A majority of senior professional scientists have been through a rigorous and prolonged process of education, selection and training to become professional researchers. Yet the nature of the rigour and the duration of the process in modern science ensures that those who come out at the end and attain long-term scientific employment are not the kind of people capable of top level, revolutionary science. They will very probably be extremely productive and socially compliant, but of only moderately high intelligence and likely to be lacking in imagination [2].
(Of course, such an accusation of dullness is less likely to fit those scientists who are reading this article than the average scientist, since it is generally acknowledged that people who read or publish in Medical Hypotheses are atypical and tend to come from the more vividly colourful end of the scientific spectrum!)
Dullness-inducing trends in modern science
Modern science is just too dull an activity to attract, retain or promote many of the most intelligent and creative people. In particular the requirement for around 10, 15, even 20 years of postgraduate ‘training’ before even having a chance at doing some independent research of one’s own choosing, is enough to deter almost anyone with a spark of vitality or self-respect; and utterly exclude anyone with an urgent sense of vocation for creative endeavour. Even after a decade or two of ‘training’ the most likely scientific prospect is that of researching a topic determined by the availability of funding rather than scientific importance, or else functioning as a cog in someone else’s research machine. Either way, the scientist will be working on somebody else’s problem – not his own. Why would any serious intellectual wish to aim for such a career?
The whole process and texture of doing science has slowed-up. Read the memoirs of scientists active up to the middle 1960s – doing science then was nimble and fast-moving in texture and also longer-termist in ambition. Unexpected leads could be pursued. It was common for people to begin independent (really independent) research in their early- to mid-twenties. For the individuals concerned there was a palpable sense of progress, a crackling excitement.
Nowadays, training to be a scientist is an exercise in almost-endlessly-deferred satisfaction. There is an always-increasing requirement for years of training (i.e., extra years of doing what other people decide you ‘need’ to do, and not what interests you) – and also for more advance-planning, application for committee permissions, and demand for logistical organization; combined with a proliferation of scientifically-irrelevant and energy-sapping bureaucracy.
The timescale of scientific action and discourse has gone up from days, weeks and months to months, years and decades. Yet at the same time, the requirement for unremitting annual high productivity means that the timescale for research pay-off has contracted to a maximum of 3–5 years. It is usually career suicide to take the time and risks entailed by scientifically-ambitious research [2]. In sum, the tempo of science has slowed but the time-horizon of science has contracted. Modern science is both duller and more short-termist: the worst of both worlds!
Demanding superhuman perseverance filters-out intelligence and creativity
The kind of person who can thrive in the world of modern science is likely to be characterized primarily by an almost superhuman level of the personality attribute of perseverance – the ability doggedly to continue a course of action in pursuit of a goal, over a long period and despite difficulties, setbacks and the lack of immediate rewards (and indeed the lack of any guaranteed ultimate rewards); with simultaneous, continuous productivity.
Modern science therefore imposes an extraordinarily high minimum threshold for perseverance – lacking which will deter many individuals from going into science in the first place, and which will cull and exclude many others during the process of accumulating sufficient qualifications and experience to allow them to embark on independent research. Other near-synonyms for perseverance are ‘self-discipline’ or ‘grit’ [3], [4] and [5] and the ‘Big Five’ personality trait called ‘Conscientiousness’ (abbreviated here as ‘C’) [6].
Secondarily such an individual will usually need to have high levels of the Big Five personality trait termed ‘Agreeableness’ (abbreviated here as ‘A’) – which encompasses the ability to empathize with others, get along with groups, and compliantly to put the interests of the group above one’s own concerns [6].
Now, both Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are admirable traits in terms of society as a whole. Most people would wish to live in a society where Conscientious and Agreeable people predominated. Furthermore, a higher level of Conscientiousness, in particular, is predictive of better job performance [7]. But, success in top level revolutionary science demands somewhat different qualities than society as a whole. While high levels of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness make a person an excellent citizen and employee; high average levels of these traits in selected personnel are attainable only at the cost of accepting lower average levels of other attributes (such as IQ and creativity).
This is a serious problem because Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are not the most important traits required for doing ‘revolutionary’ science at the highest level [9] and [10]. (Revolutionary science is that type of science which changes the direction of science [9]; a revolutionary scientist is one whose activates are directed at this goal, someone trying to develop qualitatively new theories or methods [10].) Instead, for success in revolutionary science intelligence and creativity are the most important qualities [8]. Further, there is evidence to suggest that very high levels of the traits of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness may actually be hostile to – or even incompatible with – scientific genius; because to be hard-working and pleasant is useful only when these virtues are mobilized in pursuit of worthwhile scientific goals – and not when they become the highest scientific value in their own right.
The vital importance of high IQ in revolutionary science
The personnel requirements for being a good science employee on the one hand and on the other hand an original and ambitious ‘revolutionary’ scientist are, in some respects, in opposition. This should not really be surprising – but the implications have been ignored and flouted for several decades.
For an employee in ‘normal’ science – that is, science which aims at incrementally building on existing ideas and knowledge – reliability and technical competence are primary [9] and [10]. The great bulk of modern science is ‘normal’ science – that has been the major focus of expansion in funding and manpower over the past 60 years [11] and [12]. Such scientists do not need to be original; rather they need to be hard-working, meticulous and conservative in terms of their ideas and methods. And since normal science is increasingly collaborative, it is beneficial if normal scientists enjoy working socially and within group norms. High intelligence is also valuable in normal science, as it is in almost all employment activities [13], but perhaps especially valuable in the ‘troubleshooting’ aspects of normal science – making methods work.
So, for normal science it seems that high Conscientiousness is essential, high intelligence and Agreeableness are both useful, but creativity is probably detrimental.
But for revolutionary science intelligence and creativity are both vital ingredients. By contrast, Conscientiousness is necessary in revolutionary science only to the degree that a scientist must be able and willing to work long and hard at his chosen scientific problem, the problem which fascinates him. And working on your own problem requires much less perseverance than working hard for many years at non-scientific problems (as happens at school or during the first college degree), or working hard for many years at other peoples’ scientific problems (as required at graduate school or when working as a post-doc).
General intelligence (or ‘g factor’ intelligence), as measured by formal IQ tests, is a very important psychological ingredient in the ability to perform top level scientific research [8]. Indeed, to understand both the nature of g factor intelligence and the nature of elite science is to recognize as obvious the value of high general intelligence to research in revolutionary science [14]. Studies of the best scientists suggest that these typically have very high IQ of several standard deviations above average [8]. (Note: for the UK the average IQ of a random population sample is defined as 100 with a standard deviation defined as 15 points – other nations may have a different average/ distribution when calibrated against UK IQ norms.)
Cox’s study of 1926 retrospectively and indirectly estimated the average IQ of ‘genius’ scientists from the past as between 135 and 175, which is in the top 1% of the population (cited in [8]) – however the methodology generated only imprecise measurements During the 1950s Roe performed direct IQ tests on 23 highly-eminent US scientists [15] and found a median verbal IQ of 166 with a range from 121 to 177 (177 is about 5 standard deviations above average and was the ceiling of the tests; otherwise some subjects would have scored even higher).
Since very high IQ is found to be a near-universal feature of top scientists, it is presumably a necessary factor in becoming a top scientist. One way of looking at this is that successful revolutionary scientists are apparently among the most intelligent humans alive. And Roe’s work suggests that the minimum IQ for successful revolutionary science may be about 120 – which is in the top 10% of the UK population; or about the top 7% of the US population which has a slightly lower average IQ than the UK; or about 15% of the population of some East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore or Hong Kong, which have a higher average IQ than the UK [16].
Furthermore, prospective follow-up cohort studies of ‘gifted’ children (i.e., children with very high formally-measured IQs [17] and [18]) have demonstrated much higher than average ability in science examinations, with greatly increased rates of achieving the highest levels of educational attainment (e.g., pure science, medical or engineering doctorates at elite universities); also a strong tendency to study science subjects as a career (e.g., mathematics, pure sciences, engineering and medicine) at both Bachelors and Doctoral level; and much higher than average attainment of measures of elite scientific performance such as election to major scholarly societies. However, it is important to recognize that most of these measures do not differentiate between normal science and revolutionary science.
In sum, achievement in revolutionary science almost certainly requires a very high IQ; and a high IQ was in the past often associated with a career choice towards, and aptitude in, scientific subjects. However, nowadays it is seldom that direct IQ measurements are explicitly used as a selection method in modern science; and instead examination performance or other educational measures are usually given the greatest weighting. Hence we simply do not know the size of effect of modern selection, education, training and career structure on the average and peak IQ of scientists who stay the course to become long-term researchers.
But although the size of effect is not known, and making the assumption that the intellectual quality of scientific recruits has not risen significantly and the size of the population of professional scientists has not fallen to make a more selected elite (in fact science employment has grown several-fold), then the effect of modern scientific selection practices is very probably in the direction of reducing average IQ among long-term researchers.
Intelligence and Conscientiousness predict educational attainment
It has been known for more than a century that many types of attainment, including educational qualifications such as examination results, are predicted by a combination of ‘capacity’ or ‘ability’ with ‘zeal’ or ‘motivation’ (summarized in [19]). In more modern terms, this implies that general (g factor) intelligence (IQ) and Big Five Conscientiousness (C) are the main contributors to educational attainment.
The relationship between IQ and C can be expressed as an equation
IQ×C≈Educational attainment
(Note that because the relationship between IQ and C is multiplicative, this equation correctly implies that ‘zero’ (or very low) levels of either IQ or C would prevent significant educational attainment.)
The above equation derives from Lynn [19], who actually proposed the more general formulation of “IQ × Conscientiousness × opportunity = Achievement”. However, I have left-out the multiplication by opportunity, as this is hard to evaluate, and (within the normal bounds of developed societies) there is little evidence that variations in opportunity create significant systematic differences in achievement when IQ (and perhaps personality) are controlled [14] and [20].
Therefore, at a first approximation, the best established personal attributes that predict educational attainment are IQ [13], [14] and [21] and C [3], [22], [23], [24] and [25]. Intelligence and Conscientiousness are certainly not the only factors contributing to educational attainment, but they are probably the most important and – since other factors are less certain or harder to measure – I will focus exclusively on IQ and C.
The measured level of correlations between IQ, C and educational attainment depend on the population studied, the subject and nature of the educational measurement, and the methodology. Traditionally IQ has been more powerful at predicting educational performance than personality [13], [14], [21] and [22], but not always [3]; and my guess is that over recent decades the predictive ability of IQ will very likely have declined, and that of C increased, due to increased demands for C in the educational process.
IQ and C are not highly correlated – so selection for Conscientiousness tends to depress average IQ
At an individual level there is little or no observable correlation between intelligence and Conscientiousness. Some group studies – especially sampling across very diverse social classes, ethnic groups or nations – show a positive correlation between IQ and measures correlated with C [16], [19] and [26], many studies show no significant correlation [5] and [27], and other studies show a significant negative correlation between IQ and C [28].
Probably the reason for this observed discrepancy between studies relates to subject selection. My guess is that when a population sample is very diverse in terms of educational attainment, class or ethnicity there will be a positive correlation between IQ and C; but when the sample is controlled for class or educational attainment (as in university student samples) the correlation may disappear or become inverse because the same level of educational attainment can be the result of various combinations of IQ and C. For example, a harder working person with lower IQ may get the same examination results as a higher IQ person who works less hard.
In other words; when educational attainment is held constant by sampling only a narrow stratum of educational attainment then there may be an inverse relationship between IQ and C, as indicated by a reversed version of the above equation: Educational attainment ≈ IQ × C.
But the lack of a strong correlation between IQ and Conscientiousness means that when very high levels of perseverance are a pre-requisite for scientists (i.e., only people who have competed a PhD and 6 years of postdoctoral research are eligible for selection) then this increased average level of C will inevitably be attainable only at the cost of sacrificing other personal abilities including IQ. This effect would be more powerful where educational attainment is held constant and IQ and C have a reciprocal relationship – but selecting for C would tend to depress average IQ even when there is no significant relationship between the variables.
For instance, imagine a university was selecting the top 10% of applicants for a PhD program. The average accepted person might be in the top 10% for IQ and also the top 10% for C – and around this average some would be harder working but less bright and others would be brighter but less diligent. (Students who were higher than the top 10% in both IQ and C would probably attend a higher ranked and more selective university.)
Now suppose that there was an increased level of Conscientiousness required to reach a given level of educational attainment – for example there was a shift from infrequent formal exams to frequent coursework, plus an extra 3 years were added to the formal educational process. The imaginary university would still have the same degree of selectivity (i.e., taking the top 10% of students) and would still be taking the top 10% on the basis of exam attainment – but now students would need to be in the top 5% for C.
With a requirement for C in the top 5%, many of the top 10% IQ students who had previously been eligible would no longer be able (or willing) to complete their educational evaluations; and their places would be taken by students of lower IQ but in the top 5% of C. The university might need to dredge down to include (say) the top 20% for IQ. Average IQ of successful applicants would reduce, and the newly-excluded high IQ but lower C students would then drop down the system to attend universities with a lower degree of selectivity (and they would thereby probably lose some of their competitive career edge).
When requirements for perseverance are increased, throughout the educational system there would be an assortment process such that higher C people will move up the system to more selective institutions and lower C individuals will move down the system. Students with the very best examination results would still have both very high IQ and very high C – but there would not be many such students since there is no strong positive correlation between IQ and C. In essence, students with higher C would now be valued more than those with higher IQ.
Typically, and all else being equal, greater selectivity for C therefore entails lesser selectivity for IQ.
A long-lasting, step-wise, hierarchical and competitive educational system tends to filter-out high IQ
Intelligence becomes progressively more powerful at predicting educational and occupational success as the cognitive demands of the job increase. IQ probably becomes more important the more advanced the educational level, and the higher the level of scientific activity. Conversely, it would be expected that non-IQ factors, especially C, will be more important at lower levels of scientific education, training and professional practice. So, a level of intelligence which suffices for excellence in routine, technical science could be grossly inadequate for cutting edge, revolutionary science.
The implication is that there is an intrinsic tendency for lower levels of the educational system, including scientific education, to select for different personal qualities than are required at higher levels. The tendency is for lower levels to favour higher Conscientiousness candidates at the expense of higher IQ candidates. Because at early stages of science perseverance is relatively more valuable than it is at advanced levels of science, and IQ is less valuable (since the cognitive demands are easier).
In the absence of specific IQ testing (used to identify and retain or promote the most intelligent candidates); a long-lasting, step-wise, hierarchical and competitive educational system – in which progression to more advanced stages depends on differentially successful performance at easier and less cognitively-demanding stages – will favour the most Conscientious individuals and select-out some individuals whose higher IQ would be expected to generate higher performance at advanced levels of the profession.
The result is that the highest levels of science almost certainly have a lower average IQ than would be optimal – due to the cohort having been selected so strongly for a higher level of C at lower (less cognitively-demanding) levels of the hierarchy. Since very high IQ is likely to be necessary for successful revolutionary science, the implication is that too many high level scientists are prevented (by their too-low IQ) from operating as revolutionary scientists. Instead they (presumably) become normal scientists – but unusually productive normal scientists (due to their vast capacity for hard work and self-discipline).
Of course, the loss of high IQ individuals could be compensated by the selective sieve causing a reduction in the number of people retained as the ladder is ascended – so that even if half of the high IQ people were lost, then this might not be noticed if only a quarter of people were retained. However, the long-term expansion of science funding with several-fold increase in the numbers of professional scientific personnel over recent decades [2] and [12] means that this kind of increasingly selectivity is unlikely to be operative.
In essence, high level scientific personnel should be a ‘highest IQ elite’ most of whom are capable of revolutionary science; but in modern science the leadership is more like a ‘highest perseverance elite’ who are typically incapable of revolutionary science and instead do a great deal of normal science [2].
Combining examination results with IQ testing can indirectly estimate Conscientiousness
A vital step should be to do a lot more IQ testing throughout science. IQ tests are powerfully predictive in many ways [29], including being highly predictive of job performance (in all jobs, but especially cognitively-complex jobs) [13] and there are many reasons why IQ testing should be much more widely deployed in our society. However, widespread (and deliberate) politically-motivated misrepresentation and disinformation currently prevents this situation [30].
Intelligence testing is particularly valuable in science because the ability to understand science and do scientific research is highly dependent on IQ. And formal IQ testing has probably become more necessary over recent decades as the educational system has evolved to be more selective for Conscientiousness (hence less selective for IQ). For example, in the UK and the USA educational systems there have been greatly increased demands for course work instead of less-frequent formal, supervised and timed examinations; as well as the above-mentioned lengthening duration of education and training.
The point of measuring IQ in a candidate would be to look for discrepancies between IQ testing and examination performance. If there is a large difference in ranked performance in examinations and IQ tests this will imply that the subject’s Conscientiousness is unusually high or low.
This can be expressed in the form of a rearranged equation relating IQ and C
[View the MathML source]
or expressed in terms of rank orderings:
[View the MathML source]
In other words, measures of educational attainment and intelligence can, together, be used as an indirect estimate of Conscientiousness.
(It seems to me that in the context of institutional selection and career decisions this indirect method of estimating Conscientiousness is likely to be more valid than the usual method of self-rating personality questionnaires [6] because it is much harder to cheat. It is facile for high IQ people to cheat in self-rating questionnaires by learning the correct responses that are marked to indicate high (or low) conscientiousness. But the only way for applicants to ‘fake’ this indirect method of estimating C would be to perform deliberately badly on either the IQ test or the examination – which would usually be a career-damaging strategy. For example, a candidate who dishonestly wished to signal high C could do so by deliberately performing badly on their IQ test, so that their exam ranking was higher than their IQ ranking. But there are not many selection or employment situations when this would be an adaptive strategy. Conversely, a person could make themselves look like an ‘underachiever’ by deliberately messing up their exams but trying hard on the IQ test – so their IQ rank was higher than their exam rank – however this would only be achievable at the cost of lowering their exam results, which is not often going to be a helpful thing to do.)
The object of this exercise in comparing exam results with IQ tests is to enable revolutionary science educational or research institutions to select under-achievers in preference to over-achievers. If, for example, a person is in the top 2% of the population for IQ but the exam results are only in the top 20%, then it is plausible that the relatively weak exam performance happened because the subject is relatively lower in C (although still above average). This is under-achievement.
If population norms are not available, then an institution could simply place its candidates into relative order for their examination results compared with their performance in an IQ test. Any significant discrepancies in rank ordering between the two lists would suggest either over- or under-achieving. For example, an under-achiever might be ranked second out of 20 for IQ and 16 out of 20 for exam results.
The opposite situation – ‘over-performers’ – are those who have significantly higher ranked exam results than IQ test results. The interpretation is that over-performers are higher in C lower and lower in IQ (harder working but less intelligent).
Agreeableness versus Psychoticism and creativity
High IQ is required for revolutionary science, but high IQ people are not necessarily creative – indeed some people with the highest recorded IQs have been (apparently) uncreative. And creativity as well as high IQ is required by revolutionary scientists – indeed revolutionary science is one of the primary arenas of human creativity with iconic figures such as Newton, Darwin and Einstein [8].
Perhaps surprisingly, creativity has often been found to be predicted by moderately high levels of Eysenck’s personality trait of ‘Psychoticism’ [31]. The trait of Psychoticism has been well-validated [6] and [32]; high psychoticism combines low-Agreeableness (e.g., higher selfishness, independence from group norms), low Conscientiousness (for example impulsivity, sensation-seeking) with a style of cognition that involves fluent, associative and rapid production of many ideas. So, although a trait of low Psychoticism implies a rational and pro-social personality (which are usually highly desirable traits); moderately high Psychoticism is not merely antisocial but has positive aspects as well – since it has flavours of independence of spirit and a more spontaneous and fantasy-like mode of thinking. This style of cognition seems to be a basis for creativity.
The highest levels of Psychoticism are maladaptive (as the name implies) since the individuals’ behaviour is so impulsive as to render impossible any sustained effort, so antisocial as to be psychopathic (and lead to prison or expulsion from society) and their thought processes are so disorganized as to be psychotic with hallucinations, delusions and thought-disorder (and lead to incoherence, un-employability and perhaps hospitalization). But Eysenck showed that a moderately high degree of the trait of Psychoticism is associated with creativity (whether creativity is measured by achievement, by laboratory tests, or by measurement of creativity in psychosis-prone individuals [8], [31] and [32]). Moderately high Psychoticism is often a feature of individuals exhibiting the highest levels of achievement (not just in the sciences, but in the arts too) [8].
If the focus is revolutionary science, this makes sense in that setting science onto a new direction requires considerable independence from group norms, a certain selfish indifference to the feelings of others, as well as a mode of thinking which generates novelty. By contrast, a low Psychoticism individual would probably be too inclined to obey orders and too fearful to risk societal sanctions and too logical in their thought processes to generate and pursue disruptively original (i.e., creative) work. Low Psychoticism would therefore be a desirable trait for normal scientists, but undesirable for revolutionary scientists.
In conclusion, ‘genius’ probably entails moderately high Psychoticism. And, if correct, this has important implications for the selection of scientific personnel, since creativity is inversely correlated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Therefore the modern type of scientific career structure – which enforces high levels of Conscientiousness, and which favours an Agreeable and socially compliant personality type – will not merely fail to select creative scientists: such a career structure will actually tend to exclude creative people.
Revolutionary science institutions should be selecting positively for high IQ and creativity/ moderately high Psychoticism
So, assuming that top level, elite scientific education and training institutions aim to select the highest levels of genius – i.e., those potential revolutionary scientists who are capable of changing the direction of their subjects – then modern selection methods and career structures will both need to change.
In the first place, elite institutions will need to know the IQ of applicants. As explained above, the particular value of IQ testing comes in identifying under-achievers whose high IQ is not reflected in high exam performance. These people may have lower Conscientiousness which impairs their performance at tasks which do not much interest or engage them. However, if their level of perseverance is sufficient to get them to the point of independent research, then their Conscientiousness may be high-enough to allow for very hard and sustained work at self-chosen problems which provide much more immediate reward. So that someone who found school and undergraduate college boring, and was thereby lacking motivation, may be altogether more driven when tackling a self-chosen problem. And selecting high IQ scientists of only-sufficiently-high Conscientiousness should also serve to increase the proportion of moderately high Psychoticism individuals – hence those who have the potential to become creative and revolutionary scientists.
Creativity cannot, at present, be directly selected-for. Although there are some psychological tests of creativity [6], [8], [31] and [32], these are of uncertain validity especially at predicting the high levels of creativity required by revolutionary science. However, elite scientific institutes could and certainly should avoid their present practice of (unintentionally) selecting against creativity.
For example many elite college application procedures (inadvertently) currently select against creativity when they ask for evidence of altruistic and sociable behaviours from their applicants – evidence of such activities as community service, participation in team sports, administrative responsibility, or memberships of drama or musical groups. Choosing the most ‘Agreeable’ students may make for a more pleasant and stimulating social environment and a more friendly and compliant student body. However, this strategy of excluding asocial or awkward individuals is a policy that is highly likely to lower the ceiling of achievement of the best science graduates.
On the other hand, less-selective ‘normal science’ educational and training institutions – who aim to educate and train personnel for reliable but more routine accomplishment at technical and administrative tasks, or functions that require close attention to detail – may be more legitimately interested in selecting for a higher average C – but inevitably at the cost of lower IQ. They may thus recruit a population of ‘overachiever’ students, whose attributes include the capacity for long hours of steady work; and such institutions may also wish to select for high Agreeableness which should improve the capacity for cooperative teamwork.
Whatever the aims of selection of scientific personnel might be – a combination of the results of examinations with IQ tests allows a more precise, informative and objective estimate of individual aptitudes than the current situation of using examinations alone.
Transcendental truth-seekers
In a nutshell, I am suggesting that:
1. Educational attainment depends on IQ × C; but IQ and C are not closely-correlated.
2. Modern education has progressively raised the floor for C (by lengthening the educational process and by changes in educational evaluation methods).
3. Educational attainment therefore nowadays increasingly rewards C in preference to IQ.
4. Yet revolutionary science still requires high levels of IQ, and the higher the better.
5. So, in revolutionary science where IQ is vital, selection of personnel should not be determined only or mainly by educational attainments; but this information needs to be supplemented with direct, formal IQ testing.
6. Furthermore, revolutionary science requires high levels of creativity; which are associated with moderately high Psychoticism trait – yet modern education and science selects very strongly in favour of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness and therefore enforces low Psychoticism.
7. So, the education, training and career structure of modern science tends to depress average IQ and cull creativity – which are the prime qualities requires for success in revolutionary science. Consequently, modern top scientists are likely to be less intelligent and creative than is desirable, and probably significantly less intelligent and creative than top scientists used to be.
In the past, the education and training of a scientist was a much shorter process – with many scientists reaching a position to do independent research by their middle-twenties. This shorter process imposed a much lower requirement for both Conscientiousness and Agreeableness – because for a moderately conscientious person the end was not impossibly remote and relatively few years of unpleasant effort provided access to desired goal, and a dis-Agreeable person did need to get along with a long series of bosses and their teams – any of whom might sabotage his career.
Also, in the past educational ability was more often measured using relatively-infrequent, timed and supervised, previously-unseen formal examinations during which the examinee would need to work fast to organize their knowledge. Such formal examinations are likely to be more ‘g-loaded’ (i.e., correlate more strongly with IQ) than the greater emphasis on frequent ‘course work’ which has characterized educational systems over recent decades – course work tends to reward Conscientiousness over IQ compared with formal exams and be preferred by more Conscientious and less intelligent students [33].
To return to the original question of why top scientists are so dull nowadays – the conclusion is that scientists are dull mainly because the progressive increase in the requirements for long-term plodding perseverance and social inoffensiveness has the effect of deterring, driving-out and failing to reward too many smart and creative potential scientists before they ever get a chance to engage in independent research. And maybe even more smart and interesting people are lost from science due later on to the requirement for so much planning and administration. Since the people who nowadays eventually emerge from the ever-lengthening pipeline of scientific training are quite different from the scientists of 50 years ago, they naturally tend to move science even further in the direction which created their own success. So that modern scientific leader often elevate the requirements for very long periods of tedious and scientifically-irrelevant activity, and judge scientists mainly by their capacity for steady and reliable production and teamwork. These requirements will tend to act against both creativity and intelligence.
It seem inevitable that the changes in selection process in science over the past several decades will have reduced both average IQ and creativity among those who have been through the full professional training process. Such changes would be expected particularly to damage performance in revolutionary science, but might even enhance performance in normal science where perseverance and sociability (assuming at least moderately high IQ) are likely to be more crucial to success. Indeed, this is presumably the reason why such changes have occurred, since the great majority of scientists are working in normal science, so the requirements of normal science therefore tend to dominate [2]. However, the magnitude of the effect on reducing IQ and creativity has not been measured and constitutes a subject deserving of future empirical study.
Instead of having an educational and career structure which selects for superhuman Conscientiousness and makes-do with whatever intelligence and creativity happen to be left-over; in revolutionary science we need a system which selects for superhuman intelligence and high creativity – and requires only enough Conscientiousness to ensure that independent scientists with a vocation for their work are motivated to put in the long, hard hours to solve those self-chosen problems that have come to enthral them, and only enough Agreeableness to exclude psychotics and psychopaths.
Selecting elite scientists on the basis of high and IQ and moderately high Psychoticism – implied by Eysenck’s research [8] – may sound like a recipe for disaster, since these ingredients resemble a formula for gifted charlatans and con artists. A further vital ingredient is necessary: that elite scientists must have a vocational devotion to transcendental values of truth. In his magisterial study of the pinnacles of human accomplishment [34], Charles Murray concluded that achievement of genius was nurtured by social systems in which transcendental values were a living presence. Great revolutionary science is therefore a product of transcendental truth-seeking individuals working in a truth-seeking milieu.
It is truth-seeking which distinguishes a great independent-spirited scientist from mere brilliant charlatans and confidence tricksters who seek nothing higher than to use professional science in pursuit of their own selfish ends. Of course, making such a distinction, i.e., detecting truth-seeking, requires a scientific system that explicitly and in practice values transcendental truth-seeking above social virtues of perseverance and sociability – and such a perspective is uncommon within science nowadays. Lacking the living presence of such transcendental values, science has lapsed back into valuing social virtues for their own sake, with peer approval as the highest court of appeal, the ultimate validation [35]. Unsurprisingly such a science will over-promote C and A, and undervalue IQ and creativity.
The problem is that the current scientific leadership themselves often lack the trait of truth-seeking, and would not be able to detect it in others. This implies that revolutionary science (or ‘pure’ science) may need to be rebuilt on the basis of a new ‘apostolic succession’ of truth-seekers; starting from that minority of intelligent and imaginative top scientists who have managed to buck the trends and land professional positions of high status and authority [36].
People characterized by very high IQ, and moderately high Psychoticism might well be regarded as brilliant, but too selfish, unstable and/or foolish for everyday social purposes. But strange and luminous fools seem to be precisely what is most needed for successful revolutionary science. And modern society needs a place where clever, antisocial, imaginative people can do good and be prevented from inflicting the social harm than can result from ability and fantasy unconstrained by common sense, generosity or sensitivity to group norms. Science should be one such place: a place which should welcome and nurture inspired oddballs – so long as they are also vocational truth-seekers.
Acknowledgements
Richard Lynn, Phil Rushton, Wendy Johnson and Ian Deary have all (sometime inadvertently) made extremely helpful contributions to this polemic – however they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use I have made of their ideas and insights. Of course, the main intellectual debt is to the late Hans Eysenck, especially his book Genius: the natural history of creativity [8].
References
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[34] C. Murray, Human accomplishment. The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences 800 BC to 1950, HarperCollins, New York (2003).
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Medical Hypotheses. Volume 72, Issue 3, Pages 237-243
Bruce G. Charlton
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Summary
Question: why are so many leading modern scientists so dull and lacking in scientific ambition? Answer: because the science selection process ruthlessly weeds-out interesting and imaginative people. At each level in education, training and career progression there is a tendency to exclude smart and creative people by preferring Conscientious and Agreeable people. The progressive lengthening of scientific training and the reduced independence of career scientists have tended to deter vocational ‘revolutionary’ scientists in favour of industrious and socially adept individuals better suited to incremental ‘normal’ science. High general intelligence (IQ) is required for revolutionary science. But educational attainment depends on a combination of intelligence and the personality trait of Conscientiousness; and these attributes do not correlate closely. Therefore elite scientific institutions seeking potential revolutionary scientists need to use IQ tests as well as examination results to pick-out high IQ ‘under-achievers’. As well as high IQ, revolutionary science requires high creativity. Creativity is probably associated with moderately high levels of Eysenck’s personality trait of ‘Psychoticism’. Psychoticism combines qualities such as selfishness, independence from group norms, impulsivity and sensation-seeking; with a style of cognition that involves fluent, associative and rapid production of many ideas. But modern science selects for high Conscientiousness and high Agreeableness; therefore it enforces low Psychoticism and low creativity. Yet my counter-proposal to select elite revolutionary scientists on the basis of high IQ and moderately high Psychoticism may sound like a recipe for disaster, since resembles a formula for choosing gifted charlatans and confidence tricksters. A further vital ingredient is therefore necessary: devotion to the transcendental value of Truth. Elite revolutionary science should therefore be a place that welcomes brilliant, impulsive, inspired, antisocial oddballs – so long as they are also dedicated truth-seekers.
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Introduction
Why are so many leading modern scientists intellectually dull and lacking in scientific ambition? The short answer is: because the science selection process ruthlessly weeds-out interesting and imaginative people [1].
At each level in education, training and career progression there is a tendency to exclude smart and creative people by preferring conscientious and sociable people. As science becomes ever-more dominated by ‘peer review’ mechanisms, pro-social behaviour in scientists has been accorded primacy over the brilliant and inspired – but abrasive and rebellious – type of truth-seekers who used to be common among the best scientists.
A majority of senior professional scientists have been through a rigorous and prolonged process of education, selection and training to become professional researchers. Yet the nature of the rigour and the duration of the process in modern science ensures that those who come out at the end and attain long-term scientific employment are not the kind of people capable of top level, revolutionary science. They will very probably be extremely productive and socially compliant, but of only moderately high intelligence and likely to be lacking in imagination [2].
(Of course, such an accusation of dullness is less likely to fit those scientists who are reading this article than the average scientist, since it is generally acknowledged that people who read or publish in Medical Hypotheses are atypical and tend to come from the more vividly colourful end of the scientific spectrum!)
Dullness-inducing trends in modern science
Modern science is just too dull an activity to attract, retain or promote many of the most intelligent and creative people. In particular the requirement for around 10, 15, even 20 years of postgraduate ‘training’ before even having a chance at doing some independent research of one’s own choosing, is enough to deter almost anyone with a spark of vitality or self-respect; and utterly exclude anyone with an urgent sense of vocation for creative endeavour. Even after a decade or two of ‘training’ the most likely scientific prospect is that of researching a topic determined by the availability of funding rather than scientific importance, or else functioning as a cog in someone else’s research machine. Either way, the scientist will be working on somebody else’s problem – not his own. Why would any serious intellectual wish to aim for such a career?
The whole process and texture of doing science has slowed-up. Read the memoirs of scientists active up to the middle 1960s – doing science then was nimble and fast-moving in texture and also longer-termist in ambition. Unexpected leads could be pursued. It was common for people to begin independent (really independent) research in their early- to mid-twenties. For the individuals concerned there was a palpable sense of progress, a crackling excitement.
Nowadays, training to be a scientist is an exercise in almost-endlessly-deferred satisfaction. There is an always-increasing requirement for years of training (i.e., extra years of doing what other people decide you ‘need’ to do, and not what interests you) – and also for more advance-planning, application for committee permissions, and demand for logistical organization; combined with a proliferation of scientifically-irrelevant and energy-sapping bureaucracy.
The timescale of scientific action and discourse has gone up from days, weeks and months to months, years and decades. Yet at the same time, the requirement for unremitting annual high productivity means that the timescale for research pay-off has contracted to a maximum of 3–5 years. It is usually career suicide to take the time and risks entailed by scientifically-ambitious research [2]. In sum, the tempo of science has slowed but the time-horizon of science has contracted. Modern science is both duller and more short-termist: the worst of both worlds!
Demanding superhuman perseverance filters-out intelligence and creativity
The kind of person who can thrive in the world of modern science is likely to be characterized primarily by an almost superhuman level of the personality attribute of perseverance – the ability doggedly to continue a course of action in pursuit of a goal, over a long period and despite difficulties, setbacks and the lack of immediate rewards (and indeed the lack of any guaranteed ultimate rewards); with simultaneous, continuous productivity.
Modern science therefore imposes an extraordinarily high minimum threshold for perseverance – lacking which will deter many individuals from going into science in the first place, and which will cull and exclude many others during the process of accumulating sufficient qualifications and experience to allow them to embark on independent research. Other near-synonyms for perseverance are ‘self-discipline’ or ‘grit’ [3], [4] and [5] and the ‘Big Five’ personality trait called ‘Conscientiousness’ (abbreviated here as ‘C’) [6].
Secondarily such an individual will usually need to have high levels of the Big Five personality trait termed ‘Agreeableness’ (abbreviated here as ‘A’) – which encompasses the ability to empathize with others, get along with groups, and compliantly to put the interests of the group above one’s own concerns [6].
Now, both Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are admirable traits in terms of society as a whole. Most people would wish to live in a society where Conscientious and Agreeable people predominated. Furthermore, a higher level of Conscientiousness, in particular, is predictive of better job performance [7]. But, success in top level revolutionary science demands somewhat different qualities than society as a whole. While high levels of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness make a person an excellent citizen and employee; high average levels of these traits in selected personnel are attainable only at the cost of accepting lower average levels of other attributes (such as IQ and creativity).
This is a serious problem because Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are not the most important traits required for doing ‘revolutionary’ science at the highest level [9] and [10]. (Revolutionary science is that type of science which changes the direction of science [9]; a revolutionary scientist is one whose activates are directed at this goal, someone trying to develop qualitatively new theories or methods [10].) Instead, for success in revolutionary science intelligence and creativity are the most important qualities [8]. Further, there is evidence to suggest that very high levels of the traits of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness may actually be hostile to – or even incompatible with – scientific genius; because to be hard-working and pleasant is useful only when these virtues are mobilized in pursuit of worthwhile scientific goals – and not when they become the highest scientific value in their own right.
The vital importance of high IQ in revolutionary science
The personnel requirements for being a good science employee on the one hand and on the other hand an original and ambitious ‘revolutionary’ scientist are, in some respects, in opposition. This should not really be surprising – but the implications have been ignored and flouted for several decades.
For an employee in ‘normal’ science – that is, science which aims at incrementally building on existing ideas and knowledge – reliability and technical competence are primary [9] and [10]. The great bulk of modern science is ‘normal’ science – that has been the major focus of expansion in funding and manpower over the past 60 years [11] and [12]. Such scientists do not need to be original; rather they need to be hard-working, meticulous and conservative in terms of their ideas and methods. And since normal science is increasingly collaborative, it is beneficial if normal scientists enjoy working socially and within group norms. High intelligence is also valuable in normal science, as it is in almost all employment activities [13], but perhaps especially valuable in the ‘troubleshooting’ aspects of normal science – making methods work.
So, for normal science it seems that high Conscientiousness is essential, high intelligence and Agreeableness are both useful, but creativity is probably detrimental.
But for revolutionary science intelligence and creativity are both vital ingredients. By contrast, Conscientiousness is necessary in revolutionary science only to the degree that a scientist must be able and willing to work long and hard at his chosen scientific problem, the problem which fascinates him. And working on your own problem requires much less perseverance than working hard for many years at non-scientific problems (as happens at school or during the first college degree), or working hard for many years at other peoples’ scientific problems (as required at graduate school or when working as a post-doc).
General intelligence (or ‘g factor’ intelligence), as measured by formal IQ tests, is a very important psychological ingredient in the ability to perform top level scientific research [8]. Indeed, to understand both the nature of g factor intelligence and the nature of elite science is to recognize as obvious the value of high general intelligence to research in revolutionary science [14]. Studies of the best scientists suggest that these typically have very high IQ of several standard deviations above average [8]. (Note: for the UK the average IQ of a random population sample is defined as 100 with a standard deviation defined as 15 points – other nations may have a different average/ distribution when calibrated against UK IQ norms.)
Cox’s study of 1926 retrospectively and indirectly estimated the average IQ of ‘genius’ scientists from the past as between 135 and 175, which is in the top 1% of the population (cited in [8]) – however the methodology generated only imprecise measurements During the 1950s Roe performed direct IQ tests on 23 highly-eminent US scientists [15] and found a median verbal IQ of 166 with a range from 121 to 177 (177 is about 5 standard deviations above average and was the ceiling of the tests; otherwise some subjects would have scored even higher).
Since very high IQ is found to be a near-universal feature of top scientists, it is presumably a necessary factor in becoming a top scientist. One way of looking at this is that successful revolutionary scientists are apparently among the most intelligent humans alive. And Roe’s work suggests that the minimum IQ for successful revolutionary science may be about 120 – which is in the top 10% of the UK population; or about the top 7% of the US population which has a slightly lower average IQ than the UK; or about 15% of the population of some East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore or Hong Kong, which have a higher average IQ than the UK [16].
Furthermore, prospective follow-up cohort studies of ‘gifted’ children (i.e., children with very high formally-measured IQs [17] and [18]) have demonstrated much higher than average ability in science examinations, with greatly increased rates of achieving the highest levels of educational attainment (e.g., pure science, medical or engineering doctorates at elite universities); also a strong tendency to study science subjects as a career (e.g., mathematics, pure sciences, engineering and medicine) at both Bachelors and Doctoral level; and much higher than average attainment of measures of elite scientific performance such as election to major scholarly societies. However, it is important to recognize that most of these measures do not differentiate between normal science and revolutionary science.
In sum, achievement in revolutionary science almost certainly requires a very high IQ; and a high IQ was in the past often associated with a career choice towards, and aptitude in, scientific subjects. However, nowadays it is seldom that direct IQ measurements are explicitly used as a selection method in modern science; and instead examination performance or other educational measures are usually given the greatest weighting. Hence we simply do not know the size of effect of modern selection, education, training and career structure on the average and peak IQ of scientists who stay the course to become long-term researchers.
But although the size of effect is not known, and making the assumption that the intellectual quality of scientific recruits has not risen significantly and the size of the population of professional scientists has not fallen to make a more selected elite (in fact science employment has grown several-fold), then the effect of modern scientific selection practices is very probably in the direction of reducing average IQ among long-term researchers.
Intelligence and Conscientiousness predict educational attainment
It has been known for more than a century that many types of attainment, including educational qualifications such as examination results, are predicted by a combination of ‘capacity’ or ‘ability’ with ‘zeal’ or ‘motivation’ (summarized in [19]). In more modern terms, this implies that general (g factor) intelligence (IQ) and Big Five Conscientiousness (C) are the main contributors to educational attainment.
The relationship between IQ and C can be expressed as an equation
IQ×C≈Educational attainment
(Note that because the relationship between IQ and C is multiplicative, this equation correctly implies that ‘zero’ (or very low) levels of either IQ or C would prevent significant educational attainment.)
The above equation derives from Lynn [19], who actually proposed the more general formulation of “IQ × Conscientiousness × opportunity = Achievement”. However, I have left-out the multiplication by opportunity, as this is hard to evaluate, and (within the normal bounds of developed societies) there is little evidence that variations in opportunity create significant systematic differences in achievement when IQ (and perhaps personality) are controlled [14] and [20].
Therefore, at a first approximation, the best established personal attributes that predict educational attainment are IQ [13], [14] and [21] and C [3], [22], [23], [24] and [25]. Intelligence and Conscientiousness are certainly not the only factors contributing to educational attainment, but they are probably the most important and – since other factors are less certain or harder to measure – I will focus exclusively on IQ and C.
The measured level of correlations between IQ, C and educational attainment depend on the population studied, the subject and nature of the educational measurement, and the methodology. Traditionally IQ has been more powerful at predicting educational performance than personality [13], [14], [21] and [22], but not always [3]; and my guess is that over recent decades the predictive ability of IQ will very likely have declined, and that of C increased, due to increased demands for C in the educational process.
IQ and C are not highly correlated – so selection for Conscientiousness tends to depress average IQ
At an individual level there is little or no observable correlation between intelligence and Conscientiousness. Some group studies – especially sampling across very diverse social classes, ethnic groups or nations – show a positive correlation between IQ and measures correlated with C [16], [19] and [26], many studies show no significant correlation [5] and [27], and other studies show a significant negative correlation between IQ and C [28].
Probably the reason for this observed discrepancy between studies relates to subject selection. My guess is that when a population sample is very diverse in terms of educational attainment, class or ethnicity there will be a positive correlation between IQ and C; but when the sample is controlled for class or educational attainment (as in university student samples) the correlation may disappear or become inverse because the same level of educational attainment can be the result of various combinations of IQ and C. For example, a harder working person with lower IQ may get the same examination results as a higher IQ person who works less hard.
In other words; when educational attainment is held constant by sampling only a narrow stratum of educational attainment then there may be an inverse relationship between IQ and C, as indicated by a reversed version of the above equation: Educational attainment ≈ IQ × C.
But the lack of a strong correlation between IQ and Conscientiousness means that when very high levels of perseverance are a pre-requisite for scientists (i.e., only people who have competed a PhD and 6 years of postdoctoral research are eligible for selection) then this increased average level of C will inevitably be attainable only at the cost of sacrificing other personal abilities including IQ. This effect would be more powerful where educational attainment is held constant and IQ and C have a reciprocal relationship – but selecting for C would tend to depress average IQ even when there is no significant relationship between the variables.
For instance, imagine a university was selecting the top 10% of applicants for a PhD program. The average accepted person might be in the top 10% for IQ and also the top 10% for C – and around this average some would be harder working but less bright and others would be brighter but less diligent. (Students who were higher than the top 10% in both IQ and C would probably attend a higher ranked and more selective university.)
Now suppose that there was an increased level of Conscientiousness required to reach a given level of educational attainment – for example there was a shift from infrequent formal exams to frequent coursework, plus an extra 3 years were added to the formal educational process. The imaginary university would still have the same degree of selectivity (i.e., taking the top 10% of students) and would still be taking the top 10% on the basis of exam attainment – but now students would need to be in the top 5% for C.
With a requirement for C in the top 5%, many of the top 10% IQ students who had previously been eligible would no longer be able (or willing) to complete their educational evaluations; and their places would be taken by students of lower IQ but in the top 5% of C. The university might need to dredge down to include (say) the top 20% for IQ. Average IQ of successful applicants would reduce, and the newly-excluded high IQ but lower C students would then drop down the system to attend universities with a lower degree of selectivity (and they would thereby probably lose some of their competitive career edge).
When requirements for perseverance are increased, throughout the educational system there would be an assortment process such that higher C people will move up the system to more selective institutions and lower C individuals will move down the system. Students with the very best examination results would still have both very high IQ and very high C – but there would not be many such students since there is no strong positive correlation between IQ and C. In essence, students with higher C would now be valued more than those with higher IQ.
Typically, and all else being equal, greater selectivity for C therefore entails lesser selectivity for IQ.
A long-lasting, step-wise, hierarchical and competitive educational system tends to filter-out high IQ
Intelligence becomes progressively more powerful at predicting educational and occupational success as the cognitive demands of the job increase. IQ probably becomes more important the more advanced the educational level, and the higher the level of scientific activity. Conversely, it would be expected that non-IQ factors, especially C, will be more important at lower levels of scientific education, training and professional practice. So, a level of intelligence which suffices for excellence in routine, technical science could be grossly inadequate for cutting edge, revolutionary science.
The implication is that there is an intrinsic tendency for lower levels of the educational system, including scientific education, to select for different personal qualities than are required at higher levels. The tendency is for lower levels to favour higher Conscientiousness candidates at the expense of higher IQ candidates. Because at early stages of science perseverance is relatively more valuable than it is at advanced levels of science, and IQ is less valuable (since the cognitive demands are easier).
In the absence of specific IQ testing (used to identify and retain or promote the most intelligent candidates); a long-lasting, step-wise, hierarchical and competitive educational system – in which progression to more advanced stages depends on differentially successful performance at easier and less cognitively-demanding stages – will favour the most Conscientious individuals and select-out some individuals whose higher IQ would be expected to generate higher performance at advanced levels of the profession.
The result is that the highest levels of science almost certainly have a lower average IQ than would be optimal – due to the cohort having been selected so strongly for a higher level of C at lower (less cognitively-demanding) levels of the hierarchy. Since very high IQ is likely to be necessary for successful revolutionary science, the implication is that too many high level scientists are prevented (by their too-low IQ) from operating as revolutionary scientists. Instead they (presumably) become normal scientists – but unusually productive normal scientists (due to their vast capacity for hard work and self-discipline).
Of course, the loss of high IQ individuals could be compensated by the selective sieve causing a reduction in the number of people retained as the ladder is ascended – so that even if half of the high IQ people were lost, then this might not be noticed if only a quarter of people were retained. However, the long-term expansion of science funding with several-fold increase in the numbers of professional scientific personnel over recent decades [2] and [12] means that this kind of increasingly selectivity is unlikely to be operative.
In essence, high level scientific personnel should be a ‘highest IQ elite’ most of whom are capable of revolutionary science; but in modern science the leadership is more like a ‘highest perseverance elite’ who are typically incapable of revolutionary science and instead do a great deal of normal science [2].
Combining examination results with IQ testing can indirectly estimate Conscientiousness
A vital step should be to do a lot more IQ testing throughout science. IQ tests are powerfully predictive in many ways [29], including being highly predictive of job performance (in all jobs, but especially cognitively-complex jobs) [13] and there are many reasons why IQ testing should be much more widely deployed in our society. However, widespread (and deliberate) politically-motivated misrepresentation and disinformation currently prevents this situation [30].
Intelligence testing is particularly valuable in science because the ability to understand science and do scientific research is highly dependent on IQ. And formal IQ testing has probably become more necessary over recent decades as the educational system has evolved to be more selective for Conscientiousness (hence less selective for IQ). For example, in the UK and the USA educational systems there have been greatly increased demands for course work instead of less-frequent formal, supervised and timed examinations; as well as the above-mentioned lengthening duration of education and training.
The point of measuring IQ in a candidate would be to look for discrepancies between IQ testing and examination performance. If there is a large difference in ranked performance in examinations and IQ tests this will imply that the subject’s Conscientiousness is unusually high or low.
This can be expressed in the form of a rearranged equation relating IQ and C
[View the MathML source]
or expressed in terms of rank orderings:
[View the MathML source]
In other words, measures of educational attainment and intelligence can, together, be used as an indirect estimate of Conscientiousness.
(It seems to me that in the context of institutional selection and career decisions this indirect method of estimating Conscientiousness is likely to be more valid than the usual method of self-rating personality questionnaires [6] because it is much harder to cheat. It is facile for high IQ people to cheat in self-rating questionnaires by learning the correct responses that are marked to indicate high (or low) conscientiousness. But the only way for applicants to ‘fake’ this indirect method of estimating C would be to perform deliberately badly on either the IQ test or the examination – which would usually be a career-damaging strategy. For example, a candidate who dishonestly wished to signal high C could do so by deliberately performing badly on their IQ test, so that their exam ranking was higher than their IQ ranking. But there are not many selection or employment situations when this would be an adaptive strategy. Conversely, a person could make themselves look like an ‘underachiever’ by deliberately messing up their exams but trying hard on the IQ test – so their IQ rank was higher than their exam rank – however this would only be achievable at the cost of lowering their exam results, which is not often going to be a helpful thing to do.)
The object of this exercise in comparing exam results with IQ tests is to enable revolutionary science educational or research institutions to select under-achievers in preference to over-achievers. If, for example, a person is in the top 2% of the population for IQ but the exam results are only in the top 20%, then it is plausible that the relatively weak exam performance happened because the subject is relatively lower in C (although still above average). This is under-achievement.
If population norms are not available, then an institution could simply place its candidates into relative order for their examination results compared with their performance in an IQ test. Any significant discrepancies in rank ordering between the two lists would suggest either over- or under-achieving. For example, an under-achiever might be ranked second out of 20 for IQ and 16 out of 20 for exam results.
The opposite situation – ‘over-performers’ – are those who have significantly higher ranked exam results than IQ test results. The interpretation is that over-performers are higher in C lower and lower in IQ (harder working but less intelligent).
Agreeableness versus Psychoticism and creativity
High IQ is required for revolutionary science, but high IQ people are not necessarily creative – indeed some people with the highest recorded IQs have been (apparently) uncreative. And creativity as well as high IQ is required by revolutionary scientists – indeed revolutionary science is one of the primary arenas of human creativity with iconic figures such as Newton, Darwin and Einstein [8].
Perhaps surprisingly, creativity has often been found to be predicted by moderately high levels of Eysenck’s personality trait of ‘Psychoticism’ [31]. The trait of Psychoticism has been well-validated [6] and [32]; high psychoticism combines low-Agreeableness (e.g., higher selfishness, independence from group norms), low Conscientiousness (for example impulsivity, sensation-seeking) with a style of cognition that involves fluent, associative and rapid production of many ideas. So, although a trait of low Psychoticism implies a rational and pro-social personality (which are usually highly desirable traits); moderately high Psychoticism is not merely antisocial but has positive aspects as well – since it has flavours of independence of spirit and a more spontaneous and fantasy-like mode of thinking. This style of cognition seems to be a basis for creativity.
The highest levels of Psychoticism are maladaptive (as the name implies) since the individuals’ behaviour is so impulsive as to render impossible any sustained effort, so antisocial as to be psychopathic (and lead to prison or expulsion from society) and their thought processes are so disorganized as to be psychotic with hallucinations, delusions and thought-disorder (and lead to incoherence, un-employability and perhaps hospitalization). But Eysenck showed that a moderately high degree of the trait of Psychoticism is associated with creativity (whether creativity is measured by achievement, by laboratory tests, or by measurement of creativity in psychosis-prone individuals [8], [31] and [32]). Moderately high Psychoticism is often a feature of individuals exhibiting the highest levels of achievement (not just in the sciences, but in the arts too) [8].
If the focus is revolutionary science, this makes sense in that setting science onto a new direction requires considerable independence from group norms, a certain selfish indifference to the feelings of others, as well as a mode of thinking which generates novelty. By contrast, a low Psychoticism individual would probably be too inclined to obey orders and too fearful to risk societal sanctions and too logical in their thought processes to generate and pursue disruptively original (i.e., creative) work. Low Psychoticism would therefore be a desirable trait for normal scientists, but undesirable for revolutionary scientists.
In conclusion, ‘genius’ probably entails moderately high Psychoticism. And, if correct, this has important implications for the selection of scientific personnel, since creativity is inversely correlated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Therefore the modern type of scientific career structure – which enforces high levels of Conscientiousness, and which favours an Agreeable and socially compliant personality type – will not merely fail to select creative scientists: such a career structure will actually tend to exclude creative people.
Revolutionary science institutions should be selecting positively for high IQ and creativity/ moderately high Psychoticism
So, assuming that top level, elite scientific education and training institutions aim to select the highest levels of genius – i.e., those potential revolutionary scientists who are capable of changing the direction of their subjects – then modern selection methods and career structures will both need to change.
In the first place, elite institutions will need to know the IQ of applicants. As explained above, the particular value of IQ testing comes in identifying under-achievers whose high IQ is not reflected in high exam performance. These people may have lower Conscientiousness which impairs their performance at tasks which do not much interest or engage them. However, if their level of perseverance is sufficient to get them to the point of independent research, then their Conscientiousness may be high-enough to allow for very hard and sustained work at self-chosen problems which provide much more immediate reward. So that someone who found school and undergraduate college boring, and was thereby lacking motivation, may be altogether more driven when tackling a self-chosen problem. And selecting high IQ scientists of only-sufficiently-high Conscientiousness should also serve to increase the proportion of moderately high Psychoticism individuals – hence those who have the potential to become creative and revolutionary scientists.
Creativity cannot, at present, be directly selected-for. Although there are some psychological tests of creativity [6], [8], [31] and [32], these are of uncertain validity especially at predicting the high levels of creativity required by revolutionary science. However, elite scientific institutes could and certainly should avoid their present practice of (unintentionally) selecting against creativity.
For example many elite college application procedures (inadvertently) currently select against creativity when they ask for evidence of altruistic and sociable behaviours from their applicants – evidence of such activities as community service, participation in team sports, administrative responsibility, or memberships of drama or musical groups. Choosing the most ‘Agreeable’ students may make for a more pleasant and stimulating social environment and a more friendly and compliant student body. However, this strategy of excluding asocial or awkward individuals is a policy that is highly likely to lower the ceiling of achievement of the best science graduates.
On the other hand, less-selective ‘normal science’ educational and training institutions – who aim to educate and train personnel for reliable but more routine accomplishment at technical and administrative tasks, or functions that require close attention to detail – may be more legitimately interested in selecting for a higher average C – but inevitably at the cost of lower IQ. They may thus recruit a population of ‘overachiever’ students, whose attributes include the capacity for long hours of steady work; and such institutions may also wish to select for high Agreeableness which should improve the capacity for cooperative teamwork.
Whatever the aims of selection of scientific personnel might be – a combination of the results of examinations with IQ tests allows a more precise, informative and objective estimate of individual aptitudes than the current situation of using examinations alone.
Transcendental truth-seekers
In a nutshell, I am suggesting that:
1. Educational attainment depends on IQ × C; but IQ and C are not closely-correlated.
2. Modern education has progressively raised the floor for C (by lengthening the educational process and by changes in educational evaluation methods).
3. Educational attainment therefore nowadays increasingly rewards C in preference to IQ.
4. Yet revolutionary science still requires high levels of IQ, and the higher the better.
5. So, in revolutionary science where IQ is vital, selection of personnel should not be determined only or mainly by educational attainments; but this information needs to be supplemented with direct, formal IQ testing.
6. Furthermore, revolutionary science requires high levels of creativity; which are associated with moderately high Psychoticism trait – yet modern education and science selects very strongly in favour of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness and therefore enforces low Psychoticism.
7. So, the education, training and career structure of modern science tends to depress average IQ and cull creativity – which are the prime qualities requires for success in revolutionary science. Consequently, modern top scientists are likely to be less intelligent and creative than is desirable, and probably significantly less intelligent and creative than top scientists used to be.
In the past, the education and training of a scientist was a much shorter process – with many scientists reaching a position to do independent research by their middle-twenties. This shorter process imposed a much lower requirement for both Conscientiousness and Agreeableness – because for a moderately conscientious person the end was not impossibly remote and relatively few years of unpleasant effort provided access to desired goal, and a dis-Agreeable person did need to get along with a long series of bosses and their teams – any of whom might sabotage his career.
Also, in the past educational ability was more often measured using relatively-infrequent, timed and supervised, previously-unseen formal examinations during which the examinee would need to work fast to organize their knowledge. Such formal examinations are likely to be more ‘g-loaded’ (i.e., correlate more strongly with IQ) than the greater emphasis on frequent ‘course work’ which has characterized educational systems over recent decades – course work tends to reward Conscientiousness over IQ compared with formal exams and be preferred by more Conscientious and less intelligent students [33].
To return to the original question of why top scientists are so dull nowadays – the conclusion is that scientists are dull mainly because the progressive increase in the requirements for long-term plodding perseverance and social inoffensiveness has the effect of deterring, driving-out and failing to reward too many smart and creative potential scientists before they ever get a chance to engage in independent research. And maybe even more smart and interesting people are lost from science due later on to the requirement for so much planning and administration. Since the people who nowadays eventually emerge from the ever-lengthening pipeline of scientific training are quite different from the scientists of 50 years ago, they naturally tend to move science even further in the direction which created their own success. So that modern scientific leader often elevate the requirements for very long periods of tedious and scientifically-irrelevant activity, and judge scientists mainly by their capacity for steady and reliable production and teamwork. These requirements will tend to act against both creativity and intelligence.
It seem inevitable that the changes in selection process in science over the past several decades will have reduced both average IQ and creativity among those who have been through the full professional training process. Such changes would be expected particularly to damage performance in revolutionary science, but might even enhance performance in normal science where perseverance and sociability (assuming at least moderately high IQ) are likely to be more crucial to success. Indeed, this is presumably the reason why such changes have occurred, since the great majority of scientists are working in normal science, so the requirements of normal science therefore tend to dominate [2]. However, the magnitude of the effect on reducing IQ and creativity has not been measured and constitutes a subject deserving of future empirical study.
Instead of having an educational and career structure which selects for superhuman Conscientiousness and makes-do with whatever intelligence and creativity happen to be left-over; in revolutionary science we need a system which selects for superhuman intelligence and high creativity – and requires only enough Conscientiousness to ensure that independent scientists with a vocation for their work are motivated to put in the long, hard hours to solve those self-chosen problems that have come to enthral them, and only enough Agreeableness to exclude psychotics and psychopaths.
Selecting elite scientists on the basis of high and IQ and moderately high Psychoticism – implied by Eysenck’s research [8] – may sound like a recipe for disaster, since these ingredients resemble a formula for gifted charlatans and con artists. A further vital ingredient is necessary: that elite scientists must have a vocational devotion to transcendental values of truth. In his magisterial study of the pinnacles of human accomplishment [34], Charles Murray concluded that achievement of genius was nurtured by social systems in which transcendental values were a living presence. Great revolutionary science is therefore a product of transcendental truth-seeking individuals working in a truth-seeking milieu.
It is truth-seeking which distinguishes a great independent-spirited scientist from mere brilliant charlatans and confidence tricksters who seek nothing higher than to use professional science in pursuit of their own selfish ends. Of course, making such a distinction, i.e., detecting truth-seeking, requires a scientific system that explicitly and in practice values transcendental truth-seeking above social virtues of perseverance and sociability – and such a perspective is uncommon within science nowadays. Lacking the living presence of such transcendental values, science has lapsed back into valuing social virtues for their own sake, with peer approval as the highest court of appeal, the ultimate validation [35]. Unsurprisingly such a science will over-promote C and A, and undervalue IQ and creativity.
The problem is that the current scientific leadership themselves often lack the trait of truth-seeking, and would not be able to detect it in others. This implies that revolutionary science (or ‘pure’ science) may need to be rebuilt on the basis of a new ‘apostolic succession’ of truth-seekers; starting from that minority of intelligent and imaginative top scientists who have managed to buck the trends and land professional positions of high status and authority [36].
People characterized by very high IQ, and moderately high Psychoticism might well be regarded as brilliant, but too selfish, unstable and/or foolish for everyday social purposes. But strange and luminous fools seem to be precisely what is most needed for successful revolutionary science. And modern society needs a place where clever, antisocial, imaginative people can do good and be prevented from inflicting the social harm than can result from ability and fantasy unconstrained by common sense, generosity or sensitivity to group norms. Science should be one such place: a place which should welcome and nurture inspired oddballs – so long as they are also vocational truth-seekers.
Acknowledgements
Richard Lynn, Phil Rushton, Wendy Johnson and Ian Deary have all (sometime inadvertently) made extremely helpful contributions to this polemic – however they bear no responsibility whatsoever for the use I have made of their ideas and insights. Of course, the main intellectual debt is to the late Hans Eysenck, especially his book Genius: the natural history of creativity [8].
References
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[34] C. Murray, Human accomplishment. The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences 800 BC to 1950, HarperCollins, New York (2003).
[35] B.G. Charlton, Figureheads, ghost-writers and pseudonymous quant bloggers: the recent evolution of authorship in science publishing, Med Hypotheses 71 (2008), pp. 475–480.
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Saturday, 27 December 2008
Kealey on scientific motivations and incentives
Editorial
Invisible colleges, private patronage and commercial profits versus public goods, government funding and ‘crowding-out’: Terence Kealey on the motivations and incentives driving science
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; Volume 72, Pages 111-115
***
Summary
What kind of a thing is science and how does it work? [Kealey T. Sex, science and profits: In a recent book (Sex, science and profits: how people evolved to make money. London: William Heinemann; 2008) (p. 455)] Terence Kealey argues persuasively that the motivations driving science are widely misunderstood. Science is often assumed to be useful to the public but an economic loser for the scientist and his or her paymasters – in other words, science is supposed to be a ‘public good’. The public good argument is used to support large-scale government funding of science, on the basis that if government does not fund science it will not be funded adequately. But Kealey argues that most science is profitable to commercial organizations, and other types of worthwhile science will be supported by private patronage. Yet excessive government funding tends to ‘crowd-out’ potential private sources of funding – both by replacing and by deterring private investment. And scientists are not primarily motivated by money, but instead by striving for status within the ‘invisible college’ of active researchers in their field. Kealey’s take-home message is that overall and in the long-term, science neither requires nor benefits from government funding. Scientific research would be better-served by private funding from commercial organizations that are seeking profit, combined with patronage from charities and foundations that regard science as intrinsically valuable.
***
What kind of a thing is science and how does it work? In a recent book [1] – tightly packed with insights, evidence and jokes – Terence Kealey argues persuasively that the motivations driving science are widely misunderstood. Kealey suggests that the major motivation for scientists is to attain status within the ‘invisible college’ of active researchers in their field. So powerful is this motivation that scientists routinely subsidise their work from their own pockets.
Science is often assumed to be useful to the public but an economic loser for the scientist and his or her paymasters – in other words, science is supposed to be a ‘public good’. The public good argument is used to support large-scale government funding of science, on the basis that if government does not fund science it will not be funded adequately. But Kealey argues that most science is profitable to commercial organizations, and other worthwhile types of science will be supported by private patronage.
Yet excessive government funding tends to ‘crowd-out’ potential private sources of funding – both by replacing and by deterring private investment. Kealey’s take-home message is that science neither requires, nor benefits from, government funding; but that over the long-term science would be better-served by private funding by commercial organizations that are seeking profit combined with patronage by charities and foundations that regard science as intrinsically valuable.
Status motivates scientists
Although, like almost everyone else, scientists need income (and would prefer to have more of it), scientists are not ‘in it for the money’. Instead, scientists are ‘in it for the status’ – specifically the esteem of the peer group of scientists actively working in the same field.
The ‘sex’ element in the book’s title explains this, since it refers to sexual selection [2] and [3]. Sexual selection provides the ultimate evolutionary explanation as to the human motivation to seek status, because status is attractive – especially male status is attractive to females [4]. Science can be seen as one of many competitive social systems which harnesses and puts-to-good-use the human craving for prestige within a social group.
If scientists are primarily motivated by the desire for status rather than money, then this predicts that they will risk or sacrifice money to achieve scientific status. And this can often be observed – much scientific activity (e.g. computer, book and stationary purchases; journal subscriptions; conference attendance; media appearances; advice and consultancy; even postgraduate training) is funded to some extent from scientists’ own pockets or done in their private time.
In one of numerous witty and telling asides, Kealey comments that in economic terms virtually all science publishing is a type of ‘vanity publishing’ (a term usually reserved for the self-publication of slim volumes of verse) – since scientific papers are published at best with no monetary reward, and more often at significant monetary loss. Authors are prepared to pay when this helps to disseminate their research and scholarship: examples of ‘pay-to-publish’ journals are legion and include Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), PLoS Medicine, and indeed Medical Hypotheses.
Tacit knowledge and the invisible college
The group within which a scientist seeks status is termed an ‘invisible college’ [5] Wikipedia. Invisible College. (accessed 12.09.08).[5] – ‘invisible’ in the sense that it is characterized by the exchange of information among dispersed peers rather than by co-residence in a specific physical building, and a ‘college’ in the sense that it is exclusive. Nowadays an invisible college is often international and may be sustained by electronic communications rather than face-to-face interactions. Nonetheless, Kealey emphasizes that personal relationships remains very important in science, as in many other areas of modern life, as evidenced by the phenomenon of ‘clustering’, in which rival niche businesses tend to locate near to each other. Clustering facilitates mutual evaluation of personal qualities and the build-up of networks of trust that allow information exchange. Conferences perform a similar function in science.
But the invisible college is not about giving-away information to all-and-sundry; the invisible college is specifically about trading information for mutual benefit. And the trading of knowledge is a matter of enlightened self-interest – in the long-term a group who share knowledge will out-perform those who do not share. However, the fact that an invisible college is based on trade means that participants must have something to trade which is valued by the other members of the college. Those with no useful knowledge to trade are excluded from the college.
One of the types of information which is traded in science is ‘tacit knowledge’ (the term comes from the philosopher and scientist Michael Polanyi [6]). In science tacit knowledge includes a great deal of unpublished, and probably un-publishable, knowledge about the skills and minutiae of doing science – the kind of thing that can only be learnt from direct personal apprenticeship – for example during a Ph.D. It is tacit knowledge which is learned by personal conversation, or lab visits, and by working alongside experts – for example in discovering and dealing-with raw data.
So, there is a substantial cost attached to membership of an invisible college. The cost involves attaining sufficient expertise to participate in college communications; and on top of that there is the effort required to generate new knowledge or skills which can be traded: i.e. the possession of knowledge or skills for which other scientists are willing to trade their own tacit knowledge.
The trading of knowledge depends on trust – the greater the level of trust the more extended and complex can be the networks of mutually-beneficial information exchange. But if trust is betrayed so that valid and useful information flows only one way, then the benefits of trade become merely one-sided and ultimately trade breaks-down [7]. And trust must be earned, which is another reason for the exclusivity of invisible colleges. Those who have not yet proved themselves trustworthy, or who have behaved in an untrustworthy manner, will not get access to tacit knowledge.
To what extent is copying a problem?
It is easy enough to acknowledge the workings of invisible colleges in non-commercial research, but Kealey emphasizes how exactly the same mechanisms support scientific research in the commercial, profit-seeking, sector. He argues that, far from being secretive, competitors in the private sector share their scientific knowledge – for the same self-interested reasons as in the non-profit sector: that those who share knowledge out-perform those who do not. However, private firms are selective concerning whom their knowledge is shared-with, and there must be trust in reciprocity. And most relevant and useful knowledge is either highly technical or tacit, and therefore, either incomprehensible or inaccessible to those outside the invisible college.
It is generally assumed that the major problem for commercial science is the danger of copying, whereby a commercial rival takes the benefits of innovation without paying the cost of development. Of course, in one sense, copying is the basis of human progress, the mechanism by which improvements spread from their originator. Unless there was copying there would be no general benefit. So, the real problem is attaining a balance between the public benefits of copying and the need for the originator to have an incentive to innovate. Copying is good, but there should also be the probability of a sufficient reward for the originator.
The question is what form this reward should take. Since scientists are primarily seeking status within the invisible college, they often welcome copying – so long as the innovator gets personal credit for having the original idea. In other words, since scientists are primarily motivated by status rather than money, it is logical that their rewards should primarily be in the currency of prestige rather than cash. From this ‘pure’ science perspective, plagiarism – i.e. copying without giving credit to the source – is a problem; but copying with credit is actually in itself a reward because it confers status.
But Kealey emphasizes that even in commercial business situations copying is not such a big problem as is sometimes imagined. The reason is that copying is usually costly: very costly. Copying takes both time and considerable money. Furthermore copying involves other scarce and valuable resources too, because a firm which is set-up to copy its rivals must support a high level of scientific expertise in order that they can detect and understand potentially-useful innovations as well as doing the actual copying and production.
In other words, although apparently ‘free’ and seldom kept secret, scientific knowledge is in fact comprehensible and usable by only a small and highly-trained elite group. Relevant tacit knowledge (without which explicit knowledge can seldom be exploited) is a kind of ‘secret ingredient’ that is extremely costly to acquire because it is usually only traded for equally valuable tacit knowledge – and this keeps it within the exclusive confines of the trust-based invisible college.
Kealey suggests that it is the intrinsic difficulty of copying, rather than ‘intellectual property rights’ such as patents, which are the significant factors in protecting the monopoly of innovators, allowing them to profit from their innovations and thereby providing the motivation for innovation.
If so, then the major commercial advantage of innovation is to gain the ‘first mover advantage’ in monopolizing a market niche: the temporary monopoly situation that exists before rivals are able to mobilize production, distribution and marketing of their copies. As a consequence Kealey suggests that patents are usually a bad thing all-round, both for the public and the patenter.
(There are exceptions in rare and specific circumstances where there is a long and expensive investment to generate a product which is relatively quick and cheap to copy – such as the pharmaceutical industry.)
An example of patents harming the public is James Watt’s steam engine patent, which held-back progress in the field for several decades. Furthermore patents can also distract innovators from the primary requirement rapidly to exploit their first mover advantage, and to continue seeking further innovations. An example of patents harming the patenter is the Wright brothers Wilbur and Orville, who invented the first functional aeroplane; but squandered prodigious time, energy and money in trying (and usually failing) to defend their patents.
If this is correct, and the argument seems plausible, then there needs to be a radical reappraisal of the current trend progressively to extend the scope and duration of intellectual property rights – especially copyright. If the aim is to benefit the public, probably we ought to be experimenting with narrowing the scope of patenting, and progressive shortening of the allowed duration of copyright and patents in most intellectual fields.
Government funding and ‘crowding-out’
By describing a range of powerful economic and personal motivations to do science, Kealey is arguing the falsity of the common conceptualization of science as a public good requiring government funding. His idea is that ‘self-interest’ of various types (individual and institutional) would ensure that enough science of the right kind was funded without need for government intervention.
Furthermore Kealey suggests that increasing government funding of science may not lead to greater funding overall, because state support ‘crowds out’ and deters private funding, leading to excess dependence on government funding and the damaging politicization of science.
It is extremely important to be aware of, and to recognize, the possibility of crowding-out of private by state investment in science. Because those of us who live in the developed world are used to prodigious and rising levels of government funding for science – doubling in real terms about every 15 years for science overall [1] and with even more rapid growth (doubling about every decade) for medical science [7]. Kealey provides evidence that such expansion of government funding crowds out private funding in science. Crowding-out means that in practice (although not necessarily by intention) private funding usually declines as government funding increases until science becomes de facto almost a public monopoly.
Of course, most people assume that government funding will cause crowding-in to science – in other words they hope that the more money which government spends, the more private money will be attracted to the field. Kealey’s example of crowding-in occurs in road transportation when the government builts a new road with free usage, and private individuals then buy more cars to use the improved facility.
But the evidence suggests that increasing government funding of science usually crowds out private funding, leading – for instance – to reduced corporate investment in research and development (and Kealey emphasizes that R&D really is an investment, making a significant contribution to organizational profitability). The more that government funding increases, the more that private funding declines. Possible reasons for crowding-out the private sector include state money being used to substitute for private research funding, and the general reduction in competition between rival firms which is often explicitly encouraged by government policy.
Another factor in the phenomenon of government funding crowding-out private funding is, I suspect, probably related to science being a status-oriented activity. Where government provides the lion’s share of funding then government will take the lion’s share of status. Because status is a zero-sum game, if one party gets a larger share of prestige then this leaves less prestige for everyone else. There is little incentive for private patrons to engage in funding science if government then claims most of the credit for the achievements of science – so discriminating patrons will look elsewhere to gain prestige for allocating their support.
Creative destruction
Governments often believe that competition is harmful, in science as elsewhere, and they instead try to encourage cooperation. But Kealey agrees with Joseph Schumpeter’s general economic schema of capitalism as powered-by ‘creative destruction’ – an interpretation which emphasizes the value of competition in driving innovation, and innovation in promoting economic growth [8].
According to Schumpeter, the main driving force of capitalism is that companies compete to gain then retain monopoly. Entrepreneurs continuously pursue innovation and where this is successful the price of failure paid by commercial rivals may be extinction (i.e. destruction). Failure is intrinsic to the dynamic of success [9]. Incumbent monopolists are forced to seek innovation by the credible threat of rival entrepreneurs ‘snapping at their heels’ by generating innovations intended to take away their markets.
This destruction of commercial firms is termed ‘creative’ because in the long-term it allows better allocation of resources – innovation can only thrive at the expense of discarding the obsolete. A few hundred years ago some 90% of the UK population were engaged in growing food, now the proportion working in agriculture is less than 1%, and the other 89% of the ex-farm-labouring population have (forcibly) liberated to perform a multitude of other economic activities.
The destruction of agriculture as the dominant mode of employment was therefore, creative in the sense that it enabled a massive reallocation of manpower with an increase in productivity (economic output per person), and therefore, creative destruction of agriculture promoted economic growth. Failure in one area was necessary to success in another. Specific short-term suffering (e.g. reduced income among newly unemployed farm labourers) was intrinsic to the general long-term benefits (e.g. increased income spread among everyone, including the grandchildren of the unemployed farm labourers).
Creative destruction is, of course, also a feature of science: new theories displace the old and the destruction of old ideas is necessary in order to liberate resources to invest in new science. Karl Popper’s philosophy of science could, indeed, be regarded as an equivalent process to Schumpeter’s creative destruction in the economy [10]. Example are legion: the decline of astrology entailed by the creation of astronomy, the extinction of alchemy and the reallocation of effort into chemistry, the replacement of classical physics by relativity and quantum theory [11].
The progress of science generally and in the long-term is attainable only at the cost of specific and short-term destruction – e.g. of the reputations and livelihoods of scientists working in fields which have been superseded.
Political corruption of science by excessive government influence
Because expanding government support of science usually results in crowding-out of private support, the state tends to become a monopoly supplier of science. Government funding agencies then shape the direction of scientific research, and government thereby gains an unhealthy degree of control. Essentially, the systems of government and science fuse to form a single hybrid system of politicized science – i.e. science that promotes government interests.
At the end-point of decades of crowding-out, all kinds of pathologies of science have now emerged, although they are often taken for granted and hardly noticed. For example, in the UK, government-funded science is often regarded (especially by other government agencies) as having intrinsically higher prestige than privately-funded science. This principle has been formalized in some UK state-administered university research evaluation mechanisms (RAE – [12]) where extra credit was given to funding from government agencies (in my opinion credit should only have been given for scientific output, and not for input measures such as funding [13]).
Another almost inevitable effect of government funding is inefficiency [7]. As science becomes more like a monopolistic ‘nationalized industry’ there are the usual problems of excessive yet still-growing bureaucracy. Many economists recognize as a general principle that government provision is only about half as efficient (in terms of outputs per input, and controlling for quality) as the private sector [14].
Science funding may be used to pursue political, not scientific, goals. For example government may shift funding towards what are perceived as vote-winning causes that are likely to attract votes such as the ‘war on’ cancer, or special attention on AIDS, breast cancer or other diseases. The special government attention may or may not be scientifically or medically justifiable – but the reason for extra funding is primarily political. Or political parties may deploy large-scale research facilities to specific geographic regions as a reward for political support. Or parties may ‘buy’ the support of scientists by (in effect) bribing them with extra grants and salaries, or blackmailing scientists with the (credible) threat of bribe-withdrawal if the opposition party gets power.
And having crowded-out significant private funding from science, government may then shape the emphasis of science strategy so that they build-up science and scientific perspectives which bolster their political views while simultaneously starving-out science that is hostile to the governing ethos. The most notorious example of this was Stalin’s support of ‘Lysenkoism’ in the mid-twentieth century USSR and the persecution of biologists who adhered to Darwin’s theory of natural selection [15]. A similar phenomenon (usually minus the violence) can be seen in the way that IQ research has been marginalized by government policy in the US and UK [16].
Large-scale and long-term government funding of science creates economic and psychological dependence on the state. It is this pervasive dependency culture which makes Kealey’s message so alarming and unacceptable to most scientists.
A vision of diverse private science funding
Kealey’s ideal is a world in which government funding of science has dwindled to insignificant levels, and science is mainly funded by a mixture of private commerce and private patronage.
Commercial organizations would be motivated to do science by the bottom-line of profit; because pursuing continued innovation and supporting science is the only way they can have access to the invisible college of information (including tacit knowledge) upon which their continued competitiveness depends.
In the absence of crowding-out by government funding, substantial further science patronage would come from private research foundations and charities of many types, who would fund diverse branches of science simply because they value that science and like to support it – just as foundations and charities support the arts, sports, religions and numerous other good causes. This altruistic motivation is helped by the fact that supporting science is, in general, a prestigious thing to do.
Scientists are motivated to work mainly by the desire for enhanced status within their invisible college – which ensures competition; they are also motivated to trade their knowledge (i.e. cooperate) by the advantages this brings to their competitive pursuit of scientific knowledge. For these reasons scientists will spontaneously self-organize into exclusive and elite invisible colleges or communities of reciprocal trust for mutual benefit.
So, in a world of negligible state funding of science; competition and cooperation would work together at both individual and organizational levels to create a dynamic and self-regulating system orientated towards increased efficiency and growth of knowledge by means of creative destruction.
Modern science may be over-funded overall, and the pattern of funding sub-optimal
Kealey’s book provokes me to further speculation.
In Kealy’s world of mostly-private funding of science it seems possible, or likely, that the total quantity of private funding for science would differ significantly from the current level of state funding.
In other words, government might – according to circumstances – either be over-funding or under-funding science overall. Furthermore, it is likely that the pattern of state funding of science (i.e. the distribution of funding between specialties) would be different from the spontaneous outcome of a private system of funding.
Indeed, lacking a market, hence lacking ‘price’ signals, it may not be possible to know – even in principle – whether a system such as science was optimally-funded [17] and [18]. From a ‘systems theory’ perspective, it could be argued that a private (‘market’) system of funding would be able to reach a more efficient volume and distribution of funding for science than could centralized decision-making [19].
If science was under-funded by government, the spontaneous tendency would be for private funding to move-in to fill the gaps where needed. But science could be chronically under-funded if private companies and patrons were legislatively-prevented or financially-deterred from spending money on science. Or science may be blocked by political, religious or ethical considerations – especially in totalitarian societies. And even in liberal democracies, scientific research may become so hemmed-around with regulations, restrictions or potential legal pitfalls as to prevent, or at least deter, private spending.
Alternatively, or at the same time as there is chronic under-funding in some areas, other areas of science could be chronically over-funded by the government, especially if government spending was driven by political rather than scientific objectives, as described above. Indeed, my guess is that medical science is currently over-funded in the US, UK and Western Europe [7], because medical research is used as a way of government gathering voter support by spending public money to show that it ‘cares’.
And overall over-funding of scientific research may tend to be self-sustaining if it creates a bigger and more powerful interest group to lobby in favour of continued over-funding. This interest group would extend beyond scientific researchers to embrace universities and the science communications media.
If science was indeed over-funded by government, then there would be a decline in funding under private provision. Add to this the inevitable reallocation of funding between different branches of science which would result for any change in the funding mechanism, and these threats will mobilize interest groups to resist change – even when such change would be beneficial overall and in the long-term.
Of course, it is very likely that a private funding system would open-up many new areas of science that are currently starved of support; however, these areas of science (precisely because they have been starved!) currently lack any incumbents who might lobby for such policy changes.
So normal ‘interest politics’, politics as usual, will usually tend to prevent radical change to the scientific research funding allocation procedures – except when change benefits the most powerful incumbents.
Five (bad) reasons why Kealey’s analysis will be ignored (especially if correct)
I believe that Terence Kealey is generally correct in his analysis and arguments. However, I am pessimistic about the prospects for these ideas getting serious consideration.
There are at least five powerful aspects of mainstream scientific thinking which make it probable that the arguments will be ignored:
1. There is now a long-established dependency culture of science. Scientists find it hard even to imagine a world without quasi-monopolistic government funding of science.
2. This dependency culture of science has for decades been attracting into the profession a risk-averse and uncompetitive type of scientist who prefers the mediocre conditions and job-security of working under bureaucratic supervision to the freer and more meritocratic – but harsher and less predictable – world of ‘creative destruction’ associated with markets and private funding.
3. There is, I believe a covert suspicion among many scientists that science in the US, UK and Western Europe may be over-funded, and therefore, that any shift to a more efficient and effective mode of supporting science privately would lead (overall) to a significant cull of scientists and ‘down-sizing’ of scientific research organizations.
4. The current scientific leadership has evolved a cozy, collusive and mutually-beneficial relationship with government; and this would be threatened if there was a significant diminution of state support for science. For instance, in the UK the Royal Society gets more than two thirds of its income direct from the UK government. Senior personnel migrate back and forth between science and the civil service. A major change towards private funding would bring the potential for a major loss of power and prestige for many powerful figures in science administration.
5. Combining all the above points – if science funding was reformed, things would get worse before they got better. Creative destruction may be the way that the world improves; but, since destruction comes before creation, blame for early damage is almost inevitably allocated with greater surety than credit for later benefits. Those responsible for policies that trigger short-term harm to science and scientists will therefore, be subject to the certainty of immediate vilification and the possibility of an enduring negative reputation. These are major reasons for bad government everywhere and at all times.
In sum, sensible reform of science funding away from quasi-monopolistic government support and towards a multitude of private sources will probably have to wait until, eventually, some desperate crisis will force the appropriate action.
References
[1] T. Kealey, Sex, science and profits: how people evolved to make money, William Heinemann, London (2008) p. 455.
[2] H. Cronin, The ant and the peacock: altruism and sexual selection from Darwin to today, Cambridge University Press, New York, UK (1993).
[3] G. Miller, The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature, Heinemann, Oxford, UK (2000).
[4] D.M. Buss, The evolution of desire: strategies of human mating, Basic Books, New York (1994).
[5] Wikipedia. Invisible College. (accessed 12.09.08).
[6] R. Allen, Polanyi, Claridge Press, London (1990).
[7] B.G. Charlton, Boom or bubble? Is medical research thriving or about to crash?, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 1–2.
[8] J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, Allen and Unwin, London (1954).
[9] P. Ormerod, Why most things fail: evolution, extinction and economics, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, USA (2007).
[10] B. Magee, Popper, Collins, London (1973).
[11] J. Bronowski, The ascent of man, BBC, London (1983).
[12] Wikipedia. Research Assessment Exercise. (accessed 12.09.08).
[13] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Evaluating universities using simple scientometric research-output metrics: total citation counts per university for a retrospective seven-year rolling sample, Science and Public Policy 34 (2007), pp. 555–563.
[14] M. Friedman, Capitalism and freedom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1963).
[15] D. Joravsky, The Lysenko affair, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (1970).
[16] Charlton BG. Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’. Medical Hypotheses 2008;71:625-8.
[17] T. Sowell, Knowledge and decisions, Basic Books, New York (1980).
[18] F.A. von Hayek, The fatal conceit, Routledge, London (1988).
[19] B. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
Invisible colleges, private patronage and commercial profits versus public goods, government funding and ‘crowding-out’: Terence Kealey on the motivations and incentives driving science
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; Volume 72, Pages 111-115
***
Summary
What kind of a thing is science and how does it work? [Kealey T. Sex, science and profits: In a recent book (Sex, science and profits: how people evolved to make money. London: William Heinemann; 2008) (p. 455)] Terence Kealey argues persuasively that the motivations driving science are widely misunderstood. Science is often assumed to be useful to the public but an economic loser for the scientist and his or her paymasters – in other words, science is supposed to be a ‘public good’. The public good argument is used to support large-scale government funding of science, on the basis that if government does not fund science it will not be funded adequately. But Kealey argues that most science is profitable to commercial organizations, and other types of worthwhile science will be supported by private patronage. Yet excessive government funding tends to ‘crowd-out’ potential private sources of funding – both by replacing and by deterring private investment. And scientists are not primarily motivated by money, but instead by striving for status within the ‘invisible college’ of active researchers in their field. Kealey’s take-home message is that overall and in the long-term, science neither requires nor benefits from government funding. Scientific research would be better-served by private funding from commercial organizations that are seeking profit, combined with patronage from charities and foundations that regard science as intrinsically valuable.
***
What kind of a thing is science and how does it work? In a recent book [1] – tightly packed with insights, evidence and jokes – Terence Kealey argues persuasively that the motivations driving science are widely misunderstood. Kealey suggests that the major motivation for scientists is to attain status within the ‘invisible college’ of active researchers in their field. So powerful is this motivation that scientists routinely subsidise their work from their own pockets.
Science is often assumed to be useful to the public but an economic loser for the scientist and his or her paymasters – in other words, science is supposed to be a ‘public good’. The public good argument is used to support large-scale government funding of science, on the basis that if government does not fund science it will not be funded adequately. But Kealey argues that most science is profitable to commercial organizations, and other worthwhile types of science will be supported by private patronage.
Yet excessive government funding tends to ‘crowd-out’ potential private sources of funding – both by replacing and by deterring private investment. Kealey’s take-home message is that science neither requires, nor benefits from, government funding; but that over the long-term science would be better-served by private funding by commercial organizations that are seeking profit combined with patronage by charities and foundations that regard science as intrinsically valuable.
Status motivates scientists
Although, like almost everyone else, scientists need income (and would prefer to have more of it), scientists are not ‘in it for the money’. Instead, scientists are ‘in it for the status’ – specifically the esteem of the peer group of scientists actively working in the same field.
The ‘sex’ element in the book’s title explains this, since it refers to sexual selection [2] and [3]. Sexual selection provides the ultimate evolutionary explanation as to the human motivation to seek status, because status is attractive – especially male status is attractive to females [4]. Science can be seen as one of many competitive social systems which harnesses and puts-to-good-use the human craving for prestige within a social group.
If scientists are primarily motivated by the desire for status rather than money, then this predicts that they will risk or sacrifice money to achieve scientific status. And this can often be observed – much scientific activity (e.g. computer, book and stationary purchases; journal subscriptions; conference attendance; media appearances; advice and consultancy; even postgraduate training) is funded to some extent from scientists’ own pockets or done in their private time.
In one of numerous witty and telling asides, Kealey comments that in economic terms virtually all science publishing is a type of ‘vanity publishing’ (a term usually reserved for the self-publication of slim volumes of verse) – since scientific papers are published at best with no monetary reward, and more often at significant monetary loss. Authors are prepared to pay when this helps to disseminate their research and scholarship: examples of ‘pay-to-publish’ journals are legion and include Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), PLoS Medicine, and indeed Medical Hypotheses.
Tacit knowledge and the invisible college
The group within which a scientist seeks status is termed an ‘invisible college’ [5] Wikipedia. Invisible College.
But the invisible college is not about giving-away information to all-and-sundry; the invisible college is specifically about trading information for mutual benefit. And the trading of knowledge is a matter of enlightened self-interest – in the long-term a group who share knowledge will out-perform those who do not share. However, the fact that an invisible college is based on trade means that participants must have something to trade which is valued by the other members of the college. Those with no useful knowledge to trade are excluded from the college.
One of the types of information which is traded in science is ‘tacit knowledge’ (the term comes from the philosopher and scientist Michael Polanyi [6]). In science tacit knowledge includes a great deal of unpublished, and probably un-publishable, knowledge about the skills and minutiae of doing science – the kind of thing that can only be learnt from direct personal apprenticeship – for example during a Ph.D. It is tacit knowledge which is learned by personal conversation, or lab visits, and by working alongside experts – for example in discovering and dealing-with raw data.
So, there is a substantial cost attached to membership of an invisible college. The cost involves attaining sufficient expertise to participate in college communications; and on top of that there is the effort required to generate new knowledge or skills which can be traded: i.e. the possession of knowledge or skills for which other scientists are willing to trade their own tacit knowledge.
The trading of knowledge depends on trust – the greater the level of trust the more extended and complex can be the networks of mutually-beneficial information exchange. But if trust is betrayed so that valid and useful information flows only one way, then the benefits of trade become merely one-sided and ultimately trade breaks-down [7]. And trust must be earned, which is another reason for the exclusivity of invisible colleges. Those who have not yet proved themselves trustworthy, or who have behaved in an untrustworthy manner, will not get access to tacit knowledge.
To what extent is copying a problem?
It is easy enough to acknowledge the workings of invisible colleges in non-commercial research, but Kealey emphasizes how exactly the same mechanisms support scientific research in the commercial, profit-seeking, sector. He argues that, far from being secretive, competitors in the private sector share their scientific knowledge – for the same self-interested reasons as in the non-profit sector: that those who share knowledge out-perform those who do not. However, private firms are selective concerning whom their knowledge is shared-with, and there must be trust in reciprocity. And most relevant and useful knowledge is either highly technical or tacit, and therefore, either incomprehensible or inaccessible to those outside the invisible college.
It is generally assumed that the major problem for commercial science is the danger of copying, whereby a commercial rival takes the benefits of innovation without paying the cost of development. Of course, in one sense, copying is the basis of human progress, the mechanism by which improvements spread from their originator. Unless there was copying there would be no general benefit. So, the real problem is attaining a balance between the public benefits of copying and the need for the originator to have an incentive to innovate. Copying is good, but there should also be the probability of a sufficient reward for the originator.
The question is what form this reward should take. Since scientists are primarily seeking status within the invisible college, they often welcome copying – so long as the innovator gets personal credit for having the original idea. In other words, since scientists are primarily motivated by status rather than money, it is logical that their rewards should primarily be in the currency of prestige rather than cash. From this ‘pure’ science perspective, plagiarism – i.e. copying without giving credit to the source – is a problem; but copying with credit is actually in itself a reward because it confers status.
But Kealey emphasizes that even in commercial business situations copying is not such a big problem as is sometimes imagined. The reason is that copying is usually costly: very costly. Copying takes both time and considerable money. Furthermore copying involves other scarce and valuable resources too, because a firm which is set-up to copy its rivals must support a high level of scientific expertise in order that they can detect and understand potentially-useful innovations as well as doing the actual copying and production.
In other words, although apparently ‘free’ and seldom kept secret, scientific knowledge is in fact comprehensible and usable by only a small and highly-trained elite group. Relevant tacit knowledge (without which explicit knowledge can seldom be exploited) is a kind of ‘secret ingredient’ that is extremely costly to acquire because it is usually only traded for equally valuable tacit knowledge – and this keeps it within the exclusive confines of the trust-based invisible college.
Kealey suggests that it is the intrinsic difficulty of copying, rather than ‘intellectual property rights’ such as patents, which are the significant factors in protecting the monopoly of innovators, allowing them to profit from their innovations and thereby providing the motivation for innovation.
If so, then the major commercial advantage of innovation is to gain the ‘first mover advantage’ in monopolizing a market niche: the temporary monopoly situation that exists before rivals are able to mobilize production, distribution and marketing of their copies. As a consequence Kealey suggests that patents are usually a bad thing all-round, both for the public and the patenter.
(There are exceptions in rare and specific circumstances where there is a long and expensive investment to generate a product which is relatively quick and cheap to copy – such as the pharmaceutical industry.)
An example of patents harming the public is James Watt’s steam engine patent, which held-back progress in the field for several decades. Furthermore patents can also distract innovators from the primary requirement rapidly to exploit their first mover advantage, and to continue seeking further innovations. An example of patents harming the patenter is the Wright brothers Wilbur and Orville, who invented the first functional aeroplane; but squandered prodigious time, energy and money in trying (and usually failing) to defend their patents.
If this is correct, and the argument seems plausible, then there needs to be a radical reappraisal of the current trend progressively to extend the scope and duration of intellectual property rights – especially copyright. If the aim is to benefit the public, probably we ought to be experimenting with narrowing the scope of patenting, and progressive shortening of the allowed duration of copyright and patents in most intellectual fields.
Government funding and ‘crowding-out’
By describing a range of powerful economic and personal motivations to do science, Kealey is arguing the falsity of the common conceptualization of science as a public good requiring government funding. His idea is that ‘self-interest’ of various types (individual and institutional) would ensure that enough science of the right kind was funded without need for government intervention.
Furthermore Kealey suggests that increasing government funding of science may not lead to greater funding overall, because state support ‘crowds out’ and deters private funding, leading to excess dependence on government funding and the damaging politicization of science.
It is extremely important to be aware of, and to recognize, the possibility of crowding-out of private by state investment in science. Because those of us who live in the developed world are used to prodigious and rising levels of government funding for science – doubling in real terms about every 15 years for science overall [1] and with even more rapid growth (doubling about every decade) for medical science [7]. Kealey provides evidence that such expansion of government funding crowds out private funding in science. Crowding-out means that in practice (although not necessarily by intention) private funding usually declines as government funding increases until science becomes de facto almost a public monopoly.
Of course, most people assume that government funding will cause crowding-in to science – in other words they hope that the more money which government spends, the more private money will be attracted to the field. Kealey’s example of crowding-in occurs in road transportation when the government builts a new road with free usage, and private individuals then buy more cars to use the improved facility.
But the evidence suggests that increasing government funding of science usually crowds out private funding, leading – for instance – to reduced corporate investment in research and development (and Kealey emphasizes that R&D really is an investment, making a significant contribution to organizational profitability). The more that government funding increases, the more that private funding declines. Possible reasons for crowding-out the private sector include state money being used to substitute for private research funding, and the general reduction in competition between rival firms which is often explicitly encouraged by government policy.
Another factor in the phenomenon of government funding crowding-out private funding is, I suspect, probably related to science being a status-oriented activity. Where government provides the lion’s share of funding then government will take the lion’s share of status. Because status is a zero-sum game, if one party gets a larger share of prestige then this leaves less prestige for everyone else. There is little incentive for private patrons to engage in funding science if government then claims most of the credit for the achievements of science – so discriminating patrons will look elsewhere to gain prestige for allocating their support.
Creative destruction
Governments often believe that competition is harmful, in science as elsewhere, and they instead try to encourage cooperation. But Kealey agrees with Joseph Schumpeter’s general economic schema of capitalism as powered-by ‘creative destruction’ – an interpretation which emphasizes the value of competition in driving innovation, and innovation in promoting economic growth [8].
According to Schumpeter, the main driving force of capitalism is that companies compete to gain then retain monopoly. Entrepreneurs continuously pursue innovation and where this is successful the price of failure paid by commercial rivals may be extinction (i.e. destruction). Failure is intrinsic to the dynamic of success [9]. Incumbent monopolists are forced to seek innovation by the credible threat of rival entrepreneurs ‘snapping at their heels’ by generating innovations intended to take away their markets.
This destruction of commercial firms is termed ‘creative’ because in the long-term it allows better allocation of resources – innovation can only thrive at the expense of discarding the obsolete. A few hundred years ago some 90% of the UK population were engaged in growing food, now the proportion working in agriculture is less than 1%, and the other 89% of the ex-farm-labouring population have (forcibly) liberated to perform a multitude of other economic activities.
The destruction of agriculture as the dominant mode of employment was therefore, creative in the sense that it enabled a massive reallocation of manpower with an increase in productivity (economic output per person), and therefore, creative destruction of agriculture promoted economic growth. Failure in one area was necessary to success in another. Specific short-term suffering (e.g. reduced income among newly unemployed farm labourers) was intrinsic to the general long-term benefits (e.g. increased income spread among everyone, including the grandchildren of the unemployed farm labourers).
Creative destruction is, of course, also a feature of science: new theories displace the old and the destruction of old ideas is necessary in order to liberate resources to invest in new science. Karl Popper’s philosophy of science could, indeed, be regarded as an equivalent process to Schumpeter’s creative destruction in the economy [10]. Example are legion: the decline of astrology entailed by the creation of astronomy, the extinction of alchemy and the reallocation of effort into chemistry, the replacement of classical physics by relativity and quantum theory [11].
The progress of science generally and in the long-term is attainable only at the cost of specific and short-term destruction – e.g. of the reputations and livelihoods of scientists working in fields which have been superseded.
Political corruption of science by excessive government influence
Because expanding government support of science usually results in crowding-out of private support, the state tends to become a monopoly supplier of science. Government funding agencies then shape the direction of scientific research, and government thereby gains an unhealthy degree of control. Essentially, the systems of government and science fuse to form a single hybrid system of politicized science – i.e. science that promotes government interests.
At the end-point of decades of crowding-out, all kinds of pathologies of science have now emerged, although they are often taken for granted and hardly noticed. For example, in the UK, government-funded science is often regarded (especially by other government agencies) as having intrinsically higher prestige than privately-funded science. This principle has been formalized in some UK state-administered university research evaluation mechanisms (RAE – [12]) where extra credit was given to funding from government agencies (in my opinion credit should only have been given for scientific output, and not for input measures such as funding [13]).
Another almost inevitable effect of government funding is inefficiency [7]. As science becomes more like a monopolistic ‘nationalized industry’ there are the usual problems of excessive yet still-growing bureaucracy. Many economists recognize as a general principle that government provision is only about half as efficient (in terms of outputs per input, and controlling for quality) as the private sector [14].
Science funding may be used to pursue political, not scientific, goals. For example government may shift funding towards what are perceived as vote-winning causes that are likely to attract votes such as the ‘war on’ cancer, or special attention on AIDS, breast cancer or other diseases. The special government attention may or may not be scientifically or medically justifiable – but the reason for extra funding is primarily political. Or political parties may deploy large-scale research facilities to specific geographic regions as a reward for political support. Or parties may ‘buy’ the support of scientists by (in effect) bribing them with extra grants and salaries, or blackmailing scientists with the (credible) threat of bribe-withdrawal if the opposition party gets power.
And having crowded-out significant private funding from science, government may then shape the emphasis of science strategy so that they build-up science and scientific perspectives which bolster their political views while simultaneously starving-out science that is hostile to the governing ethos. The most notorious example of this was Stalin’s support of ‘Lysenkoism’ in the mid-twentieth century USSR and the persecution of biologists who adhered to Darwin’s theory of natural selection [15]. A similar phenomenon (usually minus the violence) can be seen in the way that IQ research has been marginalized by government policy in the US and UK [16].
Large-scale and long-term government funding of science creates economic and psychological dependence on the state. It is this pervasive dependency culture which makes Kealey’s message so alarming and unacceptable to most scientists.
A vision of diverse private science funding
Kealey’s ideal is a world in which government funding of science has dwindled to insignificant levels, and science is mainly funded by a mixture of private commerce and private patronage.
Commercial organizations would be motivated to do science by the bottom-line of profit; because pursuing continued innovation and supporting science is the only way they can have access to the invisible college of information (including tacit knowledge) upon which their continued competitiveness depends.
In the absence of crowding-out by government funding, substantial further science patronage would come from private research foundations and charities of many types, who would fund diverse branches of science simply because they value that science and like to support it – just as foundations and charities support the arts, sports, religions and numerous other good causes. This altruistic motivation is helped by the fact that supporting science is, in general, a prestigious thing to do.
Scientists are motivated to work mainly by the desire for enhanced status within their invisible college – which ensures competition; they are also motivated to trade their knowledge (i.e. cooperate) by the advantages this brings to their competitive pursuit of scientific knowledge. For these reasons scientists will spontaneously self-organize into exclusive and elite invisible colleges or communities of reciprocal trust for mutual benefit.
So, in a world of negligible state funding of science; competition and cooperation would work together at both individual and organizational levels to create a dynamic and self-regulating system orientated towards increased efficiency and growth of knowledge by means of creative destruction.
Modern science may be over-funded overall, and the pattern of funding sub-optimal
Kealey’s book provokes me to further speculation.
In Kealy’s world of mostly-private funding of science it seems possible, or likely, that the total quantity of private funding for science would differ significantly from the current level of state funding.
In other words, government might – according to circumstances – either be over-funding or under-funding science overall. Furthermore, it is likely that the pattern of state funding of science (i.e. the distribution of funding between specialties) would be different from the spontaneous outcome of a private system of funding.
Indeed, lacking a market, hence lacking ‘price’ signals, it may not be possible to know – even in principle – whether a system such as science was optimally-funded [17] and [18]. From a ‘systems theory’ perspective, it could be argued that a private (‘market’) system of funding would be able to reach a more efficient volume and distribution of funding for science than could centralized decision-making [19].
If science was under-funded by government, the spontaneous tendency would be for private funding to move-in to fill the gaps where needed. But science could be chronically under-funded if private companies and patrons were legislatively-prevented or financially-deterred from spending money on science. Or science may be blocked by political, religious or ethical considerations – especially in totalitarian societies. And even in liberal democracies, scientific research may become so hemmed-around with regulations, restrictions or potential legal pitfalls as to prevent, or at least deter, private spending.
Alternatively, or at the same time as there is chronic under-funding in some areas, other areas of science could be chronically over-funded by the government, especially if government spending was driven by political rather than scientific objectives, as described above. Indeed, my guess is that medical science is currently over-funded in the US, UK and Western Europe [7], because medical research is used as a way of government gathering voter support by spending public money to show that it ‘cares’.
And overall over-funding of scientific research may tend to be self-sustaining if it creates a bigger and more powerful interest group to lobby in favour of continued over-funding. This interest group would extend beyond scientific researchers to embrace universities and the science communications media.
If science was indeed over-funded by government, then there would be a decline in funding under private provision. Add to this the inevitable reallocation of funding between different branches of science which would result for any change in the funding mechanism, and these threats will mobilize interest groups to resist change – even when such change would be beneficial overall and in the long-term.
Of course, it is very likely that a private funding system would open-up many new areas of science that are currently starved of support; however, these areas of science (precisely because they have been starved!) currently lack any incumbents who might lobby for such policy changes.
So normal ‘interest politics’, politics as usual, will usually tend to prevent radical change to the scientific research funding allocation procedures – except when change benefits the most powerful incumbents.
Five (bad) reasons why Kealey’s analysis will be ignored (especially if correct)
I believe that Terence Kealey is generally correct in his analysis and arguments. However, I am pessimistic about the prospects for these ideas getting serious consideration.
There are at least five powerful aspects of mainstream scientific thinking which make it probable that the arguments will be ignored:
1. There is now a long-established dependency culture of science. Scientists find it hard even to imagine a world without quasi-monopolistic government funding of science.
2. This dependency culture of science has for decades been attracting into the profession a risk-averse and uncompetitive type of scientist who prefers the mediocre conditions and job-security of working under bureaucratic supervision to the freer and more meritocratic – but harsher and less predictable – world of ‘creative destruction’ associated with markets and private funding.
3. There is, I believe a covert suspicion among many scientists that science in the US, UK and Western Europe may be over-funded, and therefore, that any shift to a more efficient and effective mode of supporting science privately would lead (overall) to a significant cull of scientists and ‘down-sizing’ of scientific research organizations.
4. The current scientific leadership has evolved a cozy, collusive and mutually-beneficial relationship with government; and this would be threatened if there was a significant diminution of state support for science. For instance, in the UK the Royal Society gets more than two thirds of its income direct from the UK government. Senior personnel migrate back and forth between science and the civil service. A major change towards private funding would bring the potential for a major loss of power and prestige for many powerful figures in science administration.
5. Combining all the above points – if science funding was reformed, things would get worse before they got better. Creative destruction may be the way that the world improves; but, since destruction comes before creation, blame for early damage is almost inevitably allocated with greater surety than credit for later benefits. Those responsible for policies that trigger short-term harm to science and scientists will therefore, be subject to the certainty of immediate vilification and the possibility of an enduring negative reputation. These are major reasons for bad government everywhere and at all times.
In sum, sensible reform of science funding away from quasi-monopolistic government support and towards a multitude of private sources will probably have to wait until, eventually, some desperate crisis will force the appropriate action.
References
[1] T. Kealey, Sex, science and profits: how people evolved to make money, William Heinemann, London (2008) p. 455.
[2] H. Cronin, The ant and the peacock: altruism and sexual selection from Darwin to today, Cambridge University Press, New York, UK (1993).
[3] G. Miller, The mating mind: how sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature, Heinemann, Oxford, UK (2000).
[4] D.M. Buss, The evolution of desire: strategies of human mating, Basic Books, New York (1994).
[5] Wikipedia. Invisible College.
[6] R. Allen, Polanyi, Claridge Press, London (1990).
[7] B.G. Charlton, Boom or bubble? Is medical research thriving or about to crash?, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 1–2.
[8] J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, Allen and Unwin, London (1954).
[9] P. Ormerod, Why most things fail: evolution, extinction and economics, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, USA (2007).
[10] B. Magee, Popper, Collins, London (1973).
[11] J. Bronowski, The ascent of man, BBC, London (1983).
[12] Wikipedia. Research Assessment Exercise.
[13] B.G. Charlton and P. Andras, Evaluating universities using simple scientometric research-output metrics: total citation counts per university for a retrospective seven-year rolling sample, Science and Public Policy 34 (2007), pp. 555–563.
[14] M. Friedman, Capitalism and freedom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1963).
[15] D. Joravsky, The Lysenko affair, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA (1970).
[16] Charlton BG. Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – an example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’. Medical Hypotheses 2008;71:625-8.
[17] T. Sowell, Knowledge and decisions, Basic Books, New York (1980).
[18] F.A. von Hayek, The fatal conceit, Routledge, London (1988).
[19] B. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
Sunday, 30 November 2008
Sub-types of depression and self-treatment
A model for self-treatment of four sub-types of symptomatic ‘depression’ using non-prescription agents: Neuroticism (anxiety and emotional instability); malaise (fatigue and painful symptoms); demotivation (anhedonia) and seasonal affective disorder ‘SAD’
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; 72: 1-7
Summary
This article will present a model for how ‘depression’ (i.e. depressive symptoms) can be divided into four self-diagnosed sub-types or causes which might then be self-treated using agents available without prescription. (Another, much rarer, cause of depressed symptoms is the classical illness of ‘melancholia’, which when severe cannot be self-treated and typically requires hospitalization.) A self-management option and alternative is now needed due to the an inappropriate emphasis of modern psychiatry on treatment of imprecise syndromal ‘disorders’ which may entail treating ‘depression’ at the cost of making the patient feel and function worse. By contrast, the basic theoretical stance of self-management is that depressed mood should be seen as a result of unpleasant symptoms – and it is the symptoms that require treatment, not the mood itself. Furthermore, drugs (or other interventions) need to be classified in terms of their potential therapeutic effects on these symptoms that may cause depressed mood. The four common causes of depressed mood considered here are the personality trait of Neuroticism; the state of malaise (fatigue, aching etc) which accompanies an illness with an activated immune system; demotivation due to lack of positive emotions (anhedonia); and the syndrome of seasonal affective disorder (SAD). Each of the four sub-types is then ‘matched’ with a first–line non-prescription agent. The ‘stabilizing’ agents such as St John’s Wort and the antihistamines chlorpheniramine and diphenhydramine are used for treatment of Neuroticism; analgesics/pain killers such as aspirin, ibuprofen, paracetamol/acetaminophen and the opiates are used to treat malaise; energizing agents such as caffeine and nicotine are used for the treatment of demotivation; and bright light used in the early morning to treat SAD. Self-treatments are intended to be used after research and experimentally, on a trial-and-error basis; with self-monitoring of beneficial and harmful effects, and a willingness to stop and switch treatments. The model of S-DTM (self-diagnosis, self-treatment and self–monitoring) is suggested as potentially applicable more widely within psychiatry and medicine.
***
Introduction
‘Depressive disorder’ and ‘anti-depressant’ are categories that should be discarded
Imprecise diagnosis and treatment of depression
Self-diagnosis by introspection – the ‘phenomenological’ approach
The self-diagnosis, -treatment and- monitoring (S-DTM) model [4] treating depressed mood pharmacologically
Introduction
‘Depressive disorder’ and ‘anti-depressant’ are categories that should be discarded
The gross imprecision of the diagnosis of ‘depression’ has become farcical in recent decades, when the supposed prevalence of ‘depression’ has risen from a fraction of a percent by about a hundred-fold to anything from ten to twenty-five percent [1] and [2]. Nowadays, any person suffering a persistent unpleasant emotional state may be officially diagnosable as depressed, and treated with drugs termed ‘anti-depressants’.
I have previously argued that the disease category of mood (affective) disorder called depression is neither coherent nor useful; and instead it would be preferable to regard ‘depressed mood’ as secondary to a variety of unpleasant emotional states [3]. In other words, depressed mood should be seen as caused by symptoms and emotions – for example anxiety, fatigue or lack of positive emotions (anhedonia) can all lead to depressed mood. Diagnosis and treatment of ‘depression’ should therefore be focused on the emotional states which cause depressed mood, and not upon treating a vaguely-defined – hence over-inclusive – syndrome termed ‘depressive disorder’. In principle there might be an unbounded number of causes of negative, depressed states of unhappiness – in practice, I will focus upon four which are apparently amenable to improvement by therapeutic intervention.
I have also argued that the term ‘anti-depressant’ should not be used, since there are no drugs which have a general action to alleviate depressed mood: what the effective drugs are really doing is to alleviate the causes of depressed mood [3]. There are a variety of different drugs types which can alleviate some symptoms that may lead to depressive symptoms in some people. For example, when anxiety is causing depressed mood then any drug which reduces anxiety (including alcohol, neuroleptics/antipsychotics, benzodiazepines or selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors – SSRIs) may all (for a while) alleviate ’depression’. But when a person’s depressed mood is not caused by anxiety then these same drugs could be ineffective or may actually worsen the depressed mood.
I believe that a self-management option and alternative [4] is now urgently needed (at least in the UK and USA) due to the incorrect and counter-productive theoretical stance of modern psychiatry [3], the corruption of modern psychiatry by industrial and political influences [2], and the inappropriate emphasis of modern psychiatry on treatment of syndromal ‘disorders’ [3] and [4]. This focus on syndromes may lead modern psychiatrists to treat ‘depression’ at the cost of making the patient feel and function worse [5]
This is the rationale and justification for the following article, which represents a personal view – speculative and tentative – of a possible future for psychopharmacology in psychiatry, specifically in relation to negative symptoms of ‘depression’ such as sadness unhappiness, lack of motivation, long-term miserable anxiety, unpleasant mood swings and the inability to feel happiness. My hope is that these ideas are sufficiently accurate and valid to be useful and applicable – but also that they will stimulate discussion and serve as a basis for a process of evolution and improvement.
By extension, this general model of self-diagnosis, self-treatment and self-monitoring (S-DTM) could potentially be extended to other areas of psychiatry and medicine in which symptoms are the focus and where effective treatments are available without prescription. Indeed, as well as being used to alleviate negative states, the model is also applicable to lifestyle/quality of life enhancement [3] and [5].
Imprecise diagnosis and treatment of depression
I believe that, one the one hand, the treatment of depression can be more specific and effective than at present; but on the other hand it is also correct that the psychoactive drugs are all imprecise in their effects, and in particular tend to affect different people differently. This means that psychiatric treatment (whether self-treatment or treatment by professionals) is almost inevitably a trial-and-error matter, and should be embarked-upon in an experimental spirit.
Psychiatric drugs (and also some other psychiatric interventions such as electroconvulsive therapy and perhaps bright light) tend to be non-specific in relation to traditional diagnostic syndromes [3]. Different categories of drugs such as ‘antidepressants’ and the neuroleptics/antipsychotics often have over-lapping therapeutic effects, side effects and indications – mainly because many of the most-used drugs were chemically-developed from a relatively small number of coloured dyes which were initially made into antihistamines during the 1940s then further modified over the following decades to make the neuroleptic/antipsychotics, tricyclic and SSRI antidepressants [1], [6] and [7].
So, drug recommendations for symptomatic treatment in psychiatry are mainly about suggesting which drug to try first. There needs to be an attitude of trial-and-error; with self-monitoring of the effects of treatment, willingness to change to stop treatment or change to another treatment if the first choice has undesirable side effects or is apparently ineffective.
With these cautions in place, I see no compelling reason why people should not self-treat for psychiatric symptoms using drugs which are available ‘over the counter’ and without prescription. After all, in a country such as the UK or the USA people in their tens of millions already self-treat for headaches and back pains, constipation and diarrhoea, runny noses and blocked noses, hay fever and eczema, high cholesterol, skin infections and duodenal ulcers. And in a world where it is common to assert that anything up to half the population have significant psychiatric symptoms of some sort (e.g. depression, anxiety states, various phobias and compulsions, insomnia) then self-treatment become a practical necessity.
Furthermore, I suggest that symptomatic self-treatment for ‘depression’, when done by careful and informed people, might well be superior to the average treatment on offer from psychiatric professionals. The main constraint is the limited range of drugs available without prescription (especially, see below, in the case of demotivated depression); but this restrictive public policy may change over time or be circumvented by the increased ease of purchasing pharmacological agents without prescription.
Self-diagnosis by introspection – the ‘phenomenological’ approach
The process by which self-diagnosis may be accomplished requires some elucidation. I have previously termed the sequence S-DTM – meaning Self-Diagnosis, self-Treatment and self–Monitoring. The aim is to introduce to self-management a helpful degree of thoroughness and formalization to make the process both safer and more effective than unstructured self-management.
The first step involves developing self-awareness of symptoms. The word ‘phenomenology’ refers to the process of introspection or inward-looking by which a person can become aware of their inner, subjective states – psychiatric symptoms are one of the body states which may be accessible to such introspection [3], [8] and [9]. To self-diagnose by introspection requires a skill which may be unfamiliar. For example, it is possible to be anxious but unaware of the anxiety [10] and [11]. To become aware of anxiety as a feeling, a person needs to be able to identify their own state of mental angst, muscular tension, rapidly beating heart, sweatiness, ‘butterflies in the stomach’ and so on.
Furthermore, inner states must be identified in terms of a system of classification – because body sensations tend to be experienced as formless and undividedly ’holistic’ unless there is a systematic classification which can describe them. Without some such analytic scheme, it may not be possible for someone to be aware of, and to express even to themselves, much more than a simple dichotomy of feeling either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Self-treatment, however, requires that different types of ‘feeling bad’ can be distinguished and identified.
In terms of ‘depression’ – the process begins with recognition of a depressed mood, in other words a negative or unpleasant mood state which could be characterized by some kind of unhappiness. Then there is a further introspective process by which the sufferer tries to identify some inner physical, bodily state which may be the main cause of this unhappiness. The assumption is that if this causal symptom can be alleviated or eliminated then the person may become happier.
Happiness is not necessarily entailed by removing the cause of unhappiness, but it is easier and more probable that a currently-unhappy person will become happy if they are relieved of unpleasant symptoms. For example, it is hard to be happy when suffering a headache and relief of the headache may therefore cause a person to become happy who would otherwise have remained miserable.
More exactly, there is an attempt to match-up inner states against a pre-determined classification. Four body states which may cause unhappiness include emotional instability with anxiety (Neuroticism); fatigue and bodily aches and pains (malaise); lack of emotion – especially loss of the ability to anticipate future pleasures (demotivated depression); and sleepy, hungry, irritable mood specifically during the winter season (SAD).
Having identified a particular aversive body state as a probable cause of depressed mood, this symptom is then made the focus for self-treatment; and the symptom is monitored for its response to treatment. A treatment agent or mode is selected as being both safe and potentially able to alleviate the specific symptom, and a trial of this treatment is made. So, if the symptom underlying depressed mood is identified as anxiety and unstable emotions then stabilizing drug is chosen (such as St John’s Wort or chlorpheniramine – see below); and the symptom is monitored to see whether it responds to this treatment.
The self-diagnosis, -treatment and- monitoring (S-DTM) model [4] treating depressed mood pharmacologically
Self-diagnosis
1. Recognition of a depressed, unhappy, low mood.
2. Introspective self–diagnosis of the sub-type of symptomatic and emotional cause of depressed mood.
3. Matching the symptoms and emotions to one of the four sub-types of ‘depression’.
4. Matching the sub-type of depression to the drug class which is most likely to alleviate those symptoms and emotions.
5. Researching the scientific literature on the effects, side effects and possible interactions of the drug class – and choose a (probably) safe first-line agent.
Self-treatment
6. Begin trial of treatment.
Self-monitoring
7. Very careful monitoring for effects and side effects for the first 4 hours after taking the agent, and continued vigilance for several days. Keep a record. (e.g. Consider self-monitoring blood pressure when using psychostimulant type drugs.)
8. If immediate problems of side effects or feeling worse after taking a drug, consider stopping immediately – or continue with vigilant self-monitoring.
9. If no benefit at all after a few days consider increasing dose or stopping and trying another agent.
10. If side effects are bad, or there is concern over dependence, or if unsure about whether or not the drug is having benefit, or if wanting to stop taking the drug; consider stopping the drug and self-monitoring the result of stopping – then consider restarting and monitor the results of restarting.
11. Go through the process for each new drug tried. Avoid interactions between the drug stopped and a new one started, and between multiple agents.
Four sub-types of self-treatable depression
I will consider four sub-type causes of depressed mood (’depressive disorder’) which may be suitable for self-treatment: these are Neuroticism, Malaise, Demotivation and Seasonal Affective Disorder-SAD. I will also refer to a fifth type of depressive disorder - Melancholia - which was the original type of depression recognized for centuries, and is often too severe and debilitating to be self-treated and for which the best treatment (electroconvulsive therapy) cannot be self-administered.
This list of five sub-types is not exhaustive, and there almost certainly are other well-defined syndromes that are causes of depressed mood (or these four sub-types may fruitfully further be subdivided), and these might require different treatment, or treatments that are not available without prescription, but probably those sub-types described here are the commonest.
So, my suggestion is that sustained depressed mood (i.e. so – called depressive disorder) is ‘caused’ by least five more – specific sub-types. Naturally, each of these sub-types must have its own cause. Typically this cause is unknown or uncertain – and I will not consider the matter further here; because - whatever their cause may be – each sub-type has somewhat different symptoms and there are relatively specific treatments which have the potential to alleviate these symptoms.
I further suggest that there is no general purpose ’antidepressant’ action of a drug. Instead of there being ‘anti-depressants’, in actuality there are several types of intervention which alleviate different unpleasant symptoms and emotions, and which may as a result make people feel less depressed. A drug which alleviates depression in one person may actually cause depression in another person because the effect on depression is secondary to the effect on the symptoms or emotions. In what follows, drugs are classified according to their effect on symptoms; drug types considered here include stabilizing drugs; analgesics/pain killers and energizing drugs.
Melancholia – not self-treatable
Probably it is best to note and set-aside the ‘melancholia’ type of depression at this point. Melancholia is probably best described in textbooks from at least thirty years ago, before the diagnosis of depression became over-inclusive [12]. This is the classic, severe, debilitating form of ‘endogenous’ depression which may have psychotic features such as hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder, catatonia and psychomotor retardation.
Melancholia typically renders the sufferer incapable of work with severely-diminished or absent self-care and often suicidal tendencies. Subjectively, the mood state may be one of profound sadness, despair, emptiness, guilt, nothingness – speech and movement are slowed to near inertia, appetite may be absent, and death by starvation is a possibility.
Patients usually require admission to a hospital or similar institution for the treatment of melancholia – and they may require close supervision to prevent suicide. The episode of illness usually lasts for several months and the most effective treatment to improve symptoms is electroconvulsive therapy/electroshock therapy (ECT/ECS) [13] and [14].
Neuroticism
Anxiety is a normal, evolved human emotion which functions to increase alertness and avoid harm. However, anxiety is almost certainly the most frequently-experienced psychiatric symptom, and anxiety and depression are major feature of the ‘neurotic’ personality type characterized by emotional instability.
Neuroticism is one of the ‘Big 5’ personality traits, and was derived from the work of Hans Eysenck [15] and [16]. Neuroticism is an underlying disposition which is substantially hereditary and tends to endure throughout life. The personality type extends from high Neuroticism with extreme unpleasant mood swings at one extreme, to emotional stability at the opposite extreme. Other aspects of high Neuroticism include guilt feelings, low-self esteem, irrationality, shyness, moodiness and emotionality. Low Neuroticism personalities are described as emotionally stable, and display the opposite traits: calmness, cheerfulness, confidence.
I regard Neuroticism as more-or-less the same entity as Nutt’s category of ‘depression with anxiety’ [17]; very similar to Neurotic Depression on the Newcastle Diagnostic Scale [12] and essentially the same entity as DSM IV dysthymic disorder [18]. Watson calls it ‘negative emotionality’ – the tendency to experience strong negative emotions [19].
Neuroticism is a kind of hypersensitivity to the environment, akin to feeling the hyper-vigilant state of being alone in an unfamiliar and threatening environment. The average level of Neuroticism is higher in women, and high Neuroticism may be commoner in modern mass societies [3].
Since it is a type of personality and not a disease, Neuroticism probably cannot be ‘cured’. But severity of symptoms related to Neuroticism tend to wax and wane, probably in response to life stresses and also factors such as age, illness, drug usage etc. Given the ineffectiveness of psychotherapy and counseling, the psychiatric treatment of Neuroticism is essentially a matter of using drugs either to blunt exacerbations or else to promote long-term stabilization of emotions.
Because Neuroticism is a dispositional trait, emotion blunting drugs – when they work – are perceived to have caused a change in personality – and such change in personality may be perceived either positively or negatively [20] and [21].
Stabilizing drugs for Neuroticism
The anxiety component of a personality high in Neuroticism can be treated using a variety of anti-anxiety agents (e.g. neuroleptics/antipsychotics, benzodiazepines, propranolol – and people may self-medicate with alcohol) but since the core problem is emotional instability then the more relevant classes of drugs seem to be those that stabilize by buffering or blunting emotions. I shall term these the class of ‘stabilizing’ drugs.
The most powerful emotion stabilizing drugs are the neuroleptics/antipsychotics; but these tend to blunt emotions to the point of blank inertia [7]. Indeed, the neuroleptic core effect is to induce Parkinsonism as a method of non-sedating behavior control – as implied by the name which means ’nervous system-seizing’ (i.e. seizing and holding the nervous system, so it does not react) [22] and [23].
So assuming that people do not wish to suffer from self-inflicted Parkinson’s disease, neuroleptic/antipsychotics should be avoided and instead the most appropriate class of drugs for treating emotional instability are probably those which have serotonin-reuptake-inhibiting properties of which the class of selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are the best-known and most widely-prescribed examples. These can buffer or blunt the strength of emotions [3] (Healy has termed them ‘serenic’ in their effect [2]) but without necessarily demotivating the individual. Indeed, the emotional stability induced by SSRIs might provide previously-Neurotic people with better focus and direction.
‘Over the counter’ versions of the SSRIs that are available without prescription include at least two of the drugs sold as ‘antihistamines’ [4]. These antihistamines were used as the basic molecules from which SSRIs drugs were manufactured [6], [7], [24], [25] and [26]. (They were also the base molecules for the tricyclic antidepressants such as imipramine, and the earliest neuroleptics/antipsychotics such as chlorpromazine – consequently there are overlapping therapeutic effects and side effects among these drug classes [7].)
Diphenhydramine was the base molecule for synthesizing fluoxetine (‘Prozac’) which was the first SSRI to reach market [6]. Diphenhydramine is marketed as a sedative cough suppressant; and is probably an SSRI in terms of blocking reuptake of serotonin more potently than noradrenaline [24] (this is the pharmacological definition of an SSRI).
Chlorpheniramine was the base molecule for the synthesis of zimelidine; which was the first SSRI to be made but which never reached market due to its side effects [25] and [26]. Chlorpheniramine is sold as an anti allergy/anti-hay fever medication and is regarded as very safe; even being used in pregnancy for the treatment of nausea [27]. Chlorpheniramine blocks the reuptake of serotonin and also of noradrenaline [24], so is probably best regarded as a Serotonin and Noradrenalin Re-uptake Inhibitor (SNRI) resembling venlafaxine [26].
To support the use of these antihistamines in treating depressive symptom exacerbations due to Neuroticism there is the above strong theoretical argument plus a small literature of the beneficial effects of chlorpheniramine as an anti-anxiety drug and probably stabilizing agent (e.g. [28], [29] and [30]) – evidence for the benefits of diphehydramine is at present more theoretical and anecdotal. However, with a self-treatment approach using safe and non-prescription drugs, the evidence of effectiveness comes from personal experience – it is relatively easy to discover whether the drug ‘works for you’ since typically the benefits (and side effects) on the core symptom of emotional instability can be felt (or not felt) as soon as the drug is absorbed – i.e. within an hour or two. However, drug effects on mood are much more indirect and more variable, and mood improvement may take days or weeks to emerge [3].
However, probably the best drug for producing emotional stabilization is the herb St John’s Wort/Hypericum. The evidence concerning the usage and value of this drug is conveniently gathered in an excellent Wikipedia survey [31]. According to the preponderance of randomized trials, St John’s Wort (SJW) seems to be the equal or superior of the SSRIs; in terms of equal or better therapeutic effectiveness, fewer unwanted side effects and greater drug safety. St John’s Wort has mainly been evaluated as an anxiolytic and/or ‘anti-depressant’; but my inference is that SJW is essentially an emotion stabilizing drug akin to SSRIs. SJW is available in measured doses without prescription from pharmacists and supermarkets, usually being sold as a food supplement alongside vitamins, minerals and other herbs.
In conclusion, an exacerbation of ‘depression’ due to Neuroticism may imply a first-line self-treatment with St John’s Wort, chlorpheniramine or diphenhydramine. Since Neuroticism is a personality trait, when stabilizing drugs are effective they produce a change in personality, and potentially may make the neurotic individual feel more positive than ever before – they may seem to themselves and others as if they are ‘better than well’ [20]. Alternatively, stabilizing drugs such as SSRIs in another individual, or too high a dose, might cause a ‘hardening’ of personality (making the person more indifferent to things which ought to be of concern) and this may cause a reduction in motivation and a reduced inability to enjoy life (anhedonia) [21].
Very rarely SSRIs (and other psychoactive drugs, such a neuroleptics) can provoke extreme unpleasant states of inner turmoil or suicidal feelings in predisposed individuals [2] – and this may be a feature of the chemical structure of stabilizing drugs [7].
Malaise
Malaise is a term I suggested in 2000 for a sub-type of depression which is underpinned by that state of exhaustion which is familiar as the effect (and persisting after – effect) of infectious disorders such as influenza or glandular fever [3] and [32]. Since this description, some of the main features of the Malaise theory of depression have been confirmed by further studies (e.g. [33], [34], [35], [36], [37] and [38]).
The main symptoms of malaise are fatigue, feeling physically ‘TAT’ (tired all the time – and by ‘tired’ is meant physically-exhausted rather than sleepy), a washed-out or drained sensation in the body and limbs, heaviness in the head or limbs, aching, headaches and low-grade pain or tenderness in trunk and limbs. Malaise corresponds to Kurt Schneider’s ‘vital’ symptoms of depression, which he regarded as being of primary diagnostic significance [39].
Depressed mood is the response to this state of malaise, so that malaise depression is primarily a problem of the body, and not necessarily the brain. The idea of malaise comes from a general recognition of ‘sickness behavior’ as the general behavior which is characteristic of a sick mammal (summarized in [32]). Sickness behavior is regarded as an evolved adaptation to acute infectious disease – a behavioral state that is energy-conserving, risk-minimizing and immune-enhancing to allow an all-out (but temporary) attack on invading micro-organism.
So, malaise is caused by activation of the immune system, and is associated with increased blood levels of immune chemicals called cytokines – eg interferons, interleukins, Tumor Necrosis Factors (TNFs) and dozens more types. There is considerable evidence of raised levels of cytokines in depression (e.g. [32], [36] and [39]). But blood cytokines are typically also increased in autoimmune diseases (such as rheumatoid arthritis) and disseminated cancer – and these types of disease are also associated with ‘sickness behavior’ and malaise which can lead to depressed mood [3].
From anecdotal observation and general reading, I believe that sleep disruption is probably a common cause of malaise. Potentially there can be neurotransmitter and/or hormone changes triggered by sleep deprivation or sleep disruption. For example, malaise often follows sleepless nights, shift working or as an aspect of ’jet lag’ due to crossing several time zones; or post-operative states with catabolism triggered by tissue destruction and sleep disruption; or following childbirth (with a combination of major hormonal and phychological changes, tissue damage and sleep disruption).
Since malaise is characterized by unpleasant, pain-like physical states, it follows that an appropriate treatment for malaise is with analgesic or pain killer drugs [32]. For example, painkillers often alleviate (to some extent) the aching and exhausted physical state associated with influenza or its aftermath.
Analgesics/pain killers for malaise
There is considerable anecdotal and indirect evidence to suggest that analgesics are effective in treating some types of depression. I am aware of one formal trial designed partially to test this hypothesis – which confirmed it [38].
However, the effectiveness of the traditional ‘tricyclic’ antidepressants (TCAs) in ’major depressive disorder’ (which includes malaise symptoms in its definition) may be interpreted as being due the drugs’ analgesic properties [40]. Especially this applies to the effectiveness of amitriptyline, which has been the most widely-prescribed TCA for depression [1]; and which is also currently used in the treatment of cancer pain in terminal/palliative care, migraine etc. Furthermore, opiates (which are analgesics) have, at various times throughout history - most recently during the 1980s – been apparently successfully used in the treatment of depressive symptoms [3], [32] and [41]. (By contrast, SSRIs probably do not have significant analgesic properties [3] and [40].)
When depressed mood is associated with a malaise state, there could be a trial of the various simple analgesics available without prescriptions: aspirin, ibuprofen, paracetamol/acetaminophen and the mild opiates such as codeine or dihydrocodeine. Either aspirin or ibuprofen can also be combined with paracetamol and/or an opiate. Individual responsiveness to these analgesics is variable, and so are the experienced side effects – so there may need to be a period of trial-and-error before concluding that analgesics are ineffective.
As when treating Neuroticism with stabilizing drugs; the analgesics/pain killers would be expected to have a rapid effect in alleviating malaise symptoms as soon as the drug has been absorbed – i.e. in just a few hours [3]. But because mood is not directly related to malaise symptoms, it may take days or weeks before a reduction in malaise symptoms leads to an improvement in mood. So even when malaise is alleviated with treatment, the mood may remain depressed for other reasons – perhaps due to other unpleasant emotions, or to circumstances or habit [3], [9] and [32].
Demotivated depression
Demotivated depression is characterized by reduced positive emotions; and it is this inability or impaired ability to experience pleasure (i.e. anhedonia) that is the cause of demotivation.
Motivation is at root a product of the ability to feel current pleasure in anticipation of future situations – it is this pleasurable anticipation of future positive states of emotion which provides the immediate motivation needed for present action [3] and [10]. If one cannot experience pleasure, and if nothing seems likely to induce pleasure, then there will be a generalized loss of interest in life and its opportunities, and this will be experienced as a lack of vitality and drive (including reduced sexual drive).
Life usually involves a trade off between present and future pleasure and pains – normal people will often do something which is worse in the here-and-now, if this leads to the prospect of something better in the future. Something as simple as making the effort to visit a friend is done in the expectation that the here-and-now inconvenience of walking or catching a bus will be compensated by the future pleasure of conversation. But if the thought of having a conversation with a friend does not lead to a here-and-now sense of pleasure (pleasurable anticipation), then the deterrent effect of the unpleasant aspects of walking or catching a bus will weaken the motivation to visit the friend.
Demotivated depression is therefore a concept derived from and almost identical with Nutt’s ‘Depression with loss of interest and energy’ [17] and Watson’s state of low positive emotionality [19]. Causally, demotivated depression may be an exacerbation of the personality trait of introversion (asocial, quiet, submissive, timid, avoidant) [15] and [16] or a sub-clinical state of early Parkinsonism [42]. Demotivation may be a consequence of taking certain types of drug – especially drugs that lead to a reduction in dopaminergic – or noradrenergic/norepinephric – activity in brain; agents such as the neuroleptic/antipsychotic drugs which block dopaminergic receptors [7] and [23]. The motivational system seems to involve mainly the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system, and this seems to interact with noradrenergic, serotonergic and cholinergic systems – among others [43].
It is important to recognize that demotivated depression would probably be made worse by stabilizing drugs which tend to blunt emotions – since stabilizers would blunt the positive emotions which are already deficient in demotivated depression.
Energizing drugs for demotivated depression
The suggested treatment of demotivated depression is with energizing drugs which enhance dopamine or norepinephrine actions – either directly or indirectly [44]. The classic examples of such drugs include the psychostimulants such as dexamphetamine or methylphenidate (‘Ritalin’). Other energizing drugs include bupropion, monoamine-oxidase inhibitors such as phenelzine or moclobemide, amineptine, reboxetine, and the tricyclic desimipramine [17] and [44]. However, these drugs are only available with a prescription.
There are few energizing drugs which are available without prescription (probably due to fears of inducing addiction or dependence). The best-known and by far the most widely used energizers are caffeine and nicotine.
Caffeine [45] is found in coffee and tea and available in tablet form without prescription. It is a weak psychostimulant which increases alertness. Caffeine probably has properties as an analgesic or painkiller; and probably also has beneficial effects in preventing and perhaps treating Parkinson’s disease (suggesting that caffeine acts like a dopamine agonist) [46] and [47].
Nicotine [48] is found in tobacco but is also available as a non-prescription drug (for example as lozenges, chewing gum, or skin patches). While nicotine works directly upon the cholinergic neurotransmitter system, it appears to have indirect effects as a ‘dopaminergic’ psychostimulant – it often increases energy and alertness and like caffeine (but with stronger evidence) seems to have both a preventive and therapeutic effect on Parkinson’s disease [47], [48], [49] and [50].
In conclusion, the range of possibilities for self-treatment of demotivated depression with non-prescription drugs are at present both limited and somewhat speculative.
Seasonal Affective Disorder – SAD
Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) is winter depression or winter blues: low mood that occurs with greater frequency at more extreme latitudes (north or south) almost certainly due to the short daylight hours during winter months [51]. It is treated, not with drugs, but with bright artificial light, usually administered in the early morning [52] and [53].
The typical symptoms of SAD include excessive sleeping (hypersomnia) i.e. still tired when waking in the morning and sleepy throughout the day; increased appetite with carbohydrate craving and weight gain; irritability; fatigue; reduced motivation and sociability. In other words, while sleepiness and carbohydrate craving with weight gain are somewhat distinctive to SAD; many of the symptoms of SAD overlap with the three other sub-types of depression (i.e. irritability overlaps with Neuroticism, fatigue overlaps with malaise, and reduced motivation and sociability overlap with demotivated depression).
It is therefore the seasonal pattern of depressed mood and the characteristic behaviors which are crucial for the diagnosis rather than the specific subjective symptoms being experienced. Another diagnostic factor is the rapid and profound improvement of these symptoms in response to exposure to bright early morning light – which makes the response to light treatment something of a ‘diagnostic test’ for SAD.
SAD needs to be distinguished from the increased seasonal incidence of malaise symptoms which would be expected during winter months due to the increased prevalence of infectious diseases in many parts of the world (especially upper respiratory tract infections such as colds and influenza). Indeed, discriminating SAD from malaise could be tricky, since in the first place the main symptom of malaise is physical tiredness or ‘fatigue’ while the main symptom of SAD is mental tiredness or ‘sleepiness’. In the second place there is no reason why a person should not simultaneously suffer from both malaise and SAD, therefore from ‘tiredness’ due to both fatigue and sleepiness.
Indeed, it is plausible that the circadian hormone disruptions which are plausibly associated with SAD might themselves lead to immune activation as a secondary consequence – so that SAD might precipitate malaise.
Bright light therapy for the treatment of SAD
Bright artificial light usually administered early in the early morning seems a very effective treatment for SAD [51], [52] and [53] – this requires no prescription but only the purchase of a device delivering suitably bright light.
Especially-bright artificial light is needed to treat or prevent SAD because the aim is to simulate the kind of brightness that is provided by natural outdoor light. Normal indoor house lighting in a kitchen is only about 400 lux (there is even less light in bedrooms), while outdoors, even on a cloudy day, there is about 10 times greater intensity of light – 4000 lux.
Specialized ‘light boxes’ generate about 10000 lux of suitable-wavelength light at close range. This should be sufficient to cure SAD if administered for 30 minutes - however the subject must usually be sedentary and near to the light. A ‘light visor’ shines the light from much closer to the eye for about the same length of time, while allowing the subject to be mobile. ’Dawn simulators’ are like an alarm clock that brightens up to about 400 lux over a period of about an hour – apparently these also seem to work for some people.
If a person has SAD, then bright early morning light will probably produce a marked improvement in their symptoms within just a few days and continued use of bright light therapy would probably prevent a return of SAD symptoms.
SAD is a syndrome
SAD therefore is an example of diagnosing and treating a syndrome; rather than the symptom based-management model as recommended for Neuroticism, malaise and demotivation.
The delineation of SAD is actually a tremendous success story of psychiatry within the past few decades. And interestingly, (although perhaps not surprisingly) this process of definition and development of treatments happened largely outside of the professional structures of modern psychiatry, presumably because bright light treatment is non-pharmacological and not patentable.
It is a significant paradox (and one which supports the need for self-management in psychiatry) that probably the most valid and most effectively-treatable of recently-defined psychiatric syndromes arose mostly outwith the ‘official’ field of heavily-funded psychiatric research.
Conclusion
The main benefits of the S-DTM approach to self-management of psychiatric symptoms using non-prescription drugs (Table 1) is that it allows people to avoid contact with modern psychiatry and to maintain control of their own therapy and tailor treatment to their own needs. The main limitations are those of limited (or inaccurate) knowledge, difficulties of introspection and self-monitoring, and the restricted range of treatments available without prescription.
Table 1.
Four sub-types of ‘depression’ and first-line agents for their treatment
Sub-type Emotions Treatment
Neuroticism Anxiety, unstable emotions Stabilizing drugs
Malaise Fatigue, pains Analgesics/pain killers
Demotivated Anhedonia – lack positive emotions Energizing drugs
SAD Winter seasonal symptoms Bright morning light
One major advantage of a more specific approach to diagnosing and treating sub-types of ‘depression’ in a symptomatic fashion is that of avoid the damaging consequences of treating demotivated depression with stabilizing drugs. Under the currently prevailing standard model of depressive disorder, it is quite likely that any person with a depressed mood would first be tried-out with the stabilizing and emotion blunting SSRIs; and any observed worsening of mood would probably be blamed on the ‘disease’ of depression instead of the drug. But since demotivated people lack strong positive emotions, SSRIs would probably make them feel worse by blunting their emotions still further. (i.e. if your problem is insufficient pleasurable experience, the last thing you need is to be made even less responsive to pleasurable stimuli.)
The five sub-types of ‘depression’ (including melancholia) are not mutually exclusive. An individual might suffer from two or more of these syndromes simultaneously. Various combinations are possible. For example, a person with depressed mood due to a neurotic and unstable personality might well in addition suffer from seasonal affective disorder during the winters, or from malaise following influenza. Or a person with lack of drive due to a chronic demotivated depression might in addition experience malaise secondary to a chronic infection or autoimmune disease, or SAD. Such subjects might perhaps, rarely, go on to develop severe melancholia.
In such situations of several simultaneous diagnoses, alleviation of one type of symptom could fail to improve mood due the persistence of other types of symptom. More than one type of treatment may be required simultaneously, as in any situation characterized by multiple causal pathologies.
In terms of the treatments available without prescription, the biggest problem is that there is only a limited number of energizing drug treatments available without prescription; and the premier energizing drugs all require prescription at present. On the other hand, St Johns Wort is quite possibly the best all-round stabilizing drug (better than SSRIs), bright light therapy is certainly the best treatment for SAD (short of moving to live in a latitude nearer the equator and with sunnier weather); and there is a reasonable range of effective analgesics available ’over the counter’ for treating malaise – stronger opiates and stronger NSAIDs being the main categories of pain killers currently requiring a prescription.
In sum, the ability of individuals to self-manage ’depression’ is already powerful, and the future looks promising. I hope the above ideas will be useful and will also stimulate debate. And, looking beyond depression, it is possible that the general S-DTM model might be more widely-applicable within psychiatry and medicine, and for enhancement of the quality of life.
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[45] Wikipedia. Caffeine. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caffeine. Accessed 7 August 2008.
[46] A. Aschero, S.M. Zhang, M.A. Hernan, I. Kawachi, G.A. Colditz and F.E. Speizer et al., Prospective study of caffeine consumption and risk of Parkinson’s disease in men and women, Ann Neurology 50 (2001), pp. 56–63.
[47] M.A. Hernan, B. Takkouche, F. Caamano-Isorna and J.J. Gestal-Otero, A meta-analysis of coffee-drinking, cigarette smoking and the risk of Parkinson’s disease, Ann Neurology 52 (2002), pp. 276–284.
[48] Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicotine. Accessed 7 August 2008.
[49] M. Quik, Smoking, nicotine and Parkinson’s disease, Trends in Neurosci 27 (2004), pp. 561–568.
[50] G. Villafane, P. Cesaro, A. Rialland, S. Baloul, S. Azimi and C. Bourdet et al., Chronic high dose transdermal nicotine in Parkinson’s disease: an open trial, Eur. J Neurology 14 (2007), pp. 1313–1316.
[51] N.E. Rosenthal, D.A. Sack, J.C. Gillin, A.J. Lewy, F.K. Goodwin and Y. Davenport et al., Seasonal affective disorder: A description of the syndrome and preliminary findings with light therapy, Arch Gen Psychiat 41 (1984), pp. 72–80.
[52] R.W. Lam, Seasonal affective disorder: diagnosis and management, Primary Care Psychiat 4 (1998), pp. 63–74.
[53] J.M. Eagles, Seasonal affective disorder, Brit J Psychiat 182 (2003), pp. 174–176.
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2009; 72: 1-7
Summary
This article will present a model for how ‘depression’ (i.e. depressive symptoms) can be divided into four self-diagnosed sub-types or causes which might then be self-treated using agents available without prescription. (Another, much rarer, cause of depressed symptoms is the classical illness of ‘melancholia’, which when severe cannot be self-treated and typically requires hospitalization.) A self-management option and alternative is now needed due to the an inappropriate emphasis of modern psychiatry on treatment of imprecise syndromal ‘disorders’ which may entail treating ‘depression’ at the cost of making the patient feel and function worse. By contrast, the basic theoretical stance of self-management is that depressed mood should be seen as a result of unpleasant symptoms – and it is the symptoms that require treatment, not the mood itself. Furthermore, drugs (or other interventions) need to be classified in terms of their potential therapeutic effects on these symptoms that may cause depressed mood. The four common causes of depressed mood considered here are the personality trait of Neuroticism; the state of malaise (fatigue, aching etc) which accompanies an illness with an activated immune system; demotivation due to lack of positive emotions (anhedonia); and the syndrome of seasonal affective disorder (SAD). Each of the four sub-types is then ‘matched’ with a first–line non-prescription agent. The ‘stabilizing’ agents such as St John’s Wort and the antihistamines chlorpheniramine and diphenhydramine are used for treatment of Neuroticism; analgesics/pain killers such as aspirin, ibuprofen, paracetamol/acetaminophen and the opiates are used to treat malaise; energizing agents such as caffeine and nicotine are used for the treatment of demotivation; and bright light used in the early morning to treat SAD. Self-treatments are intended to be used after research and experimentally, on a trial-and-error basis; with self-monitoring of beneficial and harmful effects, and a willingness to stop and switch treatments. The model of S-DTM (self-diagnosis, self-treatment and self–monitoring) is suggested as potentially applicable more widely within psychiatry and medicine.
***
Introduction
‘Depressive disorder’ and ‘anti-depressant’ are categories that should be discarded
Imprecise diagnosis and treatment of depression
Self-diagnosis by introspection – the ‘phenomenological’ approach
The self-diagnosis, -treatment and- monitoring (S-DTM) model [4] treating depressed mood pharmacologically
Introduction
‘Depressive disorder’ and ‘anti-depressant’ are categories that should be discarded
The gross imprecision of the diagnosis of ‘depression’ has become farcical in recent decades, when the supposed prevalence of ‘depression’ has risen from a fraction of a percent by about a hundred-fold to anything from ten to twenty-five percent [1] and [2]. Nowadays, any person suffering a persistent unpleasant emotional state may be officially diagnosable as depressed, and treated with drugs termed ‘anti-depressants’.
I have previously argued that the disease category of mood (affective) disorder called depression is neither coherent nor useful; and instead it would be preferable to regard ‘depressed mood’ as secondary to a variety of unpleasant emotional states [3]. In other words, depressed mood should be seen as caused by symptoms and emotions – for example anxiety, fatigue or lack of positive emotions (anhedonia) can all lead to depressed mood. Diagnosis and treatment of ‘depression’ should therefore be focused on the emotional states which cause depressed mood, and not upon treating a vaguely-defined – hence over-inclusive – syndrome termed ‘depressive disorder’. In principle there might be an unbounded number of causes of negative, depressed states of unhappiness – in practice, I will focus upon four which are apparently amenable to improvement by therapeutic intervention.
I have also argued that the term ‘anti-depressant’ should not be used, since there are no drugs which have a general action to alleviate depressed mood: what the effective drugs are really doing is to alleviate the causes of depressed mood [3]. There are a variety of different drugs types which can alleviate some symptoms that may lead to depressive symptoms in some people. For example, when anxiety is causing depressed mood then any drug which reduces anxiety (including alcohol, neuroleptics/antipsychotics, benzodiazepines or selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors – SSRIs) may all (for a while) alleviate ’depression’. But when a person’s depressed mood is not caused by anxiety then these same drugs could be ineffective or may actually worsen the depressed mood.
I believe that a self-management option and alternative [4] is now urgently needed (at least in the UK and USA) due to the incorrect and counter-productive theoretical stance of modern psychiatry [3], the corruption of modern psychiatry by industrial and political influences [2], and the inappropriate emphasis of modern psychiatry on treatment of syndromal ‘disorders’ [3] and [4]. This focus on syndromes may lead modern psychiatrists to treat ‘depression’ at the cost of making the patient feel and function worse [5]
This is the rationale and justification for the following article, which represents a personal view – speculative and tentative – of a possible future for psychopharmacology in psychiatry, specifically in relation to negative symptoms of ‘depression’ such as sadness unhappiness, lack of motivation, long-term miserable anxiety, unpleasant mood swings and the inability to feel happiness. My hope is that these ideas are sufficiently accurate and valid to be useful and applicable – but also that they will stimulate discussion and serve as a basis for a process of evolution and improvement.
By extension, this general model of self-diagnosis, self-treatment and self-monitoring (S-DTM) could potentially be extended to other areas of psychiatry and medicine in which symptoms are the focus and where effective treatments are available without prescription. Indeed, as well as being used to alleviate negative states, the model is also applicable to lifestyle/quality of life enhancement [3] and [5].
Imprecise diagnosis and treatment of depression
I believe that, one the one hand, the treatment of depression can be more specific and effective than at present; but on the other hand it is also correct that the psychoactive drugs are all imprecise in their effects, and in particular tend to affect different people differently. This means that psychiatric treatment (whether self-treatment or treatment by professionals) is almost inevitably a trial-and-error matter, and should be embarked-upon in an experimental spirit.
Psychiatric drugs (and also some other psychiatric interventions such as electroconvulsive therapy and perhaps bright light) tend to be non-specific in relation to traditional diagnostic syndromes [3]. Different categories of drugs such as ‘antidepressants’ and the neuroleptics/antipsychotics often have over-lapping therapeutic effects, side effects and indications – mainly because many of the most-used drugs were chemically-developed from a relatively small number of coloured dyes which were initially made into antihistamines during the 1940s then further modified over the following decades to make the neuroleptic/antipsychotics, tricyclic and SSRI antidepressants [1], [6] and [7].
So, drug recommendations for symptomatic treatment in psychiatry are mainly about suggesting which drug to try first. There needs to be an attitude of trial-and-error; with self-monitoring of the effects of treatment, willingness to change to stop treatment or change to another treatment if the first choice has undesirable side effects or is apparently ineffective.
With these cautions in place, I see no compelling reason why people should not self-treat for psychiatric symptoms using drugs which are available ‘over the counter’ and without prescription. After all, in a country such as the UK or the USA people in their tens of millions already self-treat for headaches and back pains, constipation and diarrhoea, runny noses and blocked noses, hay fever and eczema, high cholesterol, skin infections and duodenal ulcers. And in a world where it is common to assert that anything up to half the population have significant psychiatric symptoms of some sort (e.g. depression, anxiety states, various phobias and compulsions, insomnia) then self-treatment become a practical necessity.
Furthermore, I suggest that symptomatic self-treatment for ‘depression’, when done by careful and informed people, might well be superior to the average treatment on offer from psychiatric professionals. The main constraint is the limited range of drugs available without prescription (especially, see below, in the case of demotivated depression); but this restrictive public policy may change over time or be circumvented by the increased ease of purchasing pharmacological agents without prescription.
Self-diagnosis by introspection – the ‘phenomenological’ approach
The process by which self-diagnosis may be accomplished requires some elucidation. I have previously termed the sequence S-DTM – meaning Self-Diagnosis, self-Treatment and self–Monitoring. The aim is to introduce to self-management a helpful degree of thoroughness and formalization to make the process both safer and more effective than unstructured self-management.
The first step involves developing self-awareness of symptoms. The word ‘phenomenology’ refers to the process of introspection or inward-looking by which a person can become aware of their inner, subjective states – psychiatric symptoms are one of the body states which may be accessible to such introspection [3], [8] and [9]. To self-diagnose by introspection requires a skill which may be unfamiliar. For example, it is possible to be anxious but unaware of the anxiety [10] and [11]. To become aware of anxiety as a feeling, a person needs to be able to identify their own state of mental angst, muscular tension, rapidly beating heart, sweatiness, ‘butterflies in the stomach’ and so on.
Furthermore, inner states must be identified in terms of a system of classification – because body sensations tend to be experienced as formless and undividedly ’holistic’ unless there is a systematic classification which can describe them. Without some such analytic scheme, it may not be possible for someone to be aware of, and to express even to themselves, much more than a simple dichotomy of feeling either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Self-treatment, however, requires that different types of ‘feeling bad’ can be distinguished and identified.
In terms of ‘depression’ – the process begins with recognition of a depressed mood, in other words a negative or unpleasant mood state which could be characterized by some kind of unhappiness. Then there is a further introspective process by which the sufferer tries to identify some inner physical, bodily state which may be the main cause of this unhappiness. The assumption is that if this causal symptom can be alleviated or eliminated then the person may become happier.
Happiness is not necessarily entailed by removing the cause of unhappiness, but it is easier and more probable that a currently-unhappy person will become happy if they are relieved of unpleasant symptoms. For example, it is hard to be happy when suffering a headache and relief of the headache may therefore cause a person to become happy who would otherwise have remained miserable.
More exactly, there is an attempt to match-up inner states against a pre-determined classification. Four body states which may cause unhappiness include emotional instability with anxiety (Neuroticism); fatigue and bodily aches and pains (malaise); lack of emotion – especially loss of the ability to anticipate future pleasures (demotivated depression); and sleepy, hungry, irritable mood specifically during the winter season (SAD).
Having identified a particular aversive body state as a probable cause of depressed mood, this symptom is then made the focus for self-treatment; and the symptom is monitored for its response to treatment. A treatment agent or mode is selected as being both safe and potentially able to alleviate the specific symptom, and a trial of this treatment is made. So, if the symptom underlying depressed mood is identified as anxiety and unstable emotions then stabilizing drug is chosen (such as St John’s Wort or chlorpheniramine – see below); and the symptom is monitored to see whether it responds to this treatment.
The self-diagnosis, -treatment and- monitoring (S-DTM) model [4] treating depressed mood pharmacologically
Self-diagnosis
1. Recognition of a depressed, unhappy, low mood.
2. Introspective self–diagnosis of the sub-type of symptomatic and emotional cause of depressed mood.
3. Matching the symptoms and emotions to one of the four sub-types of ‘depression’.
4. Matching the sub-type of depression to the drug class which is most likely to alleviate those symptoms and emotions.
5. Researching the scientific literature on the effects, side effects and possible interactions of the drug class – and choose a (probably) safe first-line agent.
Self-treatment
6. Begin trial of treatment.
Self-monitoring
7. Very careful monitoring for effects and side effects for the first 4 hours after taking the agent, and continued vigilance for several days. Keep a record. (e.g. Consider self-monitoring blood pressure when using psychostimulant type drugs.)
8. If immediate problems of side effects or feeling worse after taking a drug, consider stopping immediately – or continue with vigilant self-monitoring.
9. If no benefit at all after a few days consider increasing dose or stopping and trying another agent.
10. If side effects are bad, or there is concern over dependence, or if unsure about whether or not the drug is having benefit, or if wanting to stop taking the drug; consider stopping the drug and self-monitoring the result of stopping – then consider restarting and monitor the results of restarting.
11. Go through the process for each new drug tried. Avoid interactions between the drug stopped and a new one started, and between multiple agents.
Four sub-types of self-treatable depression
I will consider four sub-type causes of depressed mood (’depressive disorder’) which may be suitable for self-treatment: these are Neuroticism, Malaise, Demotivation and Seasonal Affective Disorder-SAD. I will also refer to a fifth type of depressive disorder - Melancholia - which was the original type of depression recognized for centuries, and is often too severe and debilitating to be self-treated and for which the best treatment (electroconvulsive therapy) cannot be self-administered.
This list of five sub-types is not exhaustive, and there almost certainly are other well-defined syndromes that are causes of depressed mood (or these four sub-types may fruitfully further be subdivided), and these might require different treatment, or treatments that are not available without prescription, but probably those sub-types described here are the commonest.
So, my suggestion is that sustained depressed mood (i.e. so – called depressive disorder) is ‘caused’ by least five more – specific sub-types. Naturally, each of these sub-types must have its own cause. Typically this cause is unknown or uncertain – and I will not consider the matter further here; because - whatever their cause may be – each sub-type has somewhat different symptoms and there are relatively specific treatments which have the potential to alleviate these symptoms.
I further suggest that there is no general purpose ’antidepressant’ action of a drug. Instead of there being ‘anti-depressants’, in actuality there are several types of intervention which alleviate different unpleasant symptoms and emotions, and which may as a result make people feel less depressed. A drug which alleviates depression in one person may actually cause depression in another person because the effect on depression is secondary to the effect on the symptoms or emotions. In what follows, drugs are classified according to their effect on symptoms; drug types considered here include stabilizing drugs; analgesics/pain killers and energizing drugs.
Melancholia – not self-treatable
Probably it is best to note and set-aside the ‘melancholia’ type of depression at this point. Melancholia is probably best described in textbooks from at least thirty years ago, before the diagnosis of depression became over-inclusive [12]. This is the classic, severe, debilitating form of ‘endogenous’ depression which may have psychotic features such as hallucinations, delusions, thought disorder, catatonia and psychomotor retardation.
Melancholia typically renders the sufferer incapable of work with severely-diminished or absent self-care and often suicidal tendencies. Subjectively, the mood state may be one of profound sadness, despair, emptiness, guilt, nothingness – speech and movement are slowed to near inertia, appetite may be absent, and death by starvation is a possibility.
Patients usually require admission to a hospital or similar institution for the treatment of melancholia – and they may require close supervision to prevent suicide. The episode of illness usually lasts for several months and the most effective treatment to improve symptoms is electroconvulsive therapy/electroshock therapy (ECT/ECS) [13] and [14].
Neuroticism
Anxiety is a normal, evolved human emotion which functions to increase alertness and avoid harm. However, anxiety is almost certainly the most frequently-experienced psychiatric symptom, and anxiety and depression are major feature of the ‘neurotic’ personality type characterized by emotional instability.
Neuroticism is one of the ‘Big 5’ personality traits, and was derived from the work of Hans Eysenck [15] and [16]. Neuroticism is an underlying disposition which is substantially hereditary and tends to endure throughout life. The personality type extends from high Neuroticism with extreme unpleasant mood swings at one extreme, to emotional stability at the opposite extreme. Other aspects of high Neuroticism include guilt feelings, low-self esteem, irrationality, shyness, moodiness and emotionality. Low Neuroticism personalities are described as emotionally stable, and display the opposite traits: calmness, cheerfulness, confidence.
I regard Neuroticism as more-or-less the same entity as Nutt’s category of ‘depression with anxiety’ [17]; very similar to Neurotic Depression on the Newcastle Diagnostic Scale [12] and essentially the same entity as DSM IV dysthymic disorder [18]. Watson calls it ‘negative emotionality’ – the tendency to experience strong negative emotions [19].
Neuroticism is a kind of hypersensitivity to the environment, akin to feeling the hyper-vigilant state of being alone in an unfamiliar and threatening environment. The average level of Neuroticism is higher in women, and high Neuroticism may be commoner in modern mass societies [3].
Since it is a type of personality and not a disease, Neuroticism probably cannot be ‘cured’. But severity of symptoms related to Neuroticism tend to wax and wane, probably in response to life stresses and also factors such as age, illness, drug usage etc. Given the ineffectiveness of psychotherapy and counseling, the psychiatric treatment of Neuroticism is essentially a matter of using drugs either to blunt exacerbations or else to promote long-term stabilization of emotions.
Because Neuroticism is a dispositional trait, emotion blunting drugs – when they work – are perceived to have caused a change in personality – and such change in personality may be perceived either positively or negatively [20] and [21].
Stabilizing drugs for Neuroticism
The anxiety component of a personality high in Neuroticism can be treated using a variety of anti-anxiety agents (e.g. neuroleptics/antipsychotics, benzodiazepines, propranolol – and people may self-medicate with alcohol) but since the core problem is emotional instability then the more relevant classes of drugs seem to be those that stabilize by buffering or blunting emotions. I shall term these the class of ‘stabilizing’ drugs.
The most powerful emotion stabilizing drugs are the neuroleptics/antipsychotics; but these tend to blunt emotions to the point of blank inertia [7]. Indeed, the neuroleptic core effect is to induce Parkinsonism as a method of non-sedating behavior control – as implied by the name which means ’nervous system-seizing’ (i.e. seizing and holding the nervous system, so it does not react) [22] and [23].
So assuming that people do not wish to suffer from self-inflicted Parkinson’s disease, neuroleptic/antipsychotics should be avoided and instead the most appropriate class of drugs for treating emotional instability are probably those which have serotonin-reuptake-inhibiting properties of which the class of selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are the best-known and most widely-prescribed examples. These can buffer or blunt the strength of emotions [3] (Healy has termed them ‘serenic’ in their effect [2]) but without necessarily demotivating the individual. Indeed, the emotional stability induced by SSRIs might provide previously-Neurotic people with better focus and direction.
‘Over the counter’ versions of the SSRIs that are available without prescription include at least two of the drugs sold as ‘antihistamines’ [4]. These antihistamines were used as the basic molecules from which SSRIs drugs were manufactured [6], [7], [24], [25] and [26]. (They were also the base molecules for the tricyclic antidepressants such as imipramine, and the earliest neuroleptics/antipsychotics such as chlorpromazine – consequently there are overlapping therapeutic effects and side effects among these drug classes [7].)
Diphenhydramine was the base molecule for synthesizing fluoxetine (‘Prozac’) which was the first SSRI to reach market [6]. Diphenhydramine is marketed as a sedative cough suppressant; and is probably an SSRI in terms of blocking reuptake of serotonin more potently than noradrenaline [24] (this is the pharmacological definition of an SSRI).
Chlorpheniramine was the base molecule for the synthesis of zimelidine; which was the first SSRI to be made but which never reached market due to its side effects [25] and [26]. Chlorpheniramine is sold as an anti allergy/anti-hay fever medication and is regarded as very safe; even being used in pregnancy for the treatment of nausea [27]. Chlorpheniramine blocks the reuptake of serotonin and also of noradrenaline [24], so is probably best regarded as a Serotonin and Noradrenalin Re-uptake Inhibitor (SNRI) resembling venlafaxine [26].
To support the use of these antihistamines in treating depressive symptom exacerbations due to Neuroticism there is the above strong theoretical argument plus a small literature of the beneficial effects of chlorpheniramine as an anti-anxiety drug and probably stabilizing agent (e.g. [28], [29] and [30]) – evidence for the benefits of diphehydramine is at present more theoretical and anecdotal. However, with a self-treatment approach using safe and non-prescription drugs, the evidence of effectiveness comes from personal experience – it is relatively easy to discover whether the drug ‘works for you’ since typically the benefits (and side effects) on the core symptom of emotional instability can be felt (or not felt) as soon as the drug is absorbed – i.e. within an hour or two. However, drug effects on mood are much more indirect and more variable, and mood improvement may take days or weeks to emerge [3].
However, probably the best drug for producing emotional stabilization is the herb St John’s Wort/Hypericum. The evidence concerning the usage and value of this drug is conveniently gathered in an excellent Wikipedia survey [31]. According to the preponderance of randomized trials, St John’s Wort (SJW) seems to be the equal or superior of the SSRIs; in terms of equal or better therapeutic effectiveness, fewer unwanted side effects and greater drug safety. St John’s Wort has mainly been evaluated as an anxiolytic and/or ‘anti-depressant’; but my inference is that SJW is essentially an emotion stabilizing drug akin to SSRIs. SJW is available in measured doses without prescription from pharmacists and supermarkets, usually being sold as a food supplement alongside vitamins, minerals and other herbs.
In conclusion, an exacerbation of ‘depression’ due to Neuroticism may imply a first-line self-treatment with St John’s Wort, chlorpheniramine or diphenhydramine. Since Neuroticism is a personality trait, when stabilizing drugs are effective they produce a change in personality, and potentially may make the neurotic individual feel more positive than ever before – they may seem to themselves and others as if they are ‘better than well’ [20]. Alternatively, stabilizing drugs such as SSRIs in another individual, or too high a dose, might cause a ‘hardening’ of personality (making the person more indifferent to things which ought to be of concern) and this may cause a reduction in motivation and a reduced inability to enjoy life (anhedonia) [21].
Very rarely SSRIs (and other psychoactive drugs, such a neuroleptics) can provoke extreme unpleasant states of inner turmoil or suicidal feelings in predisposed individuals [2] – and this may be a feature of the chemical structure of stabilizing drugs [7].
Malaise
Malaise is a term I suggested in 2000 for a sub-type of depression which is underpinned by that state of exhaustion which is familiar as the effect (and persisting after – effect) of infectious disorders such as influenza or glandular fever [3] and [32]. Since this description, some of the main features of the Malaise theory of depression have been confirmed by further studies (e.g. [33], [34], [35], [36], [37] and [38]).
The main symptoms of malaise are fatigue, feeling physically ‘TAT’ (tired all the time – and by ‘tired’ is meant physically-exhausted rather than sleepy), a washed-out or drained sensation in the body and limbs, heaviness in the head or limbs, aching, headaches and low-grade pain or tenderness in trunk and limbs. Malaise corresponds to Kurt Schneider’s ‘vital’ symptoms of depression, which he regarded as being of primary diagnostic significance [39].
Depressed mood is the response to this state of malaise, so that malaise depression is primarily a problem of the body, and not necessarily the brain. The idea of malaise comes from a general recognition of ‘sickness behavior’ as the general behavior which is characteristic of a sick mammal (summarized in [32]). Sickness behavior is regarded as an evolved adaptation to acute infectious disease – a behavioral state that is energy-conserving, risk-minimizing and immune-enhancing to allow an all-out (but temporary) attack on invading micro-organism.
So, malaise is caused by activation of the immune system, and is associated with increased blood levels of immune chemicals called cytokines – eg interferons, interleukins, Tumor Necrosis Factors (TNFs) and dozens more types. There is considerable evidence of raised levels of cytokines in depression (e.g. [32], [36] and [39]). But blood cytokines are typically also increased in autoimmune diseases (such as rheumatoid arthritis) and disseminated cancer – and these types of disease are also associated with ‘sickness behavior’ and malaise which can lead to depressed mood [3].
From anecdotal observation and general reading, I believe that sleep disruption is probably a common cause of malaise. Potentially there can be neurotransmitter and/or hormone changes triggered by sleep deprivation or sleep disruption. For example, malaise often follows sleepless nights, shift working or as an aspect of ’jet lag’ due to crossing several time zones; or post-operative states with catabolism triggered by tissue destruction and sleep disruption; or following childbirth (with a combination of major hormonal and phychological changes, tissue damage and sleep disruption).
Since malaise is characterized by unpleasant, pain-like physical states, it follows that an appropriate treatment for malaise is with analgesic or pain killer drugs [32]. For example, painkillers often alleviate (to some extent) the aching and exhausted physical state associated with influenza or its aftermath.
Analgesics/pain killers for malaise
There is considerable anecdotal and indirect evidence to suggest that analgesics are effective in treating some types of depression. I am aware of one formal trial designed partially to test this hypothesis – which confirmed it [38].
However, the effectiveness of the traditional ‘tricyclic’ antidepressants (TCAs) in ’major depressive disorder’ (which includes malaise symptoms in its definition) may be interpreted as being due the drugs’ analgesic properties [40]. Especially this applies to the effectiveness of amitriptyline, which has been the most widely-prescribed TCA for depression [1]; and which is also currently used in the treatment of cancer pain in terminal/palliative care, migraine etc. Furthermore, opiates (which are analgesics) have, at various times throughout history - most recently during the 1980s – been apparently successfully used in the treatment of depressive symptoms [3], [32] and [41]. (By contrast, SSRIs probably do not have significant analgesic properties [3] and [40].)
When depressed mood is associated with a malaise state, there could be a trial of the various simple analgesics available without prescriptions: aspirin, ibuprofen, paracetamol/acetaminophen and the mild opiates such as codeine or dihydrocodeine. Either aspirin or ibuprofen can also be combined with paracetamol and/or an opiate. Individual responsiveness to these analgesics is variable, and so are the experienced side effects – so there may need to be a period of trial-and-error before concluding that analgesics are ineffective.
As when treating Neuroticism with stabilizing drugs; the analgesics/pain killers would be expected to have a rapid effect in alleviating malaise symptoms as soon as the drug has been absorbed – i.e. in just a few hours [3]. But because mood is not directly related to malaise symptoms, it may take days or weeks before a reduction in malaise symptoms leads to an improvement in mood. So even when malaise is alleviated with treatment, the mood may remain depressed for other reasons – perhaps due to other unpleasant emotions, or to circumstances or habit [3], [9] and [32].
Demotivated depression
Demotivated depression is characterized by reduced positive emotions; and it is this inability or impaired ability to experience pleasure (i.e. anhedonia) that is the cause of demotivation.
Motivation is at root a product of the ability to feel current pleasure in anticipation of future situations – it is this pleasurable anticipation of future positive states of emotion which provides the immediate motivation needed for present action [3] and [10]. If one cannot experience pleasure, and if nothing seems likely to induce pleasure, then there will be a generalized loss of interest in life and its opportunities, and this will be experienced as a lack of vitality and drive (including reduced sexual drive).
Life usually involves a trade off between present and future pleasure and pains – normal people will often do something which is worse in the here-and-now, if this leads to the prospect of something better in the future. Something as simple as making the effort to visit a friend is done in the expectation that the here-and-now inconvenience of walking or catching a bus will be compensated by the future pleasure of conversation. But if the thought of having a conversation with a friend does not lead to a here-and-now sense of pleasure (pleasurable anticipation), then the deterrent effect of the unpleasant aspects of walking or catching a bus will weaken the motivation to visit the friend.
Demotivated depression is therefore a concept derived from and almost identical with Nutt’s ‘Depression with loss of interest and energy’ [17] and Watson’s state of low positive emotionality [19]. Causally, demotivated depression may be an exacerbation of the personality trait of introversion (asocial, quiet, submissive, timid, avoidant) [15] and [16] or a sub-clinical state of early Parkinsonism [42]. Demotivation may be a consequence of taking certain types of drug – especially drugs that lead to a reduction in dopaminergic – or noradrenergic/norepinephric – activity in brain; agents such as the neuroleptic/antipsychotic drugs which block dopaminergic receptors [7] and [23]. The motivational system seems to involve mainly the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system, and this seems to interact with noradrenergic, serotonergic and cholinergic systems – among others [43].
It is important to recognize that demotivated depression would probably be made worse by stabilizing drugs which tend to blunt emotions – since stabilizers would blunt the positive emotions which are already deficient in demotivated depression.
Energizing drugs for demotivated depression
The suggested treatment of demotivated depression is with energizing drugs which enhance dopamine or norepinephrine actions – either directly or indirectly [44]. The classic examples of such drugs include the psychostimulants such as dexamphetamine or methylphenidate (‘Ritalin’). Other energizing drugs include bupropion, monoamine-oxidase inhibitors such as phenelzine or moclobemide, amineptine, reboxetine, and the tricyclic desimipramine [17] and [44]. However, these drugs are only available with a prescription.
There are few energizing drugs which are available without prescription (probably due to fears of inducing addiction or dependence). The best-known and by far the most widely used energizers are caffeine and nicotine.
Caffeine [45] is found in coffee and tea and available in tablet form without prescription. It is a weak psychostimulant which increases alertness. Caffeine probably has properties as an analgesic or painkiller; and probably also has beneficial effects in preventing and perhaps treating Parkinson’s disease (suggesting that caffeine acts like a dopamine agonist) [46] and [47].
Nicotine [48] is found in tobacco but is also available as a non-prescription drug (for example as lozenges, chewing gum, or skin patches). While nicotine works directly upon the cholinergic neurotransmitter system, it appears to have indirect effects as a ‘dopaminergic’ psychostimulant – it often increases energy and alertness and like caffeine (but with stronger evidence) seems to have both a preventive and therapeutic effect on Parkinson’s disease [47], [48], [49] and [50].
In conclusion, the range of possibilities for self-treatment of demotivated depression with non-prescription drugs are at present both limited and somewhat speculative.
Seasonal Affective Disorder – SAD
Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) is winter depression or winter blues: low mood that occurs with greater frequency at more extreme latitudes (north or south) almost certainly due to the short daylight hours during winter months [51]. It is treated, not with drugs, but with bright artificial light, usually administered in the early morning [52] and [53].
The typical symptoms of SAD include excessive sleeping (hypersomnia) i.e. still tired when waking in the morning and sleepy throughout the day; increased appetite with carbohydrate craving and weight gain; irritability; fatigue; reduced motivation and sociability. In other words, while sleepiness and carbohydrate craving with weight gain are somewhat distinctive to SAD; many of the symptoms of SAD overlap with the three other sub-types of depression (i.e. irritability overlaps with Neuroticism, fatigue overlaps with malaise, and reduced motivation and sociability overlap with demotivated depression).
It is therefore the seasonal pattern of depressed mood and the characteristic behaviors which are crucial for the diagnosis rather than the specific subjective symptoms being experienced. Another diagnostic factor is the rapid and profound improvement of these symptoms in response to exposure to bright early morning light – which makes the response to light treatment something of a ‘diagnostic test’ for SAD.
SAD needs to be distinguished from the increased seasonal incidence of malaise symptoms which would be expected during winter months due to the increased prevalence of infectious diseases in many parts of the world (especially upper respiratory tract infections such as colds and influenza). Indeed, discriminating SAD from malaise could be tricky, since in the first place the main symptom of malaise is physical tiredness or ‘fatigue’ while the main symptom of SAD is mental tiredness or ‘sleepiness’. In the second place there is no reason why a person should not simultaneously suffer from both malaise and SAD, therefore from ‘tiredness’ due to both fatigue and sleepiness.
Indeed, it is plausible that the circadian hormone disruptions which are plausibly associated with SAD might themselves lead to immune activation as a secondary consequence – so that SAD might precipitate malaise.
Bright light therapy for the treatment of SAD
Bright artificial light usually administered early in the early morning seems a very effective treatment for SAD [51], [52] and [53] – this requires no prescription but only the purchase of a device delivering suitably bright light.
Especially-bright artificial light is needed to treat or prevent SAD because the aim is to simulate the kind of brightness that is provided by natural outdoor light. Normal indoor house lighting in a kitchen is only about 400 lux (there is even less light in bedrooms), while outdoors, even on a cloudy day, there is about 10 times greater intensity of light – 4000 lux.
Specialized ‘light boxes’ generate about 10000 lux of suitable-wavelength light at close range. This should be sufficient to cure SAD if administered for 30 minutes - however the subject must usually be sedentary and near to the light. A ‘light visor’ shines the light from much closer to the eye for about the same length of time, while allowing the subject to be mobile. ’Dawn simulators’ are like an alarm clock that brightens up to about 400 lux over a period of about an hour – apparently these also seem to work for some people.
If a person has SAD, then bright early morning light will probably produce a marked improvement in their symptoms within just a few days and continued use of bright light therapy would probably prevent a return of SAD symptoms.
SAD is a syndrome
SAD therefore is an example of diagnosing and treating a syndrome; rather than the symptom based-management model as recommended for Neuroticism, malaise and demotivation.
The delineation of SAD is actually a tremendous success story of psychiatry within the past few decades. And interestingly, (although perhaps not surprisingly) this process of definition and development of treatments happened largely outside of the professional structures of modern psychiatry, presumably because bright light treatment is non-pharmacological and not patentable.
It is a significant paradox (and one which supports the need for self-management in psychiatry) that probably the most valid and most effectively-treatable of recently-defined psychiatric syndromes arose mostly outwith the ‘official’ field of heavily-funded psychiatric research.
Conclusion
The main benefits of the S-DTM approach to self-management of psychiatric symptoms using non-prescription drugs (Table 1) is that it allows people to avoid contact with modern psychiatry and to maintain control of their own therapy and tailor treatment to their own needs. The main limitations are those of limited (or inaccurate) knowledge, difficulties of introspection and self-monitoring, and the restricted range of treatments available without prescription.
Table 1.
Four sub-types of ‘depression’ and first-line agents for their treatment
Sub-type Emotions Treatment
Neuroticism Anxiety, unstable emotions Stabilizing drugs
Malaise Fatigue, pains Analgesics/pain killers
Demotivated Anhedonia – lack positive emotions Energizing drugs
SAD Winter seasonal symptoms Bright morning light
One major advantage of a more specific approach to diagnosing and treating sub-types of ‘depression’ in a symptomatic fashion is that of avoid the damaging consequences of treating demotivated depression with stabilizing drugs. Under the currently prevailing standard model of depressive disorder, it is quite likely that any person with a depressed mood would first be tried-out with the stabilizing and emotion blunting SSRIs; and any observed worsening of mood would probably be blamed on the ‘disease’ of depression instead of the drug. But since demotivated people lack strong positive emotions, SSRIs would probably make them feel worse by blunting their emotions still further. (i.e. if your problem is insufficient pleasurable experience, the last thing you need is to be made even less responsive to pleasurable stimuli.)
The five sub-types of ‘depression’ (including melancholia) are not mutually exclusive. An individual might suffer from two or more of these syndromes simultaneously. Various combinations are possible. For example, a person with depressed mood due to a neurotic and unstable personality might well in addition suffer from seasonal affective disorder during the winters, or from malaise following influenza. Or a person with lack of drive due to a chronic demotivated depression might in addition experience malaise secondary to a chronic infection or autoimmune disease, or SAD. Such subjects might perhaps, rarely, go on to develop severe melancholia.
In such situations of several simultaneous diagnoses, alleviation of one type of symptom could fail to improve mood due the persistence of other types of symptom. More than one type of treatment may be required simultaneously, as in any situation characterized by multiple causal pathologies.
In terms of the treatments available without prescription, the biggest problem is that there is only a limited number of energizing drug treatments available without prescription; and the premier energizing drugs all require prescription at present. On the other hand, St Johns Wort is quite possibly the best all-round stabilizing drug (better than SSRIs), bright light therapy is certainly the best treatment for SAD (short of moving to live in a latitude nearer the equator and with sunnier weather); and there is a reasonable range of effective analgesics available ’over the counter’ for treating malaise – stronger opiates and stronger NSAIDs being the main categories of pain killers currently requiring a prescription.
In sum, the ability of individuals to self-manage ’depression’ is already powerful, and the future looks promising. I hope the above ideas will be useful and will also stimulate debate. And, looking beyond depression, it is possible that the general S-DTM model might be more widely-applicable within psychiatry and medicine, and for enhancement of the quality of life.
References
[1] D. Healy, The antidepressant era, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1998).
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[4] B.G. Charlton, Self-management of psychiatric symptoms using over-the-counter (OTC) psychopharmacology: the S-DTM therapeutic model - self-diagnosis, self-treatment, self-monitoring, Med Hypotheses 65 (2005), pp. 823–828.
[5] B.G. Charlton, Palliative psychopharmacology: a putative speciality to optimise the subjective quality of life, QJM 96 (2003), pp. 375–378.
[6] E.F. Domino, History of modern psychopharmacology: a personal view with an emphasis on antidepressants, Psychosom Med 61 (1999), pp. 591–598.
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[11] A.R. Damasio, The feeling of what happens: body, emotion and the making of consciousness, William Heinemann, London (1999).
[12] W. Mayer-Gross, E. Slater and M. Roth, Clinical psychiatry (third ed.), Bailliere, Tindall & Cassell, London (1969).
[13] M. Fink, Electroshock: healing mental illness, Oxford University Press, NY, USA (1999).
[14] E. Shorter and D. Healy, Shock therapy: a history of electroconvulsive therapy in mental illness, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, USA (2007).
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[17] D. Nutt, K. Demyttenaere, Z. Janka, T. Aarre, M. Bourin and P.L. Canonico et al., The other face of depression, reduced positive affect: the role of catecholamines in causation and cure, J Psychopharmacol 21 (2007), pp. 461–471.
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[23] B.G. Charlton, Why are doctors still prescribing neuroleptics?, QJM 99 (2006), pp. 417–420.
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Wednesday, 22 October 2008
Genospirituality
Genospirituality: Genetic engineering for spiritual and religious enhancement
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; Volume 71: 825-828
Summary
The most frequently discussed role for genetic engineering is in relation to medicine, and a second area which provokes discussion is the use of genetic engineering as an enhancement technology. But one neglected area is the potential use of genetic engineering to increase human spiritual and religious experience – or genospirituality. If technologies are devised which can conveniently and safely engineer genes causal of spiritual and religious behaviours, then people may become able to choose their degree of religiosity or spiritual sensitivity. For instance, it may become possible to increase the likelihood of direct religious experience – i.e. ‘revelation’: the subjective experience of communication from the deity. Or, people may be able to engineer ‘animistic’ thinking, a mode of cognition in which the significant features of the world – such as large animals, trees, distinctive landscape features – are regarded as sentient and intentional beings; so that the individual experiences a personal relationship with the world. Another potentially popular spiritual ability would probably be shamanism; in which states of altered consciousness (e.g. trances, delirium or dreams) are induced and the shaman may undergo the experience of transformations, ‘soul journeys’ and contact with a spirit realm. Ideally, shamanistic consciousness could be modulated such that trances were self-induced only when wanted and when it was safe and convenient; and then switched-off again completely when full alertness and concentration are necessary. It seems likely that there will be trade-offs for increased spirituality; such as people becoming less ‘driven’ to seek status and monetary rewards – as a result of being more spiritually fulfilled people might work less hard and take more leisure. On the other hand, it is also possible that highly moral, altruistic, peaceable and principled behaviours might become more prevalent; and the energy and joyousness of the best churches might spread and be strengthened. Overall, genospirituality would probably be used by people who were unable to have the kind of spiritual or religious experiences which they wanted (or perhaps even needed) in order to lead the kind of life to which they aspired.
***
The genetic engineering imperative
The future continuation of modernizing societies (characterized by growth and progress in science, technology and the economy [1]) may depend upon rapid progress in, and widespread usage of, genetic engineering, since there are numerous processes of natural selection at work in advanced societies which are likely to have been increasing the proportion of deleterious genes and reducing the proportion of socially-useful genes over several generations – at least in developed nations [2], [3] and [4].
Because these demographic trends seem to be so strong – yet unacknowledged and therefore socio-politically irreversible – one probable implication is that the development of genetic engineering (including gene therapy and related stem cell and embryonic biotechnologies, etc.) should be regarded as a social imperative, and pursued as rapidly as possible [5] and [6].
It is widely – although not universally – appreciated that genetic engineering might potentially be very useful. The most frequently discussed role for genetic engineering is in relation to medicine, where deleterious and disease-causing genes could potentially be corrected. Assuming genetic engineering were safe, available and affordable; many people would be pleased to utilize medical genetic engineering.
The second area which provokes discussion is the use of genetic engineering as an enhancement technology. For example, biotechnology will probably be able to increase intelligence, to improve happiness, and to boost physical skills or specific abilities such as music or mathematics. This is more controversial than the medical deployment of genetic engineering – nonetheless it seems probable that safe and effective genetic enhancements would be used by many people if they were given the choice.
But one neglected area of enhancement technology is the potential use of genetic engineering to increase human spiritual and religious experience – genospirituality or genospiritual engineering. I suggest that if, or when, such technologies become a potential choice – then genospiritual engineering will find plenty of takers.
Who would want to use genospiritual technologies?
Genospirituality would not be of interest to everyone, indeed I would expect there might be hostility to the idea both from convinced atheists who regard religious and spiritual matters as false, nonsensical and probably harmful; and from some traditionally religious people who would be suspicious of such apparently un-spontaneous and artificial religiosity.
However, other people will take the view that spirituality and religious experiences are real and definable subjective psychological states or human experiences. Leaving aside the question of whether these real psychological states and experiences refer to anything external, objective or supernatural; it could be argued that spiritual and religious subjective states may be regarded as valuable, desirable and/or biologically adaptive for at least some people in some circumstances.
So, whatever the cause of religiousness and spirituality, even if the cause is not accepted to be supernatural, it is at least plausible that significant numbers of people would choose to have such experiences if they could.
What benefits might be obtained from enhanced religiousness or spirituality?
The quest for a ‘meaningful’ life is of obvious and compelling importance for many people. Of course, there are plenty of people who find life meaningful and significant without the inclusion of any spiritual or religious elements. They are content to live their lives without either spirituality or religion.
But other people – probably the majority of the population in most countries – look for something more, or something else. They may find what they need from one (or more) of the major world religions, or from other churches, or from New Age type spiritual movements.
But a large proportion of the population of most countries apparently do not find what they are looking for in these social structures. These are the people sometimes termed ‘seekers’ [7] whose life is spent searching for ‘meaning’ – this may take the form of trying-out many churches and spiritual movements, exploring art and culture, trying psychopharmacology (either from prescribed drugs or using self-medication with drugs such as alcohol), or sampling from the many types of counselling, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.
However, despite this multiplicity of possible sources of potential assistance, there are people who feel that their life or the world itself is lacking in meaning, they feel alienated and cut-off from experience, they do not feel properly alive [8]. These are the people who may in future seek a solution to their insoluble problems in changing themselves by means of genetic engineering so that they can enhance their spiritual and/or religious capacity.
Other people who practice organized religion may nonetheless wish for more powerful experience, or for the potential to shape their own behaviours in a direction in-line with their hopes and beliefs. They are already religious, but wish to become more so.
Some potential uses of genospiritual engineering
It seems likely that soon the genes associated with an increased religiousness or capacity to have spiritual experiences will become known by genome mapping methods (which link variations in the genome with traits and behaviours) becoming ever-cheaper, more sensitive and reliable, and more powerful. Some of the discovered gene-behaviour associations will on further investigation then turn-out to be causal – and this would potentially enable genetic engineering (and therapy) to modify the behaviours.
If technologies are devised which can conveniently and safely engineer these genes causal of spiritual and religious behaviours, then people may become able to choose their degree of religiosity or spiritual sensitivity. In other words genospirituality may emerge with the potential to become a popular option among spiritual seekers and those engaged in a religious quest.
In order to clarify what might be the uses, I will describe a few sample spiritual or religious experiences that might be enhanced by genospiritual engineering.
It may become possible to increase the likelihood of direct religious experience – i.e. ‘revelation’, or the subjective experience of communication from the deity/deities [9]. In the past it was unusual to experience direct communication with God/s, but perhaps this could be changed, and revelation might become accessible to a much greater number of people.
As another possible option, people may be able to engineer themselves to experience ‘animistic’ thinking – a mode of cognition in which the significant features of the world (such as large animals, trees, distinctive landscape features, or even some types of complex organization or technology) are regarded as sentient and intentional beings [10]. Animistic thinking is typical of early childhood in all societies, and is also believed to be universal among those hunter-gatherers who were the ancestors of modern humans.
One advantage of such changes could be that an animistic person has a personal relationship with the world, because the world is seen as composed of active agents. By contrast, the more typical modern mode of thinking sees the world as an abstract system of passive objects moved by impersonal forces – and this can create feelings of alienation, loneliness and pointlessness.
Another spiritual experience which would likely be popular is shamanism [11] and [12]. Shaman is the term used for the healers and ‘medicine men’ (or women) of many societies who may also do divination and make important decisions for the tribe – and characteristically their work is done by means of states of altered consciousness (e.g. trances, delirium or dreams) in which they may undergo transformations, ‘soul journeys’ and contact a spirit realm.
In modern societies, it seems that only a minority of people are able to enter shamanistic trances without some kind of technological assistance. Some artists and other creative people (including scientists) apparently do important work (for example experience inspiration, or gain sudden insight) in states of somewhat-altered consciousness [8] and [10]. These mental states need not be regarded as supernatural; but may simply offer a different, more associative, way of thinking.
Shamanistic trance states can be difficult or impossible for people to achieve spontaneously and safely, and they may require the use of fairly extreme-measures such as prolonged dancing, drumming in groups, use of mind-impairing hallucinogenic agents or other technologies. Indeed, the measures necessary for modern individuals to induce a trance state at minimum time consuming and at the extreme are dangerous. It may also be several hours or more before the side-effects of a trance, or the method used to induce a trance, wears off, so that the person would be mentally unable to do responsible tasks such as child-care, driving a car, or operating equipment.
However, in principle, it may be possible to make genetic changes such that such trance states might be spontaneously attainable at will. Ideally, shamanistic consciousness could be modulated such that trances could self-induced only when wanted and when it is safe and convenient; and then switched-off again completely when full alertness and concentration are necessary.
Trade-offs and priorities
It seems likely that spirituality and religiousness will not be found to be under the control of single genes or even just a few genes, but rather caused by the combination of suites of alleles, each of which exerts a relatively small effect. Furthermore, some of these genes will probably be pleiotropic or multi-functional – such that altering spirituality will have side-effects in terms of altering other functions or behaviours.
Indeed, except where genospiritual engineering is merely correcting deleterious single mutations; it seems likely that there will be trade-offs (as there are likely to be trade-offs for most conceivable forms of enhancement technology). For example, higher IQ is predictive of longer life expectancy and greater wealth and social status in modern societies – yet increasing IQ may (at least above a certain point) also be associated in modern cultures with impairments from an increased tendency for short-sightedness to reduced fertility rates [13] and [14].
So we should anticipate trade-offs for increased spirituality. One possible example could be the possibility that increasing spiritual fulfilment might make people less ‘driven’ to seek status and monetary rewards. Greater contentment might benefit the individual but perhaps may not benefit society as a whole – if as a result of being more spiritually fulfilled more people worked less hard and took more leisure.
While greater religiousness may be associated with greater happiness, more altruistic behaviours and higher fertility [9], and these may turn-out to be significantly causal – it is possible that genetically-enhanced religiousness might lead to other problems. Perhaps churches would get too powerful and attempt to control science, technology and the economy with disastrous effects. Or perhaps church members might become fanatically loyal and too easily manipulated into dangerous behaviours.
On the other hand, it is also possible that highly moral, altruistic, peaceable and principled behaviours might become more prevalent; and the energy and joyousness of the best churches might spread and be strengthened.
Conclusion
In considering the desirability of genospiritual engineering, it is possible to take an ‘agnostic’ stance over whether or not spiritual and religious experience refers to an external and objective supernatural world. It might be agreed that, whatever the underlying objective facts might be, some types of religiousness and spirituality are plausibly associated with some good outcomes both in terms of subjective states of mind (making people feel better) and in terms of objectively observable social behaviours (making people behave better). There are also some disadvantages of spirituality and religiousness – so the outcome is likely to vary between individuals, according to the extremity of spirituality or religiousness, between religions and spiritualities, and between societies.
Whatever the answer in a specific instance, genospirituality would probably – if available – be used by people who were unable to have the kind of spiritual or religious experiences which they wanted (or perhaps even needed) in order to lead the kind of life to which they aspired.
References
[1] B. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
[2] R.A. Fisher, The genetical theory of natural selection, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK (1930).
[3] W.D. Hamilton, The narrow roads of Gene Land vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2002).
[4] R. Lynn and J. Harvey, The decline of the world’s IQ, Intelligence 36 (2008), pp. 112–120.
[5] D. Pearce, The Hedonistic Imperative. www.hedweb.com [Accessed 10.6.2008].
[6] R. Baschetti, Evolutionary biological origins of morality: Implications for research with human embryonic stem cells, Stem Cells Develop 14 (2005), pp. 239–247.
[7] W.C. Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: baby boomers and the remaking of American religion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA (1999).
[8] B.G. Charlton, Alienation, recovered animism and altered states of consciousness, Med Hypotheses 68 (2007), pp. 727–731.
[9] R. Stark, Discovering God: the origins of the great religions and the evolution of belief, HarperOne, London (2007).
[10] B.G. Charlton, Scientific discovery, peak experiences and the col-oh-nell flastratus! phenomenon, Med Hypotheses 69 (2007), pp. 475–477.
[11] D.C. Noel, The soul of shamanism, Continuum, New York (1998).
[12] R. Hutton, Shamans: Siberian spirituality and the Western Imagination, Hambledon and London, London, UK (2007).
[13] W. Mak, M. Kwan, T. Cheng, K. Chan, R. Cheung and S. Ho, Myopia as a latent phenotype of a pleiotropic gene positively selected for facilitating neurocognitive development, and the effects of environmental factors, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 1209–1215.
[14] R. Lynn and M. Van Court, New evidence for dysgenic fertility for intelligence in the United States, Intelligence 32 (2004), pp. 193–201
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; Volume 71: 825-828
Summary
The most frequently discussed role for genetic engineering is in relation to medicine, and a second area which provokes discussion is the use of genetic engineering as an enhancement technology. But one neglected area is the potential use of genetic engineering to increase human spiritual and religious experience – or genospirituality. If technologies are devised which can conveniently and safely engineer genes causal of spiritual and religious behaviours, then people may become able to choose their degree of religiosity or spiritual sensitivity. For instance, it may become possible to increase the likelihood of direct religious experience – i.e. ‘revelation’: the subjective experience of communication from the deity. Or, people may be able to engineer ‘animistic’ thinking, a mode of cognition in which the significant features of the world – such as large animals, trees, distinctive landscape features – are regarded as sentient and intentional beings; so that the individual experiences a personal relationship with the world. Another potentially popular spiritual ability would probably be shamanism; in which states of altered consciousness (e.g. trances, delirium or dreams) are induced and the shaman may undergo the experience of transformations, ‘soul journeys’ and contact with a spirit realm. Ideally, shamanistic consciousness could be modulated such that trances were self-induced only when wanted and when it was safe and convenient; and then switched-off again completely when full alertness and concentration are necessary. It seems likely that there will be trade-offs for increased spirituality; such as people becoming less ‘driven’ to seek status and monetary rewards – as a result of being more spiritually fulfilled people might work less hard and take more leisure. On the other hand, it is also possible that highly moral, altruistic, peaceable and principled behaviours might become more prevalent; and the energy and joyousness of the best churches might spread and be strengthened. Overall, genospirituality would probably be used by people who were unable to have the kind of spiritual or religious experiences which they wanted (or perhaps even needed) in order to lead the kind of life to which they aspired.
***
The genetic engineering imperative
The future continuation of modernizing societies (characterized by growth and progress in science, technology and the economy [1]) may depend upon rapid progress in, and widespread usage of, genetic engineering, since there are numerous processes of natural selection at work in advanced societies which are likely to have been increasing the proportion of deleterious genes and reducing the proportion of socially-useful genes over several generations – at least in developed nations [2], [3] and [4].
Because these demographic trends seem to be so strong – yet unacknowledged and therefore socio-politically irreversible – one probable implication is that the development of genetic engineering (including gene therapy and related stem cell and embryonic biotechnologies, etc.) should be regarded as a social imperative, and pursued as rapidly as possible [5] and [6].
It is widely – although not universally – appreciated that genetic engineering might potentially be very useful. The most frequently discussed role for genetic engineering is in relation to medicine, where deleterious and disease-causing genes could potentially be corrected. Assuming genetic engineering were safe, available and affordable; many people would be pleased to utilize medical genetic engineering.
The second area which provokes discussion is the use of genetic engineering as an enhancement technology. For example, biotechnology will probably be able to increase intelligence, to improve happiness, and to boost physical skills or specific abilities such as music or mathematics. This is more controversial than the medical deployment of genetic engineering – nonetheless it seems probable that safe and effective genetic enhancements would be used by many people if they were given the choice.
But one neglected area of enhancement technology is the potential use of genetic engineering to increase human spiritual and religious experience – genospirituality or genospiritual engineering. I suggest that if, or when, such technologies become a potential choice – then genospiritual engineering will find plenty of takers.
Who would want to use genospiritual technologies?
Genospirituality would not be of interest to everyone, indeed I would expect there might be hostility to the idea both from convinced atheists who regard religious and spiritual matters as false, nonsensical and probably harmful; and from some traditionally religious people who would be suspicious of such apparently un-spontaneous and artificial religiosity.
However, other people will take the view that spirituality and religious experiences are real and definable subjective psychological states or human experiences. Leaving aside the question of whether these real psychological states and experiences refer to anything external, objective or supernatural; it could be argued that spiritual and religious subjective states may be regarded as valuable, desirable and/or biologically adaptive for at least some people in some circumstances.
So, whatever the cause of religiousness and spirituality, even if the cause is not accepted to be supernatural, it is at least plausible that significant numbers of people would choose to have such experiences if they could.
What benefits might be obtained from enhanced religiousness or spirituality?
The quest for a ‘meaningful’ life is of obvious and compelling importance for many people. Of course, there are plenty of people who find life meaningful and significant without the inclusion of any spiritual or religious elements. They are content to live their lives without either spirituality or religion.
But other people – probably the majority of the population in most countries – look for something more, or something else. They may find what they need from one (or more) of the major world religions, or from other churches, or from New Age type spiritual movements.
But a large proportion of the population of most countries apparently do not find what they are looking for in these social structures. These are the people sometimes termed ‘seekers’ [7] whose life is spent searching for ‘meaning’ – this may take the form of trying-out many churches and spiritual movements, exploring art and culture, trying psychopharmacology (either from prescribed drugs or using self-medication with drugs such as alcohol), or sampling from the many types of counselling, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.
However, despite this multiplicity of possible sources of potential assistance, there are people who feel that their life or the world itself is lacking in meaning, they feel alienated and cut-off from experience, they do not feel properly alive [8]. These are the people who may in future seek a solution to their insoluble problems in changing themselves by means of genetic engineering so that they can enhance their spiritual and/or religious capacity.
Other people who practice organized religion may nonetheless wish for more powerful experience, or for the potential to shape their own behaviours in a direction in-line with their hopes and beliefs. They are already religious, but wish to become more so.
Some potential uses of genospiritual engineering
It seems likely that soon the genes associated with an increased religiousness or capacity to have spiritual experiences will become known by genome mapping methods (which link variations in the genome with traits and behaviours) becoming ever-cheaper, more sensitive and reliable, and more powerful. Some of the discovered gene-behaviour associations will on further investigation then turn-out to be causal – and this would potentially enable genetic engineering (and therapy) to modify the behaviours.
If technologies are devised which can conveniently and safely engineer these genes causal of spiritual and religious behaviours, then people may become able to choose their degree of religiosity or spiritual sensitivity. In other words genospirituality may emerge with the potential to become a popular option among spiritual seekers and those engaged in a religious quest.
In order to clarify what might be the uses, I will describe a few sample spiritual or religious experiences that might be enhanced by genospiritual engineering.
It may become possible to increase the likelihood of direct religious experience – i.e. ‘revelation’, or the subjective experience of communication from the deity/deities [9]. In the past it was unusual to experience direct communication with God/s, but perhaps this could be changed, and revelation might become accessible to a much greater number of people.
As another possible option, people may be able to engineer themselves to experience ‘animistic’ thinking – a mode of cognition in which the significant features of the world (such as large animals, trees, distinctive landscape features, or even some types of complex organization or technology) are regarded as sentient and intentional beings [10]. Animistic thinking is typical of early childhood in all societies, and is also believed to be universal among those hunter-gatherers who were the ancestors of modern humans.
One advantage of such changes could be that an animistic person has a personal relationship with the world, because the world is seen as composed of active agents. By contrast, the more typical modern mode of thinking sees the world as an abstract system of passive objects moved by impersonal forces – and this can create feelings of alienation, loneliness and pointlessness.
Another spiritual experience which would likely be popular is shamanism [11] and [12]. Shaman is the term used for the healers and ‘medicine men’ (or women) of many societies who may also do divination and make important decisions for the tribe – and characteristically their work is done by means of states of altered consciousness (e.g. trances, delirium or dreams) in which they may undergo transformations, ‘soul journeys’ and contact a spirit realm.
In modern societies, it seems that only a minority of people are able to enter shamanistic trances without some kind of technological assistance. Some artists and other creative people (including scientists) apparently do important work (for example experience inspiration, or gain sudden insight) in states of somewhat-altered consciousness [8] and [10]. These mental states need not be regarded as supernatural; but may simply offer a different, more associative, way of thinking.
Shamanistic trance states can be difficult or impossible for people to achieve spontaneously and safely, and they may require the use of fairly extreme-measures such as prolonged dancing, drumming in groups, use of mind-impairing hallucinogenic agents or other technologies. Indeed, the measures necessary for modern individuals to induce a trance state at minimum time consuming and at the extreme are dangerous. It may also be several hours or more before the side-effects of a trance, or the method used to induce a trance, wears off, so that the person would be mentally unable to do responsible tasks such as child-care, driving a car, or operating equipment.
However, in principle, it may be possible to make genetic changes such that such trance states might be spontaneously attainable at will. Ideally, shamanistic consciousness could be modulated such that trances could self-induced only when wanted and when it is safe and convenient; and then switched-off again completely when full alertness and concentration are necessary.
Trade-offs and priorities
It seems likely that spirituality and religiousness will not be found to be under the control of single genes or even just a few genes, but rather caused by the combination of suites of alleles, each of which exerts a relatively small effect. Furthermore, some of these genes will probably be pleiotropic or multi-functional – such that altering spirituality will have side-effects in terms of altering other functions or behaviours.
Indeed, except where genospiritual engineering is merely correcting deleterious single mutations; it seems likely that there will be trade-offs (as there are likely to be trade-offs for most conceivable forms of enhancement technology). For example, higher IQ is predictive of longer life expectancy and greater wealth and social status in modern societies – yet increasing IQ may (at least above a certain point) also be associated in modern cultures with impairments from an increased tendency for short-sightedness to reduced fertility rates [13] and [14].
So we should anticipate trade-offs for increased spirituality. One possible example could be the possibility that increasing spiritual fulfilment might make people less ‘driven’ to seek status and monetary rewards. Greater contentment might benefit the individual but perhaps may not benefit society as a whole – if as a result of being more spiritually fulfilled more people worked less hard and took more leisure.
While greater religiousness may be associated with greater happiness, more altruistic behaviours and higher fertility [9], and these may turn-out to be significantly causal – it is possible that genetically-enhanced religiousness might lead to other problems. Perhaps churches would get too powerful and attempt to control science, technology and the economy with disastrous effects. Or perhaps church members might become fanatically loyal and too easily manipulated into dangerous behaviours.
On the other hand, it is also possible that highly moral, altruistic, peaceable and principled behaviours might become more prevalent; and the energy and joyousness of the best churches might spread and be strengthened.
Conclusion
In considering the desirability of genospiritual engineering, it is possible to take an ‘agnostic’ stance over whether or not spiritual and religious experience refers to an external and objective supernatural world. It might be agreed that, whatever the underlying objective facts might be, some types of religiousness and spirituality are plausibly associated with some good outcomes both in terms of subjective states of mind (making people feel better) and in terms of objectively observable social behaviours (making people behave better). There are also some disadvantages of spirituality and religiousness – so the outcome is likely to vary between individuals, according to the extremity of spirituality or religiousness, between religions and spiritualities, and between societies.
Whatever the answer in a specific instance, genospirituality would probably – if available – be used by people who were unable to have the kind of spiritual or religious experiences which they wanted (or perhaps even needed) in order to lead the kind of life to which they aspired.
References
[1] B. Charlton and P. Andras, The modernization imperative, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK (2003).
[2] R.A. Fisher, The genetical theory of natural selection, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK (1930).
[3] W.D. Hamilton, The narrow roads of Gene Land vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK (2002).
[4] R. Lynn and J. Harvey, The decline of the world’s IQ, Intelligence 36 (2008), pp. 112–120.
[5] D. Pearce, The Hedonistic Imperative. www.hedweb.com [Accessed 10.6.2008].
[6] R. Baschetti, Evolutionary biological origins of morality: Implications for research with human embryonic stem cells, Stem Cells Develop 14 (2005), pp. 239–247.
[7] W.C. Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: baby boomers and the remaking of American religion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA (1999).
[8] B.G. Charlton, Alienation, recovered animism and altered states of consciousness, Med Hypotheses 68 (2007), pp. 727–731.
[9] R. Stark, Discovering God: the origins of the great religions and the evolution of belief, HarperOne, London (2007).
[10] B.G. Charlton, Scientific discovery, peak experiences and the col-oh-nell flastratus! phenomenon, Med Hypotheses 69 (2007), pp. 475–477.
[11] D.C. Noel, The soul of shamanism, Continuum, New York (1998).
[12] R. Hutton, Shamans: Siberian spirituality and the Western Imagination, Hambledon and London, London, UK (2007).
[13] W. Mak, M. Kwan, T. Cheng, K. Chan, R. Cheung and S. Ho, Myopia as a latent phenotype of a pleiotropic gene positively selected for facilitating neurocognitive development, and the effects of environmental factors, Med Hypotheses 66 (2006), pp. 1209–1215.
[14] R. Lynn and M. Van Court, New evidence for dysgenic fertility for intelligence in the United States, Intelligence 32 (2004), pp. 193–201
Tuesday, 30 September 2008
Pioneering studies of IQ
Pioneering studies of IQ by G.H. Thomson and J.F. Duff – An example of established knowledge subsequently ‘hidden in plain sight’
Bruce G. Charlton. Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 71: 625-628
Summary
Perhaps the earliest authoritative measurement of a social class gradient in IQ, with a stratification of occupations among the parents of children with different IQs, is seen in two fascinating papers published in 1923 and 1929 in the British Journal of Psychology. The authors were GH Thomson and JF Duff (both of whom were later knighted) and the papers’ main findings were confirmed by later researchers. Results of an intelligence test administered to 13419 children aged 11–12 were analyzed according to parent’s occupation. The average children’s IQ at extremes of social class among their parents included clergymen-121, teachers-116 and bankers and managers-112 at the upper end; while at the lower end there were ‘cripples and invalids’-94, cattlemen-93, hawkers and chimneysweeps-91, and the ‘insane, criminal’-88. More than 100 specific categories of parental occupations were then combined into 13 social classes, with their children’s average IQ as follows: Professional-112; Managers-110; Higher Commercial-109; Army, Navy, Police, Postmen-106; Shopkeeping-105; Engineers [ie. apprenticed craftsmen, such as mining engineers]-103; Foremen-103; Building trades-102; Metal workers, shipbuilders-101; Miscellaneous industrial workers-101; Miners and quarrymen-98; Agriculture-98; Labourers-96. A follow-up study compared an ‘intelligent’ group (IQ 136 plus) with a matched IQ 95–105 ‘control’ group. IQ testing at age 11–12 was predictive of teacher’s reports of higher levels of intelligence and health at age 16; and better performance in official examinations. The occupations of fathers, grandfathers and uncles were consistent with occupation being indicative of ‘an inherited quality’ (i.e. IQ) and there was regression from parents to grandparents and uncles among the ’intelligent’ but not among controls. Other findings included a wider variance in intelligence among boys than girls, and descriptions of the predictive value of IQ in estimating future education, examinations and health. Although the distribution, heredity and predictive value of childhood IQ measurements was once quite widely understood, for the last few decades IQ research has been regarded as morally-suspect and IQ scientists subjected to vilification, persecution and sanctions. Ignorance and misunderstanding of IQ is the norm among intellectual elites in schools, universities, the media, politics and public administration. Consequently IQ research is actively-shunned, and has near-zero influence on public policies. Since this area of science has been so comprehensively ‘disappeared’ from public consciousness as a result of socio-political pressure; it seems probable that other similarly solid and vital domains of scientific knowledge may also be ‘hidden in plain sight’.
***
Perhaps the earliest authoritative measurement of a social class gradient among the parents of children with different IQs is seen in two fascinating papers published in 1923 [1] and 1929 [2] in the British Journal of Psychology.
The authors were Godfrey H Thomson and James Fitzjames Duff – both of whom were later knighted. The research was done from Armstrong College of Durham University in the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, England – Armstrong College later became a part of King’s College which then became the independent University of Newcastle [3]. Thomson was Professor of Education in Newcastle, then later moved to the Chair of Education in Edinburgh from where he provided ‘Eleven plus’ examinations for much of Britain [4] and [5]. Duff moved to Manchester University and ultimately returned to Durham to become Warden (equivalent to Vice Chancellor – the senior administrative position in UK universities) of the collegiate Durham division of the university [3] and [6]. Duff is credited with initiating Durham’s ascent from a tiny theological and teaching college to become one of the premier UK universities [3].
As well as the intrinsic fascination of these trail-blazing researches, the two papers provoke reflection on the effect on science of changes in the national socio-political ethos. The fate of Sir Godfrey and Sir James’s papers provides an example of how once widely-accepted knowledge, generated by very senior and prestigious establishment figures, can later become generally disregarded or even denied, despite abundant scientific confirmation and elaboration by later researchers.
It seems that even in modern times, and in a liberal democratic society such as the UK where information is freely and easily accessible, scientific knowledge can apparently be ‘disappeared’ when it comes into conflict with the dominant socio-political agenda: can become, as it were, ‘hidden in plain sight’.
The social distribution of intelligence in Northumberland
The 1923 Duff and Thomson study began when an intelligence test was administered on February 24 1922, to all children aged 11 and 12 at state elementary schools in Northumberland excluding Newcastle and Tynemouth; yielding an enormous sample of 13419 children (6930 boys; 6695 girls). Further information on parental occupation was provided by teachers. The children’s IQ was then tabulated according to their parent’s (implicitly father’s) occupation.
Average IQ was 99.6, 877 children had an IQ of 120 plus and 1337 had an IQ less than 80. Boys exhibited a slightly larger apparent standard deviation than girls (no specific numbers were given by the authors), with a greater proportion of the most intelligent children being boys (IQ 130-9 - 80 boys, 49 girls; IQ above 140 – 12 boys, 4 girls) and also a greater proportion of the least intelligent being boys (IQ below 80 – 715 boys, 622 girls).
Although private schools were not sampled, and consequently there were no children with parents of the very highest social classes, nonetheless the parents social classes ranged widely from clergymen, lawyers, teachers, chemists, bankers and managers at the top; to farm labourers, brewery and mineral-water workers, ‘cripples and invalids’, cattlemen, ‘hawkers and chimneysweeps’ and the ‘insane, criminal’ at the bottom.
The average IQ (rounded to the nearest integer) of the children of some well-represented extremes of social class among the parents was clergymen-121, teachers-116 and bankers and managers-112 at the upper end; while at the lower end there were farm labourers-94; brewery workers-94; ‘cripples and invalids’-94, cattlemen-93, hawkers and chimneysweeps-91, and the ‘insane, criminal’-88. In between, by far the largest number of parents was the 5659 coal miners (average IQ of children-98).
One surprising statistic is that the children of n = 16 ‘Doctors, dentists, vets’ [i.e. veterinarians] had a reported average IQ of only 102 – the same as builders and below plumbers! My guess is that (in this particular time and place) most rural or semi-rural resident ’doctors, dentists, vets’ who sent their children to state schools were not college-educated, but had instead been trained by apprenticeship: more like craftsmen than professionals.
More than 100 specific categories of parental occupations were then combined into 13 social classes, with their children’s average IQ as follows: Professional-112; Managers-110; Higher Commercial-109; Army, Navy, Police, Postmen-106; Shopkeeping-105; Engineers [ie. apprenticed craftsmen, such as mining engineers]-103; Foremen-103; Building trades-102; Metal workers, shipbuilders-101; Miscellaneous industrial workers-101; Miners and quarrymen-98; Agriculture-98; Low grade occupations, labourers-96.
Finally the parents occupations were divided into two simple divisions of ‘brain work’ having an average IQ of 107 versus ‘hand work’ having an average of IQ 99.
Duff and Thomson also comment that although there are striking stepwise average differences in IQ by parental social class, the parental occupation according to the 13 social classes only predicted child’s IQ with a Pearson correlation of 0.28. In other words, each social class contained a range of IQs, with considerable overlapping between classes.
Following-up the children of highest intelligence
The 1929 Duff paper was a follow-up of the highest-IQ children (IQ 136 plus) which were termed the ‘intelligent’ group with an IQ 95-105 ‘control’ group matched from the same schools. Parents and teachers were asked for information, but the replies were incomplete; and data was obtained on only 64 ‘intelligent’ and 28 ‘control’ subjects.
It was found that IQ testing at age 11–12 was predictive of teacher’s reports of higher levels of intelligence and health at age 16; higher career aspirations; and also better performance in the Durham School Certificate examinations, especially the highest levels of examination results.
Occupations of fathers, grandfathers and uncles were surveyed in terms of their social class. The most striking analysis was in terms of the percentage of fathers that were at the level of skilled labourer or higher: there were 64% of fathers in the intelligent group at this level and 28% of fathers in the control group. By comparison among the intelligent group 49% of grandfathers and 52% of uncles were at this level; while in the control group 33% of grandfathers and 40% of uncles.
Duff commented that this pattern was consistent with occupation being indicative of ‘an inherited quality’ with a regression from parents to grandparents and uncles among the intelligent – but no consistent regression among the average control group when the data as a whole is analyzed. He concludes: “Intelligence is not the sole factor that determines occupation; but that it is an important factor cannot be doubted.”
Science then and now
Reading the articles after eighty years there are striking differences when compared with modern practice. Most surprisingly there is no Reference section and only five footnotes (in the earliest paper). My impression is that this paucity is partly due to embryonic nature of the field – with very little prior relevant published research; and partly due to the fact that the authors were writing for a small, familiar audience of scientific peers, who did not need to have spelled-out precisely how this piece of research fitted into the development of the subject. In those days background assumptions were often simply taken for granted, rather than referenced. The methodology was, by modern standards, skimpy – supplemented with an offer to supply extra detail to ‘anyone interested’. The general tone of these papers is therefore somewhat like a letter addressed to other members of an exclusive club.
At this early stage in the science, researchers were almost simultaneously devising methods and applying them to gather data. The social class categories used were generated specifically for this paper, and apparently on ‘commonsense’ grounds – since no detail is given about the principles underlying the classification.
Yet, for all the apparent arbitrariness and subjectivism of style (as is seems to us nowadays), and the incompleteness of the follow-up study, these two papers seem to have been both prescient and essentially correct (as judged by subsequent knowledge) and their main findings have been substantially replicated or expanded:
1. It has been confirmed that men have a wider variance in intelligence than women – with a greater proportion of both high-scorers and low-scorers [7].
2. Although Duff and Thomson’s studies did not directly measure parental IQ, the authors’ assumption was that occupations reflected IQ. Many later studies have confirmed that there is a significant social class/occupational gradient in average IQ – the size of this gradient depending upon the degree of specificity with which social class is defined e.g. [8], [9], [10] and [11].
3. Thomson and Duff’s 1923 analysis demonstrated what later epidemiologists of the 1990s re-discovered for health and social class [12] – that socio-economic differences are not absolute or fixed in size; rather the gradient is much greater when socio-economic position is analyzed precisely than when measured imprecisely. Here there was a gradient of 33 IQ points from 121 down to 88 when 100-plus specific occupations are used; a gradient of 16 IQ points from 112 down to 96 when specific occupations are collapsed into 13 groups; and a gradient of only 8 IQ points from 107 down to 99 for the dual categories of head-work versus hand-work.
4. Childhood IQ has been confirmed to be predictive of future educational (and also occupational) attainments e.g. [13], [14], [15] and [16].
5. It has been confirmed that childhood measurements of IQ are predictive of subsequent health e.g. [9], [17] and [18].
6. IQ is confirmed to be substantially heritable, and exhibits regression to the mean consistent with the degree of heritability e.g. [13], [14] and [15].
The contemporary invisibility of IQ research
Duff and Thomson were both knighted, ending their careers as highly respected and influential figures in the UK educational establishment. The main findings of these papers from the 1920s have been amply replicated in the modern consensus on IQ [e.g. [20] and see above]. And the basic understanding of the distribution, heredity and predictive value of childhood IQ measurements which they pioneered was widely appreciated.
However, for the last few decades IQ research has generally been regarded as a morally-suspect activity and the candid discussion of IQ is taboo among the intellectual elites in schools, universities, the media, politics and public administration. IQ scientists have been – and still are – subjected to vilification, persecution and sanctions [15], [19], [21], [22] and [23]. This 80 year old knowledge is typically regarded by mainstream public discourse as surprising, shocking and controversial – or the facts may even be denied outright.
Consequently, despite its remarkable prescience and importance, this pioneering work on IQ, plus three generations of supporting scientific literature, is ignored or actively-shunned – and has near-zero influence on modern public policies.
Since this area of science has so been comprehensively ‘disappeared’ from public consciousness in the face of socio-political pressure, it seems probable that other similarly solid and vital domains of scientific knowledge may also be hidden in plain sight.
References
[1] J.F. Duff and G.H. Thomson, The social and geographical distribution of intelligence in Northumberland, Brit J Psychol 14 (1923), pp. 193–198.
[2] J.F. Duff, Children of high intelligence: a following-up enquiry, Brit J Psychol 29 (1929), pp. 413–438.
[3] E.M. Bettenson, The University of Newcastle upon Tyne: a historical introduction, 1834–1971, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK (1971).
[4] G.H. Thomson, Education of an Englishman, Moray House, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh (1968).
[5] Wikipedia. Godfrey Thomson. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godfrey_Thomson; 2008 [accessed 10.07.2008].
[6] Sir James Fitzjames Duff. thePeerage.com: A genealogical survey of the peerage of Britain as well as the royal families of Europe. http://thepeerage.com/p18060.htm; 2008 [accessed 10.07.2008].
[7] L.V. Hedges and A. Nowell, Sex differences in mental test scores, variability, and numbers of high-scoring individuals, Science 269 (1995), pp. 41–45.
[8] M. Argyle, The psychology of social class, Routledge, London (1994).
[9] C.L. Hart, I.J. Deary, M.D. Taylor, P.L. MacKinnon, G. Davey Smith and L.J. Whalley et al., Scottish mental health survey 1932 linked to the Midspan Studies: a prospective investigation of childhood intelligence and future health, Public Health 117 (2003), pp. 187–195.
[10] D. Nettle, Intelligence and class mobility in the British population, Brit J Psychol 94 (2003), pp. 551–561.
[11] R. Lynn and T. Vanhanen, IQ and global inequality, Washington Summit, Augusta, Georgia, USA (2006).
[12] G.D. Smith, M.J. Shipley and G. Rose, Magnitude and causes of socioeconomic differentials in mortality: further evidence from the Whitehall Study, J Epidemiol Commun Health 44 (1990), pp. 265–270.
[13] L.M. Terman and L.H. Oden, The gifted child grows up: Volume 4 (Twenty five years follow up of a superior group), Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, USA (1959).
[14] A.R. Jensen, The g factor Praeger: the science of mental ability, Westport, CT, USA (1998) p. 15.
[15] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve, Forbes, New York (1994).
[16] G. Park, D. Lubinski and C.P. Benbow, Contrasting intellectual patterns predict creativity in the arts and sciences, Psychol Sci 18 (2007), pp. 948–952.
[17] G.D. Batty, I.J. Deary and G.S. Gottfredson, Premorbid (early life) IQ and later mortality risk: systematic review, Annals Epidemiol 17 (2007), pp. 278–288.
[18] L.S. Gottfredson, Intelligence: is it the epidemiologists elusive ‘fundamental cause’ of social class inequalities in health?, J Personality Social Psychol 86 (2004), pp. 174–199.
[19] H.J. Eysenck, Rebel with a cause: autobiography of Hans Eysenck, W.H. Allen, London (1990).
[20] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Amer Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[21] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
[22] L.S. Gottfredson, Applying double-standards to ‘divisive’ ideas, Perspect Psychol Sci 2 (2007), pp. 216–220.
[23] J. Malloy, James Watson tells the inconvenient truth: faces the consequences, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1081–1091.
Bruce G. Charlton. Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 71: 625-628
Summary
Perhaps the earliest authoritative measurement of a social class gradient in IQ, with a stratification of occupations among the parents of children with different IQs, is seen in two fascinating papers published in 1923 and 1929 in the British Journal of Psychology. The authors were GH Thomson and JF Duff (both of whom were later knighted) and the papers’ main findings were confirmed by later researchers. Results of an intelligence test administered to 13419 children aged 11–12 were analyzed according to parent’s occupation. The average children’s IQ at extremes of social class among their parents included clergymen-121, teachers-116 and bankers and managers-112 at the upper end; while at the lower end there were ‘cripples and invalids’-94, cattlemen-93, hawkers and chimneysweeps-91, and the ‘insane, criminal’-88. More than 100 specific categories of parental occupations were then combined into 13 social classes, with their children’s average IQ as follows: Professional-112; Managers-110; Higher Commercial-109; Army, Navy, Police, Postmen-106; Shopkeeping-105; Engineers [ie. apprenticed craftsmen, such as mining engineers]-103; Foremen-103; Building trades-102; Metal workers, shipbuilders-101; Miscellaneous industrial workers-101; Miners and quarrymen-98; Agriculture-98; Labourers-96. A follow-up study compared an ‘intelligent’ group (IQ 136 plus) with a matched IQ 95–105 ‘control’ group. IQ testing at age 11–12 was predictive of teacher’s reports of higher levels of intelligence and health at age 16; and better performance in official examinations. The occupations of fathers, grandfathers and uncles were consistent with occupation being indicative of ‘an inherited quality’ (i.e. IQ) and there was regression from parents to grandparents and uncles among the ’intelligent’ but not among controls. Other findings included a wider variance in intelligence among boys than girls, and descriptions of the predictive value of IQ in estimating future education, examinations and health. Although the distribution, heredity and predictive value of childhood IQ measurements was once quite widely understood, for the last few decades IQ research has been regarded as morally-suspect and IQ scientists subjected to vilification, persecution and sanctions. Ignorance and misunderstanding of IQ is the norm among intellectual elites in schools, universities, the media, politics and public administration. Consequently IQ research is actively-shunned, and has near-zero influence on public policies. Since this area of science has been so comprehensively ‘disappeared’ from public consciousness as a result of socio-political pressure; it seems probable that other similarly solid and vital domains of scientific knowledge may also be ‘hidden in plain sight’.
***
Perhaps the earliest authoritative measurement of a social class gradient among the parents of children with different IQs is seen in two fascinating papers published in 1923 [1] and 1929 [2] in the British Journal of Psychology.
The authors were Godfrey H Thomson and James Fitzjames Duff – both of whom were later knighted. The research was done from Armstrong College of Durham University in the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, England – Armstrong College later became a part of King’s College which then became the independent University of Newcastle [3]. Thomson was Professor of Education in Newcastle, then later moved to the Chair of Education in Edinburgh from where he provided ‘Eleven plus’ examinations for much of Britain [4] and [5]. Duff moved to Manchester University and ultimately returned to Durham to become Warden (equivalent to Vice Chancellor – the senior administrative position in UK universities) of the collegiate Durham division of the university [3] and [6]. Duff is credited with initiating Durham’s ascent from a tiny theological and teaching college to become one of the premier UK universities [3].
As well as the intrinsic fascination of these trail-blazing researches, the two papers provoke reflection on the effect on science of changes in the national socio-political ethos. The fate of Sir Godfrey and Sir James’s papers provides an example of how once widely-accepted knowledge, generated by very senior and prestigious establishment figures, can later become generally disregarded or even denied, despite abundant scientific confirmation and elaboration by later researchers.
It seems that even in modern times, and in a liberal democratic society such as the UK where information is freely and easily accessible, scientific knowledge can apparently be ‘disappeared’ when it comes into conflict with the dominant socio-political agenda: can become, as it were, ‘hidden in plain sight’.
The social distribution of intelligence in Northumberland
The 1923 Duff and Thomson study began when an intelligence test was administered on February 24 1922, to all children aged 11 and 12 at state elementary schools in Northumberland excluding Newcastle and Tynemouth; yielding an enormous sample of 13419 children (6930 boys; 6695 girls). Further information on parental occupation was provided by teachers. The children’s IQ was then tabulated according to their parent’s (implicitly father’s) occupation.
Average IQ was 99.6, 877 children had an IQ of 120 plus and 1337 had an IQ less than 80. Boys exhibited a slightly larger apparent standard deviation than girls (no specific numbers were given by the authors), with a greater proportion of the most intelligent children being boys (IQ 130-9 - 80 boys, 49 girls; IQ above 140 – 12 boys, 4 girls) and also a greater proportion of the least intelligent being boys (IQ below 80 – 715 boys, 622 girls).
Although private schools were not sampled, and consequently there were no children with parents of the very highest social classes, nonetheless the parents social classes ranged widely from clergymen, lawyers, teachers, chemists, bankers and managers at the top; to farm labourers, brewery and mineral-water workers, ‘cripples and invalids’, cattlemen, ‘hawkers and chimneysweeps’ and the ‘insane, criminal’ at the bottom.
The average IQ (rounded to the nearest integer) of the children of some well-represented extremes of social class among the parents was clergymen-121, teachers-116 and bankers and managers-112 at the upper end; while at the lower end there were farm labourers-94; brewery workers-94; ‘cripples and invalids’-94, cattlemen-93, hawkers and chimneysweeps-91, and the ‘insane, criminal’-88. In between, by far the largest number of parents was the 5659 coal miners (average IQ of children-98).
One surprising statistic is that the children of n = 16 ‘Doctors, dentists, vets’ [i.e. veterinarians] had a reported average IQ of only 102 – the same as builders and below plumbers! My guess is that (in this particular time and place) most rural or semi-rural resident ’doctors, dentists, vets’ who sent their children to state schools were not college-educated, but had instead been trained by apprenticeship: more like craftsmen than professionals.
More than 100 specific categories of parental occupations were then combined into 13 social classes, with their children’s average IQ as follows: Professional-112; Managers-110; Higher Commercial-109; Army, Navy, Police, Postmen-106; Shopkeeping-105; Engineers [ie. apprenticed craftsmen, such as mining engineers]-103; Foremen-103; Building trades-102; Metal workers, shipbuilders-101; Miscellaneous industrial workers-101; Miners and quarrymen-98; Agriculture-98; Low grade occupations, labourers-96.
Finally the parents occupations were divided into two simple divisions of ‘brain work’ having an average IQ of 107 versus ‘hand work’ having an average of IQ 99.
Duff and Thomson also comment that although there are striking stepwise average differences in IQ by parental social class, the parental occupation according to the 13 social classes only predicted child’s IQ with a Pearson correlation of 0.28. In other words, each social class contained a range of IQs, with considerable overlapping between classes.
Following-up the children of highest intelligence
The 1929 Duff paper was a follow-up of the highest-IQ children (IQ 136 plus) which were termed the ‘intelligent’ group with an IQ 95-105 ‘control’ group matched from the same schools. Parents and teachers were asked for information, but the replies were incomplete; and data was obtained on only 64 ‘intelligent’ and 28 ‘control’ subjects.
It was found that IQ testing at age 11–12 was predictive of teacher’s reports of higher levels of intelligence and health at age 16; higher career aspirations; and also better performance in the Durham School Certificate examinations, especially the highest levels of examination results.
Occupations of fathers, grandfathers and uncles were surveyed in terms of their social class. The most striking analysis was in terms of the percentage of fathers that were at the level of skilled labourer or higher: there were 64% of fathers in the intelligent group at this level and 28% of fathers in the control group. By comparison among the intelligent group 49% of grandfathers and 52% of uncles were at this level; while in the control group 33% of grandfathers and 40% of uncles.
Duff commented that this pattern was consistent with occupation being indicative of ‘an inherited quality’ with a regression from parents to grandparents and uncles among the intelligent – but no consistent regression among the average control group when the data as a whole is analyzed. He concludes: “Intelligence is not the sole factor that determines occupation; but that it is an important factor cannot be doubted.”
Science then and now
Reading the articles after eighty years there are striking differences when compared with modern practice. Most surprisingly there is no Reference section and only five footnotes (in the earliest paper). My impression is that this paucity is partly due to embryonic nature of the field – with very little prior relevant published research; and partly due to the fact that the authors were writing for a small, familiar audience of scientific peers, who did not need to have spelled-out precisely how this piece of research fitted into the development of the subject. In those days background assumptions were often simply taken for granted, rather than referenced. The methodology was, by modern standards, skimpy – supplemented with an offer to supply extra detail to ‘anyone interested’. The general tone of these papers is therefore somewhat like a letter addressed to other members of an exclusive club.
At this early stage in the science, researchers were almost simultaneously devising methods and applying them to gather data. The social class categories used were generated specifically for this paper, and apparently on ‘commonsense’ grounds – since no detail is given about the principles underlying the classification.
Yet, for all the apparent arbitrariness and subjectivism of style (as is seems to us nowadays), and the incompleteness of the follow-up study, these two papers seem to have been both prescient and essentially correct (as judged by subsequent knowledge) and their main findings have been substantially replicated or expanded:
1. It has been confirmed that men have a wider variance in intelligence than women – with a greater proportion of both high-scorers and low-scorers [7].
2. Although Duff and Thomson’s studies did not directly measure parental IQ, the authors’ assumption was that occupations reflected IQ. Many later studies have confirmed that there is a significant social class/occupational gradient in average IQ – the size of this gradient depending upon the degree of specificity with which social class is defined e.g. [8], [9], [10] and [11].
3. Thomson and Duff’s 1923 analysis demonstrated what later epidemiologists of the 1990s re-discovered for health and social class [12] – that socio-economic differences are not absolute or fixed in size; rather the gradient is much greater when socio-economic position is analyzed precisely than when measured imprecisely. Here there was a gradient of 33 IQ points from 121 down to 88 when 100-plus specific occupations are used; a gradient of 16 IQ points from 112 down to 96 when specific occupations are collapsed into 13 groups; and a gradient of only 8 IQ points from 107 down to 99 for the dual categories of head-work versus hand-work.
4. Childhood IQ has been confirmed to be predictive of future educational (and also occupational) attainments e.g. [13], [14], [15] and [16].
5. It has been confirmed that childhood measurements of IQ are predictive of subsequent health e.g. [9], [17] and [18].
6. IQ is confirmed to be substantially heritable, and exhibits regression to the mean consistent with the degree of heritability e.g. [13], [14] and [15].
The contemporary invisibility of IQ research
Duff and Thomson were both knighted, ending their careers as highly respected and influential figures in the UK educational establishment. The main findings of these papers from the 1920s have been amply replicated in the modern consensus on IQ [e.g. [20] and see above]. And the basic understanding of the distribution, heredity and predictive value of childhood IQ measurements which they pioneered was widely appreciated.
However, for the last few decades IQ research has generally been regarded as a morally-suspect activity and the candid discussion of IQ is taboo among the intellectual elites in schools, universities, the media, politics and public administration. IQ scientists have been – and still are – subjected to vilification, persecution and sanctions [15], [19], [21], [22] and [23]. This 80 year old knowledge is typically regarded by mainstream public discourse as surprising, shocking and controversial – or the facts may even be denied outright.
Consequently, despite its remarkable prescience and importance, this pioneering work on IQ, plus three generations of supporting scientific literature, is ignored or actively-shunned – and has near-zero influence on modern public policies.
Since this area of science has so been comprehensively ‘disappeared’ from public consciousness in the face of socio-political pressure, it seems probable that other similarly solid and vital domains of scientific knowledge may also be hidden in plain sight.
References
[1] J.F. Duff and G.H. Thomson, The social and geographical distribution of intelligence in Northumberland, Brit J Psychol 14 (1923), pp. 193–198.
[2] J.F. Duff, Children of high intelligence: a following-up enquiry, Brit J Psychol 29 (1929), pp. 413–438.
[3] E.M. Bettenson, The University of Newcastle upon Tyne: a historical introduction, 1834–1971, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK (1971).
[4] G.H. Thomson, Education of an Englishman, Moray House, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh (1968).
[5] Wikipedia. Godfrey Thomson. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godfrey_Thomson; 2008 [accessed 10.07.2008].
[6] Sir James Fitzjames Duff. thePeerage.com: A genealogical survey of the peerage of Britain as well as the royal families of Europe. http://thepeerage.com/p18060.htm; 2008 [accessed 10.07.2008].
[7] L.V. Hedges and A. Nowell, Sex differences in mental test scores, variability, and numbers of high-scoring individuals, Science 269 (1995), pp. 41–45.
[8] M. Argyle, The psychology of social class, Routledge, London (1994).
[9] C.L. Hart, I.J. Deary, M.D. Taylor, P.L. MacKinnon, G. Davey Smith and L.J. Whalley et al., Scottish mental health survey 1932 linked to the Midspan Studies: a prospective investigation of childhood intelligence and future health, Public Health 117 (2003), pp. 187–195.
[10] D. Nettle, Intelligence and class mobility in the British population, Brit J Psychol 94 (2003), pp. 551–561.
[11] R. Lynn and T. Vanhanen, IQ and global inequality, Washington Summit, Augusta, Georgia, USA (2006).
[12] G.D. Smith, M.J. Shipley and G. Rose, Magnitude and causes of socioeconomic differentials in mortality: further evidence from the Whitehall Study, J Epidemiol Commun Health 44 (1990), pp. 265–270.
[13] L.M. Terman and L.H. Oden, The gifted child grows up: Volume 4 (Twenty five years follow up of a superior group), Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, USA (1959).
[14] A.R. Jensen, The g factor Praeger: the science of mental ability, Westport, CT, USA (1998) p. 15.
[15] R.J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, The bell curve, Forbes, New York (1994).
[16] G. Park, D. Lubinski and C.P. Benbow, Contrasting intellectual patterns predict creativity in the arts and sciences, Psychol Sci 18 (2007), pp. 948–952.
[17] G.D. Batty, I.J. Deary and G.S. Gottfredson, Premorbid (early life) IQ and later mortality risk: systematic review, Annals Epidemiol 17 (2007), pp. 278–288.
[18] L.S. Gottfredson, Intelligence: is it the epidemiologists elusive ‘fundamental cause’ of social class inequalities in health?, J Personality Social Psychol 86 (2004), pp. 174–199.
[19] H.J. Eysenck, Rebel with a cause: autobiography of Hans Eysenck, W.H. Allen, London (1990).
[20] U. Neisser et al., Intelligence: knowns and unknowns, Amer Psychol 51 (1996), pp. 77–101.
[21] I.J. Deary, Intelligence: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
[22] L.S. Gottfredson, Applying double-standards to ‘divisive’ ideas, Perspect Psychol Sci 2 (2007), pp. 216–220.
[23] J. Malloy, James Watson tells the inconvenient truth: faces the consequences, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1081–1091.
Wednesday, 27 August 2008
Figureheads, ghost-writers and quant bloggers
Figureheads, ghost-writers and pseudonymous quant bloggers: The recent evolution of authorship in science publishing
Editorial - Bruce G. Charlton, Editor-in-Chief–Medical Hypotheses
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 71: 475-480
doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2008.06.023
Summary
Traditionally, science has been published only under the proper names and postal addresses of the scientists who did the work. This is no longer the case, and over recent decades science authorship has fundamentally changed its character. At one extreme, prestigious scientists writing from high status institutions are used as mere figureheads to publish research that has been performed, analyzed and ‘ghost-written’ by commercial organizations. At the other extreme ‘quant bloggers’ are publishing real science with their personal identity shielded by pseudonyms and writing from internet addresses that give no indication of their location or professional affiliation. Yet the paradox is that while named high status scientists from famous institutions are operating with suspect integrity (e.g. covertly acting as figureheads) and minimal accountability (i.e. failing to respond to substantive criticism); pseudonymous bloggers – of mostly unknown identity, unknown education or training, and unknown address – are publishing interesting work and interacting with their critics on the internet. And at the same time as ‘official’ and professional science is increasingly timid careerist and dull; the self-organized, amateur realm of science blogs displays curiosity, scientific motivation, accountability, responsibility – and often considerable flair and skill. Quant bloggers and other internet scientists are, however, usually dependent on professional scientists to generate databases. But professional science has become highly constrained by non-scientific influences: increasingly sluggish, rigid, bureaucratic, managerial, and enmeshed with issues of pseudo-ethics, political correctness, public relations, politics and marketing. So it seems that professional science needs the quant bloggers. One possible scenario is that professional scientists may in future continue to be paid to do the plodding business of generating raw data (dull work that no one would do unless they were paid); but these same professional scientists (functioning essentially as either project managers or technicians) may be found to lack the boldness, flair, sheer ‘smarts’ or genuine interest in the subject to make sense of what they have discovered. Some branches of future science may then come to depend on a swarm of gifted ‘amateurs’ somewhat like the current quant bloggers; for analysis and integration of their data, for understanding its implications, and for speculating freely about the potential applications.
***
Traditionally, science has been published only under the proper names of the scientists who did the work. This is no longer the case, and – especially in the biomedical sciences – authorship has fundamentally changed its character. At one extreme, real names of prestigious scientists writing from high status institutions are used as figureheads to publish research that has been performed, analyzed and written by commercial organizations; while at the other extreme ‘quant bloggers’ are engaged in real science but with their personal identity shielded by pseudonyms and from web addresses that give no indication of their status, location, education or professional affiliation.
Personal status and accountability
Early science was mostly not published, but on the contrary kept secret and exploited for personal prestige and commercial gain [1]. It was an innovation of the Royal Society of London that science ought to be published – and the incentive to publish was gaining personal status among that elite Royal Society, and similar scientific societies. The earliest ‘publications’ were in the form of letters to other society members (which explains why the articles in the journal Nature are still called ‘letters’) and in the form of talks and lectures (records of which were preserved in volumes called ‘proceedings’ or ‘annals’ of these societies). The convention arose that status would be awarded to the first to publish new information – and these conventions served to overcome the incentive for secrecy and instead rapidly disseminate science which enabled the new recording and sharing of knowledge to lead to more rapid progress [1].
The tradition of publishing science only under real names served a variety of functions. One was self-interest, in that each scientist was usually motivated by competing for scientific prestige by striving to be the first to publish an idea, technique or new data. This required each publication to have an unique provenance. Scientific prestige was primarily allocated by logging and totalling each individual’s accumulated contribution.
Scientific accountability was another important principle. Anonymous publication was generally forbidden because it was unaccountable – if nobody knew who was making an anonymous assertion the author could not be called-upon to provide clarification or defend their data or reasoning; whereas by contrast science published under a specific person’s name was regarded as their personal responsibility. For accountability to be enforced also required that the work be published from a postal address, since most scientific communication that was not face to face, was done by postal correspondence. From this practice of named scientists publishing from specific (usually institutional) addresses, there emerged an informal convention that a scientist should respond to all reasonable written queries about their work, even up to the point of sharing raw data where substantive issues were involved.
For example, if a substantive critical letter was published in a professional venue referring to an scientific author’s work, then the author was obliged to respond; and the research was considered suspect until such time as the author had responded adequately to deal with the criticism. If an author failed to respond to a critical letter, or responded irrelevantly or without answering the substantive criticisms, then it would usually be assumed that – by default – the criticism had been correct.
So, in science, by contrast with the law, a scientist accused of error in a rational communication from a competent critic was traditionally regarded as “guilty until proven innocent” – this being a consequence of regarding newly-published science as merely conjectural (or ‘false’) until it had been validated by further (preferably independent) research.
The unaccountability of high status scientists
Over the past few decades, these ideas of personal responsibility and accountability seem to have broken down – at least in medical science. Scientists’ names no longer guarantee the provenance of the work published under that name, and a specific name and address no longer implies accountability. Especially has accountability broken down in relation to the highest status scientists.
From numerous informal observations over the past two decades, it seems clear that high status scientists are no longer required to respond to requests for clarification or to published criticism, but can ignore it with impunity. The traditional default that criticism was regarded as correct unless it was refuted, no longer seems to apply to high status scientists when a criticism comes from a lower-status scientist. This applies even when clarification is clearly necessary, when the criticism is potentially devastating, and even when critical communications are published as articles or correspondence in high impact journals. The fact is that, nowadays, high status scientists are seldom sanctioned in any way for ignoring criticism by the scientific community.
The current default assumption seems to be along the lines that high status scientists are always right unless and until conclusively demonstrated otherwise – in other words, high status scientists are now regarded as innocent until proved guilty. So that science published under the name of high status scientists from prestigious institutions is apparently regarded as intrinsically correct until such time as it is proven false.
And high status scientists are now placed under no obligation to co-operate with their critics in discovering the truth – in the first place high status scientists usually do not need to acknowledge or respond at all to criticism; if they respond they are not compelled to provide relevant refutation but are allowed to bluster, change the subject, and make ad hominem attacks on their critics; requests for extra methodological detail or raw data can be ignored. Sometimes, criticism is met with legal threats – for example accusations of libel.
This kind of blocking of critique happens precisely because the onus of proof in science has now reversed – at least in relation to high status scientists. I believe that it is precisely this lack of accountability of high status scientists for sloppiness, error, incompleteness or bias in their published research which has made it possible for them to act as figureheads to publish other people’s work under their own name.
Because of the prevailing lack of accountability, published scientific work is now seen as an undivided benefit for a scientist’s career. The consequence is a system in which the more research that is published under an author’s name, the better for that authors career: good quality published science accrues credit while poor quality published science does not attract sanctions and does not diminish the reputation of the scientist who published it – at worst bad science is merely ignored. And anyway, the ‘badness’ of science done by high status scientists must now be established using a new – and extraordinarily demanding – standard of proof.
The peer review cartel of high status scientists
The deep, underlying cause of the immunity to criticism of high status scientists is probably the greater role of peer review in science, and the domination of peer review by a minority (‘cartel’) of high status scientists. Peer review mechanisms are now used not only to evaluate completed science, but pre-emptively in allocating resources.
Modern science uses peer review mechanisms at many levels: defining overall research strategies, awarding research grants, granting ethical permission to do research, journal refereeing processes prior to publication, organizing conferences… indeed it is hard to find an area of science which is not dominated by peer review. This means that a low status scientist can have their career damaged (perhaps without knowing it) if s/he makes a powerful enemy of a high status scientist who is influential within the all-important peer review system. The problem is that peer review processes are systematically biased to give more weight to negative than positive evaluations (ie. a bad report has a greater impact on the review process than a good report [2]) – so having a high status enemy involved in the peer review system is likely to have a significantly damaging impact on a scientist’s career.
The result is that high status scientists are feared to the extent that the mass of lower-ranked scientists will not call them to account for their errors and misdemeanours in case they provoke reprisals via the peer review systems.
Another very important result of the centrality of peer review is that while traditional science was mostly a marketplace of ideas, modern science is dominated by a ‘cartel’ of scientists who are powerful within peer review and have quasi-monopolistic power. (In economics a cartel usually refers to a group of persons or organizations who cooperate to act as if a monopoly; to control production and prices and to protect themselves against competition, for example by lobbying government to introduce favourable regulations.)
Many of the trends of modern science which de-emphasize actual science and increase the emphasis on the activities which surround science can be understood as ways in which the cartel of high status scientists protect their research organizations (hence their own reputations) against competition. I am thinking of the increasing requirements for planning and coordination, the vast expansion of procedural and financial regulations, or the shift away from judging science by its accomplishments towards judging science by its ‘inputs’ (e.g. grant income, expensive technologies, numbers employed) – i.e. the whole style of ‘Big Science’ [3].
It is noticeable that the most prestigious branches of biomedical science (i.e. ‘prestigious’ as defined by the peer review cartel) are high capitalization specialties. For example, over the past couple of decades the use of extremely expensive brain imaging technologies in neuroscience has served to restrict participation in this field to those few who could afford to buy, maintain and run the latest version of these machines. Or, in the recent era of the human genome project, the high status laboratories were those which could afford to employ armies of sequencers. To those outside these fields it sometimes seemed as if the published output of novel brain imaging and large scale sequencing projects did not need to earn its status as breakthrough major science but rather had been pre-defined as significant.
The cost of technologies such as brain scanners, or huge work forces such as gene sequencers, therefore constitutes the minimum ‘capital’ a scientist must have before s/he can enter the marketplace of science and compete with the ‘incumbent’ high status scientists. The ‘market entry’ costs for doing high status science have risen and risen, and are now extraordinarily high compared with a few decades ago. In sum, high market entry costs (enforced by peer review) function as barriers which protect the scientific incumbents from competition.
Furthermore, once in the market and competing, the ‘overheads’ of science are another formidable barrier. The resources required for grant applications (including increasingly detailed planning, costing, billing and financial estimates) and for recruiting (including the expansion of employment and safety regulations) mean that the resources required for running a research team may now be very great indeed. A small researcher needs to cover the same fixed costs, therefore their overheads are higher relative to the actual science; and the large scale scientist also has the advantage of economies of scale. In the not-so-distant past a scientist could start work on a shoe-string and build-up; now the combination of high capital barriers and increased fixed administration costs are so onerous and so time-consuming as to make it extremely difficult, or impossible, for aspiring individuals or small teams to compete with the incumbent high status scientists.
How did this situation arise? Simple: all that high status scientists needed to do to secure their protected cartel was to acquiesce to external (e.g. governmental) pressures to over-regulate science. Incumbent high status scientists, who had already built-up a large administrative infrastructure, found that over-regulation gifted them with enormous structural advantages in perpetuating their scientific ‘empires’ because of this new protection against rivals.
The benefits to incumbent high status scientists may explain why science has been so easily subjected to over-regulation with barely a squeak of protest, and no significant resistance from the cartel of high status scientists who also control the peer review systems.
The greatly increased power of this cartel of incumbent high status scientists who participate in the ever-more-important processes of peer review is probably the underlying reason why high status scientists have now become de facto unaccountable – and how they can get away with flagrant scientific abuses such as ghost-writing.
Science ghost-writing
It has long been the case that high status scientists function as team leaders; and that their role in much research published under their name is managerial. However, it has recently emerged that some high status scientists – associated with the most prestigious universities and research institutions – do not even manage the research which appears under their names; but are functioning as little more than a figurehead, their names merely tagged-onto ready-made scientific publications for which the research was planned, prosecuted and analyzed by pharmaceutical companies, and the writing was done by commercial agencies [4], [5], [6] and [7].
The bottom-line function of such ghost-written publications is marketing rather than scientific enquiry. Naturally, the aim is that the named ‘authors’ of ghost-written publications should be high status scientists from prestigious institutions. Such names are apparently forthcoming. Very high impact ‘peer reviewed’ journals often publish such papers, and such papers attract more than usual levels of citations [4]. After all, they are professionally-written, have famous authors from famous institutions – and publication may be followed by very large scale purchases of thousands of ‘offprints’ (used by corporations for marketing purposes) which may yield extra income of many tens of thousands of dollars for journals.
This practice of figurehead authorship has been largely ignored, and the many individuals who have functioned as figureheads for ghost-written research have not yet been investigated or called to account – again it seems that immunity has been de facto accorded to high status scientists for practices which are dubious at best and corrupt at worst.
It seems apparent that although contemporary medical science still operates using the superficial forms of traditional science, such as crediting scientific publications to individuals identified by personal names and specific postal addresses, behind this apparent continuity the scientific practices have utterly transformed such that many of the most prestigious modern scientists now wield scientific power without scientific accountability.
The pseudonymous ‘quant bloggers’
It is a bizarre paradox of modern science that while named high status scientists with postal addresses at prestigious institutions are operating with suspect integrity and minimal accountability; by contrast, science bloggers – of (mostly) pseudonymous and unknown identity, unknown education or training, and writing from unknown addresses – are nonetheless publishing interesting work and having exciting interactions, on the internet.
The recent emergence of (frequently pseudonymous) ‘quant bloggers’ and other internet scientists is a phenomenon at the opposite extreme from the high status scientists who seem to be operating as individuals but in fact function as ‘front-men’ (or women) for anonymous teams with inscrutable agendas.
In what follows I provide only a very selective picture of blog science, based on my personal interests and tastes, and noting only the blogs that I have been reading for months or years. Clearly there are many, many other examples – but the blogosphere is now so vast that no individual can experience and evaluate more than a tiny fraction of the output.
The term ‘quant blogger’ (i.e. quantitative analysis blogger) was invented by Steve Sailer [8] who is the practicing ‘blogfather’ of an interconnected group of mostly pseudonymous bloggers that have been in some way inspired by Sailer’s example and his (often distinctly ‘non-PC’) interests in issues such as IQ; immigration; evolution; education; politics and sports – often analyzed by sex, class and race. Sailer has blogged many interesting quantitative analyses, including an influential hypothesis of the relationship between ‘affordable family formation’ and politics in the USA.
The Sailer-influenced quant bloggers include the pseudonymous Razib who hosts GNXP (Gene Expression) which includes several other quant bloggers such as the pseudonymous Agnostic and (his real name) Jason Malloy [9]. Other pseudonymous quant bloggers in this Sailer-descended group include Inductivist [10], Half-Sigma [11] and the Audacious Epigone [12].
Unrelated, not-Sailer-connected, quant bloggers include Engram who posts almost daily quantitative analyses on mainly socio-political or policy topics [13]; and who discovered an inverse relationship between capital punishment and murder rates in four developed nations. La Griffe du Lion has focused on IQ [14] and developed many hypotheses including the ‘smart fraction’ theory of economic development. The Climate Audit blog has been influential in its field, and is associated with discrediting the ‘hockey stick’ graph that was supposed to illustrate climate change over the past millenium [15].
In most of the above examples, typically the blogger presents analysis, tabulations or graphs of already-published data sets – such as population surveys or questionnaires; or does a re-analysis of a published scientific paper; or synthesizes several studies; or draws out applied implications of published science which are neglected (or obfuscated) by the primary authors. (Of course, quant bloggers usually also post chatty ‘opinion’ pieces and responses to current news.)
Although often the blogger’s true identify and location may be unknown, there is an accountability mechanism via the comments section of the blog which follows the primary blog posting, and potentially also by other blogs linking and critiquing the original blog. Most of the above named bloggers form a broadly-sympathetic network who comment-on and critique each others work. But the crucial point is that a quant blogger must behave such as to earn the trust of their readers – and this typically involves engaging with their critics, and refuting relevant criticisms to the satisfaction of their readership.
Presumably, the reason why most of these bloggers are pseudonymous is their subject matter: they are often dealing with population differences in relation to sex, class and race; focusing on controversial matters such as IQ, personality, educational achievement or crime. At present, in USA and Western Europe – and especially in universities – such issues are virtually taboo except when treated using elaborately euphemistic language and reaching politically correct conclusions [16]. This means that mainstream human sciences may err in ignoring robust, but politically-incorrect, interpretations for their data [e.g. 17].
Pseudonyms are used because scientists (and other media commentators) who work in these non-PC ‘taboo’ fields may be subject to the risk of denunciation by the media and to professional or institutional arbiters of coercive political correctness. The sanctions have ranged from the moderate unpleasantness of unpopularity among professional colleagues, up to deliberate misrepresentation and false ascription of opinions or motivations, mob-vilification, hate campaigns, persecution by employers (failure to get academic jobs, failure to get promotion or tenure, sacking etc.), legal sanctions, aggression and personal violence. Even the most distinguished scientists are vulnerable to onslaught: the hugely-influential psychologist Hans Eysenck was one of the earliest victims from the mid 1960s, the sociobiologist E.O Wilson was similarly attacked in the late 1970s, and more recently Harvard President Larry Summers and the great James D. Watson both lost their jobs after transgressing the bound of political correctness.
In such a context of endemic intimidation, a scientist’s natural wish to get maximum personal credit for their research by using their real name and address is often overwhelmed by sheer survival instinct – and pseudonyms and web addresses are regarded as safer. For such reasons, some of the most exciting and potentially important current scientific discourse is forced to be pseudonymous; even though – in a more honest, tolerant and rational world – it would surely be better to have scientific discussion between people using their real identities.
The future of internet science
There is a sense in which quant bloggers and other internet scientists are secondary-to and dependent-on professional science – which, after all, typically generates the databases. Professional scientists have the infrastructure, time and resources to do large and sustained projects; by contrast amateur or part-time internet scientists usually have only their brains, web-community, computers and spare time. On the other hand, a great deal of highly-prestigious mainstream quantitative science, published in the highest impact journals, also involves re-analysis and combination of already-collected data.
But professional science is significantly disadvantaged too, because modern science has become so highly constrained. Even compared with just a few decades ago, modern science is now over-planned, slow, rigid and bureaucratic. In fact, much modern science often has little to do with ‘science’ at all – but has become more like some kind of mega ‘project management’ task, analogous to building a new public hospital or major road bridge. Such large-scale and long-term activity makes modern scientists risk averse – and the leaders will avoid doing or saying things which may prevent them winning the next major research grant upon which depends their livelihood (and also the livelihoods of the large research teams which depend upon the leader’s continued ability to raise funds). So the nimble quant bloggers, lacking such baggage, are able do and say things which the professional scientists cannot, or will not, do and say.
The pedestrian nature of modern science means that the activity will fail to attract and retain the kind of creative people it used to. Future professional scientists will probably tend to comprise a large majority of specialized technicians being co-ordinated by a small minority of high status project managers. Both technicians and managers will typically lack the genuine ‘interest in the subject’ of old-style scientists – they will also lack boldness, flair, and either the motivation or the ability to get the most from the information they have gathered. Then professional science will become dependent on people like the science bloggers to understand and analyze their data.
One possible future outcome is that professional scientists will continue to be essential for the routine, highly-organized business of collecting or generating raw data. Professional scientists might therefore get paid to plod through the mechanical work of accumulating information (work that people will only do when they are paid to do it). But since they are too dull and timid to understand what they have amassed, gifted amateur scientists will be needed for the clever work. And spontaneously creative people like the best quant bloggers actually enjoy this kind of activity.
‘Serious’ science must have space for the fun of discovery, the play of skill, and the joy of insight; and this seems to be an increasing role for the blogosphere.
References
[1] D.L. Hull, Science as a process, Chicago University Press, Chicago (1988).
[2] D.F. Horrobin, The philosophical basis of peer review and the suppression of innovation, JAMA 263 (1990), pp. 1438–1441. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (70)
[3] J. Ziman, Real science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2000).
[4] D. Healy and D. Cattell, Interface between authorship, industry and science in the domain of therapeutics, Brit J Psychiat 183 (2003), pp. 22–27.
[5] S. Sismondo, Ghost management: how much of the medical literature is shaped behind the scenes by the pharmaceutical industry?, PLoS Med 4 (2007), pp. 1429–1433.
[6] B. Moffat and C. Elliott, Ghost marketing: pharmaceutical companies and ghostwritten joural articles, Perspect Biol Med 50 (2007), pp. 18–31.
[7] D. Healy, Mania: a short history of bipolar disorder, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, USA (2008).
[8] Sailer S. Steve Sailer’s iSteve Blog,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[9] Gene expression,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[10] Inductivist,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[11] Half Sigma,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[12] The Audacious Epigone.; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[13] Engram. Back Talk,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[14] La Griffe du Lion,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[15] McIntyre S. Climate Audit,; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
[16] B.G. Charlton, First a hero of science and now a martyr to science: the James Watson Affair – Political correctness crushes free scientific communication, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1077–1080.
[17] Half Sigma. Breastfeeding does not cause higher IQ.; 2008 [accessed 25.06.08].
Editorial - Bruce G. Charlton, Editor-in-Chief–Medical Hypotheses
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 71: 475-480
doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2008.06.023
Summary
Traditionally, science has been published only under the proper names and postal addresses of the scientists who did the work. This is no longer the case, and over recent decades science authorship has fundamentally changed its character. At one extreme, prestigious scientists writing from high status institutions are used as mere figureheads to publish research that has been performed, analyzed and ‘ghost-written’ by commercial organizations. At the other extreme ‘quant bloggers’ are publishing real science with their personal identity shielded by pseudonyms and writing from internet addresses that give no indication of their location or professional affiliation. Yet the paradox is that while named high status scientists from famous institutions are operating with suspect integrity (e.g. covertly acting as figureheads) and minimal accountability (i.e. failing to respond to substantive criticism); pseudonymous bloggers – of mostly unknown identity, unknown education or training, and unknown address – are publishing interesting work and interacting with their critics on the internet. And at the same time as ‘official’ and professional science is increasingly timid careerist and dull; the self-organized, amateur realm of science blogs displays curiosity, scientific motivation, accountability, responsibility – and often considerable flair and skill. Quant bloggers and other internet scientists are, however, usually dependent on professional scientists to generate databases. But professional science has become highly constrained by non-scientific influences: increasingly sluggish, rigid, bureaucratic, managerial, and enmeshed with issues of pseudo-ethics, political correctness, public relations, politics and marketing. So it seems that professional science needs the quant bloggers. One possible scenario is that professional scientists may in future continue to be paid to do the plodding business of generating raw data (dull work that no one would do unless they were paid); but these same professional scientists (functioning essentially as either project managers or technicians) may be found to lack the boldness, flair, sheer ‘smarts’ or genuine interest in the subject to make sense of what they have discovered. Some branches of future science may then come to depend on a swarm of gifted ‘amateurs’ somewhat like the current quant bloggers; for analysis and integration of their data, for understanding its implications, and for speculating freely about the potential applications.
***
Traditionally, science has been published only under the proper names of the scientists who did the work. This is no longer the case, and – especially in the biomedical sciences – authorship has fundamentally changed its character. At one extreme, real names of prestigious scientists writing from high status institutions are used as figureheads to publish research that has been performed, analyzed and written by commercial organizations; while at the other extreme ‘quant bloggers’ are engaged in real science but with their personal identity shielded by pseudonyms and from web addresses that give no indication of their status, location, education or professional affiliation.
Personal status and accountability
Early science was mostly not published, but on the contrary kept secret and exploited for personal prestige and commercial gain [1]. It was an innovation of the Royal Society of London that science ought to be published – and the incentive to publish was gaining personal status among that elite Royal Society, and similar scientific societies. The earliest ‘publications’ were in the form of letters to other society members (which explains why the articles in the journal Nature are still called ‘letters’) and in the form of talks and lectures (records of which were preserved in volumes called ‘proceedings’ or ‘annals’ of these societies). The convention arose that status would be awarded to the first to publish new information – and these conventions served to overcome the incentive for secrecy and instead rapidly disseminate science which enabled the new recording and sharing of knowledge to lead to more rapid progress [1].
The tradition of publishing science only under real names served a variety of functions. One was self-interest, in that each scientist was usually motivated by competing for scientific prestige by striving to be the first to publish an idea, technique or new data. This required each publication to have an unique provenance. Scientific prestige was primarily allocated by logging and totalling each individual’s accumulated contribution.
Scientific accountability was another important principle. Anonymous publication was generally forbidden because it was unaccountable – if nobody knew who was making an anonymous assertion the author could not be called-upon to provide clarification or defend their data or reasoning; whereas by contrast science published under a specific person’s name was regarded as their personal responsibility. For accountability to be enforced also required that the work be published from a postal address, since most scientific communication that was not face to face, was done by postal correspondence. From this practice of named scientists publishing from specific (usually institutional) addresses, there emerged an informal convention that a scientist should respond to all reasonable written queries about their work, even up to the point of sharing raw data where substantive issues were involved.
For example, if a substantive critical letter was published in a professional venue referring to an scientific author’s work, then the author was obliged to respond; and the research was considered suspect until such time as the author had responded adequately to deal with the criticism. If an author failed to respond to a critical letter, or responded irrelevantly or without answering the substantive criticisms, then it would usually be assumed that – by default – the criticism had been correct.
So, in science, by contrast with the law, a scientist accused of error in a rational communication from a competent critic was traditionally regarded as “guilty until proven innocent” – this being a consequence of regarding newly-published science as merely conjectural (or ‘false’) until it had been validated by further (preferably independent) research.
The unaccountability of high status scientists
Over the past few decades, these ideas of personal responsibility and accountability seem to have broken down – at least in medical science. Scientists’ names no longer guarantee the provenance of the work published under that name, and a specific name and address no longer implies accountability. Especially has accountability broken down in relation to the highest status scientists.
From numerous informal observations over the past two decades, it seems clear that high status scientists are no longer required to respond to requests for clarification or to published criticism, but can ignore it with impunity. The traditional default that criticism was regarded as correct unless it was refuted, no longer seems to apply to high status scientists when a criticism comes from a lower-status scientist. This applies even when clarification is clearly necessary, when the criticism is potentially devastating, and even when critical communications are published as articles or correspondence in high impact journals. The fact is that, nowadays, high status scientists are seldom sanctioned in any way for ignoring criticism by the scientific community.
The current default assumption seems to be along the lines that high status scientists are always right unless and until conclusively demonstrated otherwise – in other words, high status scientists are now regarded as innocent until proved guilty. So that science published under the name of high status scientists from prestigious institutions is apparently regarded as intrinsically correct until such time as it is proven false.
And high status scientists are now placed under no obligation to co-operate with their critics in discovering the truth – in the first place high status scientists usually do not need to acknowledge or respond at all to criticism; if they respond they are not compelled to provide relevant refutation but are allowed to bluster, change the subject, and make ad hominem attacks on their critics; requests for extra methodological detail or raw data can be ignored. Sometimes, criticism is met with legal threats – for example accusations of libel.
This kind of blocking of critique happens precisely because the onus of proof in science has now reversed – at least in relation to high status scientists. I believe that it is precisely this lack of accountability of high status scientists for sloppiness, error, incompleteness or bias in their published research which has made it possible for them to act as figureheads to publish other people’s work under their own name.
Because of the prevailing lack of accountability, published scientific work is now seen as an undivided benefit for a scientist’s career. The consequence is a system in which the more research that is published under an author’s name, the better for that authors career: good quality published science accrues credit while poor quality published science does not attract sanctions and does not diminish the reputation of the scientist who published it – at worst bad science is merely ignored. And anyway, the ‘badness’ of science done by high status scientists must now be established using a new – and extraordinarily demanding – standard of proof.
The peer review cartel of high status scientists
The deep, underlying cause of the immunity to criticism of high status scientists is probably the greater role of peer review in science, and the domination of peer review by a minority (‘cartel’) of high status scientists. Peer review mechanisms are now used not only to evaluate completed science, but pre-emptively in allocating resources.
Modern science uses peer review mechanisms at many levels: defining overall research strategies, awarding research grants, granting ethical permission to do research, journal refereeing processes prior to publication, organizing conferences… indeed it is hard to find an area of science which is not dominated by peer review. This means that a low status scientist can have their career damaged (perhaps without knowing it) if s/he makes a powerful enemy of a high status scientist who is influential within the all-important peer review system. The problem is that peer review processes are systematically biased to give more weight to negative than positive evaluations (ie. a bad report has a greater impact on the review process than a good report [2]) – so having a high status enemy involved in the peer review system is likely to have a significantly damaging impact on a scientist’s career.
The result is that high status scientists are feared to the extent that the mass of lower-ranked scientists will not call them to account for their errors and misdemeanours in case they provoke reprisals via the peer review systems.
Another very important result of the centrality of peer review is that while traditional science was mostly a marketplace of ideas, modern science is dominated by a ‘cartel’ of scientists who are powerful within peer review and have quasi-monopolistic power. (In economics a cartel usually refers to a group of persons or organizations who cooperate to act as if a monopoly; to control production and prices and to protect themselves against competition, for example by lobbying government to introduce favourable regulations.)
Many of the trends of modern science which de-emphasize actual science and increase the emphasis on the activities which surround science can be understood as ways in which the cartel of high status scientists protect their research organizations (hence their own reputations) against competition. I am thinking of the increasing requirements for planning and coordination, the vast expansion of procedural and financial regulations, or the shift away from judging science by its accomplishments towards judging science by its ‘inputs’ (e.g. grant income, expensive technologies, numbers employed) – i.e. the whole style of ‘Big Science’ [3].
It is noticeable that the most prestigious branches of biomedical science (i.e. ‘prestigious’ as defined by the peer review cartel) are high capitalization specialties. For example, over the past couple of decades the use of extremely expensive brain imaging technologies in neuroscience has served to restrict participation in this field to those few who could afford to buy, maintain and run the latest version of these machines. Or, in the recent era of the human genome project, the high status laboratories were those which could afford to employ armies of sequencers. To those outside these fields it sometimes seemed as if the published output of novel brain imaging and large scale sequencing projects did not need to earn its status as breakthrough major science but rather had been pre-defined as significant.
The cost of technologies such as brain scanners, or huge work forces such as gene sequencers, therefore constitutes the minimum ‘capital’ a scientist must have before s/he can enter the marketplace of science and compete with the ‘incumbent’ high status scientists. The ‘market entry’ costs for doing high status science have risen and risen, and are now extraordinarily high compared with a few decades ago. In sum, high market entry costs (enforced by peer review) function as barriers which protect the scientific incumbents from competition.
Furthermore, once in the market and competing, the ‘overheads’ of science are another formidable barrier. The resources required for grant applications (including increasingly detailed planning, costing, billing and financial estimates) and for recruiting (including the expansion of employment and safety regulations) mean that the resources required for running a research team may now be very great indeed. A small researcher needs to cover the same fixed costs, therefore their overheads are higher relative to the actual science; and the large scale scientist also has the advantage of economies of scale. In the not-so-distant past a scientist could start work on a shoe-string and build-up; now the combination of high capital barriers and increased fixed administration costs are so onerous and so time-consuming as to make it extremely difficult, or impossible, for aspiring individuals or small teams to compete with the incumbent high status scientists.
How did this situation arise? Simple: all that high status scientists needed to do to secure their protected cartel was to acquiesce to external (e.g. governmental) pressures to over-regulate science. Incumbent high status scientists, who had already built-up a large administrative infrastructure, found that over-regulation gifted them with enormous structural advantages in perpetuating their scientific ‘empires’ because of this new protection against rivals.
The benefits to incumbent high status scientists may explain why science has been so easily subjected to over-regulation with barely a squeak of protest, and no significant resistance from the cartel of high status scientists who also control the peer review systems.
The greatly increased power of this cartel of incumbent high status scientists who participate in the ever-more-important processes of peer review is probably the underlying reason why high status scientists have now become de facto unaccountable – and how they can get away with flagrant scientific abuses such as ghost-writing.
Science ghost-writing
It has long been the case that high status scientists function as team leaders; and that their role in much research published under their name is managerial. However, it has recently emerged that some high status scientists – associated with the most prestigious universities and research institutions – do not even manage the research which appears under their names; but are functioning as little more than a figurehead, their names merely tagged-onto ready-made scientific publications for which the research was planned, prosecuted and analyzed by pharmaceutical companies, and the writing was done by commercial agencies [4], [5], [6] and [7].
The bottom-line function of such ghost-written publications is marketing rather than scientific enquiry. Naturally, the aim is that the named ‘authors’ of ghost-written publications should be high status scientists from prestigious institutions. Such names are apparently forthcoming. Very high impact ‘peer reviewed’ journals often publish such papers, and such papers attract more than usual levels of citations [4]. After all, they are professionally-written, have famous authors from famous institutions – and publication may be followed by very large scale purchases of thousands of ‘offprints’ (used by corporations for marketing purposes) which may yield extra income of many tens of thousands of dollars for journals.
This practice of figurehead authorship has been largely ignored, and the many individuals who have functioned as figureheads for ghost-written research have not yet been investigated or called to account – again it seems that immunity has been de facto accorded to high status scientists for practices which are dubious at best and corrupt at worst.
It seems apparent that although contemporary medical science still operates using the superficial forms of traditional science, such as crediting scientific publications to individuals identified by personal names and specific postal addresses, behind this apparent continuity the scientific practices have utterly transformed such that many of the most prestigious modern scientists now wield scientific power without scientific accountability.
The pseudonymous ‘quant bloggers’
It is a bizarre paradox of modern science that while named high status scientists with postal addresses at prestigious institutions are operating with suspect integrity and minimal accountability; by contrast, science bloggers – of (mostly) pseudonymous and unknown identity, unknown education or training, and writing from unknown addresses – are nonetheless publishing interesting work and having exciting interactions, on the internet.
The recent emergence of (frequently pseudonymous) ‘quant bloggers’ and other internet scientists is a phenomenon at the opposite extreme from the high status scientists who seem to be operating as individuals but in fact function as ‘front-men’ (or women) for anonymous teams with inscrutable agendas.
In what follows I provide only a very selective picture of blog science, based on my personal interests and tastes, and noting only the blogs that I have been reading for months or years. Clearly there are many, many other examples – but the blogosphere is now so vast that no individual can experience and evaluate more than a tiny fraction of the output.
The term ‘quant blogger’ (i.e. quantitative analysis blogger) was invented by Steve Sailer [8] who is the practicing ‘blogfather’ of an interconnected group of mostly pseudonymous bloggers that have been in some way inspired by Sailer’s example and his (often distinctly ‘non-PC’) interests in issues such as IQ; immigration; evolution; education; politics and sports – often analyzed by sex, class and race. Sailer has blogged many interesting quantitative analyses, including an influential hypothesis of the relationship between ‘affordable family formation’ and politics in the USA.
The Sailer-influenced quant bloggers include the pseudonymous Razib who hosts GNXP (Gene Expression) which includes several other quant bloggers such as the pseudonymous Agnostic and (his real name) Jason Malloy [9]. Other pseudonymous quant bloggers in this Sailer-descended group include Inductivist [10], Half-Sigma [11] and the Audacious Epigone [12].
Unrelated, not-Sailer-connected, quant bloggers include Engram who posts almost daily quantitative analyses on mainly socio-political or policy topics [13]; and who discovered an inverse relationship between capital punishment and murder rates in four developed nations. La Griffe du Lion has focused on IQ [14] and developed many hypotheses including the ‘smart fraction’ theory of economic development. The Climate Audit blog has been influential in its field, and is associated with discrediting the ‘hockey stick’ graph that was supposed to illustrate climate change over the past millenium [15].
In most of the above examples, typically the blogger presents analysis, tabulations or graphs of already-published data sets – such as population surveys or questionnaires; or does a re-analysis of a published scientific paper; or synthesizes several studies; or draws out applied implications of published science which are neglected (or obfuscated) by the primary authors. (Of course, quant bloggers usually also post chatty ‘opinion’ pieces and responses to current news.)
Although often the blogger’s true identify and location may be unknown, there is an accountability mechanism via the comments section of the blog which follows the primary blog posting, and potentially also by other blogs linking and critiquing the original blog. Most of the above named bloggers form a broadly-sympathetic network who comment-on and critique each others work. But the crucial point is that a quant blogger must behave such as to earn the trust of their readers – and this typically involves engaging with their critics, and refuting relevant criticisms to the satisfaction of their readership.
Presumably, the reason why most of these bloggers are pseudonymous is their subject matter: they are often dealing with population differences in relation to sex, class and race; focusing on controversial matters such as IQ, personality, educational achievement or crime. At present, in USA and Western Europe – and especially in universities – such issues are virtually taboo except when treated using elaborately euphemistic language and reaching politically correct conclusions [16]. This means that mainstream human sciences may err in ignoring robust, but politically-incorrect, interpretations for their data [e.g. 17].
Pseudonyms are used because scientists (and other media commentators) who work in these non-PC ‘taboo’ fields may be subject to the risk of denunciation by the media and to professional or institutional arbiters of coercive political correctness. The sanctions have ranged from the moderate unpleasantness of unpopularity among professional colleagues, up to deliberate misrepresentation and false ascription of opinions or motivations, mob-vilification, hate campaigns, persecution by employers (failure to get academic jobs, failure to get promotion or tenure, sacking etc.), legal sanctions, aggression and personal violence. Even the most distinguished scientists are vulnerable to onslaught: the hugely-influential psychologist Hans Eysenck was one of the earliest victims from the mid 1960s, the sociobiologist E.O Wilson was similarly attacked in the late 1970s, and more recently Harvard President Larry Summers and the great James D. Watson both lost their jobs after transgressing the bound of political correctness.
In such a context of endemic intimidation, a scientist’s natural wish to get maximum personal credit for their research by using their real name and address is often overwhelmed by sheer survival instinct – and pseudonyms and web addresses are regarded as safer. For such reasons, some of the most exciting and potentially important current scientific discourse is forced to be pseudonymous; even though – in a more honest, tolerant and rational world – it would surely be better to have scientific discussion between people using their real identities.
The future of internet science
There is a sense in which quant bloggers and other internet scientists are secondary-to and dependent-on professional science – which, after all, typically generates the databases. Professional scientists have the infrastructure, time and resources to do large and sustained projects; by contrast amateur or part-time internet scientists usually have only their brains, web-community, computers and spare time. On the other hand, a great deal of highly-prestigious mainstream quantitative science, published in the highest impact journals, also involves re-analysis and combination of already-collected data.
But professional science is significantly disadvantaged too, because modern science has become so highly constrained. Even compared with just a few decades ago, modern science is now over-planned, slow, rigid and bureaucratic. In fact, much modern science often has little to do with ‘science’ at all – but has become more like some kind of mega ‘project management’ task, analogous to building a new public hospital or major road bridge. Such large-scale and long-term activity makes modern scientists risk averse – and the leaders will avoid doing or saying things which may prevent them winning the next major research grant upon which depends their livelihood (and also the livelihoods of the large research teams which depend upon the leader’s continued ability to raise funds). So the nimble quant bloggers, lacking such baggage, are able do and say things which the professional scientists cannot, or will not, do and say.
The pedestrian nature of modern science means that the activity will fail to attract and retain the kind of creative people it used to. Future professional scientists will probably tend to comprise a large majority of specialized technicians being co-ordinated by a small minority of high status project managers. Both technicians and managers will typically lack the genuine ‘interest in the subject’ of old-style scientists – they will also lack boldness, flair, and either the motivation or the ability to get the most from the information they have gathered. Then professional science will become dependent on people like the science bloggers to understand and analyze their data.
One possible future outcome is that professional scientists will continue to be essential for the routine, highly-organized business of collecting or generating raw data. Professional scientists might therefore get paid to plod through the mechanical work of accumulating information (work that people will only do when they are paid to do it). But since they are too dull and timid to understand what they have amassed, gifted amateur scientists will be needed for the clever work. And spontaneously creative people like the best quant bloggers actually enjoy this kind of activity.
‘Serious’ science must have space for the fun of discovery, the play of skill, and the joy of insight; and this seems to be an increasing role for the blogosphere.
References
[1] D.L. Hull, Science as a process, Chicago University Press, Chicago (1988).
[2] D.F. Horrobin, The philosophical basis of peer review and the suppression of innovation, JAMA 263 (1990), pp. 1438–1441. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (70)
[3] J. Ziman, Real science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2000).
[4] D. Healy and D. Cattell, Interface between authorship, industry and science in the domain of therapeutics, Brit J Psychiat 183 (2003), pp. 22–27.
[5] S. Sismondo, Ghost management: how much of the medical literature is shaped behind the scenes by the pharmaceutical industry?, PLoS Med 4 (2007), pp. 1429–1433.
[6] B. Moffat and C. Elliott, Ghost marketing: pharmaceutical companies and ghostwritten joural articles, Perspect Biol Med 50 (2007), pp. 18–31.
[7] D. Healy, Mania: a short history of bipolar disorder, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, USA (2008).
[8] Sailer S. Steve Sailer’s iSteve Blog,
[9] Gene expression,
[10] Inductivist,
[11] Half Sigma,
[12] The Audacious Epigone.
[13] Engram. Back Talk,
[14] La Griffe du Lion,
[15] McIntyre S. Climate Audit,
[16] B.G. Charlton, First a hero of science and now a martyr to science: the James Watson Affair – Political correctness crushes free scientific communication, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1077–1080.
[17] Half Sigma. Breastfeeding does not cause higher IQ.
Saturday, 26 July 2008
Zombie Science - dead but won't lie down
Editorial - Bruce G. Charlton
Zombie science: A sinister consequence of evaluating scientific theories purely on the basis of enlightened self-interest. Medical Hypotheses. 2008; Volume 71: 327-329
***
Summary
Although the classical ideal is that scientific theories are evaluated by a careful teasing-out of their internal logic and external implications, and checking whether these deductions and predictions are in-line-with old and new observations; the fact that so many vague, dumb or incoherent scientific theories are apparently believed by so many scientists for so many years is suggestive that this ideal does not necessarily reflect real world practice. In the real world it looks more like most scientists are quite willing to pursue wrong ideas for so long as they are rewarded with a better chance of achieving more grants, publications and status. The classic account has it that bogus theories should readily be demolished by sceptical (or jealous) competitor scientists. However, in practice even the most conclusive ‘hatchet jobs’ may fail to kill, or even weaken, phoney hypotheses when they are backed-up with sufficient economic muscle in the form of lavish and sustained funding. And when a branch of science based on phoney theories serves a useful but non-scientific purpose, it may be kept-going indefinitely by continuous transfusions of cash from those whose interests it serves. If this happens, real science expires and a ‘zombie science’ evolves. Zombie science is science that is dead but will not lie down. It keeps twitching and lumbering around so that (from a distance, and with your eyes half-closed) zombie science looks much like the real thing. But in fact the zombie has no life of its own; it is animated and moved only by the incessant pumping of funds. If zombie science is not scientifically-useable – what is its function? In a nutshell, zombie science is supported because it is useful propaganda to be deployed in arenas such as political rhetoric, public administration, management, public relations, marketing and the mass media generally. It persuades, it constructs taboos, it buttresses some kind of rhetorical attempt to shape mass opinion. Indeed, zombie science often comes across in the mass media as being more plausible than real science; and it is precisely the superficial face-plausibility which is the sole and sufficient purpose of zombie science.
***
How do scientists decide whether a theory is ‘valid’?
In contrast to the ideal of impartial and objective analysis, in the real world it looks more like most scientists are quite willing to pursue wrong ideas – so long as they are rewarded for doing so with a better chance of achieving more grants, publications and status.
Thus is ‘enlightened self-interest’ a powerful factor in scientific evaluation. ‘Self-interest’ because the primary criterion of the ‘validity’ of a theory is whether or not acting-upon-it will benefit the career of the individual scientist; ‘enlightened’ because the canny career scientist will be looking ahead a few years in order to prefer that theory which offers the best prospect of netting the next grant, tenure, promotion or prestigious job opportunity.
When a new theory is launched upon the population of scientists, it is unlikely to win converts unless the early-adopters are rewarded in a fairly obvious fashion – usually with a greater chance of generous research funding, the opportunity to publish in prestigious journals (plus a raft of new second-string specialist journals – to provide a home for the more modest and less-important papers), and the hope of increased status exemplified by interest, admiration and respect from other scientists.
How do bogus theories survive?
While it is simply human nature to respond to immediate incentives, this phenomenon does imply that theories may become popular or even dominant purely because of their association with immediate incentives – and despite their scientific weaknesses.
In terms of the classical theory of science; bogus theories should be readily demolished by sceptical (or jealous) competitor scientists, who will denounce the weaknesses of merely-fashionable theories in conferences and in print. However, in practice it seems that even the most conclusive ‘hatchet jobs’ done on phoney theories will fail to kill, or even weaken, them when the phoney theories are backed-up with sufficient economic muscle in the form of funding. Scientists will – at the margin – gravitate to where the money is; and the paraphernalia of specialist conferences (to present results at) journals (to publish in) and academic jobs (to work in) will follow as day follows night; so long as the funding stream is sufficiently deep and sustained.
Classical theory has it that a bogus hypothesis will be rejected when it fails to predict ‘reality’ as determined by controlled observations and experiments. But such a catastrophe can be deferred almost indefinitely by the elaboration of secondary hypotheses to explain why not fitting the facts is not – after all – fatal to the theory; but instead merely implies the need for a more complex theory – which then requires further testing (and generates more work for the bogus believers).
Furthermore, since the new version of the bogus theory, with its many auxiliary secondary hypotheses, is so complex – this complexity makes it that much harder to test: further putting-off the time when the bogus theory needs to be abandoned.
(Meanwhile, a much simpler rival theory – i.e. that the first theory is phoney, and always was phoney, and this is why it so singularly fails to predict reality – is regarded as simplistic, crass, merely a sign of lack of sophistication …)
And anyway, there are massive ‘sunk costs’ associated with the phoney theory including the reputations of numerous scientists who are now successful and powerful on the back of the phoney theory, and who by-now control the peer review process (including allocation of grants, publications and jobs) so there is a powerful disincentive against upsetting the apple cart.
False theories, theories which never did have anything in their favour except careerism, can therefore prove very long-lived. However, they are probably not immortal. Eventually, the branch of science which is underpinned by a bogus hypotheses will be evaluated as a whole.
People will ask: what is the good of all this activity, effort and expense? And the answer will be – no good at all. An area of science underpinned by a bogus theory is really only a species of job-creation or make-work. Perhaps there will be some by-products – for example the development of new methods and technologies. But since these are an accidental spin-off, they do not serve to justify the field as a whole. And the plug may be pulled – so a whole branch of science goes down the drain.
The zombification of science
On the other hand, when a branch of science based on phoney theories is serving a useful but non-scientific purpose it may be kept-going by continuous transfusions of cash from those whose interests it serves.
For example, if a branch of pseudo-science based on a phoney theory is nonetheless valuable for political purposes (e.g. to justify government policies) or for marketing purposes (to provide a rationale for sales) then real science expires and a ‘zombie science’ evolves.
Zombie science is science that is dead but will not lie down. It keeps twitching and lumbering around so that (from a distance, and with your eyes half-closed) zombie science looks much like real science. But in fact the zombie has no life of its own; it is animated and moved only by the incessant pumping of funds.
Proper science finds its use, and gets its validation, from being deployed in technology. So proper medical science is underpinned by the effectiveness of medical treatments based upon its theories and results; proper physics is underpinned by successful engineering – and so on. But the findings of zombie science do not have value for technology because any technology built using bogus theories would likely not work in the first place; and if it did happen to survive construction then would soon fall from the sky, collapse, or otherwise crash and burn.
(Of course, such technical disasters can sometimes themselves be explained-away – and thereby covered-up – by yet further phoney theoretical elaborations, especially when there is monopolistic control of information. However, so long as there are rival competing technologies being chosen by those who use them and depend on them, the inferiority of technologies based on bogus science is usually apparent.)
So, zombie science is not useable by applied science. What, then, is its function? In a nutshell, zombie science is supported because it is useful propaganda. Zombie science is deployed in arenas such as political rhetoric, public administration, management, public relations, marketing and the mass media generally. It persuades, it constructs taboos, it buttresses some kind of rhetorical attempt to shape mass opinion.
Indeed, zombie science often comes across in the mass media as being more plausible than real science; and it is precisely the superficial face-plausibility which in actuality is the sole and sufficient purpose of zombie science.
Can zombie science be killed?
Zombie science can be seen as the ultimate consequence of the practice of scientists evaluating theories in terms of their propensity to enhance scientific careers in the short- to medium-term – when this propensity is unconstrained by the imperative to use science in applied technology. Immediate personal careerist benefits seem easily able to overwhelm the more theoretical and abstract scientific benefits of trying to establish and adhere to the ‘real world’ truth.
What does this mean and what can be done about it? For one thing it suggests that the process by which science moves towards the truth may be much slower and coarser than it apparently used to be. In current science, there seems to be a greater possibility that large scale change may be fashion rather than progress, and such change may be serving propagandistic goals rather than advancing scientific understanding.
The emergent slowness in self-correction may perhaps be a consequence of the greatly increased size of the scientific enterprise as it has grown over recent decades – science now has a great deal of inertia. Science in the past was fast, light and nimble; and as easily redirected as a fleeing antelope. By comparison modern science may have a lumbering pace, but its vast bulk means that once it has begun moving in a particular direction, trying to deflect its path is like stopping a charging rhinoceros.
Any realistic prospect of reversing the expansion of zombie science would seem to involve greater competition among the suppliers of research grants. Where science funders are few, it is easier for a bogus theory to survive uncontested – whereas in situations where there are many potential sources of funding there is likely to be some competition among funders to debunk and replace bogus theories supported by rival grant givers.
(This model assumes that grant-awarders are engaged in some kind of competition to become the agency that supports the best, most revolutionary and most technologically useful scientific research – however, it is uncertain whether funders do in fact operate in this way. Certainly it would be desirable if grant agencies did compete to fund the best science and scientists – but perhaps funders cooperate, coordinate and collude, and therefore should instead be regarded as a cartel.)
In a world of competition among science funders, a particular research foundation (so long as it was sufficiently large and influential) could use its resources to help build-up a rival new theory to challenge, then supplant, an old and scientifically unsuccessful (because phoney) theory. By backing a winner and thereby triggering a scientific revolution, a competitive research foundation could expect to grow in fame and influence.
The natural desire of one scientist to thrive, even at the expense of another scientist’s reputation and livelihood, would in this instance be additionally fuelled by the incentive of new sources of research support.
The resulting combination of individual ambition and acquisitiveness should ensure a sufficient supply of would-be debunkers to keep the gardens of science weeded of bogus theories, and to banish the zombies of science to the graveyards where they belong.
Zombie science: A sinister consequence of evaluating scientific theories purely on the basis of enlightened self-interest. Medical Hypotheses. 2008; Volume 71: 327-329
***
Summary
Although the classical ideal is that scientific theories are evaluated by a careful teasing-out of their internal logic and external implications, and checking whether these deductions and predictions are in-line-with old and new observations; the fact that so many vague, dumb or incoherent scientific theories are apparently believed by so many scientists for so many years is suggestive that this ideal does not necessarily reflect real world practice. In the real world it looks more like most scientists are quite willing to pursue wrong ideas for so long as they are rewarded with a better chance of achieving more grants, publications and status. The classic account has it that bogus theories should readily be demolished by sceptical (or jealous) competitor scientists. However, in practice even the most conclusive ‘hatchet jobs’ may fail to kill, or even weaken, phoney hypotheses when they are backed-up with sufficient economic muscle in the form of lavish and sustained funding. And when a branch of science based on phoney theories serves a useful but non-scientific purpose, it may be kept-going indefinitely by continuous transfusions of cash from those whose interests it serves. If this happens, real science expires and a ‘zombie science’ evolves. Zombie science is science that is dead but will not lie down. It keeps twitching and lumbering around so that (from a distance, and with your eyes half-closed) zombie science looks much like the real thing. But in fact the zombie has no life of its own; it is animated and moved only by the incessant pumping of funds. If zombie science is not scientifically-useable – what is its function? In a nutshell, zombie science is supported because it is useful propaganda to be deployed in arenas such as political rhetoric, public administration, management, public relations, marketing and the mass media generally. It persuades, it constructs taboos, it buttresses some kind of rhetorical attempt to shape mass opinion. Indeed, zombie science often comes across in the mass media as being more plausible than real science; and it is precisely the superficial face-plausibility which is the sole and sufficient purpose of zombie science.
***
How do scientists decide whether a theory is ‘valid’?
In contrast to the ideal of impartial and objective analysis, in the real world it looks more like most scientists are quite willing to pursue wrong ideas – so long as they are rewarded for doing so with a better chance of achieving more grants, publications and status.
Thus is ‘enlightened self-interest’ a powerful factor in scientific evaluation. ‘Self-interest’ because the primary criterion of the ‘validity’ of a theory is whether or not acting-upon-it will benefit the career of the individual scientist; ‘enlightened’ because the canny career scientist will be looking ahead a few years in order to prefer that theory which offers the best prospect of netting the next grant, tenure, promotion or prestigious job opportunity.
When a new theory is launched upon the population of scientists, it is unlikely to win converts unless the early-adopters are rewarded in a fairly obvious fashion – usually with a greater chance of generous research funding, the opportunity to publish in prestigious journals (plus a raft of new second-string specialist journals – to provide a home for the more modest and less-important papers), and the hope of increased status exemplified by interest, admiration and respect from other scientists.
How do bogus theories survive?
While it is simply human nature to respond to immediate incentives, this phenomenon does imply that theories may become popular or even dominant purely because of their association with immediate incentives – and despite their scientific weaknesses.
In terms of the classical theory of science; bogus theories should be readily demolished by sceptical (or jealous) competitor scientists, who will denounce the weaknesses of merely-fashionable theories in conferences and in print. However, in practice it seems that even the most conclusive ‘hatchet jobs’ done on phoney theories will fail to kill, or even weaken, them when the phoney theories are backed-up with sufficient economic muscle in the form of funding. Scientists will – at the margin – gravitate to where the money is; and the paraphernalia of specialist conferences (to present results at) journals (to publish in) and academic jobs (to work in) will follow as day follows night; so long as the funding stream is sufficiently deep and sustained.
Classical theory has it that a bogus hypothesis will be rejected when it fails to predict ‘reality’ as determined by controlled observations and experiments. But such a catastrophe can be deferred almost indefinitely by the elaboration of secondary hypotheses to explain why not fitting the facts is not – after all – fatal to the theory; but instead merely implies the need for a more complex theory – which then requires further testing (and generates more work for the bogus believers).
Furthermore, since the new version of the bogus theory, with its many auxiliary secondary hypotheses, is so complex – this complexity makes it that much harder to test: further putting-off the time when the bogus theory needs to be abandoned.
(Meanwhile, a much simpler rival theory – i.e. that the first theory is phoney, and always was phoney, and this is why it so singularly fails to predict reality – is regarded as simplistic, crass, merely a sign of lack of sophistication …)
And anyway, there are massive ‘sunk costs’ associated with the phoney theory including the reputations of numerous scientists who are now successful and powerful on the back of the phoney theory, and who by-now control the peer review process (including allocation of grants, publications and jobs) so there is a powerful disincentive against upsetting the apple cart.
False theories, theories which never did have anything in their favour except careerism, can therefore prove very long-lived. However, they are probably not immortal. Eventually, the branch of science which is underpinned by a bogus hypotheses will be evaluated as a whole.
People will ask: what is the good of all this activity, effort and expense? And the answer will be – no good at all. An area of science underpinned by a bogus theory is really only a species of job-creation or make-work. Perhaps there will be some by-products – for example the development of new methods and technologies. But since these are an accidental spin-off, they do not serve to justify the field as a whole. And the plug may be pulled – so a whole branch of science goes down the drain.
The zombification of science
On the other hand, when a branch of science based on phoney theories is serving a useful but non-scientific purpose it may be kept-going by continuous transfusions of cash from those whose interests it serves.
For example, if a branch of pseudo-science based on a phoney theory is nonetheless valuable for political purposes (e.g. to justify government policies) or for marketing purposes (to provide a rationale for sales) then real science expires and a ‘zombie science’ evolves.
Zombie science is science that is dead but will not lie down. It keeps twitching and lumbering around so that (from a distance, and with your eyes half-closed) zombie science looks much like real science. But in fact the zombie has no life of its own; it is animated and moved only by the incessant pumping of funds.
Proper science finds its use, and gets its validation, from being deployed in technology. So proper medical science is underpinned by the effectiveness of medical treatments based upon its theories and results; proper physics is underpinned by successful engineering – and so on. But the findings of zombie science do not have value for technology because any technology built using bogus theories would likely not work in the first place; and if it did happen to survive construction then would soon fall from the sky, collapse, or otherwise crash and burn.
(Of course, such technical disasters can sometimes themselves be explained-away – and thereby covered-up – by yet further phoney theoretical elaborations, especially when there is monopolistic control of information. However, so long as there are rival competing technologies being chosen by those who use them and depend on them, the inferiority of technologies based on bogus science is usually apparent.)
So, zombie science is not useable by applied science. What, then, is its function? In a nutshell, zombie science is supported because it is useful propaganda. Zombie science is deployed in arenas such as political rhetoric, public administration, management, public relations, marketing and the mass media generally. It persuades, it constructs taboos, it buttresses some kind of rhetorical attempt to shape mass opinion.
Indeed, zombie science often comes across in the mass media as being more plausible than real science; and it is precisely the superficial face-plausibility which in actuality is the sole and sufficient purpose of zombie science.
Can zombie science be killed?
Zombie science can be seen as the ultimate consequence of the practice of scientists evaluating theories in terms of their propensity to enhance scientific careers in the short- to medium-term – when this propensity is unconstrained by the imperative to use science in applied technology. Immediate personal careerist benefits seem easily able to overwhelm the more theoretical and abstract scientific benefits of trying to establish and adhere to the ‘real world’ truth.
What does this mean and what can be done about it? For one thing it suggests that the process by which science moves towards the truth may be much slower and coarser than it apparently used to be. In current science, there seems to be a greater possibility that large scale change may be fashion rather than progress, and such change may be serving propagandistic goals rather than advancing scientific understanding.
The emergent slowness in self-correction may perhaps be a consequence of the greatly increased size of the scientific enterprise as it has grown over recent decades – science now has a great deal of inertia. Science in the past was fast, light and nimble; and as easily redirected as a fleeing antelope. By comparison modern science may have a lumbering pace, but its vast bulk means that once it has begun moving in a particular direction, trying to deflect its path is like stopping a charging rhinoceros.
Any realistic prospect of reversing the expansion of zombie science would seem to involve greater competition among the suppliers of research grants. Where science funders are few, it is easier for a bogus theory to survive uncontested – whereas in situations where there are many potential sources of funding there is likely to be some competition among funders to debunk and replace bogus theories supported by rival grant givers.
(This model assumes that grant-awarders are engaged in some kind of competition to become the agency that supports the best, most revolutionary and most technologically useful scientific research – however, it is uncertain whether funders do in fact operate in this way. Certainly it would be desirable if grant agencies did compete to fund the best science and scientists – but perhaps funders cooperate, coordinate and collude, and therefore should instead be regarded as a cartel.)
In a world of competition among science funders, a particular research foundation (so long as it was sufficiently large and influential) could use its resources to help build-up a rival new theory to challenge, then supplant, an old and scientifically unsuccessful (because phoney) theory. By backing a winner and thereby triggering a scientific revolution, a competitive research foundation could expect to grow in fame and influence.
The natural desire of one scientist to thrive, even at the expense of another scientist’s reputation and livelihood, would in this instance be additionally fuelled by the incentive of new sources of research support.
The resulting combination of individual ambition and acquisitiveness should ensure a sufficient supply of would-be debunkers to keep the gardens of science weeded of bogus theories, and to banish the zombies of science to the graveyards where they belong.
Tuesday, 1 July 2008
Mavericks versus team players
Mavericks versus team players: The trade-off between shared glory and making a personal contribution
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 71: 165-167.
***
Summary
The modern world is characterized by progressive specialization of function and ever-larger-scale coordination of these ever-more-specialized functions. More and more of science is done by increasing-sized teams of specialists, and the ability to engage in ‘teamwork’ is regarded as an almost essential attribute for most scientists. But teamwork does not suit all personality types. Some ‘maverick’ individuals would rather have personal credit for a relatively modest scientific contribution which they achieved (mostly) by themselves, than a share of credit in a much larger scientific contribution generated by a large team. The present system of medical science is organized to discourage mavericks and, on the whole, this is probably justifiable on the basis that scientists are not natural team players. Extra inducements are necessary to get people to adopt the relatively self-effacing behaviours necessary for building the large organizations of complementary specialists that are necessary for tackling many of the most intractable modern scientific problems. However, an ethos of teamwork does carry substantial disadvantages. Although most scientists are dispensable, and do not make a significant personal contribution, the very best scientists do make a difference to the rate of progress of science. And top notch scientists are wasted as team players. The very best scientists can function only as mavericks because they are doing science for vocational reasons. The highest intensity of personal commitment requires individual rewards from distinctive contributions. In conclusion, the current incentive system that encourages teamwork involves a trade-off. The majority of modestly talented scientists can probably achieve more when working as members of a team. But the very best scientists probably need to work as mavericks.
***
Science, like most aspects of the modern world, is characterized by progressive specialization of function and ever-larger-scale coordination of these ever-more-specialized functions.
This applies to scientific careers also. More and more of science is done by increasing-sized teams of specialists, and the ability to engage in ‘teamwork’ is regarded as an almost essential attribute for most scientists.
So far, so good. But one consequence of teamwork may be a reduced sense of personal satisfaction for the individual scientist. The direction of research is often dictated by the availability of grants, specific work content and patterns may be scheduled by the needs of the team, interpretation may be a group affair, and publication a compromise between multiple authors (not to mention the potential for further distortion by referees and editors). And the glory from any resulting scientific attainments will also be shared.
This situation resembles that which Karl Marx termed ‘alienation’; in which the ‘worker’ is separated from the product, and where the need to perform as a cog in a complex machine of production strips ‘labour’ of its intrinsic satisfactions.
Of course, for many people there are other sources of satisfaction from scientific work such as (perhaps most importantly) wages, a relatively great degree of discretion in organizing work, the social life of the laboratory, and the satisfactions of a job well done. Nonetheless for some people this is not enough. Those who were drawn into science by a sense of vocation may feel that the life of a typical modern scientist fails to satisfy their yearning to make a personal contribution.
Teamwork is, more-or-less, the mainstream mode of modern medical science; but it does not suit all personality types. Not everyone is a ‘team player’ and there are some ‘maverick’ individuals who would (perhaps selfishly) rather have personal credit for a relatively modest scientific contribution which they achieved (mostly) by themselves, than a share of credit in a much larger scientific contribution generated by a large team.
In general, it could be predicted that working as a maverick increases an individual’s potential maximum contribution to science (by generating greater personal motivation); but working as a team player is on avearage more efficient overall.
There is not much doubt that the present system of medical science is organized to discourage mavericks. On the whole, this is probably justifiable on the basis that scientists (and human beings in general) are not naturally team players, so that extra inducements are necessary to get people to adopt the relatively self-effacing behaviours necessary in building the large organizations of complementary specialists that are necessary for tackling many of the most intractable modern scientific problems. However, an ethos of teamwork does carry substantial disadvantages.
The most important way that team players are rewarded over mavericks is the practice of multiple counting. This works at every level in the scientific process.
For instance, everyone associated with a successful grant award typically states the full amount of the grant to their own credit (and not, for example, the amount of the grant divided by all the other grant holders). An unspecified share of a high-profile multi-centre ten million dollar grant (running over several years) sounds very impressive – and this credit is to some extent accrued by all the team players. By contrast, the lone maverick might have attained a much less-impressive-sounding annual grant of one hundred thousand dollars.
However, using another mode of calculation, a maverick’s 100K dollars per year might equal or exceed each team players individual share of a highly publicized lump-sum of ten million pounds, when the money is spread over several institutions and several years. Furthermore, the maverick has control of who is appointed to jobs, and the specific work they do – while a team player may find that these decisions are made by committees over which s/he has little influence.
Credit for publications is another system that rewards team players above mavericks. In round numbers it seems likely that the average production of scientific papers per author has been about one per year for many decades – but the average number of publications credited to each scientist has increased due to larger numbers of authors on each publication.
This implies that a maverick author who publishes two or three single-author papers per year is probably high-performing; yet this productivity can (apparently) be swamped by a large team players who may (with the same, or less, amount of work) have a share in maybe a dozen publications per year – with perhaps one as first author. After a few years the team player may have accumulated a hundred-plus publications while even a gifted maverick may still number just a dozen or so single-author publications.
A further aspect of grant-getting and publication relates to the statistics of small numbers. An individual scientist working (mostly) alone and averaging (say) a grant every two to four years and two or three papers per years would expect – by sheer chance – to have some ‘lean years’: gaps of several years with no grants, and several years with no publications. If a promotion or job application happens to fall during one of these randomly occurring lean years it might-well look bad; as if the maverick had burned-out and become unproductive.
By contrast, an similarly productive team player who worked as part of a ten-plus person team (of similarly productive people) would have these extreme fluctuations in productivity averaged-out, and would not be expected to suffer any lean years without grants or publications. When the time comes for applying for jobs or promotions, the team player can be assured of a decent recent CV.
Does it matter that the current mode of medical science encourages team players at the expense of mavericks? Mostly not, because the harsh truth is that most scientists are dispensable, and most do not make a significant personal contribution. However, the very best scientists do make a difference to the rate of progress of science. And top notch scientists are wasted as team players.
My guess is that the very best scientists can function only as mavericks; in charge of their own activities, or else as collaborators working on a scientific problem with just one other equal partner. The reason is that great scientists are doing science for vocational reasons; and the highest intensity of personal commitment absolutely needs individual rewards from distinctive contributions.
If correct, this means that we need to recognize the downside of current incentives that encourage teamwork in modern medical science. There is a trade-off. Modestly talented people can probably achieve more when working as members of a team. But the kind of intensely vocational motivation necessary for the highest level of scientific work is not an attribute of team players. To have a chance of achieving their greatest potential, the most-talented scientists need to work as mavericks.
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 71: 165-167.
***
Summary
The modern world is characterized by progressive specialization of function and ever-larger-scale coordination of these ever-more-specialized functions. More and more of science is done by increasing-sized teams of specialists, and the ability to engage in ‘teamwork’ is regarded as an almost essential attribute for most scientists. But teamwork does not suit all personality types. Some ‘maverick’ individuals would rather have personal credit for a relatively modest scientific contribution which they achieved (mostly) by themselves, than a share of credit in a much larger scientific contribution generated by a large team. The present system of medical science is organized to discourage mavericks and, on the whole, this is probably justifiable on the basis that scientists are not natural team players. Extra inducements are necessary to get people to adopt the relatively self-effacing behaviours necessary for building the large organizations of complementary specialists that are necessary for tackling many of the most intractable modern scientific problems. However, an ethos of teamwork does carry substantial disadvantages. Although most scientists are dispensable, and do not make a significant personal contribution, the very best scientists do make a difference to the rate of progress of science. And top notch scientists are wasted as team players. The very best scientists can function only as mavericks because they are doing science for vocational reasons. The highest intensity of personal commitment requires individual rewards from distinctive contributions. In conclusion, the current incentive system that encourages teamwork involves a trade-off. The majority of modestly talented scientists can probably achieve more when working as members of a team. But the very best scientists probably need to work as mavericks.
***
Science, like most aspects of the modern world, is characterized by progressive specialization of function and ever-larger-scale coordination of these ever-more-specialized functions.
This applies to scientific careers also. More and more of science is done by increasing-sized teams of specialists, and the ability to engage in ‘teamwork’ is regarded as an almost essential attribute for most scientists.
So far, so good. But one consequence of teamwork may be a reduced sense of personal satisfaction for the individual scientist. The direction of research is often dictated by the availability of grants, specific work content and patterns may be scheduled by the needs of the team, interpretation may be a group affair, and publication a compromise between multiple authors (not to mention the potential for further distortion by referees and editors). And the glory from any resulting scientific attainments will also be shared.
This situation resembles that which Karl Marx termed ‘alienation’; in which the ‘worker’ is separated from the product, and where the need to perform as a cog in a complex machine of production strips ‘labour’ of its intrinsic satisfactions.
Of course, for many people there are other sources of satisfaction from scientific work such as (perhaps most importantly) wages, a relatively great degree of discretion in organizing work, the social life of the laboratory, and the satisfactions of a job well done. Nonetheless for some people this is not enough. Those who were drawn into science by a sense of vocation may feel that the life of a typical modern scientist fails to satisfy their yearning to make a personal contribution.
Teamwork is, more-or-less, the mainstream mode of modern medical science; but it does not suit all personality types. Not everyone is a ‘team player’ and there are some ‘maverick’ individuals who would (perhaps selfishly) rather have personal credit for a relatively modest scientific contribution which they achieved (mostly) by themselves, than a share of credit in a much larger scientific contribution generated by a large team.
In general, it could be predicted that working as a maverick increases an individual’s potential maximum contribution to science (by generating greater personal motivation); but working as a team player is on avearage more efficient overall.
There is not much doubt that the present system of medical science is organized to discourage mavericks. On the whole, this is probably justifiable on the basis that scientists (and human beings in general) are not naturally team players, so that extra inducements are necessary to get people to adopt the relatively self-effacing behaviours necessary in building the large organizations of complementary specialists that are necessary for tackling many of the most intractable modern scientific problems. However, an ethos of teamwork does carry substantial disadvantages.
The most important way that team players are rewarded over mavericks is the practice of multiple counting. This works at every level in the scientific process.
For instance, everyone associated with a successful grant award typically states the full amount of the grant to their own credit (and not, for example, the amount of the grant divided by all the other grant holders). An unspecified share of a high-profile multi-centre ten million dollar grant (running over several years) sounds very impressive – and this credit is to some extent accrued by all the team players. By contrast, the lone maverick might have attained a much less-impressive-sounding annual grant of one hundred thousand dollars.
However, using another mode of calculation, a maverick’s 100K dollars per year might equal or exceed each team players individual share of a highly publicized lump-sum of ten million pounds, when the money is spread over several institutions and several years. Furthermore, the maverick has control of who is appointed to jobs, and the specific work they do – while a team player may find that these decisions are made by committees over which s/he has little influence.
Credit for publications is another system that rewards team players above mavericks. In round numbers it seems likely that the average production of scientific papers per author has been about one per year for many decades – but the average number of publications credited to each scientist has increased due to larger numbers of authors on each publication.
This implies that a maverick author who publishes two or three single-author papers per year is probably high-performing; yet this productivity can (apparently) be swamped by a large team players who may (with the same, or less, amount of work) have a share in maybe a dozen publications per year – with perhaps one as first author. After a few years the team player may have accumulated a hundred-plus publications while even a gifted maverick may still number just a dozen or so single-author publications.
A further aspect of grant-getting and publication relates to the statistics of small numbers. An individual scientist working (mostly) alone and averaging (say) a grant every two to four years and two or three papers per years would expect – by sheer chance – to have some ‘lean years’: gaps of several years with no grants, and several years with no publications. If a promotion or job application happens to fall during one of these randomly occurring lean years it might-well look bad; as if the maverick had burned-out and become unproductive.
By contrast, an similarly productive team player who worked as part of a ten-plus person team (of similarly productive people) would have these extreme fluctuations in productivity averaged-out, and would not be expected to suffer any lean years without grants or publications. When the time comes for applying for jobs or promotions, the team player can be assured of a decent recent CV.
Does it matter that the current mode of medical science encourages team players at the expense of mavericks? Mostly not, because the harsh truth is that most scientists are dispensable, and most do not make a significant personal contribution. However, the very best scientists do make a difference to the rate of progress of science. And top notch scientists are wasted as team players.
My guess is that the very best scientists can function only as mavericks; in charge of their own activities, or else as collaborators working on a scientific problem with just one other equal partner. The reason is that great scientists are doing science for vocational reasons; and the highest intensity of personal commitment absolutely needs individual rewards from distinctive contributions.
If correct, this means that we need to recognize the downside of current incentives that encourage teamwork in modern medical science. There is a trade-off. Modestly talented people can probably achieve more when working as members of a team. But the kind of intensely vocational motivation necessary for the highest level of scientific work is not an attribute of team players. To have a chance of achieving their greatest potential, the most-talented scientists need to work as mavericks.
Thursday, 5 June 2008
False, trivial, obvious - new theories
False, trivial, obvious: Why new and revolutionary theories are typically disrespected
Bruce G. Charlton,
Medical Hypotheses 2008; 71: 1-3
***
Summary
An old joke about the response to revolutionary new scientific theories states that there are three phases on the road to acceptance: 1. The theory is not true; 2. The theory is true, but it is unimportant; 3. The theory is true, and it is important – but we knew it all along. The point of this joke is that (according to scientific theorists) new theories are never properly appreciated. The ‘false’ phase happens because a defining feature of a revolutionary theory is that it contradicts the assumptions of already-existing mainstream theory. The second ‘trivial’ phase follows from a preliminary analysis which suggests that the new idea is not in fact contradicted by the major existing evidence, but the new theory seems unimportant because its implications do not seem to lead anywhere interesting when explored in the light of current theory. A stronger version of this second phase happens when the implications of a theory are regarded as not merely unimportant but actually dangerous, because a scientific revolution is certainly destructive (especially of established reputations) yet its potential benefits are conjectural. However, once a new and revolutionary theory is in place, its importance is ‘obvious’ such that it becomes hard to imagine how anybody could ever have believed anything else. Theory for scientists is like water for fish: the invisible medium in which they swim. Observations and experiments, on the other hand, are like toys in the fish tank. New toys are attention-grabbing; but when the tank gets cloudy, its water needs changing.
***
Like water for fish
One of the most annoying experiences for those advocating revolutionary new theories occurs when their ideas are prematurely or erroneously rejected. Perhaps even more annoying is when a theory is adopted but its originator is not credited with the discovery.
This is embodied in the cynical description of the acceptance of revolutionary new scientific theories as having three stages in which the idea is first rejected as false, then dismissed as trivial, and finally accepted as obvious.
The three phases of response to a new theory on the road to its acceptance are
1. The theory is not true.
2. The theory is true, but it is unimportant.
3. The theory is true, and it is important – but we knew it all along.
The point of this joke is that (according to scientific theorists) new theories are never properly appreciated.
There is a superficial, but correct and important, level of critique in which premature or incorrect rejection of new theories is often a consequence of either the lack of sufficient attention being paid to the new theory, so that the critic never considers the new theory with sufficient care; or the sheer ignorance or incompetence of the critic such that – even if critics do pay sufficient attention – they are simply unable to comprehend the new theory due to knowledge deficiencies or a lack of brain-power.
Quantitatively, therefore, even when it is not ignored, a new idea tends get buried beneath shallow and dumb criticisms.
1. False: the theory is not true
At a deeper level, however, the ‘false, trivial, obvious’ joke implies that the reason theories are seldom appreciated is related to the primacy of theory in science.
Theories come before facts, since facts only get their ‘factual’ status from the theory in which they are embedded; such that science can most simply be conceptualized as a process of generating and testing theories against observations.
The defining feature of a revolutionary theory is precisely that it seeks to replace the assumptions of an already-existing theory – so a new theory cannot be evaluated on the basis of the assumptions of the old theory. This is why a new and revolutionary theory will almost invariably strike people as false.
In a sense, a new theory is perceived by an old theory as if the new theory were an observation. When a new theory is revolutionary, then it is perceived as an observation which is incompatible with the old theory. From this perspective either the new theory must be rejected, or else the old theory abandoned.
2. Trivial: the theory is true, but it is unimportant
The second phase is dismissing a revolutionary idea as ‘trivial’. This follows from a preliminary analysis which suggests that the new idea is not, after all, contradicted by the major existing evidence – so the new theory cannot simply be rejected as ‘false’.
However, although it may be true, the new theory seems unimportant; because its implications do not seem to lead anywhere interesting from the perspective of current theory.
A new theory may, therefore, seem trivial because it is trivial in the context of the old theory. Only from the perspective of the new theory itself can its importance be recognized.
In this sense, a theory must be ‘accepted’ (at least provisionally) before its importance can be appreciated.
2. (a) Trivial: the theory is true, and it is important, but dangerous
A stronger version of this second ‘trivial’ phase happens when the implications of a theory are regarded not merely as unimportant but actually dangerous.
It is never possible absolutely to exclude in advance the possibility of some catastrophe from a wide range of potential disasters. Nor is it possible to prove that the adoption of a new theory will almost certainly provide greater overall and general benefit compared with the old theory.
New theories often seem dangerous because their destructive effect is proximate and certain, while their potential to serve as a basis for future progress is distal and unpredictable.
In fact, the most compelling ‘danger’ of a new revolutionary theory is the real and present harm its acceptance would inflict on the power, wealth or prestige of adherents to the already-existing theory.
3. Obvious: the theory is true, and it is important – but we knew it all along
However, for reasons good or bad, and against these odds, some revolutionary theories do become adopted and displace the theories that went before.
Once a new theory is in place, its explanatory and predictive power is evident, its importance is ‘obvious’ (since the new theory now forms the framework for scientific investigation and communication), and indeed it becomes hard to imagine how anybody could ever (rationally) have believed anything else.
After a successful scientific revolution it seems (it ‘feels like’) everyone had always known that the new theory was true; because looking-back it is clear that the new theory makes sense-of, is explanatory-of, all observations of current-significance that went before.
Precursors and partial expressions of the new theory apparently abound, and it can become hard to recognize or acknowledge that past (‘pre-revolution’) scientists were operating on the basis of quite different over-arching theories.
Forgotten are the vast difficulties a new theory originally overcame in getting attention, refuting shallow and dumb criticisms, and demonstrating its validity and importance – so the achievement of the originating theorist may seem slight (and this is assuming the discoverer has not by this time been overlooked, forgotten, or robbed of credit by a more powerful colleague).
The path to fame as a theorist surely is long, winding and replete with pitfalls.
Like water for fish
So – theory for scientists is like water for fish: the invisible medium in which they swim. Observations and experiments, on the other hand, are like toys in the fish tank.
New toys are attention-grabbing; but when the tank gets cloudy, its water needs changing.
Bruce G. Charlton,
Medical Hypotheses 2008; 71: 1-3
***
Summary
An old joke about the response to revolutionary new scientific theories states that there are three phases on the road to acceptance: 1. The theory is not true; 2. The theory is true, but it is unimportant; 3. The theory is true, and it is important – but we knew it all along. The point of this joke is that (according to scientific theorists) new theories are never properly appreciated. The ‘false’ phase happens because a defining feature of a revolutionary theory is that it contradicts the assumptions of already-existing mainstream theory. The second ‘trivial’ phase follows from a preliminary analysis which suggests that the new idea is not in fact contradicted by the major existing evidence, but the new theory seems unimportant because its implications do not seem to lead anywhere interesting when explored in the light of current theory. A stronger version of this second phase happens when the implications of a theory are regarded as not merely unimportant but actually dangerous, because a scientific revolution is certainly destructive (especially of established reputations) yet its potential benefits are conjectural. However, once a new and revolutionary theory is in place, its importance is ‘obvious’ such that it becomes hard to imagine how anybody could ever have believed anything else. Theory for scientists is like water for fish: the invisible medium in which they swim. Observations and experiments, on the other hand, are like toys in the fish tank. New toys are attention-grabbing; but when the tank gets cloudy, its water needs changing.
***
Like water for fish
One of the most annoying experiences for those advocating revolutionary new theories occurs when their ideas are prematurely or erroneously rejected. Perhaps even more annoying is when a theory is adopted but its originator is not credited with the discovery.
This is embodied in the cynical description of the acceptance of revolutionary new scientific theories as having three stages in which the idea is first rejected as false, then dismissed as trivial, and finally accepted as obvious.
The three phases of response to a new theory on the road to its acceptance are
1. The theory is not true.
2. The theory is true, but it is unimportant.
3. The theory is true, and it is important – but we knew it all along.
The point of this joke is that (according to scientific theorists) new theories are never properly appreciated.
There is a superficial, but correct and important, level of critique in which premature or incorrect rejection of new theories is often a consequence of either the lack of sufficient attention being paid to the new theory, so that the critic never considers the new theory with sufficient care; or the sheer ignorance or incompetence of the critic such that – even if critics do pay sufficient attention – they are simply unable to comprehend the new theory due to knowledge deficiencies or a lack of brain-power.
Quantitatively, therefore, even when it is not ignored, a new idea tends get buried beneath shallow and dumb criticisms.
1. False: the theory is not true
At a deeper level, however, the ‘false, trivial, obvious’ joke implies that the reason theories are seldom appreciated is related to the primacy of theory in science.
Theories come before facts, since facts only get their ‘factual’ status from the theory in which they are embedded; such that science can most simply be conceptualized as a process of generating and testing theories against observations.
The defining feature of a revolutionary theory is precisely that it seeks to replace the assumptions of an already-existing theory – so a new theory cannot be evaluated on the basis of the assumptions of the old theory. This is why a new and revolutionary theory will almost invariably strike people as false.
In a sense, a new theory is perceived by an old theory as if the new theory were an observation. When a new theory is revolutionary, then it is perceived as an observation which is incompatible with the old theory. From this perspective either the new theory must be rejected, or else the old theory abandoned.
2. Trivial: the theory is true, but it is unimportant
The second phase is dismissing a revolutionary idea as ‘trivial’. This follows from a preliminary analysis which suggests that the new idea is not, after all, contradicted by the major existing evidence – so the new theory cannot simply be rejected as ‘false’.
However, although it may be true, the new theory seems unimportant; because its implications do not seem to lead anywhere interesting from the perspective of current theory.
A new theory may, therefore, seem trivial because it is trivial in the context of the old theory. Only from the perspective of the new theory itself can its importance be recognized.
In this sense, a theory must be ‘accepted’ (at least provisionally) before its importance can be appreciated.
2. (a) Trivial: the theory is true, and it is important, but dangerous
A stronger version of this second ‘trivial’ phase happens when the implications of a theory are regarded not merely as unimportant but actually dangerous.
It is never possible absolutely to exclude in advance the possibility of some catastrophe from a wide range of potential disasters. Nor is it possible to prove that the adoption of a new theory will almost certainly provide greater overall and general benefit compared with the old theory.
New theories often seem dangerous because their destructive effect is proximate and certain, while their potential to serve as a basis for future progress is distal and unpredictable.
In fact, the most compelling ‘danger’ of a new revolutionary theory is the real and present harm its acceptance would inflict on the power, wealth or prestige of adherents to the already-existing theory.
3. Obvious: the theory is true, and it is important – but we knew it all along
However, for reasons good or bad, and against these odds, some revolutionary theories do become adopted and displace the theories that went before.
Once a new theory is in place, its explanatory and predictive power is evident, its importance is ‘obvious’ (since the new theory now forms the framework for scientific investigation and communication), and indeed it becomes hard to imagine how anybody could ever (rationally) have believed anything else.
After a successful scientific revolution it seems (it ‘feels like’) everyone had always known that the new theory was true; because looking-back it is clear that the new theory makes sense-of, is explanatory-of, all observations of current-significance that went before.
Precursors and partial expressions of the new theory apparently abound, and it can become hard to recognize or acknowledge that past (‘pre-revolution’) scientists were operating on the basis of quite different over-arching theories.
Forgotten are the vast difficulties a new theory originally overcame in getting attention, refuting shallow and dumb criticisms, and demonstrating its validity and importance – so the achievement of the originating theorist may seem slight (and this is assuming the discoverer has not by this time been overlooked, forgotten, or robbed of credit by a more powerful colleague).
The path to fame as a theorist surely is long, winding and replete with pitfalls.
Like water for fish
So – theory for scientists is like water for fish: the invisible medium in which they swim. Observations and experiments, on the other hand, are like toys in the fish tank.
New toys are attention-grabbing; but when the tank gets cloudy, its water needs changing.
Sunday, 4 May 2008
The James Watson Affair
Editorial
First a hero of science and now a martyr to science: The James Watson Affair – Political correctness crushes free scientific communication
Medical Hypotheses. Volume 70, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1077-1080
Bruce G. Charlton, Editor-in-Chief – Medical Hypotheses
Available online 16 April 2008.
Summary
In 2007 James D. Watson, perhaps the most famous living scientist, was forced to retire from his position and retreat from public life in the face of international mass media condemnation following remarks concerning genetically-caused racial differences in intelligence. Watson was punished for stating forthright views on topics that elite opinion has determined should be discussed only with elaborate caution, frequent disclaimers, and solemn deference to the currently-prevailing pieties. James Watson has always struck many people as brash; however this blunt, truth-telling quality was intrinsic to his role in one of the greatest scientific discoveries. Much more importantly than ‘good manners’, Watson has consistently exemplified the cardinal scientific virtue: he speaks what he understands to be the truth without regard for the opinion of others. The most chilling aspect of the Watson Affair was the way in which so many influential members of the scientific research community joined the media condemnation directed against Watson. Perhaps the most egregious betrayal of science was an article by editorialists of the premier UK scientific journal Nature. Instead of defending the freedom of discourse in pursuit of scientific truth, Nature instead blamed Watson for being ‘crass’ and lacking ‘sensitivity’ in discussing human genetic differences. But if asked to choose between the ‘sensitive’ editors of Nature or the ‘crass’ genius of James D. Watson, all serious scientists must take the side of Watson. Because when a premier researcher such as Watson is hounded from office by a vicious, arbitrary and untruthful mob; all lesser scientists are made vulnerable to analogous treatment at the whim of the media. A zealous and coercive brand of ‘political correctness’ is now making the biological truth of human genetic differences intolerably difficult to discover and discuss in US and UK. This needs to change. My hope is that truth will prevail over political correctness and James Watson will not just be exonerated but vindicated as an exemplar of the true morality of science: that scientific communication needs to be allowed to be clear, direct – even crass – in the pursuit of truth. James Watson has been a hero of science for the achievements of his career, and also a martyr for science at the end of his career.
***
In 2007 James D. Watson, perhaps the most famous living scientist, was forced to retire from his position as Chair of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory and to retreat from public life in the face of international mass media condemnation following some remarks he made concerning genetically-caused racial differences in intelligence [1].
The substance of Watson’s remark was the speculation that the low average IQ of sub-Saharan Africans may be a contributory cause for slow economic development [1] and [2].
The Watson Affair is, so far, the most shocking example of coercive ‘political correctness’ imposed by the US and UK ‘mandarin’ intellectual class (i.e. the cultural elite who run public administration, education and the media). In other words, Watson was pilloried and punished for stating forthright views on topics (which include sexual, class and racial differences) that elite opinion has determined should be discussed only with elaborate caution, frequent disclaimers, and solemn deference to the currently-prevailing pieties.
Watson’s ‘brash’ personal style has also been his scientific strength
But ‘nuance’ has never been Watson’s style. Watson has always struck many people as disturbingly bold, direct, and brash [3], [4] and [5]. Not to put too fine a point on it, Watson has apparently often been rude and harsh in his personal relationships, and terse to the point of being elliptical or ambiguous in his pronouncements – seeming especially so to the vast majority of people whose intellectual powers are nowhere near a match for Watson’s, or who do not pick-up on his unusual sense of humor.
However, in the conduct of science, there are many things which are much more important than good manners, and many of the greatest scientists have been difficult characters [6]. But James Watson displays – in extreme and stark form – the cardinal scientific virtue: he speaks what he understands to be the truth, and does so without regard for the opinion of others [3] and [7].
And of course this blunt, truth-telling quality was absolutely intrinsic to his role in one of the greatest scientific discoveries – establishing the structure of DNA in 1953 [3] and [4]. And Watson’s directness/brashness was essential to other great career achievements including his role in establishing the science of molecular biology from a base in Harvard, in fund-raising and building-up the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, and in launching the human genome project [5].
Indeed the world has abundant cause to be grateful for James Watson’s brash personal style since this was inherent in his achievement, and few individuals have contributed more to human well-being.
Nature’s editorialists betray science
While it is perfectly understandable that non-scientific zealots of political correctness (as well as those who have been hurt or offended by Watson’s brashness in the past) would be delighted at the opportunity to destroy James Watson’s career and reputation – the most chilling aspect of the Watson Affair was the way in which so many powerful and influential members of the scientific research community joined the howling mob of media condemnation directed against Watson [1].
Perhaps the most egregious example was the article by editorialists of the premier UK scientific journal Nature – that same journal where Crick and Watson published the original paper describing structure of DNA [8].
Instead of publishing a clear and uncompromising defence of the freedom of untrammelled discourse in pursuit of the scientific truth; in an editorial entitled ‘Watson’s folly’ Nature instead chose to support political correctness as being more important than science.
In the context of just 500 words, the anonymous Nature authors spent most of the space attacking Watson’s interpersonal style, with a veritable diatribe of outrage. The editorial included such comments as: ‘his notorious propensity for making outrageous statements’, ‘a track record of making distasteful remarks’, ‘on many previous occasions voiced unpalatable views tinged with racism and sexism’, ‘his views have finally been deemed beyond the pale’, ‘demonstrates a sheer unacceptable offensiveness’, ‘unpleasant […] utterances’, and ‘crass comments’.
In a brief respite from attacking Watson’s personality, the Nature editorialists make two factually incorrect statements. Firstly they wrongly state that ‘Watson has apologized and retracted’ his ‘outburst’. Secondly they state that Watson ‘acknowledged that there is no evidence for what he claimed about racial differences in intelligence’. This is doubly false in that Watson never made such retractions or acknowledgments [9], and for the very good reason that any such retraction or acknowledgement would be untrue.
Indeed, the opposite is more nearly true, as Jason Malloy describes in the current issue of Medical Hypotheses [1]. There is no evidence that all human races have identical intelligence despite many generations of genetic separation and with widely different selection pressures, and on good theoretical grounds it is extremely unlikely. On the contrary, there is a very large and robust literature documenting significant racial and ethnic differences in average IQ [1]. But the Nature editorialists did not even attempt to argue the falsity of this large evidential database – instead, they simply denied its existence.
‘Sensitivity’ versus truth-telling
What the Nature editorialists advocate is described in the subtitle: ‘Debate about scientific issues needs to be forthright but not crass’. It is Watson’s ‘crassness’ that Nature seems to hate more than anything else.
This is later amplified in remarks about the investigation of racial differences which is described as a ‘sensitive task’; “‘race” is an emotive and unscientific word’ – according to Nature; and so is the investigation of the ‘equally sensitive genetics of ‘desirable’ traits’.
It is clear that Nature sees the crucial issue of the Watson Affair as one of crassness versus sensitivity. It is the ‘sensitive’ people (such as the Nature editorialists – i.e., the people who have ‘deemed’ Watson’s views ‘beyond the pale’) who stand as a bulwark against a ‘crass’ individual whose ‘outbursts’ are ‘lending succour and comfort to racists around the globe’, and whose behaviour will ‘undermine our very ability to debate such issues’.
In other words, Nature states that genetic differences can only be studied and discussed within a framework of political correctness as defined by the cultural mandarins of the US and UK, or else such matters had better not be studied or discussed at all.
If scientists are now being asked to choose between being sensitive or crass – between picking sides with either the anonymous editors of Nature or the ‘crass’ genius of James D. Watson – then it should be no contest: serious scientists must take the side of Watson.
But if Nature’s editorial comments are an index of elite intellectual opinion in the Anglosphere – which sadly seems to be the case – then this is evidence of an anti-scientific ‘fifth column’ of coercive, dishonest and vindictive political correctness which has infiltrated into the very heart of high-level scientific discourse.
The real ‘Science Wars’ of our time
When asking who it really is that is most likely to ‘undermine the ability to debate race and sex differences’, it seems clear that the US and UK zealots of coercive political correctness are the ones causing the problems, not people like Watson who are trying to move the science of human genetics forward as fast as possible.
When a premier league researcher such as Watson is hounded by elite commentators in such a vicious, arbitrary and untruthful fashion, then any and all scientists are potentially vulnerable to similar treatment at the whim of the mass media if – for whatever reason – they happen to step over a line defining the boundary of sufficiently ‘sensitive’ discourse. And any single such step over the sensitivity-line into ‘crassness’ is enough to undo a lifetime of stratospheric attainment.
This, then, is the real ‘science war’ of our era: a war of the ‘sensitive’ versus the ‘crass’ – in other words, the escalating conflict by which coercive political correctness in the UK and USA increasingly-successfully intimidates and controls scientific communication.
Biology is poised on the brink of extraordinary insights into the genetic determinants of human differences [10]; including sexual, class and racial differences. In order to make progress on all fronts (whether scientific, medical or social), we need to know the facts about humanity and genetics. But political correctness is making this truth harder to discover and discuss: almost impossibly hard in the US and the UK where scientists are at constant risk of being ‘denounced’ and demonized at the caprice of the mass media in collaboration with the cultural elite. This needs to change.
If UK and US mandarins are too squeamish even to mention or discuss research into the most exciting areas of human genetics in a clear and honest fashion, perhaps they should stand aside and allow other nations – for example from East Asia – to get-on with this vital work without harassment. If the anonymous Nature editorialists are too ‘sensitive’ to hear the truth about genetics from ‘crass’ individuals such as James D. Watson, then they should perhaps make way for those who are more emotionally-robust.
The scientific necessity for a major journal such as Nature is not merely to allow discussion of human genetic differences under sufferance and hedged-about with complex linguistic constraints; but actually to encourage straightforward and forceful scientific communication on human genetic differences without the slightest regard to notions of political correctness. Nature should be fighting political correctness on behalf of science, not joining a vigilante gang of self-appointed moral guardians who are crushing forthright scientific discourse under the banner of ‘sensitivity’.
From hero to martyr
James Watson has – for more than 60 years – been an exemplar of the essential morality of science; advocating by his words and displaying in his deeds the necessary freedom that scientific communication must be allowed to be clear, direct – even crass – in the pursuit of truth.
I believe that science is the most powerful cognitive system yet discovered by humanity [6] and [7], so that eventually truth will prevail and James Watson will be not just exonerated but vindicated. My hope is that soon there will be general recognition among scientists that James Watson was not just a hero of science for the achievements of his career, but also a martyr for science at the end of his career.
References
[1] J. Malloy, James Watson tells the inconvenient truth: faces the consequences, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1081–1091.
[2] Milmo C. Fury at DNA pioneer’s theory: africans are less intelligent than Westerners. The Independent,; Published 17 October 2007 [accessed 10.03.08].
[3] Watson JD. In: Gunther S. Stent, editor (critical edition). The double helix; a personal account of the discovery of the structure of DNA. London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 1981.
[4] H.F. Judson, The eighth day of creation: makers of the revolution in biology, Jonathan Cape, London (1979).
[5] V. McElheny, Watson and DNA: making a scientific revolution, John Wiley and Sons, London, UK (2003).
[6] D.L. Hull, Science as a process, Chicago University Press, Chicago (1988).
[7] J. Bronowski, The ascent of man, BBC, London (1973).
[8] Editorial. Watson’s folly. Nature 2007;449:948.
[9] J. Watson. To question genetic intelligence is not racism. The Independent,; Published 19 October 2007 [accessed 10.03.08].
[10] E. Pennisi, Breakthrough of the year: human genetic variation, Science 318 (2007), pp. 1842–1843.
First a hero of science and now a martyr to science: The James Watson Affair – Political correctness crushes free scientific communication
Medical Hypotheses. Volume 70, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1077-1080
Bruce G. Charlton, Editor-in-Chief – Medical Hypotheses
Available online 16 April 2008.
Summary
In 2007 James D. Watson, perhaps the most famous living scientist, was forced to retire from his position and retreat from public life in the face of international mass media condemnation following remarks concerning genetically-caused racial differences in intelligence. Watson was punished for stating forthright views on topics that elite opinion has determined should be discussed only with elaborate caution, frequent disclaimers, and solemn deference to the currently-prevailing pieties. James Watson has always struck many people as brash; however this blunt, truth-telling quality was intrinsic to his role in one of the greatest scientific discoveries. Much more importantly than ‘good manners’, Watson has consistently exemplified the cardinal scientific virtue: he speaks what he understands to be the truth without regard for the opinion of others. The most chilling aspect of the Watson Affair was the way in which so many influential members of the scientific research community joined the media condemnation directed against Watson. Perhaps the most egregious betrayal of science was an article by editorialists of the premier UK scientific journal Nature. Instead of defending the freedom of discourse in pursuit of scientific truth, Nature instead blamed Watson for being ‘crass’ and lacking ‘sensitivity’ in discussing human genetic differences. But if asked to choose between the ‘sensitive’ editors of Nature or the ‘crass’ genius of James D. Watson, all serious scientists must take the side of Watson. Because when a premier researcher such as Watson is hounded from office by a vicious, arbitrary and untruthful mob; all lesser scientists are made vulnerable to analogous treatment at the whim of the media. A zealous and coercive brand of ‘political correctness’ is now making the biological truth of human genetic differences intolerably difficult to discover and discuss in US and UK. This needs to change. My hope is that truth will prevail over political correctness and James Watson will not just be exonerated but vindicated as an exemplar of the true morality of science: that scientific communication needs to be allowed to be clear, direct – even crass – in the pursuit of truth. James Watson has been a hero of science for the achievements of his career, and also a martyr for science at the end of his career.
***
In 2007 James D. Watson, perhaps the most famous living scientist, was forced to retire from his position as Chair of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory and to retreat from public life in the face of international mass media condemnation following some remarks he made concerning genetically-caused racial differences in intelligence [1].
The substance of Watson’s remark was the speculation that the low average IQ of sub-Saharan Africans may be a contributory cause for slow economic development [1] and [2].
The Watson Affair is, so far, the most shocking example of coercive ‘political correctness’ imposed by the US and UK ‘mandarin’ intellectual class (i.e. the cultural elite who run public administration, education and the media). In other words, Watson was pilloried and punished for stating forthright views on topics (which include sexual, class and racial differences) that elite opinion has determined should be discussed only with elaborate caution, frequent disclaimers, and solemn deference to the currently-prevailing pieties.
Watson’s ‘brash’ personal style has also been his scientific strength
But ‘nuance’ has never been Watson’s style. Watson has always struck many people as disturbingly bold, direct, and brash [3], [4] and [5]. Not to put too fine a point on it, Watson has apparently often been rude and harsh in his personal relationships, and terse to the point of being elliptical or ambiguous in his pronouncements – seeming especially so to the vast majority of people whose intellectual powers are nowhere near a match for Watson’s, or who do not pick-up on his unusual sense of humor.
However, in the conduct of science, there are many things which are much more important than good manners, and many of the greatest scientists have been difficult characters [6]. But James Watson displays – in extreme and stark form – the cardinal scientific virtue: he speaks what he understands to be the truth, and does so without regard for the opinion of others [3] and [7].
And of course this blunt, truth-telling quality was absolutely intrinsic to his role in one of the greatest scientific discoveries – establishing the structure of DNA in 1953 [3] and [4]. And Watson’s directness/brashness was essential to other great career achievements including his role in establishing the science of molecular biology from a base in Harvard, in fund-raising and building-up the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, and in launching the human genome project [5].
Indeed the world has abundant cause to be grateful for James Watson’s brash personal style since this was inherent in his achievement, and few individuals have contributed more to human well-being.
Nature’s editorialists betray science
While it is perfectly understandable that non-scientific zealots of political correctness (as well as those who have been hurt or offended by Watson’s brashness in the past) would be delighted at the opportunity to destroy James Watson’s career and reputation – the most chilling aspect of the Watson Affair was the way in which so many powerful and influential members of the scientific research community joined the howling mob of media condemnation directed against Watson [1].
Perhaps the most egregious example was the article by editorialists of the premier UK scientific journal Nature – that same journal where Crick and Watson published the original paper describing structure of DNA [8].
Instead of publishing a clear and uncompromising defence of the freedom of untrammelled discourse in pursuit of the scientific truth; in an editorial entitled ‘Watson’s folly’ Nature instead chose to support political correctness as being more important than science.
In the context of just 500 words, the anonymous Nature authors spent most of the space attacking Watson’s interpersonal style, with a veritable diatribe of outrage. The editorial included such comments as: ‘his notorious propensity for making outrageous statements’, ‘a track record of making distasteful remarks’, ‘on many previous occasions voiced unpalatable views tinged with racism and sexism’, ‘his views have finally been deemed beyond the pale’, ‘demonstrates a sheer unacceptable offensiveness’, ‘unpleasant […] utterances’, and ‘crass comments’.
In a brief respite from attacking Watson’s personality, the Nature editorialists make two factually incorrect statements. Firstly they wrongly state that ‘Watson has apologized and retracted’ his ‘outburst’. Secondly they state that Watson ‘acknowledged that there is no evidence for what he claimed about racial differences in intelligence’. This is doubly false in that Watson never made such retractions or acknowledgments [9], and for the very good reason that any such retraction or acknowledgement would be untrue.
Indeed, the opposite is more nearly true, as Jason Malloy describes in the current issue of Medical Hypotheses [1]. There is no evidence that all human races have identical intelligence despite many generations of genetic separation and with widely different selection pressures, and on good theoretical grounds it is extremely unlikely. On the contrary, there is a very large and robust literature documenting significant racial and ethnic differences in average IQ [1]. But the Nature editorialists did not even attempt to argue the falsity of this large evidential database – instead, they simply denied its existence.
‘Sensitivity’ versus truth-telling
What the Nature editorialists advocate is described in the subtitle: ‘Debate about scientific issues needs to be forthright but not crass’. It is Watson’s ‘crassness’ that Nature seems to hate more than anything else.
This is later amplified in remarks about the investigation of racial differences which is described as a ‘sensitive task’; “‘race” is an emotive and unscientific word’ – according to Nature; and so is the investigation of the ‘equally sensitive genetics of ‘desirable’ traits’.
It is clear that Nature sees the crucial issue of the Watson Affair as one of crassness versus sensitivity. It is the ‘sensitive’ people (such as the Nature editorialists – i.e., the people who have ‘deemed’ Watson’s views ‘beyond the pale’) who stand as a bulwark against a ‘crass’ individual whose ‘outbursts’ are ‘lending succour and comfort to racists around the globe’, and whose behaviour will ‘undermine our very ability to debate such issues’.
In other words, Nature states that genetic differences can only be studied and discussed within a framework of political correctness as defined by the cultural mandarins of the US and UK, or else such matters had better not be studied or discussed at all.
If scientists are now being asked to choose between being sensitive or crass – between picking sides with either the anonymous editors of Nature or the ‘crass’ genius of James D. Watson – then it should be no contest: serious scientists must take the side of Watson.
But if Nature’s editorial comments are an index of elite intellectual opinion in the Anglosphere – which sadly seems to be the case – then this is evidence of an anti-scientific ‘fifth column’ of coercive, dishonest and vindictive political correctness which has infiltrated into the very heart of high-level scientific discourse.
The real ‘Science Wars’ of our time
When asking who it really is that is most likely to ‘undermine the ability to debate race and sex differences’, it seems clear that the US and UK zealots of coercive political correctness are the ones causing the problems, not people like Watson who are trying to move the science of human genetics forward as fast as possible.
When a premier league researcher such as Watson is hounded by elite commentators in such a vicious, arbitrary and untruthful fashion, then any and all scientists are potentially vulnerable to similar treatment at the whim of the mass media if – for whatever reason – they happen to step over a line defining the boundary of sufficiently ‘sensitive’ discourse. And any single such step over the sensitivity-line into ‘crassness’ is enough to undo a lifetime of stratospheric attainment.
This, then, is the real ‘science war’ of our era: a war of the ‘sensitive’ versus the ‘crass’ – in other words, the escalating conflict by which coercive political correctness in the UK and USA increasingly-successfully intimidates and controls scientific communication.
Biology is poised on the brink of extraordinary insights into the genetic determinants of human differences [10]; including sexual, class and racial differences. In order to make progress on all fronts (whether scientific, medical or social), we need to know the facts about humanity and genetics. But political correctness is making this truth harder to discover and discuss: almost impossibly hard in the US and the UK where scientists are at constant risk of being ‘denounced’ and demonized at the caprice of the mass media in collaboration with the cultural elite. This needs to change.
If UK and US mandarins are too squeamish even to mention or discuss research into the most exciting areas of human genetics in a clear and honest fashion, perhaps they should stand aside and allow other nations – for example from East Asia – to get-on with this vital work without harassment. If the anonymous Nature editorialists are too ‘sensitive’ to hear the truth about genetics from ‘crass’ individuals such as James D. Watson, then they should perhaps make way for those who are more emotionally-robust.
The scientific necessity for a major journal such as Nature is not merely to allow discussion of human genetic differences under sufferance and hedged-about with complex linguistic constraints; but actually to encourage straightforward and forceful scientific communication on human genetic differences without the slightest regard to notions of political correctness. Nature should be fighting political correctness on behalf of science, not joining a vigilante gang of self-appointed moral guardians who are crushing forthright scientific discourse under the banner of ‘sensitivity’.
From hero to martyr
James Watson has – for more than 60 years – been an exemplar of the essential morality of science; advocating by his words and displaying in his deeds the necessary freedom that scientific communication must be allowed to be clear, direct – even crass – in the pursuit of truth.
I believe that science is the most powerful cognitive system yet discovered by humanity [6] and [7], so that eventually truth will prevail and James Watson will be not just exonerated but vindicated. My hope is that soon there will be general recognition among scientists that James Watson was not just a hero of science for the achievements of his career, but also a martyr for science at the end of his career.
References
[1] J. Malloy, James Watson tells the inconvenient truth: faces the consequences, Med Hypotheses 70 (2008), pp. 1081–1091.
[2] Milmo C. Fury at DNA pioneer’s theory: africans are less intelligent than Westerners. The Independent,
[3] Watson JD. In: Gunther S. Stent, editor (critical edition). The double helix; a personal account of the discovery of the structure of DNA. London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; 1981.
[4] H.F. Judson, The eighth day of creation: makers of the revolution in biology, Jonathan Cape, London (1979).
[5] V. McElheny, Watson and DNA: making a scientific revolution, John Wiley and Sons, London, UK (2003).
[6] D.L. Hull, Science as a process, Chicago University Press, Chicago (1988).
[7] J. Bronowski, The ascent of man, BBC, London (1973).
[8] Editorial. Watson’s folly. Nature 2007;449:948.
[9] J. Watson. To question genetic intelligence is not racism. The Independent,
[10] E. Pennisi, Breakthrough of the year: human genetic variation, Science 318 (2007), pp. 1842–1843.
Sunday, 23 March 2008
Death can be cured!
A book of ideas collected from Medical Hypotheses: Death can be cured by Roger Dobson
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 70: 905-9.
Summary
A new collection of ideas from Medical Hypotheses by Roger Dobson is entitled Death can be cured and 99 other Medical Hypotheses. It consists of humorous summaries of Medical Hypotheses articles from the past 30 years. The book’s humour derives mainly from the subject matter, although sometimes also from the ‘unconventional’ approach of the authors with respect to matters such as evidence, argument or inference. Medical Hypotheses has generated such a lot of apparently- or actually-bizarre ideas because it aims to be open to potentially revolutionary science. The journal’s official stance is that more harm is done by a failure to publish one idea that might have been true, than by publishing a dozen ideas that turn out to be false. Bizarre ideas tend to catch attention, and may stimulate a valuable response – even when a paper is mostly-wrong. A paper may be flawed but still contain the germ of an idea that can be elaborated and developed. The journal review process is susceptible to both false positives and false negatives. False positives occur when we publish an idea that is wrong; false negatives occur when we fail to publish an important idea that is right, and a potential scientific breakthrough never happens. False positives are more obvious, since the paper will be ignored, refuted, or fail to be replicated – and often attracts criticism and controversy. Editors may therefore take the more cautious path of avoiding false positives more assiduously than false negatives; however, this policy progressively favours less-ambitious science. Consequently, in Medical Hypotheses the ‘set point’ of risk is nearer to the false positive end of the spectrum than for most journals – and the publication of many apparently-bizarre papers is a natural consequence of this policy.
***
A new book of ideas from Medical Hypotheses
Roger Dobson’s collection of ideas from Medical Hypotheses is entitled Death can be cured and 99 other Medical Hypotheses [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [89], [90], [91], [92], [93], [94], [95], [96], [97], [98], [99] and [100].
This delightful volume consists of gently-humorous summaries of Medical Hypotheses articles published since the journal’s foundation by the late David Horrobin in 1975.
The book’s humour derives mainly from the subject matter, although sometimes also from the ‘unconventional’ approach of the authors with respect to matters such as evidence, argument or inference. The apparently-bizarre nature of the science is of many types. In most instances the subject matter and conclusions are quite mainstream and serious from a scientific perspective, but from the perspective of an outsider they may seem strange. In other instances the ideas really are bizarre, from almost any perspective. And there are theories from all points in-between.
Bizarre ideas tend to catch attention, and may stimulate a valuable response – even when a paper is mostly-wrong. When reading what I think is a mostly-wrong idea submitted to Medical Hypotheses, I sometimes find myself provoked into formulating exactly where and why the idea is wrong – which can be a valuable experience. A paper may be flawed but still contain the germ of an idea that can be elaborated and developed – the reader feels they can do a better job than the author, and might embark on a new line of investigation.
Bizarre or flawed papers that provoke the reader may therefore stimulate correspondence to the author or journal in response, may turn-up later as a citation, or may have an important but invisible effect on another scientist’s attitudes, teaching or direction of research. This is all a contribution to the dynamic process of science – and science should always be regarded as a dynamic process, not a fixed body of facts and laws.
False positives and negatives in reviewing
The reason that Medical Hypotheses has generated such a lot of apparently- or actually-bizarre ideas is that it aims to be open to potentially revolutionary science. The journal’s official stance is that more harm is done by a failure to publish one idea that might have been true, than by publishing a dozen ideas that turn out to be false.
It may easily be forgotten that the review processes of science are susceptible both false positives and false negatives. False positives occur when we publish an idea that is wrong; false negatives occur when the journal fails to publish an idea that is right. False positives are more obvious, since the paper will be ignored, refuted, or fail to be replicated. This attracts criticism because it may waste the time and resources of other scientists.
But false negatives – when we fail to publish an idea which would (in an imaginary alternative universe) have led to some kind of breakthrough – are a more devastating mistake. But the false negative problem is seldom acknowledged, because the consequences may be invisible. Failure to publish might lead to an idea being lost altogether, or being published somewhere less appropriate (increasing the possibility that it would be unnoticed or ignored).
The fact that false positives attract more rapid and certain criticism and controversy than false negatives exerts a constant drip–drip of pressure on editors to take the more cautious and less controversy-generating path of avoiding false positives more assiduously than false negatives. This is prudent, but constitutes a sinister trade-off in the long term because it progressively favours less ambitious and more conservative science.
Consequently, in Medical Hypotheses the ‘set point’ of risk is nearer to the false positive end of the spectrum than it is for most journals. This is why the journal deploys editorial review (where journal contents are chose mainly by the editor) rather than the commoner but more cautious and negative peer review system.
On top of this, the Medical Hypotheses editorial policy constitutes an implicit contention concerning the style in which science should be conducted. Our idea is that it is sometimes (but not always) better to be interestingly wrong than boringly right; sometimes better to err on the side of tolerance rather than exclusion, sometimes better to stimulate than to reinforce closure.
It takes many personality types to make the world of science, and the same applies to journals. Science would not work efficiently if all journals were like Medical Hypotheses: there would be too much ‘noise’ in the system. But science does not work properly when journals will only publish papers that are regarded as completely correct by a panel of peers – because such papers cannot be bold and speculative, and because gems of insight may come from bizarre or flawed research.
Currently, the pendulum has probably swung too far in the direction of excess caution in mainstream medical science; such that the imperative to exclude noise has slipped-over into a too-rigid exclusion of diversity and dissent. The majority of journals publish only ultra-cautious papers that report dependable but cringingly-modest, incremental extrapolations of solidly-established knowledge.
One consequence is that although medical science has expanded hugely in funding and production over recent decades, there has probably been a declining frequency of major breakthroughs which seems to have slowed the rate of medical progress.
The future of bizarre ideas
These are some of the reasons why Medical Hypotheses publishes (apparently) bizarre papers, and how it was possible for Roger Dobson to collect 100 such ideas into an entertaining volume.
However, in the internet era of open-access to international publication, the role of Medical Hypotheses has inevitably become more specialised: it is now more like a place where bold scientific speculation meets the mainstream.
Since Medical Hypotheses has recently entered the realms of respectability with its 2006 impact factor of 1.29, monthly internet downloads running at about 32,000, and the rejection rate currently hovering around 80% or 90% – my challenge as editor will be to build on this success while maintaining the traditional open-ness and genial eccentricity of the journal which have characterized its first three decades.
This goal of avoiding false negatives more assiduously than false positives will almost-inevitably mean that Medical Hypotheses shall need to continue rejecting some probably-correct papers that are worthy-but-somewhat-dull, in favour of publishing some bizarre or flawed papers that just might (but – it must be admitted – probably will not) stimulate a break-though of some sort.
By holding to this principle, I hope to ensure that in another thirty years, a future science writer can produce an equally entertaining and edifying volume as Roger Dobson’s Death can be cured.
References
What follows are the 100 papers from Medical Hypotheses featured in Death can be cured and 99 other Medical Hypotheses, by Roger Dobson – Cyan Books, 32–38 Saffron Hill, London, EC1N 8FH, UK, 2007. ISBN 978-1-905736-31-7. Chapter titles are appended in italics.
[1] Mak MWM, Kwan TS, Cheng KH, Chan RTF, Ho SL. Myopia as a latent phenotype of a pleiotropic gene positively selected for facilitating neurocognitive development, and the effects of environmental factors in its expression. 2006;66:1209–15 [Short-sighted people are more intelligent].
[2] Arzy S, Idel M, Landis T, Blanke O. Why revelations have occurred on mountains. Linking mystical experiences and cognitive neuroscience. 2005;65:841–5 [Revelations always happen on mountains].
[3] Oinonen KA, Mazmanian D. Does body fat protect against negative moods in women? 2001;57:387–8 [Fat people really are more jolly].
[4] Melles RB, Katz B. Night terrors and sudden unexplained nocturnal death. 1988;26:149–54 [Nightmares can kill you].
[5] Stevenson I. The phenomenon of claimed memories of previous lives: possible interpretations and importance. 2000;54:652–9 [Birthmarks are proof of reincarnation].
[6] Fisch H, Andrews HF, Fisch KS, Golden R, Liberson G, Olsson CA. The relationship of long-term global temperature change and human fertility. 2003;61:21–8 [Global warming reduces fertility].
[7] Elsner RJF, Spangler JG. Neurotoxicity of inhaled manganese: public health danger in the shower? 2005;65:607–16 [Showers are bad for the brain].
[8] Samaras TT, Storms LH. Secular growth and its harmful ramifi cations. 2002;58:93–112 [Small people can save the world].
[9] Sri Kantha S. Total immediate ancestral longevity (TIAL) score as a longevity indicator: an analysis on Einstein and three of his scientist peers. 2001;56:519–22 [The date you will die can be calculated].
[10] Katz G, Durst R, Zislin Y, Barel Y, Knobler HY. Psychiatric aspects of jet lag: review and hypothesis. 2001;56:20–3 [Jet lag triggers mental illness].
[11] Harris JR. Parental selection: a third selection process in the evolution of human hairlessness and skin colour. 2006;66:1053–9 [Why humans are not furry].
[12] Verhaegen MJB. The aquatic ape theory and some common diseases. 1987;24:293–9 [The purpose of ear wax].
[13] Bobrow RS. Paranormal phenomena in the medical literature sufficient smoke to warrant a search for fire. 2003;60:864–8 [Hearing voices could save your life].
[14] Ichim I, Kieser J, Swain M. Tongue contractions during speech may have led to the development of the bony geometry of the chin following the evolution of human language? A mechanobiological hypothesis for the development of the human chin. 2007;69:20–24 [The reason for chins].
[15] Howe NE. The origin of humour. 2002;59:252–4 [Humour increases survival].
[16] Fessler DMT, Abrams ET. Infant mouthing behaviour: the immunocalibration hypothesis. 2004;63:925–32 [Babies suck to avoid asthma].
[17] Vardi P, Pinhas-Hamiel O. The young hunter hypothesis: age-related weight gain – a tribute to the thrifty theories. 2000;55:521–3 [Beer bellies protect men in old age].
[18] Kolettis TM, Kolettis MT. Winter swimming: healthy or hazardous? Evidence and hypotheses. 2003;61:654–6 [Why winter swimmers don’t shiver].
[19] Manning JT, Bundred PE. The ratio of 2nd to 4th digit length: a new predictor of disease predisposition? 2000;54:855–7 [Finger lengths predict disease].
[20] Mobley JL. Is rheumatoid arthritis a consequence of natural selection for enhanced tuberculosis resistance? 2004;62:839–43 [Arthritis is the price of having healthy ancestors].
[21] Rubio-Godoy M, Aunger R, Curtis V. Serotonin – a link between disgust and immunity? 2007;68:61–6 [Feeling disgusted is healthy].
[22] Miric D, Hallet-Mathieu A-M, Amar G. Aetiology of antisocial personality disorder: benefits for society from an evolutionary standpoint. 2005;65:665–70 [Psychopaths are a necessary evil].
[23] Cassano WF. Cystic fibrosis and the plague. 1985;18:51–2 [Cystic fibrosis is a legacy of the Black Death].
[24] Sontag SJ, Wanner JN. The cause of leg cramps and knee pains: a hypothesis and effective treatment. 1988;25:35–41 [Modern toilets ruin legs].
[25] Bakan R. Queen Elizabeth I: a case of testicular feminization? 1985;17:277–84 [Queen Elizabeth I was part man].
[26] Bark N. Did schizophrenia change the course of English history? The mental illness of Henry VI 2002;59:416–21 [Schizophrenia changed the course of English history].
[27] Clarkson JDB. A possible origin for the Turin shroud image. 1983;12:11–16 [Jesus, the Turin Shroud and spontaneous combustion].
[28] Størmer FC, Mysterud I. Cave smoke: air pollution poisoning involved in Neanderthal extinction? 2007;68:723–4 [Smoke made Neanderthals extinct].
[29] McSweegan E. Anthrax and the aetiology of the English Sweating Sickness. 2004;62:155–7 [English Sweating Disease was really anthrax].
[30] Walsh GP. The history of the herring and with its decline the significance to health. 1986;20:133–7 [Herrings saved us from heart disease].
[31] Hollander DH. Beef allergy and the Persian Gulf syndrome. Med Hypothesis 1995;45:221–2 [Gulf War Syndrome is an allergy to burgers].
[32] Platek SM, Gallup GG, Fryer BD. The fi reside hypothesis: Was there differential selection to tolerate air pollution during human evolution? 2002;58:1–5 [Prehistoric fires protected man from lung cancer].
[33] Sri Kantha S. Could nitroglycerine poisoning be the cause of Alfred Nobel’s anginal pains and premature death? 1997;49:303–6 [Alfred Nobel was killed by dynamite].
[34] Passie T, Hartmann U, Schneider U, Emrich HM. On the function of groaning and hyperventilation during sexual intercourse: intensification of sexual experience by altering brain metabolism through hippomania. 2003;60:660–3 [Why women groan during sex].
[35] Gofrit ON. The evolutionary role of erectile dysfunction. 2006;67:1245–9 [The importance of being impotent].
[36] Marx GF, Naushaba SH, Schulman H. Is pre-eclampsia a disease of the sexually active gravida? 1981;7:1397–9 [Sex causes high blood pressure in pregnancy].
[37] Sheth R, Panse GT. Can vasectomy reduce the incidence of prostatic tumour? 1982;8:237–41 [Vasectomy lowers the risk of prostate cancer].
[38] Shoja MM, Tubbs RS, Ansarin K. A cure for infatuation? The potential ‘therapeutic’ role of pineal gland products such as melatonin and vasotocin in attenuating romantic love. 2007;68:1172–3 [A cure for infatuation].
[39] Eagles JM. Seasonal affective disorder: a vestigial evolutionary advantage? 2004;63:767–72 [Winter depression stops sex].
[40] Ramachandran VS. Why do gentlemen prefer blondes? 1997;48:19–20 [Gentlemen prefer blondes].
[41] Burger J, Gochfeld M. A hypothesis on the role of pheromones on age of menarche. 1985;17:39–46 [House smells turn teenage girls into women].
[42] Ney PG. The intravaginal absorption of male generated hormones and their possible effect on female behaviour. 1986;20:221–31 [Baby blues are caused by lack of sex].
[43] Xiong X, Buekens P, Vastardis S, Wu T. Periodontal disease as one possible explanation for the Mexican paradox. 2006;67:1348–54 [Gum disease causes small babies].
[44] Gjorgov N. Barrier contraceptive practice and male infertility as related factors to breast cancer in married women. 1978;4:79–88 [Condoms increase the risk of breast cancer].
[45] Schreiber G, Avissar S, Tzahor Z, Barak-glantz I, Grisaru N. Photoperiodicity and annual rhythms of wars and violent crimes. 1997;48:89–96 [Sunny days make men violent].
[46] Richardson-Andrews RC. Sunspots and the recency theory of schizophrenia. 1995;44:16–19 [The sun causes schizophrenia].
[47] Davis GE, Lowell WE. Solar cycles and their relationship to human disease and adaptability. 2006;67:447–61 [The sun fixes lifespan].
[48] Yeung JWK. A hypothesis: sunspot cycles may detect pandemic influenza A in 1700–2000 ad. 2006;67:1016–22 [Flu epidemics are affected by the sun].
[49] Mikulecky M, Rovensky J. Gout attacks and lunar cycle. 2000;55:24–5 [Gout attacks are caused by the moon].
[50] Sok M, Mikulecky M, Erzen J. Onset of spontaneous pneumothorax and the synodic lunar cycle. 2001;57:638–41 [Chest pains are caused by the moon].
[51] Sher L. Effects of the weather conditions on mood and behaviour: the role of acupuncture points. 1996;46:19–20 [How weather affects mood].
[52] Erren TC, Piekarski C. Does winter darkness in the Arctic protect against cancer? The melatonin hypothesis revisited. 1999;53:1–5 [Why Greenlanders have less cancer].
[53] Pauley SM. Lighting for the human circadian clock: recent research indicates that lighting has become a public health issue. 2004;63:588–96 [Lights at night cause cancer].
[54] Laumbacher B, Fellerhoff B, Herzberger B, Wank R. Do dogs harbour risk factors for human breast cancer? 2006;67:21–6 [Dogs give women breast cancer].
[55] Milham S, Ossiander E. Electric typewriter exposure and increased female breast cancer mortality in typists. 2007;68:450–1 [Electric typewriters cause breast cancer].
[56] Komarova SV. A moat around castle walls: the role of axillary and facial hair in lymph node protection from mutagenic factors. 2006;67:698–701 [Hairy people have less cancer].
[57] Kumar A, Mallya K, Kumar J. Are lung cancers triggered by stopping smoking? 2007;68:1176–7 [Quitting smoking too fast triggers lung cancer].
[58] Steindal Hykkerud, Porojnicu AC, Moan J. Is the seasonal variation in cancer prognosis caused by sun-induced folate degradation? 2007;69:182–5 [Cancer is best diagnosed in the summer].
[59] Donovan M, Tiwary CM, Axelrod D, Sasco AJ, Jones L, Hajek R, et al. Personal care products that contain estrogens or xenoestrogens may increase breast cancer risk. 2007;68:756–66 [Hairsprays cause cancer].
[60] Manning JT, Caswell N. Constitutive skin pigmentation: a marker of breast cancer risk? 2004;63:787–9 [Skin colour and breast cancer].
[61] Hoseini SS, Gharibzadeh S. Squeezing the glans penis: a possible manoeuvre for improving the defecation process and preventing constipation. 2007;68:925–6 [A cure for constipation].
[62] Weber C. Eliminate infection (abscess) in teeth with cashew nuts. 2005;65:1200 [Nuts cure toothache].
[63] Robinson A. Electrolysis between the feet and the ground and its probable health effects. 1979;5:1071–7 [Leather shoes cure diseases].
[64] Kumar A. Gag reflex for arrest of hiccups. 2005;65:1206 [A cure for hiccups].
[65] Eby GA. Strong humming for one hour daily to terminate chronic rhinosinusitis in four days: a case report and hypothesis for action by stimulation of endogenous nasal nitric oxide production. 2006;66:851–4 [Humming 120 times a day cures blocked noses].
[66] Kolettis J, Kumar A. Sustained repulsive magnetic force for bone lengthening. 2005;65:630 [Magnets can make you taller].
Bruce G. Charlton
Medical Hypotheses. 2008; 70: 905-9.
Summary
A new collection of ideas from Medical Hypotheses by Roger Dobson is entitled Death can be cured and 99 other Medical Hypotheses. It consists of humorous summaries of Medical Hypotheses articles from the past 30 years. The book’s humour derives mainly from the subject matter, although sometimes also from the ‘unconventional’ approach of the authors with respect to matters such as evidence, argument or inference. Medical Hypotheses has generated such a lot of apparently- or actually-bizarre ideas because it aims to be open to potentially revolutionary science. The journal’s official stance is that more harm is done by a failure to publish one idea that might have been true, than by publishing a dozen ideas that turn out to be false. Bizarre ideas tend to catch attention, and may stimulate a valuable response – even when a paper is mostly-wrong. A paper may be flawed but still contain the germ of an idea that can be elaborated and developed. The journal review process is susceptible to both false positives and false negatives. False positives occur when we publish an idea that is wrong; false negatives occur when we fail to publish an important idea that is right, and a potential scientific breakthrough never happens. False positives are more obvious, since the paper will be ignored, refuted, or fail to be replicated – and often attracts criticism and controversy. Editors may therefore take the more cautious path of avoiding false positives more assiduously than false negatives; however, this policy progressively favours less-ambitious science. Consequently, in Medical Hypotheses the ‘set point’ of risk is nearer to the false positive end of the spectrum than for most journals – and the publication of many apparently-bizarre papers is a natural consequence of this policy.
***
A new book of ideas from Medical Hypotheses
Roger Dobson’s collection of ideas from Medical Hypotheses is entitled Death can be cured and 99 other Medical Hypotheses [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [89], [90], [91], [92], [93], [94], [95], [96], [97], [98], [99] and [100].
This delightful volume consists of gently-humorous summaries of Medical Hypotheses articles published since the journal’s foundation by the late David Horrobin in 1975.
The book’s humour derives mainly from the subject matter, although sometimes also from the ‘unconventional’ approach of the authors with respect to matters such as evidence, argument or inference. The apparently-bizarre nature of the science is of many types. In most instances the subject matter and conclusions are quite mainstream and serious from a scientific perspective, but from the perspective of an outsider they may seem strange. In other instances the ideas really are bizarre, from almost any perspective. And there are theories from all points in-between.
Bizarre ideas tend to catch attention, and may stimulate a valuable response – even when a paper is mostly-wrong. When reading what I think is a mostly-wrong idea submitted to Medical Hypotheses, I sometimes find myself provoked into formulating exactly where and why the idea is wrong – which can be a valuable experience. A paper may be flawed but still contain the germ of an idea that can be elaborated and developed – the reader feels they can do a better job than the author, and might embark on a new line of investigation.
Bizarre or flawed papers that provoke the reader may therefore stimulate correspondence to the author or journal in response, may turn-up later as a citation, or may have an important but invisible effect on another scientist’s attitudes, teaching or direction of research. This is all a contribution to the dynamic process of science – and science should always be regarded as a dynamic process, not a fixed body of facts and laws.
False positives and negatives in reviewing
The reason that Medical Hypotheses has generated such a lot of apparently- or actually-bizarre ideas is that it aims to be open to potentially revolutionary science. The journal’s official stance is that more harm is done by a failure to publish one idea that might have been true, than by publishing a dozen ideas that turn out to be false.
It may easily be forgotten that the review processes of science are susceptible both false positives and false negatives. False positives occur when we publish an idea that is wrong; false negatives occur when the journal fails to publish an idea that is right. False positives are more obvious, since the paper will be ignored, refuted, or fail to be replicated. This attracts criticism because it may waste the time and resources of other scientists.
But false negatives – when we fail to publish an idea which would (in an imaginary alternative universe) have led to some kind of breakthrough – are a more devastating mistake. But the false negative problem is seldom acknowledged, because the consequences may be invisible. Failure to publish might lead to an idea being lost altogether, or being published somewhere less appropriate (increasing the possibility that it would be unnoticed or ignored).
The fact that false positives attract more rapid and certain criticism and controversy than false negatives exerts a constant drip–drip of pressure on editors to take the more cautious and less controversy-generating path of avoiding false positives more assiduously than false negatives. This is prudent, but constitutes a sinister trade-off in the long term because it progressively favours less ambitious and more conservative science.
Consequently, in Medical Hypotheses the ‘set point’ of risk is nearer to the false positive end of the spectrum than it is for most journals. This is why the journal deploys editorial review (where journal contents are chose mainly by the editor) rather than the commoner but more cautious and negative peer review system.
On top of this, the Medical Hypotheses editorial policy constitutes an implicit contention concerning the style in which science should be conducted. Our idea is that it is sometimes (but not always) better to be interestingly wrong than boringly right; sometimes better to err on the side of tolerance rather than exclusion, sometimes better to stimulate than to reinforce closure.
It takes many personality types to make the world of science, and the same applies to journals. Science would not work efficiently if all journals were like Medical Hypotheses: there would be too much ‘noise’ in the system. But science does not work properly when journals will only publish papers that are regarded as completely correct by a panel of peers – because such papers cannot be bold and speculative, and because gems of insight may come from bizarre or flawed research.
Currently, the pendulum has probably swung too far in the direction of excess caution in mainstream medical science; such that the imperative to exclude noise has slipped-over into a too-rigid exclusion of diversity and dissent. The majority of journals publish only ultra-cautious papers that report dependable but cringingly-modest, incremental extrapolations of solidly-established knowledge.
One consequence is that although medical science has expanded hugely in funding and production over recent decades, there has probably been a declining frequency of major breakthroughs which seems to have slowed the rate of medical progress.
The future of bizarre ideas
These are some of the reasons why Medical Hypotheses publishes (apparently) bizarre papers, and how it was possible for Roger Dobson to collect 100 such ideas into an entertaining volume.
However, in the internet era of open-access to international publication, the role of Medical Hypotheses has inevitably become more specialised: it is now more like a place where bold scientific speculation meets the mainstream.
Since Medical Hypotheses has recently entered the realms of respectability with its 2006 impact factor of 1.29, monthly internet downloads running at about 32,000, and the rejection rate currently hovering around 80% or 90% – my challenge as editor will be to build on this success while maintaining the traditional open-ness and genial eccentricity of the journal which have characterized its first three decades.
This goal of avoiding false negatives more assiduously than false positives will almost-inevitably mean that Medical Hypotheses shall need to continue rejecting some probably-correct papers that are worthy-but-somewhat-dull, in favour of publishing some bizarre or flawed papers that just might (but – it must be admitted – probably will not) stimulate a break-though of some sort.
By holding to this principle, I hope to ensure that in another thirty years, a future science writer can produce an equally entertaining and edifying volume as Roger Dobson’s Death can be cured.
References
What follows are the 100 papers from Medical Hypotheses featured in Death can be cured and 99 other Medical Hypotheses, by Roger Dobson – Cyan Books, 32–38 Saffron Hill, London, EC1N 8FH, UK, 2007. ISBN 978-1-905736-31-7. Chapter titles are appended in italics.
[1] Mak MWM, Kwan TS, Cheng KH, Chan RTF, Ho SL. Myopia as a latent phenotype of a pleiotropic gene positively selected for facilitating neurocognitive development, and the effects of environmental factors in its expression. 2006;66:1209–15 [Short-sighted people are more intelligent].
[2] Arzy S, Idel M, Landis T, Blanke O. Why revelations have occurred on mountains. Linking mystical experiences and cognitive neuroscience. 2005;65:841–5 [Revelations always happen on mountains].
[3] Oinonen KA, Mazmanian D. Does body fat protect against negative moods in women? 2001;57:387–8 [Fat people really are more jolly].
[4] Melles RB, Katz B. Night terrors and sudden unexplained nocturnal death. 1988;26:149–54 [Nightmares can kill you].
[5] Stevenson I. The phenomenon of claimed memories of previous lives: possible interpretations and importance. 2000;54:652–9 [Birthmarks are proof of reincarnation].
[6] Fisch H, Andrews HF, Fisch KS, Golden R, Liberson G, Olsson CA. The relationship of long-term global temperature change and human fertility. 2003;61:21–8 [Global warming reduces fertility].
[7] Elsner RJF, Spangler JG. Neurotoxicity of inhaled manganese: public health danger in the shower? 2005;65:607–16 [Showers are bad for the brain].
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